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Abstract
This thesis is an analysis of Karl Barth’s theological method as it appears in his 
treatment of tliree divine perfections—unity, constancy, and eternity—in Church Dogmatics, 
II/l, chapter VI. In order to discern the method by which Barth reaches his doctrinal 
conclusions, the thesis examines the respective roles of Scripture, tradition and reason—the 
‘threefold cord’—in this portion of his Church Dogmatics. The conclusion reached in the 
thesis is that, within Barth’s treatment of God’s unity, constancy and eternity. Scripture 
functions as the authoritative source and basis for theological critique and construction, and 
tradition and reason are functionally subordinate to Scripture. That said, Barth employs a 
predominantly indirect way of relating Scripture and theological proposals, a way in which 
tradition and reason play important ‘mediatory’ roles.
The thesis defends these claims in the following manner. Chapter 1 surveys recent 
scholarship relevant to the thesis and shows how this thesis will make a distinctive 
contribution to scholarly discussion of Barth’s theology. Chapter 2 sets up the exposition of 
Barth’s theological method that is provided in the remaining chapters by providing a 
‘conceptual framework’—an orderly arrangement of definitions and conceptual categories. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the main features of Barth’s Doctrine of God as whole, as 
it appears in Church Dogmatics, with a special emphasis on the roles of Scripture, tradition 
and reason within those doctrines. Chapters 4-6 are an expository analysis of Barth’s 
treatments of divine unity, constancy and eternity respectively, and form the primary basis for 
the claims of the thesis. Chapter 7, the conclusion, summarises the argument and makes 
some final observations.
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Chapter 1: Recent Scholarship and the Argument of the Thesis
Our main tasks in this chapter are to survey the scholarship on Karl Barth relevant to 
this thesis, to identify the contributions and deficiencies of that scholarship, and to state the 
central contentions of the thesis against the backdrop of this survey of scholarship. As such, 
this chapter will give the reader an idea of the main argument of the thesis and of its 
significance in relation to recent studies of Barth’s Theology. The secondary literature that 
will be surveyed is broad and extensive, because this thesis involves the intersection of 
several specialised areas of research.
Our way of organising this chapter is attuned to the specific demands of our argument 
in this thesis—an argument that leads us to consider Barth’s theological method by means of 
a study of Barth’s use of Scripture, tradition and reason within his doctrine of divine 
perfections. Thus, we will sub-divide our treatment of the relevant Barth scholarship into 
five sub-categories: (1) scholarship that deals with Barth’s theological method on a general 
level, (2) scholarship on the role of Scripture in Barth’s theology, (3) scholarship on the role 
of tradition, (4) scholarship on the role of reason, (5) and scholarship on Barth’s doctrine of 
divine perfections. In the concluding section (6), we will state the thesis we aim to defend 
and our method of defending it.
1. Barth’s Theological Method
LL Introduction to the Study of Barth *s Theological Method
In referring to Barth’s theological method, we refer to the way inAvhich he handles 
theological questions, the approach or procedure by which he does theology. This can be 
distinguished, though not separated, from Barth’s particular material conclusions on various 
theological loci. Put differently, Barth’s method is the set of practices and procedures that he 
uses to reach those conclusions. Within the vast amount of scholarship that has been done on 
Barth’s theology, relatively few studies have focused exclusively or even primarily on 
Barth’s theological method in his Church Dogmatics}
’ Some books that concentrate on of Barth’s method are Clark 1963, Sykes 1979, Ramm 1983. Clark’s book 
clarifies aspects of how reason functions for Barth (see below) but is coloured by some significant
1
There are at least two possible reasons for this lacuna. First, even in his Prolegomena 
{CD I/l and 1/2), Barth did not spell out a comprehensive methodology in the sense in which 
this is usually understood or expected in modern theology (this will be evident as we unfold 
what Barth’s method actually does involve). Second, Barth’s theological practice 
demonstrates an unusually thorough integration of theological method and theological 
content, an integration that makes it difficult to speak of Barth’s ‘theological method’ on its 
own, abstracted from material theological content.
These two reasons also indicate why certain ways of approaching this question of 
Barth’s method are less adequate than other ways. If Barth’s method is his distinctive way of 
doing theology, then studies that focus primarily on Barth’s incomplete and ad hoc 
theoretical comments about method (in I/l and 1/2) are bound to miss aspects of what 
emerges in Barth’s actual theological practice. Furthermore, studies that for any other reason 
neglect the concrete material contours of Barth’s theological practice (i.e. what and how he 
argues about various theological topics) are likely to have an incomplete or distorted 
understanding of the complex method that Barth actually (and perhaps sometimes 
unconsciously) employs.
Our own way of discerning the nature of Barth’s method—the method by which we 
understand Barth’s theological method—is an expository analysis of Barth’s method as it 
appears in his treatment of specific doctrinal issues (see 1.3 below). This, we believe, is a 
promising way of coming to grips with Barth’s distinctive theological method in his Church 
Dogmatics that avoids the problems noted above.^
misunderstandings of Barth’s work. Sykes volume is a collection of essays, some of which are very helpful 
(e.g. see our comments on Ford’s 1979 essay below); however, as a collection, it fails to offer an adequately 
comprehensive and integrated interpretation of Bartib’s method. Ramm’s book is also helpful but again fails to 
be adequately comprehensive (it focuses on Barth’s way o f responding to the Enlightenment). See also the 
article by Crawford (1962), which is relatively comprehensive in scope, but very brief.
 ^In this thesis, we concentrate primarily on the English translation o f Die kirchliche Dogmatik [K D \ the Church 
Dogmatics {CD). This, rather than the German original, is the ‘final canonical form’ which has be received in 
the English speaking world and which has prompted most o f the secondary literature with which we will 
interact. Accordingly, we will devote our attention primarily to the English secondary literature that comments 
on this English translation. Our main argument does not depend on detailed matters of wording or translation. 
However, we do consult Barth’s German original frequently when doing close reading of his work in order to 
increase our understanding o f Barth. In addition, we consult German secondary literature that is pertinent to the 
matters discussed in the thesis—matters that were generally more abundantly discussed in English scholarly 
literature.
1.2. Some Studies Pertaining to Barth *s Theological Method
Despite the general lack of studies specifically on Barth’s method, many of the best 
general treatments or introductions to Karl Barth have gone some way toward clarifying 
Barth’s theological method. Two recent studies aie particularly helpful. The first is George 
Hunsinger’s well-known How to Read Karl Barth (1991), an excellent treatment of Barth’s 
theology in terms of six patterns or motifs that mark his theology. Some of the six motifs 
Hunsinger expounds are significantly methodological in character (e.g. particularism and 
rationalism), and nearly all of them have methodological implications (which Hunsinger does 
not always delineate). In this thesis, we will draw from and highlight the methodological 
significance of Hunsinger’s work. Accordingly, we will return to an exposition of relevant 
aspects of Hunsinger’s work later in this chapter (see subsection 4.2), and occasionally in 
later chapters.
A second helpful study is Gary Dorrien’s The Barthian Revolt in Modern Theology 
(2000), which stresses Barth’s distinctive methodological approach to theology and places it 
in historical context. Thus, he regards Barth’s theology as a ‘Herrmannian,’  ^ ‘New- 
Reformationisf'^ theology centred in the ‘exegesis of the Spirit-illmnined Word.’^  The three 
aspects of Dorrien’s characterisation of Barth’s theology correspond roughly to the three 
aspects of his method on which we will focus in this study, namely, the roles of reason, 
tradition and Scripture, respectively. That is, Barth’s appropriation of the modern, post- 
Kantian intellectual heritage mediated to him by Herrmann (and others) involves a specific 
theological use of reason; Barth’s appropriation of the theological tradition of the 
Reformation is a clear instance of his use of theological tradition, and Barth’s distinctive 
theological exegesis of the Word attested in Scripture is a crucial manifestation of the central 
role of Scripture in his theology.
In addition to the methodological contributions of these comprehensive interpretations 
of Barth’s theology, a great deal of scholarship has been devoted to several specific 
discussions of aspects of Barth’s theology which bear directly or indirectly on his
 ^This adjective refers to Barth’s adherence in certain respects to the approach of Wilhelm Herrmann (see 
Dorrien 2000: 15ff, 168ff, and. passim).
 ^See Dorrien 2000:2.
 ^Dorrien 2000: 3; cf. 192ff.
methodology. Many of these will be treated in the remainder of the chapter under the rubric 
of the functions of Scripture, tradition and reason.
13. The Strategy of This Thesis in Relation to Previous Studies
In this thesis, we will variously complement, develop and improve upon previous 
studies of Barth’s theological method. Stated in general terms, we will do so by offering a 
‘framework’ which allows for a more comprehensive and accurate understanding of Barth’s 
theological method than has been available thus far. An understanding of how Scripture, 
tradition and reason function and interrelate within Barth’s theology provides this framework. 
Hence, even as Hunsinger provided a kind o f ‘map’ of the shape of Barth’s overall theology 
(in CD) by means of an analysis of six motifs,^ we will provide a kind of map of Barth’s 
theological method in CD by tracing three aspects of Barth’s way of doing theology.
Drawing from the terminology of the Anglican tradition (especially the century Anglican
divine Richard Hooker and his followers), we will refer to these three aspects of theological 
method as the ‘threefold cord.’
In Barth’s theology, the three strands of tliis cord stand in a complex ordered 
interrelationship to each other. As a Reformed theologian, Barth gives priority to Scripture 
over tradition and reason in his theology. This priority is expressed in the way that the 
theological frmction or use of Scripture is the central and foundational feature of his 
theological method (see section 2 below and the thesis statement in section 6 below). The 
roles of tradition and reason in Barth’s theology are largely incorporated into and qualified by 
the decisive role that Scripture plays in that theology.
The claims we will defend in relation to the threefold cord in Barth’s theology 
constitute a relatively comprehensive interpretation of Barth’s theological method, at least as 
compared with previous scholarship. Previous studies treating Barth’s method tended to 
focus on only one or perhaps two of the three ‘strands’ of this three-fold cord, or some sub­
aspect of them. Our more comprehensive account has the advantage of being able to place 
the various main aspects of Barth’s theological method together and in proper ‘proportion’ to 
one other. Hence, the function of Scripture is understood in relation to the complementary
See Hunsinger 1991: ix-x.
and subordinate function of tradition, forms of reasoning like ‘dialectic’ are understood in 
relation to Barth’s effort to use Scripture and tradition properly, and so on. Indeed, the full 
significance of Barth’s use of any one of the three strands or factors is best understood when 
one sees how that strand is interwoven with the others to produce his overall theological 
method. This is true even in respect to the primary role of Scripture, which cannot be 
separated from Barth’s use of tradition or reason.
In keeping with the scope of our thesis indicated in its title, we treat Barth’s method 
as it appears in a specific section of his Church Dogmatics (CD): his treatment of divine 
unity, constancy and eternity in CD, II/1. Some light can be shed on Barth’s method by 
studies of his theoretical statements about proper theological method (found largely in his 
Prolegomena in CD, I/l and 1/2).  ^ However, Barth’s theological method is best grasped by 
an examination of Barth’s actual ‘theological practice’—i.e. the way he does theology in 
respect to the particular loci he treats after his Prolegomena (see our comments on our 
method of research in section 6).
We believe that an intensive examination of Barth’s theological method in a specific 
section of his work (selections of II/l, chapter VI) proves more fruitfiil in understanding his 
approach than does a relatively shallow and general examination of a larger scope of his 
work. If we are to attend carefully to how the method is displayed in relation to detailed 
material content, then this limits how much of Barth’s work we can examine.
In addition, there are several specific reasons that we chose to treat Barth’s account of 
‘The Reality of God’ in II/l, chapter VI for our study. First, there is good reason to think that 
this is the first chapter of CD to implement the final shift in his thinking to the more intensely 
‘Christocentric’ theology of the ‘mature’ Barth.® Second, the subject matter of the ‘doctrine 
of God’ is a crucial testing ground for Barth’s distinctive revelational theology, since this is a 
doctrine in which philosophical or ‘natural theology’ had been predominant in the work of 
many previous theologians. If Barth’s method can be shown to be ‘revelational’ and 
‘scriptural’ even here, then it almost goes without saying that it will be so in the later volumes 
of CD where the material content of the doctrines tends to be more directly related to the
’ Some brief studies on Barth’s theoretical doctrine of Scripture and tradition are: Dean 1962 and Brown 1965.
* See McCormack 1995:461.
biblical witness to the economy of salvation and revelation. Third, Barth’s translator and 
interpreter T. F. Torrance, regarded volume II/l (and especially chapter VI) as the ‘high 
point’ of CD, a view that Barth himself apparently shared.^ If we give this assessment the 
benefit of the doubt, then this section of the CD should be fruitful for understanding the 
method of Barth ‘at his best.’ Finally, there has been no extensive treatment of Barth’s 
theological method within his doctrine of God (II/l, chapter VI).
We may conclude this sub-section with two further comments on the strategy of this 
thesis. Firstly, despite our emphasis on the integration and interrelationship between 
Scripture, tradition and reason in Baith’s work, we often will treat these three aspects of his 
method individually for the purpose of clarifying and analysing them. Thus, much of this 
chapter and the next will follow a Scripture-tradition-reason organisation. Secondly, while 
our account of Barth’s method will be adequately comprehensive, there are aspects of his 
method that we will not treat extensively, such as the roles of imagination or experience.
2. The Role of Scripture in Barth’s Theology
2.1, Introduction
Barth scholars are increasingly recognising the significance of the function of 
Scripture for understanding Barth’s theological method and his theology as a whole. In 
referring to the function o f Scripture in Barth’s CD, we refer not only to his exegetical 
excursuses or explicit references to Scripture, but to the more subtle ways that Barth’s life­
long engagement with Scripture shaped his theology.*^ We are not concerned so much with
’ Torrance 1990: 124, 133. Torrance states that ‘Barth himself agreed that the high point has been reached in 
Volume II,’ as opposed to Volume IV (133).
Baxter 1981, Ford 1981, and McGlasson 1991 each have offered brief comments on Baith’s use of Scripture 
in this section of CD, but these are incomplete even in respect to the use of Scriptui e, let alone the use of 
tradition or reason (see 2.1 below).
‘ ‘ These are certainly areas for further exploration in respect to Barth’s method, even if  (in our view) they are 
not as significant as those that we designate by Scripture, tradition and reason. One reason we do not comment 
extensively on the role o f ‘experience’ (the addition to the threefold cord that constitutes the Wesleyan 
Quadrilateral) within Barth’s theological method is partly because our category of reason already allows us to 
focus on the intellectual aspects o f ‘experience’ that are most pertinent to Barth’s theology (see FI, 198-227). 
Also, we will not comment on imagination as a separate category, but will treat it occasionally within our broad 
conception of the role of ‘reason.’
The phrases ‘function of Scripture’ or ‘role of Scripture’ ai e able to include even sub-conscious influences of  
Scriptui e on Barth’s work, as the phrase ‘use o f Scriptuie’ cannot. However, for our purposes in this thesis, we 
will use ‘function,’ ‘role’ and ‘use’ more or less interchangeably. This is because we will tend to assume that
hermeneutics or exegesis in the narrow sense—with how Barth interpreted or read the 
Bible—but with the related but distinct question of how he employed his biblical 
interpretations in the theology, i.e. in the critique and construction of theological proposals.*^ 
That is, we are concerned with the question of how Barth’s exegesis and other forms of 
Scripture-usage are integrated into his dogmatic theology. This is what we have in mind 
when we refer to the ‘use’ or ‘function’ of Scripture in his theology.
There are already many scholarly studies treating Barth’s relationship to Scripture and 
they appear to be proliferating. But none has yet covered the full variety of fonctions that 
Scripture has in his theology, and sometimes the lacunae are significant and misleading. This 
leaves us with a problem of ‘reductionism’ in studies of Barth’s multifaceted use of Scripture, 
a problem that only exacerbates the related problem of the absence of an adequately 
comprehensive and multi-faceted treatment of Barth’s overall theological method. This is 
evidence that more needs to be said on the overall matter of Barth as a reader and user of 
Scripture.
In keeping with our chosen method in this thesis, the most significant resources for 
our argument regarding the place of Scripture in Barth’s theology are those which examine 
Barth’s theological practice in CD, rather than (as with many studies) his theoretical 
comments on theological hermeneutics^'^ or historical criticism. Our comments in the 
remainder of this section on the role of Scripture will therefore concentrate primarily on 
studies that are concerned with Barth’s use of Scriptuie in his practice of doctrinal or 
dogmatic theology.
Furthermore, there is no extensive treatment of Barth’s use of Scripture in CD, II/l, 
chapter VI, the ‘material’ focus of this thesis. One reason for this lacuna is that scholars 
concerned with the role of Scripture in Barth’s theology have, quite naturally, concentrated
the main ‘scriptural’ features of Barth’s work were intentional, as his own comments in his prolegomena would 
suggest.
See Kelsey 1999 [rev. ed. o f 1975], xiv.
For some fine studies of Barth’s hermeneutics, see Provence 1980; Jimgel 1986: 70-82; Wallace 1990; and 
Hunsinger 2000:210-227 [reprint of an 1987 article].
The question o f Barth’s relationship to higher-criticism has been the primary preoccupation of much earlier 
(largely German-speaking) scholarship on Barth’s use of the Bible (see Smend 1966; Marquardt 1970 and 
others). Baxter 1981, chapter 1 provides a helpful survey and assessment of this research (cf. McGlasson 1991 : 
5 f on Smend).
See our definitions o f ‘exegesis’ and ‘dogmatics’ in chapter 2.
their attention on the later volumes of CD in which the exegetical component is more obvious 
(II/2, III, and IV). For this reason, to argue for a decisive role for Scripture and its 
interpretation within Barth’s doctrine of divine perfections in II/l, a section of CD in which 
Barth does relatively little ‘exegesis’ in the usual sense of the word, is significantly more 
difficult than it would be for other aspects of Barth’s corpus. This is particularly true of the 
three ‘perfections of divine freedom’ on which we will focus: unity, constancy and eternity— 
divine attributes that traditionally have been given a highly ‘philosophical’ rather than 
‘biblical’ treatment. But the choice of II/l (chapter VI) is strategic. /^Scripture is a decisive 
basis for Barth’s doctrinal criticism and construction even in his doctrines o f unity, constancy 
and eternity, then (by means of a simple a fortiori argument) this is surely the case in respect 
to the vast majority of remaining doctrines where exegesis figures more prominently. Thus, 
although it would need confirmation in further studies, the argument of this thesis has 
significance for understanding Barth’s mature theology throughout the CD.
A few studies of Barth’s theology have indicated in general terms how Barth’s use of 
Scripture is related to his theological approach or theology as a whole. For example, Herbert 
Hartwell recognises that ‘in Barth’s view, the task of theology is the expository presentation 
of that revelation [i. e. God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ] on the basis of a theological 
exegesis of the content of the Bible.’ Hartwell rightly sees that such exegesis is typically 
the temporally and logically prior ground of the claims made in the large print of CD. But 
the wide scope of Hartwell’s introduction to Barth’s theology does not allow him to show in 
detail how this is the case. In addition, an essay by Francis Watson*® makes a brief, but 
compelling case for the significance of Scripture in Barth’s overall CD. In his words, ‘From 
beginning to end, Barth’s Church Dogmatics is nothing other than a sustained meditation on 
the texts of Holy Scripture...  Barth’s biblical interpretation is . . .  the foundation and 
principle of coherence of his entire project.’*^  Although this claim is somewhat overstated, 
Watson does point towards the great importance of Scripture in Barth’s dogmatic project.
Hartwell 1964: 15, cf. 42£F. For similar ways o f understanding Barth, see, Ramm 1983: 33ff, Cobb 1986: 
177ff and Dorrien 2000: 3, 181, 192ff, and Watson 2000.
Watson 2000.
Watson 2000: 57.
But again, the limited scope of his essay does not allow him to support this position in detail. 
One of the burdens of this thesis is to do just that in respect to our chosen section of CD}^
We will now give a brief description of the work of a number of the most important 
scholars for our purposes from the last three decades. We will group these scholars 
thematically, but in a way that happens to follow a roughly chronological order.
2.2. The Indirect Function of Scripture in Barthes Theology
In this sub-section, we will examine two important studies in the 1970’s, one German 
and one American, that have explicitly or implicitly raised the issue of the function of 
Scripture in Barth’s Theology in the Church Dogmatics, as opposed to the narrower question 
of how Barth’s interprets the Bible (his theological exegesis or hermeneutics). More 
specifically, both studies have argued, quite significantly, that the relationship of Scripture to 
Barth’s theological proposals is largely ‘indirect’ in character. As such, these studies treat the 
often tacit, but always significant function that Scripture has in Barth’s CD—even when he is 
not doing ‘exegesis’ in a narrow sense.
The first study is Wolfhart Schlichting’s Biblische Denkform in der Dogmatik: Die 
Vorbildlichkeit des biblischen Denkens fur die Methode der Kirchlichen Dogmatik Karl 
Barths (1971). Schlichting’s primary concern is to understand how ‘biblical thought forms’ 
function as paradigms or exemplars for Barth’s theological method or dogmatic thinking.^*
In making this point, Schlichting aims to follow Barth’s own characterisation of aspects of 
the Biblical witness as a normative prototype or exemplar {Vorbild) for dogmatics as a 
function of the church that hears and teaches the word of God.^  ^ Schlichting draws out the 
implications of Barth’s view that although dogmatics is biblical, it is something more than 
exegesis.^^ Schlichting goes some way toward expounding this ‘something more’—this 
indirect role of Scripture in Barth’s theology. This is an important point that our own study 
will develop in its own way.
Watson 2000.
See especially Schlichting 1971: 42ff‘.
CD F2, 816ft:
^ See Schlichting’s lengthy chapter entitled "Die indirekte Vorbildlichkeit des biblischen Denkens fiir das 
dogmatische Denkeri* (1971: 133-252).
That said, there are significant respects in which Schlichting’s work is 
underdeveloped and can be complemented by our work in this thesis. Most importantly, 
Schlichting demonstrates his thesis about the paradigmatic function of the Bible and biblical 
thought forms primarily on the basis of Barth’s theoretical comments in his prolegomena 
volumes (CD I/l and 1/2) and only secondarily (and typically very briefly) on the basis of his 
dogmatic practice. Our study supports a similar thesis to Schlichting’s about the function of 
the Bible in Barth’s dogmatic method, but by means of roughly the reverse strategy of textual 
support. That is, we will concentrate primarily on Barth’s dogmatic practice—specifically 
his doctrine of divine perfections '^*—and only secondarily give attention to relevant 
comments in his prolegomena in CD, vol. I. Not only does this complement (rather than 
reproduce) the work done by Schlichting, but it offers what we believe is a superior method 
to discerning the heart of Barth’s actual theological method (see section 6 below).
David Kelsey is a second theologian who has drawn attention to the dimension of the 
‘indirect authorisation’ of theological proposals by Scripture in Barth’s work. In his helpful 
book Proving Doctrine: The Uses o f Scripture in Modern Theology}^ Kelsey comments on 
the ‘indirect authority’ of Scripture in the practice of several modern theologians, including 
Barth. In a section on ‘Direct and Indirect Authority’^  ^Kelsey notes how difficult it would 
be for theologians to authorise their theological proposals by means of a direct use of 
Scripture. More often, Kelsey thinks, theologians let Scripture bear upon their theology in 
indirect ways. This it true even of Barth’s highly biblically-oriented style of theology. For 
example, in an insightful exposition of Barth’s treatment of Jesus Christ as the ‘Royal Man’ 
in CD, IV/2, Kelsey points out that Scripture often bears upon Barth’s theological proposals 
by rendering Jesus Christ as a particular agent, with a specific identity and character.^® For 
Barth, theology learns what Jesus Christ is like, not primarily by means of direct translations
Schlichting only devotes a page to Barth’s account of God’s perfections (1971: 105f).
^ Von Balthasar had earlier referred to the ‘thought-form’ or ‘thought-forms’ of Barth’s work in his 1951 study 
of Barth’s theology (ET 1971), although he understood them as more ‘Hegelian’ than biblical. Van Niekerk 
1989 refers to the ‘biblical conceptual form’ of Barth’s work, but does not cite Schlichting’s work and develops 
the idea in a different direction than Schlichting. James Barr regards Schlichting as ‘almost slavishly uncritical’ 
o f Barth in regard to his success in adhering to biblical thought forms (Ban 1993: 140).
Kelsey 1999 [rev. ed. o f 1975].
Kelsey 1999: 139ff.
Kelsey 1999: 39-50; cf. CD, IV/2, 155-377.
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of the conceptual content of various biblical statements about Chi'ist, but by appealing to the 
various patterns and structures evident in the narratives of the gospels and parts of Old 
Testament. In such ways, Kelsey’s work is helpful in clarifying how Scripture functions in 
Barth’s work.
However, two factors limit the value of Kelsey’s work for our purposes. First, 
Kelsey’s comments in respect to Barth are brief and highly selective. Thus, Kelsey is aware 
that he does not do justice to the ‘inventiveness and variety of the ways [Barth] uses the 
B i b l e . W e  will need to probe this inventiveness and variety more deeply in an effort to 
discern how Kelsey’s analysis applies to the functions of the Bible found in II/l, chapter VI. 
Second, Kelsey’s view of how Scripture functions authoritatively in theology (whether m 
direct or indhect ways) does not sufficiently allow for what Brevard Childs calls the 
‘coercion or pressure of the biblical text itself over the theologian and her theology^*— 
something that Barth held to be important in the faithful theological use of Scripture.^^ That 
is, by placing undue weight on the theologian’s (or her community’s) independent 
imaginative construal of Cliristianity and thus of Scripture, Kelsey downplays the capacity of 
Scripture to shape theological readers.^^ It is true Kelsey recognises that there are scriptural 
patterns or features which do impose controls on what a theologian may say about various 
theological topics; he does not believe the theologian is free to make Scripture say anything 
she wants. '^* But in the end, Kelsey believes that Scripture, and the results of the study of 
Scripture, are only ‘relevant. . .  but not decisive’ to the ways theologians construe Scripture 
and bring it to bear on th eo lo g y .A t this point we can simply say that Scripture sometimes 
(though not always) seems to function for Barth in a way that is ‘decisive’ in the 
determination of his theological proposals. When this is the case, contra Kelsey, it is
Kelsey 1999: 39.
Specifically, we will need to ask in what sense Scripture is fimctioning dii ectly and in what sense indhectly. 
We as we will see that Barth does not primarily appeal to the ‘nanative’ genre of Scriptui e in II/l as he does in 
volumes like IV/2, and this has implications for the character of the indirect authorisation that is present in II/l. 
Childs 1997: 17.
For similar critiques of Kelsey, see Frame 1977, Vanhoozer 2000: 74 and Work 2002: 125ff.
For Kelsey’s emphasis on the theologian’s imaginative construal, see 1999: 160ff, 192ff.
See especially Kelsey 1999: 196f.
Kelsey 1999: 201; cf. 197-201.
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primarily Scripture, not Barth’s prior imaginative judgement, that determines which patterns 
in Scripture the theologian will appeal to, and even to what uses he will put them.^^
This thesis will suggest that the indirect dhnension of the authoritative function of 
Scripture that Schlichting and Kelsey highlight may on the whole be more crucial than 
exegesis of specific texts for understanding Barth’s treatments of divine simplicity, constancy 
and eternity. To clarify this indirect function of Scripture in Barth’s theology is a significant 
goal of this study and has important implications for discerning Barth’s distinctive 
theological method.^^
2.3. Comprehensive Analyses o f the Role of Exegesis in Church Dogmatics 
We now turn to the work of three scholars that, at least in terms of the scope of the 
texts they treat in Barth’s corpus, are significantly more comprehensive than those treated 
above. We will focus exclusively on their commentary on Barth’s CD.
We begin with the work of the British theologian Christina Baxter, as found in her 
University of Durham doctoral thesis entitled: ‘The Movement from Exegesis to Dogmatics 
in the Theology of Karl Barth, with Special Reference to Romans, Philippians and Church 
Dogmatics"  ^ (1981).^® The textual basis of Baxter’s thesis is remarkably comprehensive, 
based on an analysis and classification of every single reference to Scripture in the entire CD 
(in addition to Barth’s use of Scripture in two of his commentaries).^^ As the title indicates, 
Baxter construes Barth’s work in terms of a movement from exegesis to dogmatics. 
Specifically, she discerns two distinct movements or procedures in CD, which together form 
his method of using Scripture in his theology: (1) a simple movement from the extended 
exegesis of a single passage to dogmatics and (2) a complex movement from collections of 
selected portions of Scripture to dogmatics.'***
See Kelsey 1999:201. Furthermore, imaginative judgements made about Scripture or its use can themselves 
be shaped by reverent engagement with Scripture (see Green-McCreight 1999:248f).
The notion of the indirect but significant relationship of Scripture to theological proposals relates closely to 
what Vanhoozer calls a ‘higher form of interpretation’ (2000: 65) and what patristic writers like Athanasius 
referred to as the ‘mind’ or ‘scope’ o f  Scripture (see Young 1997:29-45 and Torrance 1995:229-288).
Baxter has also published a shorter piece drawing on this thesis (1986).
Baxter 1981 : introduction. Her method is to deal with typical cases in the main text, to offer further parallels 
in the endnotes, and to supplement these methods with statistical analysis,
Baxter 1981:1. In Baxter’s statistical analysis o f Barth’s fine-print excursuses, the simple movement 
accounts for 25% of his use of Scripture and the complex movement 75% (1981:126, note 1).
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Baxter’s study is distinctive, not only in its comprehensiveness, but also in its 
methodology. She claims to be the first to base her conclusions about Barth’s method 
primarily on the basis of a ‘descriptive analysis’ o f ‘how he actually works,’ rather than by 
considerations of his account of his theological method.'** This promising methodology 
leads to insightful research results. For example, Baxter correctly discerns how Barth’s 
interpretation and use of Scripture in CD is ‘form-sensitive,’ i.e. shaped by the various forms 
or genres of the biblical literary phenomena upon which he draws (concepts, themes, stories, 
and so on).'*^  In such ways, Baxter’s work shows a helpful awareness of the diversity and 
complexity of Barth’s engagement with Scripture.
Baxter’s work, despite its obvious contributions, is also marked by certain 
inadequacies that our present work aims to address. First of all, although Baxter’s 
dissertation is marked by unprecedented comprehensiveness in some respects, it is not 
adequately comprehensive in others. By attending almost exclusively to the explicit citations 
of Scripture in CD, it largely neglects the crucial indirect relationship between Scripture and 
dogmatics that Schlichting and Kelsey have noted. Secondly, Baxter’s dominant construal of 
Barth’s method of engagement with Scripture in dogmatics in terms of a linear ‘movement’ 
from exegesis to dogmatics is problematic.'*^ It is not clear that this is the best way of 
understanding or evaluating Barth’s distinctively theological use of Scripture. In fact, Barth’s 
way of understanding what he called ‘theological exegesis’ resists domestication under 
Baxter’s model. Our own study treats Barth’s direct and indirect ways of relating Scripture to 
dogmatics in a way that avoids entrapment within a strictly linear model of the relationship of 
exegesis to theology. Thirdly, our detailed, in-depth analysis of a small portion of text in CD 
allows us to explore, in a way that Baxter could not, the detailed relations of Barth’s method 
of using Scripture to his concrete material conclusions.
Baxter 1981: 6. This does not appear to be accurate, since Ford, whose 1979 work Baxter is aware of, had also 
aimed to describe and analyse Barth’s practice rather than his theoretical proposals,
Baxter 1981: 126ff.
Baxter sometimes qualifies this construal—claiming that the dii ection of the movement can be reversed or 
that there is a kind of circular relationship between dogmatics and exegesis (see 1981: 112, 120, 122).
However, the metaphor of a linear movement remains predominant. Indeed, Baxter critiques Barth whenever he 
appears to stray from the linear model— i.e. a model that moves from pure, historical exegesis to theology. For 
a recent critique of such ‘linear hermeneutics,’ see Green 2002.
13
A second scholar who takes up a relatively comprehensive interpretation of Barth’s
use of Scripture is David Ford/'* In an article called ‘Barth’s Interpretation of Scripture’
(1979) and then in a book called Barth and God’s Story: Biblical Narrative and the
Theological Method o f Karl Barth in the "Church Dogmatics” (1981), Ford argues that
biblical narrative and narrative interpretation have pride of place within Barth’s theological
use of Scripture. He states this thesis as follows:
Barth’s exegesis covers the whole Bible and displays a great variety of hermeneutical 
skills and principles, but my thesis . . .  is that he uses one dominant approach which 
provides the structure of argument and much of the content of his whole theology. 
This is his interpretation of certain biblical narratives, notably the Gospels but also the 
creation stories and those Old Testament texts to which he appeals in support of his 
doctrine of election.'*^
Like Baxter, Ford claims to draw such conclusions based upon an analysis of Barth’s
theological practice, rather than his theoretical proposals. That said. Ford tends to lay greater
emphasis than Baxter on providing a ‘depth-interpretation’ of Barth that goes beyond a mere
description—an interpretation that gets at Barth’s ‘implicit principles.’ Specifically, Ford’s
interpretative proposal is that Barth’s actual method of biblical interpretation has much in
common with the method employed by Erich Auerbach and Peter Stern in their literary
criticism of the genre of realistic narrative.'*^ According to Ford, Barth ‘recognised that it is
chiefly through stories that the Bible conveys its understanding of reality,’ i.e. its theology.'*^
Also, Ford believes that Barth ‘went further in insisting that this way of rendering reality is
one in which form and content are inseparable.’'*®
Commentators such as Baxter have provided helpful critiques of Ford’s work.
Without rehearsing these critiques in detail here, we need only to point out that Baxter makes
a strong case that, in many cases in Barth’s theology, scriptural narratives aie considered
Ford considers the role of Scripture within all the major docti ines of CD (doctrine of God, election, creation, 
and reconciliation) but does not aim to take into account every single reference to Scripture as Baxter does.
Ford 1979: 56.
Ford 1979: 76-82. In drawing such parallels. Ford admits that he is offering a theoretical account of 
hermeneutics that Barth himself does not offer, but he believes that he is doing so in a manner faithful to Barth’s 
practice (Ford 1981: 48). In fact. Ford finds many o f Barth’s own descriptions of his method in the Prolegomena 
volumes o f the CD to be relatively unhelpfiil in elucidating what emerges in his interpretative practice in later 
volumes of the CD (1985: 23Q. For further support of the view that Barth interprets the Bible like a realistic 
novel, see Kelsey 1999: 43 (cf. Frei 1992: 90).
Ford 1979: 77.
Ford 1979: 77.
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theologically mute without the theological statements of Scripture that ‘interpret’ the 
narratives/^ Our argument will suggest that there are insights on both sides of this Ford- 
Baxter debate, and that the debate cannot be resolved by making general categorical 
statements about the priority of either theological statements or narratives (or any other 
literary form) within Barth’s theology as a whole. Instead, assessments about the priority of 
theological statements or narratives must be made in respect to particular purposes within 
particular aspects of Barth’s complex engagement with Scriptuie. We will see that narrative 
is not nearly as important in Barth’s theological method in CD 11/1 (chapter VI) as it is in 
later volumes of CD}^ and that the theological statements of the Bible play a more significant 
role in this context. However, because of the interrelatedness of Barth’s theology, later 
volumes sometimes provide what we could call the ‘narrative grounds’ for statements about 
the doctrine of God made in I l/ l . As such. Ford’s work, while often not directly relevant to 
the main argument of this thesis, is also not in conflict with it. Accordingly, Ford offers 
insights into the nature of Barth’s work that we will occasionally draw on in this thesis. At 
the same time, we will confirm the point that it is not adequate to regard Barth’s engagement 
with Scripture as primarily ‘narrative interpretation’ without any further qualification.
A third scholar in the 1980’s to offer a relatively detailed and comprehensive study of 
Barth’s use of Scripture in CD is Otto Bachli in his Das Alte Testament in der kirchlichen 
Dogmatik von Karl Barth (1987). The only respect in which Bachli’s study is not 
comprehensive is that, when he considers Barth’s exegetical-theological practice, he focuses 
on Barth’s interpretation of the Old Testament, rather than the whole canon. However, in 
several other respects it is more comprehensive than either Baxter or Ford. For example, 
Bachli’s book treats in detail, not only Barth’s practice, but his ‘theory’ of biblical 
interpretation (especially in 1/2). There are three main contributions of Bachli that are 
relevant to our work in this thesis.
Baxter 1981: 165ff. More generally, Baxter believes that the Bible’s ‘theological statements’ have priority 
over other biblical ‘forms’ within Barth’s theology. Thus, she calls Barth’s appeal to the theological statements 
of the Bible ‘the formative and definitive’ method in CD (1981; 165; cf. 165ff, 173ft; cf. 1986:49f).
Ford states that in volume IF2 and following, the ‘mediation of the story become more pervasive’ in Barth 
account o f the scriptural witness to revelation (Ford 1981:24). Indeed, story becomes ‘the chief source of 
support for his Theology’ (Ford 1981: 56). In this view o f Barth’s theological development. Ford appears to 
take a cue from Frei (1974: viii).
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First, Bachli offers a particular view of how to characterise the exegesis^* that Barth 
does within the CD, specifically in his exegetical excursuses. As part of the task of dogmatic 
theology, he calls such exegesis Hokalexegese'’ (Toci-exegesis’), exegesis of biblical texts in 
relation to particular dogmatic loci.^  ^ In contrast to his exegesis in his commentaries (e.g.
The Epistle to the Romans), Barth’s exegesis in CD treats Scripture selectively and topically, 
choosing to employ only those texts that illuminate or ground a particular doctrine. Bachli 
thinks that the overall structure of dogmatics, its arrangement into various loci, is largely 
determined by doctrinal tradition, not exegesis itself.^  ^ Yet he thinks that what Barth says in 
respect to the various loci (i.e. the material conclusions he reaches) is shaped strongly by 
Scripture, both directly in exegetical excursuses and also indirectly in other ways. Even the 
selection of biblical foundations (texts, themes and patterns) for a particular dogmatic locus 
occurs fm  Rahmen der biblichen Denkform’ (‘within the frame of a biblical form of 
thinking’).^ '* The exegesis of the excursuses and the dogmatic questions and framework stand 
in a reciprocal or mutual relation to each other. ‘The weight sometimes lies on the side of 
dogmatics, sometimes on the side of exegesis.
Second, Bachli recognises that Barth’s dogmatic Lokalexegese is multi-faceted. To 
begin with, it involves at least the following three tasks: (1) exposition of a single biblical 
sentence \Satz\}^ (2) philological explanation of Hebrew (and Greek) vocabulary,^^ and (3) 
the stringing together of Scripture citations, with or without commentary as an expression of 
the Reformation principle that ‘Scripture interprets Scripture.’^ ® Barth takes up these various 
tasks of exegesis either in the context o f ‘thematic e x e g e s is ,in  which biblical passages and 
words are examined in respect to particular theological themes (as is typical of the passages
By ‘exegesis’ Bachli refers to his citation of and engagement with particular texts, which is only a part, the 
‘direct’ part, of the total function of Scripture within CD. Bachli is also attentive to the other indirect aspects of 
Barth’s use of Scripture (see Bachli’s comments on biblische Denhform).
Bâchli 1987: 136.
Bachli 1987: 136.
Bachli 1987: 136. The translations o f Bachli, both here and below, are mine, with help from Andreas Loos. 
Bachli 1987: 142.
Bachli 1987: 142-147.
Bachli 1987: 147-154.
Bachli 1987: 154-164.
Bachli 1987: 167-224.
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we will treat in II/l), or in the context of ‘exegesis as theological commentary,’ as in parts of 
Barth’s doctrine of creation/**
Third, Bachli further illuminates the discussion initiated by Schlichting and others 
about what Barth called the ‘biblical thought-form’ of dogmatics (see our discussion in 2.2 
above). Bachli points out that Barth only once defined what he meant by this phrase (or 
similar phrases), and even there it is not very sharply defined.^* Bachli rightly believes that it 
should be interpreted as an oppositional concept or term {OppositionsbegrifJ] in which Barth 
opposes a biblical form of thinking to a ‘thinking schematism’ [Denkschematismus] that is 
‘anchored in philosophy and its theological offshoots.’ For Barth, such philosophical thought 
schemes ‘cannot be avoided even in theology; yet the theologian must be willing to let his 
thought schemes be broken and shattered and their place be taken by the biblical form of 
thinking.
In these three ways and others, Bachli’s fine study contributes to our understanding 
not only of the role of Scripture in Baith’s theological method, but also to the role of tradition 
and reason as they relate to the function of Scripture. Even so, Bachli leaves much 
unresolved in respect to the specific tasks of this thesis. Most significantly, in keeping with 
the scope of his work, he does not treat the role of the New Testament in Barth’s practice.
Nor does he comment extensively on the role of Scripture within the passages that we will be 
treating in Barth’s doctrine of God—where the indirect pressure of the ‘biblical thought- 
form’ or other biblical elements are often more significant in shaping Barth’s thought than the 
exegesis of specific texts. In fact, Bachli generally neglects to role of such indirect (non- 
exegetical) uses of Scripture in Barth’s theological practice, although he appears to be aware 
of such uses in Barth’s theory,
2.4. Specialised Studies of Barth *s Theological Exegesis
In the period from 1990 to the present, it seems that the main studies related to 
Barth’s use of Scripture are more specialised, rather than comprehensive. Two studies
Bachli 1987: 227-266.
Bachli 1987: 141; cf. 139. The passage is found in KD, IV /3 ,102. As Bachli points out, even this ‘definition’ 
of biblische Denlform is found in a very late formulation that cannot be claimed as applying to the whole CD. 
Especially in the earlier volumes of the dogmatics, the biblical form of thinking {Denlrform) or attitude 
(Haltung) refers to a wide framework within which Barth moves, and is not filled with much concrete content. 
Bachli 1987: 141.
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related to Barth’s exegesis in select portions of CD are worthy of comment, both of which are 
based upon doctoral dissertations at Yale University.
Paul McGlasson’s monograph, Jesus and Judas: Biblical Exegesis in Barth (199l/^ 
examines Barth’s biblical exegesis—especially in his exegetical excursuses—in volumes I 
and II of CD. Apparently unaware of Baxter’s work, McGlasson knows of no ‘large scale 
work devoted to Barth’s biblical exegesis.M cG lasson’s work, like Baxter’s, is based upon 
an examination of Barth’s actual interpretation of Scripture, rather than his occasional 
theoretical comments about how to interpret Scripture.
Perhaps the main contribution of McGlasson’s work is found in the insightful scheme 
of classification and analysis that he provides for describing and understanding Barth’s 
exegesis, which could profitably be applied to CD as a whole.^  ^ For example, McGlasson 
distinguishes between ‘conceptual a n a ly s is an d  ‘narrative exegesis.McGlasson rightly 
believes the former—‘exegesis as the definition and clarification of biblical and theological 
concepts’ —represents the majority of the cases of Barth’s exegesis in CD volumes I and II, 
and probably in CD as a whole. As such, McGlasson joins Baxter in critiquing Ford’s 
narrative-priority view.^  ^ He shows ably how both of these two forms of exegesis (the 
concept-oriented and the narrative-oriented) relate to each other^  ^and to the wider contours 
of Barth’s theological method.^*
McGlasson also makes several helpful material or substantial points in his 
interpretation of Barth. (1) McGlasson reinforces a point made independently by Baxter and 
Bachli, namely, that Barth’s exegesis is marked by ‘enormous variety’ and an irreducible
This is a published version of his Yale Ph.D. thesis; ‘Karl Barth and the Scriptures: A Study of the Biblical 
Exegesis in Church Dogmatics I and II,’ 1986. The subtitle o f the book is more accurate than the title (‘Jesus 
and Judas’), since McGlasson treats Jesus and Judas only in one section dealing with one of Barth’s excursuses 
in 11/2(1991: 135-147).
McGlasson 1991: 4.
McGlasson 1991: 3. McGlasson distinguishes this ‘descriptive and analytical language’ from a ‘systematic 
hermeneutic’ (1991:2).
McGlasson 1991: 117-123; cf. 81-113. Cf. Hans Frei (from whom McGlasson draws) on Barth’s conceptual 
analysis or conceptual redescription of Scripture (see chapter 2, section 4).
McGlasson 1991: 123-32.
^  McGlasson 1991: 154.
McGlasson 1991: 117, 132ft; cf. 6-9. McGlasson also shows how even with respect to narrative exegesis 
itself. Ford’s reduces Barth’s complex work to only one form of narrative interpretation (cf. 1991: 123-32).
McGlasson 1991: 132-135.
For example, we will examine McGlasson’s comments on the role of tradition in section 3 below and of 
conceptual analysis (a form of the theological use of reason) in section 4.
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methodological pluralism/^ (2) Yet, despite this stress on methodological variety, 
McGlasson, also rightly, sees an order and unity in Barth’s exegesis. This is provided by 
Barth’s consistent construal and use of the Bible as a ‘witness’ to the (Christological) Word 
of God.^  ^ (3) McGlasson also emphasises and clarifies the way in which, for Barth, the text 
and its content should shape the reader (i.e. exegesis) rather than the reader the text (i.e. 
eisegesis)—even if Barth’s work is not always successful in allowing this to take place. '^^
Despite these contributions of McGlasson, two main features of his work are deficient 
and require supplementation. First, hke Baxter, McGlasson restricts his treatment of Barth’s 
use of Scripture to Barth’s exegesis—and thus deals almost exclusively with Barth’s 
exegetical excursuses. But again, Barth’s use of Scripture involves more than exegesis and, 
as such, it indirectly shapes the large-print sections of his work (where no texts are usually 
cited). Second, McGlasson often does not treat even Barth’s exegesis with sufficient 
attention to detail, instead summarising and surveying broad trends in Barth’s work. 
Accordingly, he rarely quotes Barth, with the effect that we cannot easily ‘hear Barth’s voice’ 
coming through in his exposition.
A second special study of note in the decade of the 1990’s is Mary K. Cunningham’s 
What is Theological Exegesis? Interpretation and Use o f Scripture in Barth’s Doctrine o f 
Election (1995). This work is brief (95 pages) and is significantly more narrow in scope than 
any of the studies we have examined so fai*. Cunningham focuses primarily on Barth’s 
interpretation and use of one New Testament text about predestination (Ephesians 1:4f) 
within Barth’s doctrine of election in CD, II/2. Like Ford, Baxter and McGlasson, 
Cunningham is concerned with Barth’s actual exegetical and theological practice rather than 
his theoretical hermeneutical comments.^^ Specifically, she is concerned to explicate the 
‘internal logic’ of Barth’s approach under the rubric o f ‘theological e x e g e s i s .S h e
McGlasson 1991: 47, 8. Again, this stands against Ford’s reductionistic construal of Barth’s interpretation of 
Scripture under the single rubric o f ‘narrative’ interpretation 
See McGlasson 1991: chapter 1 (The Bible as Witness) and chapter 2 (Christ and the Bible). While Barth 
construes all Scripture as witness to the Word of God, he does so in a flexible and varied manner. This is partly 
owing to the feet that ‘not every strand of the biblical literature is straightforwardly witness’ (1991: 20; cf 20ff).
McGlasson 1991: 34fif. His chapter 3 on ‘The Bible and Theology’ speaks o f Barth’s presence as a theologian 
in his exegesis, which may sometimes involve Barth in ‘eisegesis.’
Cunningham 1995: 13f. Cunningham here gives several good reasons why it is methodologically superior to 
concentrate on Barth’s practice rather than theory; cf. McGlasson 1991: 6.
Cunningham 1995: 9.
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compares Barth’s exegesis of Eph 1:4f (and other related texts, like John 1 :lfif) with the 
‘standard’ historical-critical exegesis of scholars like Bultmann/^
For our purposes in this thesis, Cunningham’s most important contribution lies in her 
self-described effort to ‘illumine the relationship between Scripture and theology in [Barth’s] 
thought by exploring how Barth interweaves biblical interpretation and theological claims in 
developing the doctrine of elect ion.Cunningham’s narrow focus on a particular doctrine 
and biblical text helps her to examine the contours of this symbiotic relationship more 
concretely and more accurately than others. She shows the specific ways that Barth’s 
exegesis of Eph 1:4 and related texts shapes and grounds his doctrine of election and how his 
wider theological reflections effect his exegesis. Our treatment of Barth’s use of Scripture in 
his treatments of divine unity, constancy and eternity takes up a similar task.
Yet Cunningham’s study can be complemented and corrected by our own. First, 
while her conception of ‘theological exegesis’ is a step in the right direction, a still more 
comprehensive account of the relationship between Scripture and theology in Barth’s work is 
needed.^^ ‘Theological exegesis’ is not suited to include all the Bible’s various influences 
over the basic themes and structures of Barth’s thought. To do so would involve employing 
of terms like ‘use of Scripture,’ ‘functions of Scripture,’ ‘hermeneutical theology’ or 
‘biblically-based dogmatic theology.’ As such, Cunningham too fails to adequately recognise 
the indirect authorisation of dogmatics by Scripture. There is definitely a need to explore 
further how Bailh’s distinctive theological exegesis affects his theological method as a 
whole.
2.5. Concluding Comments
This concludes our survey of the main secondary literature in the last several decades 
of relevance to understanding the function of Scripture in Barth’s theological method.
Several other studies could be mentioned here,*  ^but the studies selected are sufficient to
Cunningham 1995: 50-67. 
Cunningham 1995:14; cf. 78-86.
Barth himself defines ‘theological exegesis’ broadly in Credo as ‘exposition of Holy Scripture’ that occurs 
‘within the pale of the Church’ and which asks the question ‘To what extent is there given to us, here in this 
text, witness to G od’s word?’ (Barth 1936: 177). Taken in a certain way, this may include the indirect use of 
Scripture, but this is not typical of the term ‘exegesis’ in Barth’s usage (see chapter 2, section 2).
Tlie following studies are worthy o f mention:
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provide a background for understanding our contribution to the question of Barth’s use of 
Scripture in the thesis.
As we have indicated throughout this section of the chapter (section 2), our thesis 
aims to challenge and overcome the unduly narrow or reductionistic views of the theological 
function of Scripture that have often prevailed in Barth scholarship. More specifically, our 
contribution regarding Bailh’s use of Scripture involves four main elements: (1) uncovering 
new ‘data’—i.e. examining a section of CD for which Barth’s use of Scripture has not yet 
been treated in detail; (2) clarifying the function of Scripture in this section of CD by placing 
it in relation to the functions of tradition and reason; (3) emphasising the ‘indirect’ 
relationship that often exists between Scripture and theology within Barth’s theological 
practice; and (4) developing the claim that the great creativity and variety of Barth’s use of 
Scripture is nonetheless ‘ordered’ or ‘disciplined’ by certain implicit hermeneutical rules and 
principles.
3. The Role of Theological Tradition in Barth’s Theology
3,L Introductory remarks
The function of theological tradition is an important lacuna in the field of Barth 
scholarship. In contrast to the large number of full-length studies related to Barth’s exegesis
(1) Wharton 1972: This article examines Barth’s ‘confessional exegesis’ with a particular emphasis on 
his influence on Biblical interpretation and his relationship to higher-criticism; as such, this work includes 
assessment of the earlier work on such subjects by Smend 1966 and Maiquardt 1970.
(2) Trowitzsch 1996: This German volume, edited by Michael Trowitzsch, contains tlie proceedings of 
a symposium held in Oct. 1995 in Jena on Barth’s interpretation of Scripture. It includes papers by Wolf 
Krotke, Walter Schmithals, Rudolf Smend and Trowitzsch. A recun ing theme of the papers is the connection 
between exegesis and dogmatics in Barth’s work.
(3) Demson 1997: This short book compares Barth and Frei concentrating on their treatments (in CD, 
IV and The Identity o f  Jesus Christ, respectively) o f a the strand of gospel narrative which relates the events of 
Jesus’ life, death and resurrection to the calling and ministry of the twelve apostles. This study treats virtually 
no secondary literature on either thinker.
(4) Kirchstein 1998: This German book provides an introduction to Baith’s biblical hermeneutic. It is 
the published form of the author’s 1991 doctoral thesis at Tübingen.
(5) Greene-McCreight 1999: This expository and comparative study treats Augustine, Calvin and 
Barth’s readings of the ‘plain sense’ of Genesis 1-3. This study provides a helpful analysis o f the relationship 
between plain or literal sense as (a) verbal sense and as (b) ecclesial ‘ruled reading’ (5-19; passim). Green- 
McCreight’s fine exposition of Barth employs a helpfiil distinction between ‘macro-exegesis’ (174-206) and 
‘micro-exegesis’ (206-221) and clarifies what it means to speak o f Barth’s exegesis as ‘literal’ (221-226). The 
relevance of this study to our own is limited, however, since its primary textual basis is Barth’s extended 
treatment of a narrative text in Barth’s Doctrine of Creation which is only very indirectly related to Barth’s 
varied use of mainly non-narrative texts in H/l.
(6) Büttner 2002: This German monograph, a revision of the author’s 2000 doctoral thesis at Erlangen- 
Nüremberg, focuses on the role of the Old Testament in Barth’s theological interpretation of Scripture.
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or use of Scripture, there ai’e hardly any such studies treating the fonction of theological 
tradition (or traditions) in Barth’s actual practice. In fact, no one has treated the fonction of 
tradition*^ comprehensively even with respect to a single section or chapter in the CD. This 
is significant, since Barth spends as much time and space in CD interacting with theological 
tradition as he does interacting with Scripture.
Despite this general lacuna in scholarship about the role of theological tradition in 
Barth’s work, there are several studies that shed light indirectly on specific aspects of his 
complex relationship to Christian theological tradition. In what follows, we will survey such 
studies under two main topical sub-divisions. We will concentrate on studies of Barth’s 
relationship to pre-modern theological tradition, since this is the aspect of theological 
tradition with which Barth interacts most frequently in 11/1 We will generally not attend to 
treatments of his relationship to individual thinkers, but will pay more attention to his 
reference to and engagement with certain broader tendencies or groupings within theological 
tradition that are represented by large numbers of individual thinkers.
3,2, Barth’s critique o f tradition: * classical or ^scholastic* views o f God
‘Classical’ or ‘scholastic’ views of God constitute what is probably the most 
significant sub-category of theological tradition that Barth interacts with in his treatment of 
divine perfections. We place the adjectives ‘classical’ and ‘scholastic’ in quotation marks in 
this sub-section, since they are terms that tend to be used in a wide variety of ways in the 
field of theology. For this reason we will need to qualify carefully our use of these terms 
later (see chapter 2, section 4). At this time, we only need to indicate that in our usage, 
‘classical’ theology and ‘scholastic’ theology both refer to theologies in the Christian West
When we refer to ‘tradition’ in this thesis, we mean theological tradition’ unless otherwise stated.
Other scholars have already stated with adequate comprehensiveness and accuracy the nature of Barth’s 
relationship to modern theology (e.g. McCormack 1995 and Dorrien 2000). The claims of this thesis fill out our 
understanding of Barth in a way that is largely complementary to the work of such scholars. In addition to Barth 
having ‘a very strong foot in the 19*’' century’ (McCormack 1995:466), we add that Barth still has a ‘strong 
foot’ in the pre-modern western exegetical-theological tradition (notably in the 4* century and the lb**' century), 
and in the still earlier ‘world of Scripture.’
Barth scholars have already done fairly extensive studies of Barth’s relationship to individual theologians. For 
example, there are several studies on Barth’s relationship to and interpretation of Anselm (G. W. Watson 1977 
and 1989; Pugh 1998, both of which respond to Barth 1960 {Amelm: Fides Quaerem Intellectum]). Also, for 
two illuminating, but somewhat differing, views on what Barth’s theological method draws from Anselm, see 
Gunton (1978: 117-127) and McCormack (1995:421-448). Rogers (1995) offers a comparison of Barth and 
Aquinas concentrating on the question of natural knowledge o f God. For Barth’s relationship to individual 
modern philosophers and theologians see the sources cited below in sub-section 4.3.
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that involve a synthesis of Hellenistic philosophical conceptions of God and the biblical 
portrayal of God.
In his Becoming and Being: The Doctrine o f God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl 
Barth, 1978, Colin Gunton offers one of very few detailed discussions of Barth’s relationship 
to ‘classical theism.’*"^ Gunton defines classical theism in terms of an interpretation of 
Thomas Aquinas as its great exemplar.^^ As such, the ‘classical’ tradition refers both to a 
particular view of God and to a theological method that tends to be associated with it.
Gunton rightly judges Barth’s view of God to depart significantly from the classical 
understanding and approach (at least as Gunton characterises it), but also to have retained 
certain traces of this classical paradigm.
We will draw from Gunton’s insightful work at several points in our exposition 
tliroughout this thesis, especially in terms of how it sheds light on Barth’s distinctive 
theological method. However, Gunton does not specifically explore (as we will do) the 
significance of Barth’s critical response to the classical approach in terms of the broader role 
of theological tradition in his theological method. This is something our thesis will need to 
do in the course of examining Bar th’s doctrine of God and especially certain perfections of 
divine freedom.
Thomas F. Torrance’s Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian, 1990, treats 
Barth’s relationship to ‘scholasticism,’ in both its medieval and Protestant forms. Torrance 
uses the term ‘scholasticism’ rather negatively to refer to a particular approach to theological 
method. The roots or this approach are found in the ‘Latin’ tradition exemplified by 
Tertullian and Augustine, which he contrasts with the Greek patristic tradition exemplified 
above all by Athanasius. Torrance regards Barth as marked by certain exemplary
^ Several scholars have alluded to Barth’s relationship with the ‘classical theism,’ although few discuss it in 
detail. Welker 1986 explores this question briefly in the context of Barth’s relationship to Process Theology, 
Like Gunton, Welker judges Barth to be largely critical o f classical theism. Moltmann judges Barth to be more 
postively related to classical theism (which he calls simply ‘theism’ or ‘monotheism’), both in respect to what 
he judges to be Barth’s inadequately Trinitarian view of God (Moltmann 1974 and 1981; see our chapter 3) and 
in respect to Barth’s allegedly ‘Platonic’ understanding o f God’s eternity (Moltmann 1996; 13-16,18; see our 
chapter 6). Gunton’s concern to emphasise Barth’s critique of classical concepts of God has roots in the creative 
exposition of Barth provided in Jenson 1969.
Gunton 1978: 1-7.
Clearly, our use of Greek here is to be contrasted with our earlier use o f ‘Hellenistic’ to refer to the earlier non 
Christian Greek philosophical-theological tradition (Plato and Aristotle, and so on).
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characteristics of this Greek tradition and as avoiding the negative characteristics of the 
Latin-scholastic tradition.®  ^ In addition, Torrance regards Barth as recapturing the insights of 
the Reformers after the theological decline represented by both the Protestant orthodox 
scholastics and the modern liberal theologians after Schleiermacher. Whether or not we 
agree with Torrance’s reading of theological history, his comments on the characteristics of 
Barth’s theology and his employment of tradition (both as an object of critique and as a 
positive guide) are often insightful and always provocative. That said, their substantiation 
calls for a more sufficiently detailed exposition of Barth than Torrance provides. Some 
detailed exposition is supplied by the scholarship we will mention in the next sub-subsection, 
and more will be provided by our thesis.
3.3. Barth *s positive use o f tradition: Trinitarian and Christological Doctrines
There are several relevant studies that relate to the methodological role of the ancient 
trinitarian and Christological doctrines in Barth’s theology. The most extensive and 
significant work in this category is E.P. Meijering’s study. Von Den Kirchenvatern zu Karl 
Barth: Das Altkircklichen Dogma in der Kirchlichen Dogmatik. This masterful study of 
Barth’s relationship to the church fathers shows in detail how Barth’s CD is thoroughly 
permeated by the trinitarian and christological dogmas of the church fathers, as they are 
expressed in the Nicene Creed and Chalcedonian formulation. Meijering shows how Barth 
uses the trinitarian and christological dogmas in relation to each of the main doctrines of CD, 
including the doctrine of God.^ ® In particular, he shows how Barth’s use of these traditional 
Christian doctrines forms the basis for Barth’s critique of other traditional patristic doctrines 
of God which have been mfluenced by forms of ‘natural theology.’ As such, we see that 
Barth’s interpretation and use of theological tradition allows him to employ some teachings 
of the fathers against others. In this thesis we will regard this two-fold (negative and 
positive) role of tradition to be a methodological pattern rooted largely in the scriptural
Torrance goes as far as to refer to the ‘Latin Heresy’ (1990:213ft).
The accuracy o f any given account o f theological history is not our concern in this thesis. We are concerned 
with such historical accounts (whether by Barth or his interpreters) only as they bear on the interpretation of 
Barth’s method.
On Barth’s relationship to the Church Fathers, see also Torrance 1990: 182-212 (focusing on Athanasius). 
Meijering 1993: 159-238.
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critique of tradition (see our comments in 3.4. below).^* Meijering’s work is useful to us, 
because it begins to clarify certain patterns in Barth’s use of patristic tradition that are 
significant for understanding Barth’s use of theological tradition as a whole within his 
theological method.
Another work showing the methodological significance of tradition, specifically the 
doctrine of the Trinity, in Barth’s theology is Benjamin C. Leslie’s Trinitarian Hermeneutics: 
The Hermeneutical Significance o f Karl Barth’s Doctrine o f the Trinity, 1991. As the title 
indicates, Leslie is concerned specifically with the hermeneutical significance of the 
trinitarian doctrine, that is, to show how the doctrine of the Trinity functions pervasively in 
Barth’s CD (he works directly with the KD) to direct the ‘interpretation of Scripture, the 
formulation of language about God, and an understanding of the human se lf’
Chapter four of Leslie’s book focuses specifically on ‘the role of the tradition in the 
trinitarian hermeneutic.’^^  Leslie begins this chapter with a section in Barth’s theoretical 
‘model for relating Scripture and tradition’ (drawing mainly fiom Barth’s comments in 1/2). 
He then turns to ‘concrete instances in which Barth uses tradition,especially in his 
development of the doctrine of the Trinity in 1/1. Leslie argues correctly that Barth’s use of 
tradition involves a ‘creative appropriation of traditional formulations.’^  ^This can be seen, 
for example, in Baith’s controversial choice of the term Seinsweise or ‘mode of being’ (the 
Western tradition’s ‘minority view’) over the usual term ‘P erso n s.D esp ite  such creativity, 
Leslie critiques Barth for often remaining overly concerned to retain the precise conceptual 
and linguistic form of the doctrine reached in the fourth century or in later Western
Meijering avoids extensive consideration of the role of the Bible in Barth’s work, restricting his attention to 
some important principles within his Bible-usage (1993: 3). However, he gi ants that the role of the Bible is to 
some extent inseparable from his consideration of the role of patristic tradition in Barth’s work. For example, 
Meijering states that for Barth the ‘God of the Bible is the Triune God and the Triune God is the God of the 
Bible’ (3; my translation).
^  Leslie 1991: 1. We could also note that Barth himself appeared to regard the Trinity as a ‘critical principle’ 
(or perhaps a ‘hermeneutical key’) useful in the critique of modern (and perhaps earlier) theology (Barth in 
Godsey 1963,48f)
Leslie 1991: 125-175.
Leslie 1991: 143.
Leslie 1991: 164.
^  See Leslie 1991: 149ff. Sympathetic to Barth’s own self-understanding o f his use o i Seinsweise, Leslie states, 
‘In challenging the tradition he is in effect championing the tradition’ (150). This relates to Barth’s frequent 
methodological tendency to critique one part of tradition on the basis of another part which he regards a fruer to 
Scripture and to the calling of the church.
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developments of it (including the filioque). Such a conservative tendency, Leslie thinks, 
stands in tension with Barth’s own theoretical affirmations of the historically relative and 
provisional character of all theological statements.^^
3.4. Responding to the scholarly situation regarding Barth *s use o f tradition 
As the studies surveyed above would suggest, Barth is marked by a ‘dialectical’ 
relationship to pre-modem theological tradition, a relationship involving both affirmation and 
critique. On this general point, most commentators would probably agree, although they 
might disagree about whether affirmation or critique (or perhaps a subsequent ‘synthesis’) 
has the priority. But few scholars (including those cited above) have developed this point in 
any detail, as we will do in this study.
More specifically, our examination of the role of tradition in parts of CD, II/1, chapter 
VI offers an interpretation of why Barth responds to the tradition as he does. Our claim is 
that the primary basis of Barth’s evaluation of theological tradition is whether it proves 
faithfiil to Scripture. Thus, Barth’s use of tradition is controlled by his interpretation and use 
of Scripture.^^
4. The Role of Reason in Barth’s Theology
4.1. Introduction
In turning to the question of the role of reason in Barth, we turn to a different order of 
inquiry than we did in considering the roles of Scripture and theological tradition. There are 
several reasons for this. (1) ‘Reason’ can be defined as a faculty or capacity (even if that is 
not all that reason is), as neither Scripture nor tradition can. (2) Unlike Christian Scripture 
and theological tradition, reason (unless it is radically qualified) does not lie within the 
specific domain of the church or of Christian faith. (3) While nearly all Barth scholars have
Leslie 1991: 165f. This would appear to one of the legitimate points underlying the Ph.D. thesis o f Haupert 
(1977). However, Haupert’s interpretation o f Barth is extreme and marked by serious flaws. For example, he 
believes that Barth is marked by a ‘creedal fundamentalism’ (1977: 377ff) that assumes that ‘creedal Tradition 
is an infallible articulation of revelation’ and even a ‘fourth form’ of “the Word o f God” (Haupert 1977: xi, 339- 
376).
^  There is also a sense in which the reverse is true. For example, Barth’s interprets Scripture in light of 
tradition and has a strong aversion to ‘biblicism’—the notion that the theologian has direct interpretative contact 
with Scripture that can and should by-pass the church of both past and present (see I/l, 607f and Barth 1936: 
1558).
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recognised at some level the important roles of Scripture and tradition in his work, they have 
often not recognised the importance of the role of reason in his theology. In fact, Barth has 
been accused of being either a ‘fideist’ or an ‘irrationalist.’^  ^Such charges, of course, involve 
a certain view of what faith and reason are or should be, often one quite different from that 
which is proposed by or operative in Barth.
For such reasons, it will be helpful to consider some studies that have clarified how 
Barth construes and uses reason. We will see that Barth’s construal and use of reason is 
complex, and cannot be reduced to a simple perspective.
4.2. General Treatments o f the Nature and Role o f Reason in Barth *s Theology 
Two scholars that have been particularly helpful in clarifying the role of reason in 
Barth’s work are Steven G. Smith and George Hunsinger.^®  ^ Smith’s relevant work is his 
article ‘Karl Barth and Fideism: A Reconsideration’ (1991), to which we now turn.
The first point of relevance is that, according to Smith, Barth believes that faith 
transcends reason only in a specific sense of ‘reason.’ Barth consistently maintained that 
‘the obedience of faith transcends reason {Vernunft).*^^^ However, in such contexts ‘ Vernunft 
means only the human individual’s faculty of reason.’ While faith and its object in revelation 
transcend such individual reason, they do not transcend or contradict rationality or reason in 
any ultimate sense (i.e. God’s ‘reason’). In fact, ‘revelation is described in the first volume of 
Church Dogmatics as a thoroughly rational event of the divine reason speaking to the human
reason.
Second, Smith makes the related point that Barth uses ‘reason’ {Vernunft and related 
words) in different ways. (1) Sometimes Barth uses reason in what we might call a pragmatic 
or instrumental sense: as our created capacity to know ‘that two and two equals four instead
^ These charges have perhaps been most vociferiously voiced by certain conservative evangelical theologians 
who believe firmly in a role for reason in the articulation and defence o f the Christian faith (Clark 1962; Holder 
2001; see McDowell 2001 for a critique of Holder). But such charges have also been voiced by more liberal 
scholars that regard Barth as an obscurantist who devalues reason (Macquarrie 1963: 333ff; Roberts 1979).
The majority o f Barth scholars, however, do recognise Barth’s efforts to be rational and to avoid mere 
fideism— as will be evident in the scholars cited below.
Other scholars giving helpful, but generally less extensive comments on this general issue ai e Hartwell 1964: 
42-48; Gunton 1978: 218ffand 1986, Torrance 1990:45f
Smith 1991: 69.
Smith 1991: 69; he cites FI, 135.
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of five.’ As such, reason is an innocent, even neutral, faculty that can be used for good or 
for ill. (2) At other times, by contrast, Barth uses reason to refer to a network of powers and 
aspirations in humanity that rebels against God and is thus in conflict with faith and God’s 
revelation. (3) Again, Barth also uses reason or rationality to refer to the capacity, given 
by God in the event of revelation/reconciliation, to conform one’s thinking to God as the 
object of one’s k n o w le d g e .A s  such, right theological reasoning requires a decision of 
faith in God and a related openness and submission to God’s word.^ ®^  In this thesis, we will 
need to be aware of all three meanings for ‘reason’—which we may call the neutral, the 
negative and the positive senses of reason respectively.
Third, Smith distinguishes between two main functions of reason in theology: a 
constraining (or critical) fonction, and an ‘enabling or fi-eeing’ (or constructive) function. 
Barth’s CD appears to employ reason in both of these functions, but gives priority to the 
latter fonction. The former, constraining function of reason ‘disciplines our discourse by 
keeping it off the wrong paths’—and for Barth that includes any path that attempts to get to 
God fiom a basis in fallen humanity rather than revelation (i.e. natural theology).*’® The 
latter, freeing function of reason is the use of our minds as grounded in the obedience of faith.
In these ways. Smith begins to clarify how Barth construes and uses reason in the CD, 
showing that Barth should not be classed as a ‘fideist.’ However, Smith does not adequately 
spell out the concrete manifestations of reason’s role in any section of CD. Neither does 
Smith develop the significance of the role of reason for understanding Barth’s overall method 
(in relation to Scripture and tradition).
George Hunsinger, in his acclaimed book How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape o f his 
Theology (1991), not only makes a significant contribution towards our understanding of the
Barth from Table Talk, as quoted in Smith 1991; 69.
Smith 1991: 69f.
Smith 1991: 70ft This link between rationality and ‘objectivity’ is an issue to which T.F. Torrance has given 
great emphasis (see his studies in 1962 and 1990), following Barth’s own emphasis on it in his book on Anselm 
(1960 [1931 German original]).
See Smith 1991: 75f.
Smith 1991: 75. Although the first function is negative in force, both functions are in the service o f the 
positive or constructive theological end of the obedience o f faith. As such both functions can be classified under 
the third ‘positive’ (or legitimate) sense of reason mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
In Barth’s earlier work (e.g. The Epistle to the Romans), his priorities are reversed in this respect.
Smith 1991: 75.
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role of reason in CD, but shows how the role of reason relates to larger trends in Baith’s 
theological method. Hunsinger identifies ‘rationalism’ as one of six motifs that pervade 
Barth’s CD.” * Hunsinger is quick to clarify that, when he uses the term ‘rationalism’ to 
describe Barth’s theology, he is using it in a highly distinctive sense. As he puts it, ‘The 
rationalism peculiar to Barth’s theology, being internal and not external to faith, might 
instead by called “reason within the limits of revelation alone.’” **^  Accordingly, Barth’s 
theology is, like Anselm’s, a project o f ‘faith seeking understanding.’
Hunsinger organises his treatment of Barth’s rationalism, under two complementary 
headings: ‘no knowledge without faith’**^  and ‘no faith without knowledge.’**"* The former 
suggests the critical limits of the ‘knowledge of faith,’ i.e. knowledge based upon faith in 
God’s self-revelation. Specifically, Barth allows for the following limits: no neutrality, no 
speculation, no apologetics and no system.**  ^ The latter phrase, ‘no faith without knowledge’ 
indicates how faith is intrinsically (though not exclusively) rational, marked by cognitive 
content that may be developed by means of vaiious logical and cognitive operations. Barth’s 
theological method involves five specific rational procedures: (1) deriving doctrines from the 
content of faith, (2) grounding the events that Scripture refers to in their conditions of 
possibility, (3) ordering the relation of parts to the whole, (4) testing each doctrine according 
to its relation to faith in Christ and its adequacy as an interpretation of Scripture, (5) and 
assimilating extra-biblical concepts in a way that transforms them so that they can fulfil their 
proper theological roles.**®
Hunsinger’s analysis of Barth’s theology in terms of these rational procedures and the 
limits of reason under the constraint and guidance of faith, provides a fairly comprehensive 
guide to the main ways that reason functions in the CD. This includes some indication of 
how reason functions in relation to Scripture and (to a lesser extent) to tradition (see the
We will briefly comment on the other motifs in chapter 2.
Hunsinger 1991: 49.
Hunsinger 1991: 49-54. This corresponds to some extent to Smith’s reference to the ‘constraining function’ 
o f reason (1991: 75; see above).
Hunsinger 1991: 54-64. This corresponds roughly to Smith’s ‘freeing function of reason’ (1991: 75; see 
above).
Each of these limits on reason involves the relationship of rationalism to one or more of the other constitutive 
motifs that Hunsinger has identified in Barth’s theology.
Hunsinger 1991: 55-63.
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procedures of deriving and assimilating in particular). However, Hunsinger’s treatment is 
relatively brief and schematic. Our work in this thesis will fill out and test his account of 
Barth’s ‘rationalism’ within the accounts of God’s unity, constancy and eternity in II/l.
4.3. Barth and Philosophy
Barth is often known for his explicit resistance to the systematic use of philosophy in 
theology, i.e. a use of philosophy in which a given philosophy is considered to be the 
necessary pre-understanding or worldview for interpreting revelation and doing theology.**^ 
However, most Barth scholars recognise Barth’s indebtedness to ‘philosophy’ in some form, 
especially modern philosophy, even though they do not agree about how one should assess 
the nature and degree of this indebtedness. Clearly, an understanding of the distinctive nature 
of Barth’s way of thinking and reasoning, requires discernment in respect to how the Western 
philosophical tradition was received by Barth, an endeavour which inevitably overlaps with 
the investigation of the role of theological tradition in his work.***
There have been many studies that deal with Barth’s explicit or implicit relationship 
with various modern thinkers, both theological and philosophical.**® Barth clearly interacts 
extensively with modem thinkers in his theological work, giving a mixture of positive and 
negative evaluations of them.*^ ® What is less clear is the nature of the subtle implicit 
influences that modem thinkers or modern intellectual trends have had on Barth’s theology.
In addition, scholars have raised questions about the role of ancient or pre-modem 
philosophy in Barth’s thought. For example, some interpreters have characterised Barth as
This is perhaps most clear in his long-running debate with Bultmann and others over the question of a 
systematic (existentialist) philosophical pre-understanding for biblical interpretation. See the comments of 
Christoph Schwôbel on the general relationship in his essay on Barth's view of ‘Theology’ (2000; 268). For 
Barth’s own theoretical comments on how reason and especially philosophy should function in biblical 
interpretation, see 1/2,727-36, on which we will comment in chapter 2 (section 4).
We could have considered the question o f philosophy under the category o f tradition (which we have decided 
to restrict to theological tradition) rather than reason. Following the work of Alastair MacIntyre, we tend to 
assume in this thesis that what counts as ‘reason’ is to a large extent particular to social and historical contexts 
or traditions (MacIntyre 1988 and 1990). Given the general appropriateness of MacIntyre’s conceptions of 
‘tradition’ and ‘traditioned rationality,’ then, Barth can be seen as a member o f a certain Christocentric- 
Reformed tradition of theological rationality.
The following secondary sources are most important for tracing the relation of the Barth (especially the 
Barth of the CD) to modem thinkers: Duke and Streetman 1988 on Schleiermacher; Jersild 1962 on Ritschl; 
Hendry 1984 and McCormack 1995 on Kant; Sherman 1997 and Gockel 2000 on Domer, and Dorrien 2000 on 
Herrmann. Various writers have commented on Barth’s alleged Hegelianism, such as Yon Balthasar 1971, 
Hendry 1978, Welker 1983, Bradshaw 1989 and Thielecke 1990.
E.g., Barth’s Protestant Theology in the Century (1972) and in various excursuses on modem 
philosophers in CD (see the list o f these in Hartwell 1964: 16f).
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Platonic or Neo-Platonic,*^* a suggestion that, if true, would limit the decisiveness of Barth’s 
critique of the classical (and often specifically Neo-Platonic) conception of God (see 3.2 
above).
A basic question in the interpretation of Barth’s theology relates to the nature of the 
role or influence of philosophy in CD—philosophy that might be variously (neo-) Platonic, 
(neo-) Kantian, Hegelian or existentialist in character. Virtually all interpreters recognise the 
presence of philosophical terminology or conceptuality in Barth’s work: e.g. the ‘Platonic’ 
distinctions between the eternal and the temporal or the ‘Kantian’ subject-object or analytic- 
synthetic distinctions. The crucial question is how the presence of such terminology, or 
perhaps more substantive instances of philosophical thinking, is to be interpreted when it is 
found in Barth’s work.
Barth scholars can be divided into two basic camps on this question. On the one 
hand, there are those who see the presence o f philosophy as simply formal *^  ^or 
terminological, and those who believe that Barth consistently transforms such philosophical 
forms or terms as needed to make them usable in a theology controlled by revelation. *^  ^ As 
such, philosophy has little or no influence on the material content of Barth’s theology. On 
the other hand, there are those who regard the influence of philosophy (usually modern 
philosophy) to be deep and pervasive in Barth’s theology, significantly shaping his material 
claims. In this thesis, we will argue that it is impossible to frame this question in such 
general terms, and that the nature of the influence of philosophy hovers between these two 
options depending on the specific part of Barth’s work in question. In the parts of CD our 
investigation emphasises, the first perspective is most often more accurate. That said, 
philosophy sometimes exercises some influence on the material content of Barth’s doctrine of 
God. This is true in part because it is impossible to fully separate the formal and material 
aspects of a philosophy or a theology, as Barth hhnself indicated on many occasions.
See especially the work of Moltmann, who regards Barth’s conception of time and eternity, and his related 
eschatology, as ‘Platonic’ (although also ‘idealistic in other respects’), a characteristic which he ascribes to the 
influence of Barth’s brother Heinrich, a Plato scholar (Moltmann 1996: 18, 13-16). See also the work of Regin 
Prenter and other scholars (cited by Leslie 1991: 109f; 122 and Gunton 1978: 183f).
See Frei 1992: 40f.
See Hunsinger on the procedure o f ‘assimilation’ (1991: 61ft; see 4.2 above).
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Accordingly, some scholars argue that Barth should have been more explicit about and 
critical of the philosophical influences shaping his theology.* "^*
4.4. A *TooT of Theological Reason: Dialectic
When asked by one student what reason meant for his theology, Barth replied, T use 
it.’ Barth’s use of this ‘instrumental’ sense of reason (see 4.2 above) encourages us to
explore the rational or conceptual tools that Barth uses within his theological method.
Scholars have typically identified ‘dialectic’ as the primary tool of this sort in Barth’s work, 
although they have not always interpreted it correctly, especially in relation to ‘analogy.’
Since there has been much confusion and controversy over how to understand the role of 
dialectic in Barth’s mature work in CD, we will use this sub-section largely to summarise the 
contributions that the recent work of Bruce McCormack has made in clarifying this issue.
In his masterful study, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology (1995), 
McCormack has offered a compelling argument in favour of an alternative to the ‘traditional’ 
two-stage, dialectic-to-analogy view of Barth’s intellectual development. In the course of 
this argument, McCoimack sheds light on the nature of dialectic and analogy and how they 
actually function in Barth’s theology.
McCormack first clarifies how there are several kinds o f ‘dialectic’ in Barth’s 
theology. For our purposes, the two main categories of dialectic are: (1) ‘noetic dialectic,’ a 
dialectical method or form of thought {Denhforrn) that structures Barth’s theological thought 
and speech, and (2) an ‘ontic dialectic’ {Realdialektik) that is descriptive of objective 
relations in reality (e.g. the relationship between time and eternity or between God’s acts of 
veiling and unveiling).*^® Although McCormack regards Barth’s Realdialektik as more basic 
and important than his ‘noetic dialectic’ or ‘dialectical method,’ we will concentrate primarily 
on the former as a fiinction (or tool) of Barth’s distinctive theological reasoning.
For a similar position to ours on the philosophical influences affecting Barth’s theology, especially his 
trinitarian doctrine, see Leslie 1991: 87-123.
Bromiley 1982:43.
See McCormack 1995: I lf , where he is summarising four kinds of dialectic discerned by Michael Beintker in 
Barth’s early theology. The term ‘ontic dialectic’ is ours.
McCormack 1995:18. That said, we are inclined to join McCormack in seeing Barth’s material convictions 
about the Realdtalectik to be prior to and determinative o f his dialectical method. Further, we wish to stress 
more generally how Barth’s theological method is closely interrelated to and often insepaiable from the material 
content o f his thought, at least in its broad outlines.
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McCormack understands Barth’s dialectical method as ‘a method that calls for every 
theological statement to be placed over against a counter-statement, without allowing the 
dialectical tension between the two to be resolved in a higher synthesis.’*^ *
McCormack provides evidence that Barth continues to use this dialectical method in 
his later work in and does so in a way that harmoniously coexists with his use of 
‘analogy.’ For example, Barth’s doctrine of God in II/1 is governed by the dialectical 
interplay between God’s love and freedom (see chapter 3). In this thesis, we will show with 
greater concreteness than McCormack how such a dialectic actually functions within Barth’s 
accounts of divine unity, constancy and eternity. We will see that dialectic is a mode of 
reasoning that allows the major aspects of the biblical witness to God to be heard without 
prematurely reducing one aspect to another.
4,5, Conclusion: Responding to Studies of the Role o f Reason in Barth 
We have seen how diverse studies of different aspects of Barth’s theology have 
illuminated the role of reason in his theology. We have seen how this is the case in respect to 
some general studies of the role of reason (4.2) as well as studies pertaining to the role of 
philosophy (4.3) or of dialectic (4.4) within Barth’s work. We have also seen some 
limitations of these studies that can be met by our present study. What will emerge is a 
conception of theological reason that is subordinate to and receptive of revelation. In the task 
of interpreting God’s self-revelation attested in Scripture, reason fimctions in a variety of ad 
hoc ways. Instead of proposing the use of a systematic philosophical pre-understanding (as 
Bultmann did), Barth believes that the object known in revelation needs to determine the 
appropriate ways of being known, including the methodological functions of reason.*^* We
McCormack 1995: 11. As such, he understands Barth’s dialectical method similarly to von Balthasar 1951 
(see McCormack 1995: 7, note 19), despite his other differences with von Balthasar.
McCormack 1995:16ff; 346; 455ff. McCormack draws from the Princeton doctoral thesis o f Teiry Cross 
(1991) to support his view that dialectic is strongly present in CD, volume II. We will also make occasional 
appeal to Cross’s work in this study. Also, McGlasson notes how ‘dialectic patterns of presentation and 
analysis’ are often present even in Barth’s exegesis within volume I and II of CD (1991: 89f; see 2.4 above).
McCormack does not believe that analogy, at least Barth’s dominant concept of analogia fldei, is a ‘method’ 
at all (1995: 18f). Instead, it is an ‘actualistic’ conception of an ontic analogy created by God’s gracious acts—  
which in the later Barth was understood Christocentrically. That said, McCormack concedes that there are 
‘methodological implications’ of the ‘analogy o f faith’ (19).
On Barth’s ‘objectivism,’ see T. F. Torrance (1990: 52-60) and Hunsinger (1991: 35-39).
33
now turn directly to Barth’s understanding of the nature of the divine object that is known in 
revelation, the unique self-revealing God who is marked by certain perfections.
5. Baith’s Doctrine of the Perfections of Divine Freedom and its Context within His 
Doctrine of God as a Whole
5.i. Introduction
As stated before, while this thesis is primarily concerned with Barth’s theological 
method, we believe that his method cannot be abstracted from Barth’s theological content. 
This conviction is implied by our overall strategic aim: to discern the nature of Barth’s 
theological method primarily from his practice, rather than his theoretical comments about 
proper method. Since Barth’s practice is always concerned with arguing for specific material 
conclusions, we cannot escape some consideration of these conclusions. In our case, we need 
to be concerned with the content of Barth’s doctrine o f ‘the reality [Wirklichkeit^ of God.’ 
Barth’s doctrine of the ‘reality of God’ is his ‘doctrine of God proper,’ a sub-set within a 
larger body of inquiry that forms the doctrine of God in a larger sense. Much of this 
doctrine of the ‘reality of God’ is concerned with the divine perfections, which Barth divides 
into the perfections of divine loving and the perfections of divine freedom (see chapter 3).
Before we turn to some studies on the ‘Doctrine of the Reality of God’ we should note 
a number of studies of aspects of Barth’s theology in CD that form part of the essential 
background or context necessary for understanding this portion of his work. These studies 
fall into two main categories. First, there are studies of Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity, both 
his detailed treatment of the doctrine in CD I/l and the significance of it in his overall 
theology.* "^* To understand the doctrine of the Trinity is foundational to understanding 
Barth’s thoroughly trinitarian doctrine of divine perfections. Second, studies of Barth’s
We remind our readers that well-known interpreters of Barth have regarded IF I and especially chapter VI as 
either a ‘high point’ (T. F. Torrance 1990: 124, 133) or a turning point (McCormack 1995: 22,461) in Barth’s 
theological work.
In the broad sense in which Barth used the term, ‘Doctrine o f God’ includes ‘Knowledge o f God’ (IF I, V) 
along with the doctrine of Election and the ethics that flowed from it (IF2), but only IF I, chapter VI would fit 
the traditional definition of the term.
The most important works in both regards are Jiingel 1976 (ED, Rowan Williams (1979) and Alan Torrance 
1996 and 2000. In addition, the following are also helpful, especially for showing the significance of the Trinity 
in Barth’s overall theology: Jenson 1969, Gunton 1978 (see 3.2 above), Bradshaw 1979 and Leslie 1991.
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doctrine of election (in II/2, chapter VII) also provide part of the relevant context for 
understanding Barth doctrine of the ‘Reality of God,’ even though it was written later.* We 
will summarise our own conclusions pertaining to Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity in chapter 3 
(section 1) and will comment on the role of election occasionally throughout the course of the 
thesis.
5,2. Studies of Barth *s Doctrine o f *The Reality of God*
The relatively few existing treatments of Barth’s doctrine of the ‘Reality of God,’ in 
CD II/l, chapter VI, tend to fall into two categories. First, there are several ‘overviews,’ 
studies that are comprehensive in scope, but which are relatively brief and lacking in detail.*^ ® 
Second, there are detailed studies of individual divine perfections, such as divine power (or 
omnipotence)*^^ or eternity.*^* We will draw on resources from both of these categories of 
study in our consideration of Barth in this thesis.
One treatment of Baith’s doctrine of God that transcends these two categories, being 
both relatively comprehensive and relatively detailed, is the University of Edinburgh doctoral 
thesis of Thomas Currie (1976), entitled ‘Being in Act: Ontology and Epistemology in Karl 
Barth’s Doctrine of God.’*^® As the title indicates, Currie’s focus is on Barth’s unique 
answer to the Western intellectual problem of how to relate divine being and the human act of 
knowing. Barth’s answer is found in his theological concept of God’s ‘being in act’—a 
concept which Barth unfolds in the opening section of the ‘Reality of God’ (§ 28.1). Currie’s 
manner of grasping the nature and significance of Barth’s distinctive concept of God’s being 
in act leads him far beyond II/l, chapter IV, which he expounds in detail in only one of seven 
chapters of his thesis.*"*® Nonetheless, Currie’s treatment of Barth’s chapter on the ‘Reality of
On election, see Gunton 1974 and McCormack 2000 (cf. other sources cited by McCormack (2000: 110). 
Election is relevant to II/1, partly because Barth had a Christocentric doctrine of election in mind similar to that 
developed in II/2 even before he wrote about the being and perfections of God in 11/1 (McCormack 1995:453- 
463).
Some of the best of these overviews o f Barth’s doctrine o f God are found the relevant portions of the 
following works: Camfield 1947, Gunton 1978, Webster 1995 and Johnson 1997.
See the book by Patricia Greeve Daveney (1986).
The best treatment of Barth’s account of eternity in II/l is Hunsinger 2000:186-209. O f the three perfections 
we have chosen to treat in this thesis, only ‘Eternity’ has been treated in any detail by other scholars, but with a 
confusing array of contradictoiy interpretations and evaluations (see chapter 6). Unity and constancy are among 
the majority of Barth’s ‘perfections’ to have received only brief treatments by Barth scholars in the course of 
treating Barth’s doctrine of God as a whole.
See also Currie 1986.
See Currie 1976:428-513.
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God’ remains one of the most helpful expositions available, especially with respect to the 
ontological and epistemological implications of Barth’s distinctive theological view. The 
epistemological implications in particular shed light on the distinctive theological method 
that Barth employs (especially in respect to the ‘obedient’ use of reason) in coming to know 
and speak of God’s acts and being in II/l.
However, there are certain limitations to Currie’s work that require supplementation 
in this thesis. His treatments of individual divine perfections (among the perfections of 
divine freedom, he treats God’s eternity and glory in more detail*"**), while longer than those 
given in the ‘overviews’ mentioned above, are not detailed enough to discern certain 
significant features of Barth’s thought that we will take up in this thesis. For example, the 
role of Scripture as an important basis for Barth’s viewpoints is virtually ignored in Currie’s 
exposition, despite its taking up a significant portion of Barth’s work in II/l.
In keeping with our primary focus on Barth’s concrete theological practice and the 
method that is evident in it, the priorities of our expository analysis of Barth’s doctrine of 
God are roughly the opposite of Currie’s. That is, while Currie gives extended attention to 
the distinctive concept of being and knowing that Barth employs in his doctrine of God as a 
whole (God’s ‘being in act’), as well as its significance in Barth’s overall theology and in the 
history of Western thought, we will summarise Barth’s use of this conceptuality only briefly 
(in chapter 3). Conversely, while Currie summarises Barth’s lengthy treatment of individual 
divine perfections relatively briefly, we will spend three chapters of our work doing extended 
expository analyses of three specific divine perfections of freedom (chapters 4-6). Our 
opposite emphasis will allow us to complement Currie’s thesis and take up a fresh approach 
to grasping the content of Barth’s doctrine of God. Furthermore, while Currie gives a 
balanced treatment of the love and freedom sides of God’s identity, our concern with how 
Barth responds to classical theological tradition and with the indirect scriptural authorisation 
leads us to concentrate our attention on the perfections of divine freedom where this response 
is more evident.
Currie 1976:490-508.
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5.3. A Need for Further Study
As may be obvious from the above, the main reason that there is a need for further 
study in Barth’s account of the divine perfections is that there has simply been so little 
extensive work done on this area of his theology. Another reason is that there is a need to 
study Barth’s accounts of divine perfections from a fresh angle, which, in our case, is 
provided by examining these accounts with a focus on the theological method they 
presuppose.
In addition, by beginning to fill in the lacuna in scholarly exposition of Barth’s 
doctrine of perfections, we aim to arrive at a clearer understanding of Barth’s doctrine of God 
as a whole, and in turn, his theology as a whole. The various aspects of Barth’s total doctrine 
of God (including doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Election) exist in an interrelated 
and ‘symbiotic’ relation to each other. Therefore, the present lacuna in regard to the doctrine 
of perfections leads to an impoverished understanding of Barth’s doctrine of God as a whole. 
Such a better understanding of Barth’s Doctrine of God ought to lead to a better 
understanding of Barth’s theology in CD as a whole. As Robert Jenson has insightfully 
remarked, Barth’s theology ‘is really one vast doctrine o f GodJ^^^
6. The Thesis Statement and the Method for its Defence
6.1. The Thesis-Statement
We can summarise the main point we want to defend in the following thesis- 
statement:
In Barth’s doctrines of God’s unity, constancy and eternity. Scripture frmctions as the 
authoritative source and basis for theological critique and construction, and tradition 
and reason are functionally subordinate to Scripture. Yet, in this process of 
redescribing the biblical testimony to God, Barth employs a predominantly indirect 
way of relating Scripture and theological proposals, a way that allows tradition and 
reason to play important ‘mediatory’ roles.
In chapter 7 (section I), we will reflect on this thesis-statement further as a way of 
summarising the main argument of this thesis.
Jenson 1969: 72. Cf. II/l, 257.
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6.2, The Method of Interpretation and Argument
The primary method by which we will communicate and defend our interpretation of 
Barth’s method could be called an analytical description or expository analysis. At times, we 
may straightforwardly describe what the text tells us about how Barth’s arrives at his 
theological proposals. But we do not have direct access to Barth’s method of arriving at his 
theological proposals, for he often does not spell out the way in which he arrives at those 
proposals. Therefore, much of our exposition will require discernment of Barth’s often 
hidden method, on the basis of an examination of the ‘results’ of his method, i.e. the material 
content of his theological proposals. However, we will also pay special attention to the fine 
print excursuses in which Barth interacts with Scripture and tradition and thus more clearly 
displays the methodological grounds for the main doctrinal conclusions he states in the main 
text. By means of this expository analysis of Barth’s treatment of the divine perfections of 
unity, constancy and eternity—as understood in the context of Barth’s doctrines of the Trinity 
and of election—we will come to a clear understanding of the roles of Scripture, tradition, 
and reason in Barth’s treatment of divine perfections.
This method of interpreting Barth presupposes and emphasises two kinds of 
‘integration’ in Barth’s theology. First, Barth’s theology is marked by an integration 
between his method (how he arrives at proposals) and content (the proposals themselves). 
Second, there is an integration between the various aspects of Barth’s method, specifically, 
between the roles or functions of Scripture, tradition and reason. We will now explain these 
two forms of integration more fully.
First, this study assumes and confirms the inseparability and inter-relationship of 
Barth’s method and his substantive theological conclusions. That the material content of 
Barth’s view of God as the unique subject and object of revelation is correlated with his 
distinctive theological method is not a novel point, but it is often not given its due in 
accounts of Barth’s theology. This method-content integration is an expression of Barth’s 
belief that the way in which we do theology (our knowledge of God itself and our way of 
rationally articulating it) must be grounded in who God is and what God has done to reveal
For example, T. F. Torrance has stressed this point in relation to his understanding of Barth’s ‘scientific’ 
theological rationality (Torrance 1990: 45-82),
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himself. Otherwise, Barth thinks, ‘theological’ thinking and speaking is vain speculation and 
anthropological projection. Again, in our desire to interpret Barth in a way that is sensitive 
to his own convictions, we will not make the mistake of passing quickly over the material 
content of these doctrines so as to arrive at some allegedly independent method. Barth’s 
methods of arriving at theological truth are specifically tailored to the aspects of theological 
truth Barth is aiming to elucidate—in this case, the perfections of God. Specifically, Barth’s 
concrete conception of God as a unique self-revealing sovereign Subject who has made 
himself known in Christ leads Barth towards certain ‘appropriate’ ways of responding to God 
and to coming to know this God better, such as reverent meditation on Scripture in openness 
to God’s dynamic Word.*"*"*
Second, our method of interpreting Baifh assumes and expresses the internal 
integration of Barth’s method in the form of the interrelationship of Scripture, tradition and 
reason in his practice. One cannot properly understand the nature and significance of Barth’s 
distinctive theological method, and its central concern to be ‘biblical,’ without understanding 
this inter-relation between Scripture, tradition and reason within Barth’s theological practice. 
In addition to recognising the ‘thieeness’ of the threefold cord, we need also to recognise its 
unity; it is one cord, one method. Yet previous studies have largely failed to do this, and this 
has yielded somewhat one-sided and problematic portrayals of Barth’s method. The method 
of ‘close reading’ (i.e. expository analysis) employed in this study, combined with the 
relatively narrow textual scope to which it is applied, has the advantage of allowing us to 
pursue the primary function of Scripture in Barth’s theology in relation to the functions of 
theological tradition and of reason in his theology.
That said, it does seem appropriate to speak of Barth’s method in some abstraction from his specific material 
conclusions, as we will often do in this thesis. In fact, understanding Barth’s theology in terms of its distinctive 
way o f relating Scripture, tradition and reason in its practice is a promising way o f being faithfiil to the 
distinctive nature of Barth’s theology. Barth’s theology, even in his own self-understanding, is not a finished 
system that calls for the repetition of his particular dogmatic conclusions, but a distinctive approach to how 
theology should be done. See Gerhard Sauter’s comments to this effect (1996: 124-131).
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Chapter 2: A Conceptual Framework for the Exposition 
of Barth’s Theological Method in Church Dogmatics
In this chapter we will provide a ‘conceptual framework’ that will aid us in the 
expository analysis of selections of Barth’s Church Dogmatics (CD) that we will take up in 
the remainder of the thesis. By ‘conceptual framework’ we mean a network of interrelated 
and clearly-defined categories or conceptual tools. Grasping this framework will afford 
maximum clarity and comprehension of the distinctive ways in which we will employ various 
terms and concepts in the remainder of the thesis. Some of these categories we will draw 
from Barth’s own (theoretical) comments on the nature of theology and theological method* 
and others we draw from our own reflections on Barth’s theological practice. While we will 
give provisional evidence for the appropriateness of this conceptual framework in this 
chapter, the actual exposition in the remainder of the thesis will provide its fuller justification.
1. Categories Related to Barth’s Dogmatics’
l.L  Barth *s Description o f the Role o f Dogmatics within the Task o f Theology
The first volume (I/l and 1/2) of Barth’s Church Dogmatics (CD) provides the 
‘prolegomena’ to his dogmatics, which, as part of dogmatics itself, takes the form of ‘The 
Doctrine of the Word of God.’ As Barth explains in §4, the Word of God takes three forms: 
the Word of God proclaimed (church proclamation), the Word of God written (Scripture) and 
the Word of God revealed (Jesus Christ). Dogmatics is a form of obedient response to this 
tliree-fold Word of God.
Barth summarises ‘the task of Dogmatics’ (CD, I/l, §1) as follows: ‘As a theological 
discipline, dogmatics is the scientific self-examination of the Christian Church with respect to 
the content of its distinctive talk about God.’^  Dogmatics is one discipline of scientific 
theology.^ All forms of scientific theology put the truth-question to the church’s God-talk,
’ We assume that Barth’s theoretical comments about theological method are helpful for understanding his own 
theological practice, unless we encounter strong evidence that shows that they are not so.M /1 ,3
I/l, 3f. As a science, dogmatics pursues answers to its own questions in an orderly way. Being independent or 
autonomous in relation to other sciences, it does not operate under general criteria for what counts as ‘scientific’
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i.e. they ask ‘the question as to the agreement between the Church’s distinctive talk o f about 
God with the being o f the Church The ‘being of the Church’—the criterion of the church’s
God-talk—is Jesus Christ, that is, ‘God in His gracious revealing and reconciling address to 
man.’
There are three forms or disciplines of scientific theology, each of which raises the 
question of the truth of the church’s God-language in a specific way. (1) Firstly, there is 
‘biblical theology.’ This discipline asks the question of the basis of the Christian church’s 
distinctive speech: i.e. ‘Does Christian utterance derive from  Him [i.e. Jesus Christ]’?^  (2) 
Secondly, there is ‘practical theology,’ which asks the question of goal or aim: i.e. Does 
Christian utterance ‘lead to Him’? (3) Thirdly, there is dogmatics, or dogmatic theology. It 
asks ‘the question of the content of the distinctive utterance of the church’: i.e. ‘Is it 
conformable to him’? None of these three questions ‘can be put apart [i.e. fi-om the others], 
but each must be put independently and with all possible force.’ This points to a mutual 
interdependence between these three main kinds of scientific theology.®
In this thesis we will be especially concerned with the relationship of mutual 
dependence between dogmatic theology and biblical theology, i.e. with the relationship 
between the question of the content of theology and the question of its basis. The method of 
dogmatics, while distinct fi*om that of biblical theology, is also thoroughly ‘biblical’ in its 
own way, as both Barth’s theory and practice testify (see especially subsection 2.3.4 below).
Dogmatics also stands in relationship to other disciplines besides biblical or 
exegetical theology. Among these, two disciplines are important for our purposes in this 
thesis: church history and apologetic theology. Barth does not regard church history as an 
independent theological science, but rather an ‘auxiliary science indispensable to exegetical, 
dogmatic and practical theology.’^  Specifically, church history is directly relevant in relating 
dogmatics to theological tradition or traditions, although dogmatics itself determines what it
(I/l, 5-11.) See Barth’s response to the general criteria outlined by H. Scholz (I/l, 8ft) and Gordon Clark’s 
critical exposition (1962: 51-75). Cf. T. F. Torrance’s account of Barth’s ‘scientific’ dogmatics (1990: 60-77).M/1,4.M /1 ,4.
I/l, 4f. Cf. 1/2,766f; cf. I/l, 121. The distinction-in-unity of the thiee theological disciplines corresponds to 
the three ‘phases’ o f interpretation of Scripture that Barth explains in § 21.2 (F2, 766; see subsection 2.2.3 
below).M/1, 5.
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will select from history for its own purposes. Unlike the relationship of dogmatics to biblical 
theology or church history, the relationship of dogmatics to ‘apologetics’ or ‘polemics’ is 
largely negative, at least if one considers it to be a theological discipline independent from 
dogmatics. In other words, Barth’s believes that the apologetic task of opposing unbelief is 
best understood as an ongoing ad hoc task within dogmatics. Otherwise, apologetic theology 
is in danger of becoming an instance o f ‘natural theology’ that is quite opposed to dogmatics 
(see 1.3 below). Barth thus resisted all ‘independently-ventured’ and ‘planned’ programmes 
or systems of apologetics or polemics.* This point is an aspect of the broader question of 
Barth’s use of reason or rationality (e.g., philosophy or historical-critical method) in his 
theological method (see section 4).
1,2. The Method of Dogmatics: Some o f Barth *s Theoretical Comments
We will now summarise Barth’s ‘theoretical’ comments on the proper method for 
dogmatics. Before we turn to this summary, a few preliminary comments are in order. First, 
Barth’s comments pertinent to theological method are scattered throughout his prolegomena 
{CD I/l and 1/2) and, occasionally, in later volumes. Barth does not offer an integrated and 
comprehensive statement of theological method. Second, none of Barth’s comments 
constitute a detailed program of theological method even with respect to a single aspect of 
dogmatics. Rather, Barth’s methodological comments tend to be general, relatively abstract, 
principles about how one ought to conceive o f  dogmatics or dogmatic method. Any 
guidelines that are explicit or implicit in these comments allow for great freedom in how one 
might express or apply them in practice. Therefore, Barth’s theoretical comments about 
dogmatic method, while they provide some basic concepts that we may employ in our 
exposition, cannot replace an examination of the actual methodological path that Barth 
decided to take in his dogmatic practice.
Some of Barth’s most salient methodological comments in CD occur in the latter part 
of his Prolegomena in his treatments o f ‘The Dogmatic Norm’ in § 23.2, and ‘The Dogmatic 
Method’ (1/2, § 24.2) respectively. The absolute and objective norm of dogmatics, of course, 
is the Word of God—the self-revelation of God attested in Scripture and proclaimed in the
FI, 30f.
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church.^ Barth speaks of thi*ee concrete requirements for dogmatics that flow out of the 
reverent and obedient hearing of the objective norm of the Word of God. Dogmatics must be 
marked by three ‘attitudes’ of hearing: (1) a biblical attitude, in which it listens to and 
follows the example of the biblical witnesses; (2) a confessional attitude, in which it 
reverently listens to the creeds and confessions of the church’s tradition, both ecumenical and 
specifically Evangelical or Reformed;^ ^  and (3) a churchly attitude, in which it listens to the 
church of today and its situation. Together these three requkements constitute the kind of
disposition or attitude that the dogmatic theologian ought to have in relation to the Word of 
God, the norm that constitutes the objective possibility of true and pure doctrine in the 
church.
With this in mind we may turn to Barth’s explicit treatment of method in CD § 24.2, 
on ‘The Dogmatic Method.’ The presupposition of this treatment is this: if dogmatics calls 
the church to hear and obey the Word as a norm, it also calls it to teach the Word as a specific 
‘content’ or ‘o b j e c t . T h e  method of dogmatics is to offer an ‘exemplary performance’ to 
the church of how such positive teaching can be done, of how to take the daring step from 
hearing to teaching. Dogmatic method is ‘the procedure which dogmatics must adopt if it is 
successfully to handle its material task, i.e. the unfolding and presentation of the content of 
the Word of God.’^^
Dogmatic method is marked by a dialectical tension between constraint and freedom. 
On the one hand, dogmatic method is constrained by the Word of God. Thus, the 
dogmatician is not free to take up any method. He must be governed and shaped by God’s 
ongoing work of revelation. As an effective, sacramental sign of the Word of God, 
dogmatics aims to be ‘wholly claimed by the object of church d o c t r i n e . I t  is to be 
‘characterised as a type of human thinking and speaking occupied and filled with the
 ^See 1/2,815f, where Barth speaks of the theonomy or the Word of God and the heteronomy of the relative 
norms that mediate it.
1/2, 816-822. This relates directly to the role of Scripture in Barth’s method (see subsection 1.3 and section 2 
below).
“ 1/2, 822-839. This relates directly to the role of tradition in Barth’s method (see section 3 below).
1/2,339-343.
See 1/2,24:1 ‘The material task of dogmatics’ (see esp. 1/2, 850).
1/2, 854.
1/2, 853.
1/2,855.
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revelation attested in Holy Scrip ture .Insofar  as dogmatics is occupied and filled with this 
unique object—i.e. revelation—this object or content ‘prescribes its way and method.’
Yet dogmatic method is also freely chosen. The dogmatic theologian is not given a 
concrete external law that spells out his course in detail and ahead of time. Rather, the 
concrete direction of the dogmatician’s method is a matter of his free obedience to revelation. 
In this sense dogmatic method is arbitrary, while still being responsible.^^ This free and 
responsible decision to take up a method that is fully appropriate to the nature of the content 
of dogmatics is the subjective possibility of pure doctrine. In obedience to the ‘spirit of the 
Word,’ dogmatics ‘receives what we call its m ethod .Because  of the very nature of Barth’s 
conception of method being a matter of free decision, he does not go on to offer systematic 
instructions about how one should relate and prioritise various proximate norms and sources 
for theology, such as Scripture, tradition, reason or experience.
In keeping with the dialectical character of dogmatic method, Barth shows that 
‘systems’ are inappropriate for a dogmatics that aims to be obedient to the Word of God. 
Barth understands a ‘system’ as a comprehensive scheme of thought marked by a two-fold 
structure of (a) a basic or foundational principle or set of principles (a basic view) and (b) 
their non-basic consequences or implications.^* Barth’s primary concern with such a 
‘foundationalist’ system is that it allows a ‘basic view’ constituted by a priori principles to 
replace the proper ‘centre’ and ‘foundation’ of dogmatics, namely, the living Word of God. 
Further, the Word of God cannot be reduced to a basic viewpoint or a stable set of 
propositions. The Word of God (or revelation) has a dynamic (personalistic and actualistic)
1/2, 855. 
1/2, 856.
19 Barth qualifies the traditional principle methodus est arbitraria in a helpful excursus (1/2, 860f). Barth speaks 
of the freedom of dogmatic method m terms of the theologian’s autonomy—an ‘autonomy o f the Holy Spirit’ 
(884) that corresponds to God’s theonomy.
1/2, 858.
Barth defines such a system as ‘a structure of principles and their consequences, founded on the 
presupposition of a basic view o f things, constructed with the help of various sources o f knowledge and axioms 
and self-contained and complete in itself (F2, 861; cf 1/2,86 Iff; cf. Godsey 1963: 23f). This is one of the 
passages that other scholars have pointed to as evidence o f  Barth’s non-foundationalism (Johnson 1997: 3f,
3 Iff; cf. Dorrien 2000: 1 Iff and A. Torrance 1996: chapter 1). To a large extent such scholars are correct. That 
said, Barth is not entirely opposed to a non-systematic, ‘weak foundationalism’ (as opposed to the ‘strong 
foundationalism’ described above), which can be defined simply as a structure of belief in which some beliefs 
are considered more basic than others. On various senses of foundationalism, see Plantinga and Wolterstorff 
(1983:1-3). Barth’s approach to epistemology can also be characterised as ‘Anselmian’ or ‘weak coherentism’ 
(see subsection 4.1.2 below).
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character in Barth’s thought that resists conceptual closure and complete coherence/^ The 
Word of God continues to authenticate itself in different situations, and thus repeatedly 
becomes the ‘foundation’ of dogmatics in various concrete doctrinal contexts. Accordingly, 
all theology is provisional, ever open to the critical and constructive capacity of God’s 
ongoing acts of revelation.
Barth does accept that dogmatics ought to be ‘systematic’ in the sense of offering an 
‘orderly and thoughtful organisation of material’ or by being ‘exhaustive in its i n t e r e s t . I n  
addition, as Colin Gunton rightly points out: ‘Karl Barth is a systematic theologian in the 
sense that nothing is written in one place without implicit or explicit reference to other 
theological themes.’^ "* This orderly interconnectedness is an obvious feature of Barth’s 
dogmatic method in his practice in CD,
To summarise Barth’s view, dogmatic method is essentially a posture o f reverent 
obedience before the revealed Word o f God and an unrelenting attempt to be faithful to its 
content (on ‘reverence’ see subsection 5.1 below). No specific method is given in the sense 
of a detailed explanation of the kind of practices he will engage in to determine his dogmatic 
answers. Barth’s method in this more concrete sense will need to be uncovered by an 
examination of his actual dogmatic practice.
1,3. Natural Theology and its Dogmatic Remedies: the Two Criteria of Dogmatics 
One helpful way to clarify the nature of Barth’s dogmatic method is to understand his 
way of contrasting dogmatics with natural theo logy .W e begin with the definition of 
natural theology that Barth gave (in his piece entitled ‘Nein!’) in his debate with Emil 
Brunner:
By “natural theology” I mean every (positive or negative) formulation o f a system 
which claims to be theological, i.e. to interpret divine revelation, whose subject.
E.g. 1/2, 862, 872. The open and provisional character of Barth’s conception of dogmatic method is evident in 
Barth’s response to H.U. von Balthasar’s influential account of his thought. Barth objected that his own method 
cannot be reduced to a guiding ‘thought form’ \I)en]form\, but that it employs a dynamic ‘movement of 
thought’ or ‘way o f thinking’ [Denkbewegung] (Barth, as cited in Johnson 1997: 192, note 14).
^ Godsey 1963: 23 f. Barth goes on to say that ‘the Bible affords the only criterion forjudging whether or not 
my theology is a system’ (24), a clear statement of the importance of Scripture for Barth,
Gunton 2000: 143. See also Leslie 1991: 67-71 on the question of the ‘systematic’ character of Barth’s 
theology.
For scholarly discussion of natural theology, see Hartwell 1964: 48-55, Torrance 1990: 136-159, Barr 1993 
and Hart 1999: 139-172.
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however, differs fundamentally from the revelation in Jesus Christ and whose method 
therefore differs equally from the exposition of Holy Scripture?^
There are several respects in which natural theology differs from dogmatics. First, natural
theology is the ‘formulation of a system,’ which in itself is inappropriate to dogmatics, as we
saw above. Second, while natural theology claims to be theological, i.e. to interpret divine
revelation, in fact it has a fundamentally different subject (or content) than revelation.
Barth’s dogmatics, by contrast, is theological, because it has God’s revelation in Jesus Clirist
as its only subject. Third, though natural theology claims to interpret revelation, it has a
fundamentally different method than that of the ‘exposition of Scripture.’ By contrast, the
method of dogmatics is genuinely ‘theological’ because its method is centrally preoccupied
with the exposition of Scripture (i.e. the Word of God written).
Although these three aspects of the distinction between dogmatics and natural
theology are relatively distinct from each other, they are also interrelated. It is because of the
unique subject matter or content of dogmatics (the revealed Word of God) that it cannot be
formulated into a system in which some other ‘basic view’ becomes its central content.
Likewise, since Barth believes the definitive witness to the subject of theology (the revelation
in Jesus Christ) is found in the Scriptures, the exposition of Scripture is the fundamental
theological method.
In light of the analysis we have given of it, Barth’s definition of natural theology 
implies a two-sided remedy for the ‘theological disease’ of natural theology. This remedy is 
to vigorously mamtain (1) the proper subject or content of theology and (2) the proper 
method of theology.^^ While we are ultimately most concerned with the second, 
methodological par t of this remedy in this thesis, both parts are of crucial significance and 
should be understood in connection to each other. We will comment on these two remedies 
in turn.
(1) Barth’s concern over the proper subject matter or content of theology results in 
what we will call his ‘'material criterion’ or rule for theology. This criterion states that 
theology, if it is not to be natural theology, must have ‘the revelation of Jesus Christ’ as its
Barth 1946 [ET]: 74f.
While the two-fold scheme does not assign an explicit, independent role to Barth’s concern to avoid a system, 
this concern is preserved in Barth’s concern over the proper content and method of theology, as will be evident.
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fundamental content. This criterion is closely related to the pervasive ‘Christocentrism’ or 
‘Christo logical concentration’ of Barth’s theology, which both Barth and his interpreters have 
identified as of crucial significance to understanding his theology. Bruce McCormack 
defines Barth’s Christocentrism ‘the attempt (which characterised his mature theology) to 
understand every doctrine from a centre in God’s self-revelation in Jesus C h r i s t .B a r t h ’s 
dogmatics is Christocentric in content?^
(2) Barth’s concern over proper method results in what we could call his 
"methodological criterion’ for theology. According to this criterion, theology, if it is not to be 
natural theology, is to be fundamentally the ‘exposition of Holy Scripture.’ This criterion or 
rule corresponds to Barth’s emphasis on the ‘theological exegesis’ of the ‘verbal sense’ of 
Scripture. By verbal sense we mean the straightforwai'd ‘grammatical’ meaning of biblical 
sentences, understood in their literary contexts.^^ Readings of Scripture, including the 
‘macro-reading’ constituted by Barth’s dogmatics as a whole, must have the ‘constraint of the 
verbal sense’ as one of its crucial criteria.^* In such ways, Barth’s dogmatics is textually- 
based or biblical in method.
While they usually peacefully coexist in Barth’s theology, a dialectical tension obtains 
between these two criteria (1 and 2 above) that enables them to act as ‘checks and balances’ 
in relation to each other. The material criterion keeps the methodological criterion from 
turning dogmatics into a disunited and disorderly collection of dispar ate exegetical- 
theological comments on various biblical passages. Alternatively, the methodological 
criterion keeps the material criterion fiom turning dogmatics into a static Christocentric 
system, in which there is no real openness to the dynamic Word of God as it is attested in 
diverse ways in Scripture. In the remaining sections of this chapter, we will include
McCormack 1995:454.
The phrase ‘in content’ does not preclude ‘in method.’ In fact, McCormack says that Barth’s Christocentrism 
is ‘a methodological rule, not an a priori principle’ (1995: 454).
In our usage, then, the verbal sense of the biblical text is an aspect of its ‘literal,’ ‘plain’ or ‘natural’ sense. I 
use the specific term ‘verbal sense,’ because the other terms in the last sentence can also include reference to a 
‘communal construal,’ which we do not have in mind here (see Green-McCreight 1999; 21 f; cf. Watson 1994: 
223-231 and Frei 1986). The sense of traditional or ‘communal construal’ is more appropriate in referring to the 
Christocentric way o f reading Scripture that is associated with Barth’s ‘material criterion.’ The sense of the 
community and a text’s relation to the cenh e of Scripture (cf. Watson 1997: 123f) can be seen as other aspects 
o f the ‘literal sense’ o f Scripture which are distinct from, but potentially complementary to. Scripture’s verbal 
sense.
Greene-McCreight 1999: 2 If.
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comments on how these two criteria relate to the respective roles of Scripture, tradition and 
reason in Barth’s theology.
2. Concepts Related to Scripture and its Theological Functions
There are three main categories for concepts related to the function of Scripture: the 
‘construal’ of Scripture (subsection 2.1), the interpretation of Scripture (subsection 2.2) and 
the use of Scripture in dogmatics (subsection 2.3). There is a degree of overlap between 
these three categories, but they do provide a helpful way of organising our analysis. In 
addition, we will comment on the relationship between Barth’s two criteria for dogmatics 
(see 1.3 above) and to the function of Scripture (subsection 2.4).
2,1. Concepts Related to Barth *s Construal o f Scripture
2,1.1. The construal of scripture as a whole
In this first subsection (2.1.1) we will lay out a series of concepts pertaining to how 
Barth construes Scripture as a whole, which may be called his ‘canonical construal.
Barth’s own doctrine of Scripture, given in his prolegomena to CD, is helpful in 
providing the concepts by which he refers to Scripture as a whole. The two most important 
are ‘Word of God’ and ‘Witness to Revela tion.Since others have written on Barth’s 
understanding of these concepts extensively, we only need to summarise briefly what Barth 
means by them. The concepts of Scripture as the ‘Word of God’ and as ‘Witness to 
Revelation’ stand in what we could call a ‘perichoretic’ relationship to each other. They are 
distinct, complementary concepts, but they are inseparably united to each other.
In their distinctness. Word of God and Witness to Revelation each emphasise 
important, complementary aspects of Barth’s dialectical view of Scripture. To refer to 
Scripture as the ‘Word of God written’ (one of his three forms of the Word of God) 
emphasises how God can speak through Scripture such that it becomes the veiy Word or 
Revelation of God.^  ^ In this way Scripture in some sense mediates a divine speech act.
See Wood 1981; Kelsey 1999: 103-108. For Barth’s own statements on the nature and unity o f the canon, see 
especially, 1/2,473-485; 597-603.
The following summary is based upon 1/2, chapter 111 on ‘Holy Scripture,’ especially paragraph 19.
^^1/1,4.2. As a form of the Word o f God, Scripture is marked by a pattern that is found in all three forms of the 
Word: namely, that God reveals himself "m his Word, but does so in indirect, mediated and human forms.
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speech that comes from God and is directed to humanity.Conversely, to refer to Scripture 
as the decisive witness of divine revelation^^ emphasises that Scripture in and of itself is a 
collection of human speech-acts—speech acts which in various ways attest to the revelation 
of God in Jesus Christ through expectation (Old Testament) or recollection (New Testament).
For our purposes, five significant claims are implicit in Barth’s referring to the Bible 
as the ‘word of God’ and as ‘witness to revelation.’ First, the relationship of identity between 
the witness of Scripture and God’s revelation (God’s Word revealed) is indirect. The words 
point beyond themselves to the Word, Jesus Christ, who in turn reveals God in se?^ Second, 
both ‘word of God’ and ‘witness’ nevertheless emphasise the Bible’s divinely authorised 
uniqueness, that we may know and expect that God speaks through this book in a way that he 
does not through others. As the first and only direct witness to the revelation of Jesus Christ, 
Scripture uniquely mediates that revelation to the church. Third, both terms emphasise that, 
for Barth, the Bible is primarily "kerygmatiC in character; it is literatui e of preaching and 
proclamation.^* Fourth, by referring to Scripture as a whole as ‘word’ or ‘witness’ in the 
singular, Barth emphasises the unity of the Bible. Fifth, the audience and purpose of 
Scripture is ecclesial, in that it is the ‘word of God for the church’ and the witness of the 
apostles and prophets for the Church. These five claims in Barth’s theological construal of 
the Bible offer some limited insights into how we might expect Barth to use Scripture in 
general, assuming (as we have been) that his practice is consistent with his theory.
The dual human-divine character of the Bible also has implications for how we 
interpret it. As a human book, the Bible ought to be read in an effort to discern the verbal 
sense of the text and the author; this is exegesis.'*** Yet, we must not become ‘stuck’ in the 
words themselves. Rather, the Bible also ought to be read theologically m an effort to grasp
See Wolterstorff 1995: 63-74 for a carefiil analysis that shows how Barth does not appear to allow for the 
literal ascription of speech acts to God in Scripture.
Barth’s more distinctive term for Scriptuie is ‘witness to revelation.’ CD, 1/2,457. G. W. Bromiley notes that 
the English translation of the subsection ‘Scripture as a Witness to Divine Revelation’ is misleading, since the 
German original has no article before the word for witness {bezeugen] (1979: 34).
Thus Barth departs from the traditional static conception of verbal inspiration in which God’s revelation is 
identified with the words of the text as such {CD, 1/2, 508-526).
See Barth’s comments on this point in a helpful essay on the doctrine of revelation (Baith 1954: 2201).
This is the title o f CD, § 19 (1/2, 457ft).
1/2,463f.
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its referent, or that about which it is speaking; this is theological exegesis.'** Indeed, Barth 
argues elsewhere that true understanding of Scripture requires a divine act by which the text’s 
subject matter (the dynamic Word of God) confronts us and enables us to perceive it.
2.1.2. Barth’s construal of Scripture according to its various parts
We have seen how Barth construes Scripture as a whole in a certain way. Barth also 
construes various parts of Scripture in a certain way. A proper description of the way that 
Scripture functions in CD requires attention to the specific aspect of Scripture that is being 
used in a particular case and to the way that Barth construes that aspect of Scripture. This is 
an important affirmation, since some influential studies of Barth’s interpretation of Scripture 
have spoken in overly general or reductive terms about how Barth uses Scripture. We will 
employ two main categories to refer to the parts or aspect of Scripture: (1) the forms (or 
genres) of scripture and (2) its patterns. Oui* thesis will indicate that Barth’s engagement with 
Scripture is (or at least aims to be) ‘contextual’ and is thus ‘form-sensitive’ and ‘pattern- 
sensitive.’
When we refer to biblical forms or genres we have in mind primarily the main literary 
types that characterise the various books of the Bible (e.g., law, narrative, epistle, etc.) or its 
contents (e.g. hymn, psalm, saga, etc.). As we saw in chapter 1, some of Barth’s interpreters 
have regarded a single genre or form as having central importance in his interpretation of 
Scripture (e.g., the role of narrative'*  ^or the role of ‘theological statements’ in Scripture'*^).
Christina Baxter discusses seven specific biblical ‘forms’ as particularly significant 
for understandiug Barth’s approach in CD, arguing that his interpretation and use of 
Scripture, instead of treating Scriptuie in a uniform or monolithic manner, is form-sensitive.'*'* 
The seven forms are: (1) concept; (2) theme; (3) theological statement; (4) story; (5) 
typology; and (6) allegory and (7) analogy. We will now briefly describe several of these 
forms, emphasising those that are of significance for understanding Barth’s engagement of 
Scripture in his treatments of divine unity, constancy and eternity.
‘"’ l/2,464f;cf.466ff.
See especially Ford 1979: 56 and 1985: 12, 56. 
See especially Baxter 1981: 165ft 172ft 178f. 
Baxter 1981: 126.
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A ‘concept’'*^ is a stable content of meaning that is associated with a particular 
biblical word or a group of closely related words. Barth often uses a conceptually-oriented 
exegetical method of ‘word study,’ usually relying on the work of others, in order to unfold 
the meaning of such biblical concepts.'*^
A ‘theme’'*^  refers rather generally to meaning or message that is shared by a number 
of passages. As such, a theme is a conceptual or logical whole. Barth organises biblical 
passages thematically in various ways. He ‘clusters’ passages together that shar e a common 
word or concept,'** speaks of phrases that ar e characteristic of a book or writer, and variously 
refers to the themes of a book, of the Old or New Testament, or of Scripture as a whole.'*^
‘A theological Statement’^ ** is an ‘unusually doctrinally articulate’ statement’ of 
‘doctrine’ or ‘confession’ occurring within Scripture itself. Such statements are relatively 
rare in Scripture. However, according to Baxter, Barth’s use of them is ‘the formative and 
definitive method’ in CD.^* Barth restates or redescribes such statements in his own 
dogmatic terminology.^^ Partly because of their brevity, Barth employs such biblical 
theological statements in CD as a modified form of ‘proof texts,’ frequently in the fine print 
excursuses and occasionally in the main text.
Besides genres and forms, we can also speak of patterns as aspects of Scripture. A 
‘pattern’ can be defined rather abstractly as an ordered whole that is formed by a construal of 
various distinct and repeated features of Scripture. These repeated features may be of 
différent kinds (e.g. literary, temporal/historical, conceptual), but for understanding Barth’s 
use of Scripture within his doctrine of God the ‘conceptual’ features of Scripture are probably 
the most important.
Baxter 1981: 127-140
Cf. Otto Bachli (1987: 147-154).
Baxter 1981: 141-155.
Among those Baxter cites within Barth’s doctrine of God are II/l, 385,459; II/l, 361, and II/1, 392. Cf. 
Bachli (1987: 154-164) on Barth’s clusters or catenae o f passages.
See Bachli comments on Barth’s ‘thematic exegesis’ (1987: 167-224).
Baxter 1981:155-168.
Baxter 1981: 165. According to Baxter (165-168), Ford’s prioritising of nanative results both from his failure 
to examine all o f the explicit uses of Scripture in CD (as she does) and his misclassification of those contents of 
Scriptuie which he did examine.
Baxter 1981: 163ff.
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By saying that a pattern is specifically concerned with the ordered configuration of 
various distinct features of Scripture, it is important to note that these features are typically 
not easy to unify in a single theological judgement, but often require the dialectical 
juxtaposition of two or more apparent contraries. This stands in some contrast to the biblical 
forms (e.g. themes, concepts or theological statements) that function as the ‘raw materials’ 
which ‘patterns’ include within themselves.
A good example of such a biblical pattern is what we might call the ‘Trinitarian 
pattern.’ Following seminal church theologians like Athanasius, Barth regards this recurring 
pattern, rather than a series of proof texts, as the primary biblical basis of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. Thus, Barth contends that the biblical ‘root’ of the doctrine of the Trinity can be 
summarised in the proposition ‘God reveals Himself as the Lord.’^  ^ Scripture is paradigmatic 
for the statement ‘God reveals Himself as the Lord’ even though this statement is not a direct 
translation of any biblical statement or even a thematic summation of several of them.
Rather, this statement sums up the three-fold pattern of God’s self-revelation. This pattern 
involves a conjunction of God’s threefold distinctness (as Revealer, Revelation and 
‘Revealedness’) and God’s unity as the one Lord. '^*
2.2, Concepts Related to Barth *s Interpretation of Scripture
2.2.1. Introduction to Barth’s hermeneutics 
We now turn to concepts for understanding Barth’s interpretation of Scripture. 
Generally speakmg, Barth’s distinctive hermeneutical perspective is marked by the 
predominance of what we could call the ‘subject matter principle.’ That is, Barth believes 
that one ought to inteipret a text with one’s attention fixed primarily on ‘that which the text 
says,’ which he refers to variously as the text’s ‘subject matter’ [Sache'\, ‘content’ [Inhalt^ or 
‘object’ {Gegenstand\.^^ This does not mean that one leaves the text behind in order to
I/l, 306 (cf. 304-333). See our comments on Barth’s account o f the Trinity in chapter 3, section 1.
The reason why this Trinitarian pattern would not aptly be called a theme, is because it involves a bringing 
together of two distinct ‘structural’ features that cannot be ‘thematised’ under a unified conceptual rubric. 
Rather, within the Trinitarian pattern, there is a dialectical interplay between two features or ‘themes’: the 
oneness of the divine being and the distinctness of the divine persons.
General theories of textual hermeneutics often speak of three main factors in interpretation: the author, the 
text and the reader. Barth joins the few theorists who wish to add a forth factor: the referent or subject matter of 
the text, and Barth wishes to place the emphasis both here and on the text (see F. Watson 1993 and 1997 for a 
similar view o f theological hermeneutics somewhat influenced by Barth). See editor G. W. Bromiley’s
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contemplate a subject matter independently of the act of interpreting the text. It simply 
means that one’s interpretation of the text should be preoccupied with that which the text 
itself is preoccupied. This basic conception of textual interpretation, which Barth would also 
apply to other texts besides Scripture,^^ clearly fulfils the two criteria for dogmatics noted in 
subsection 1.3. That is, one interprets the Bible with a focus on its Christocentric subject 
matter, but does so in a way that is accountable to the verbal sense of the biblical texts; the 
subject matter is textually mediated.^^
2.2.2. The hermeneutical principle o f ‘subordination’
In a discussion of the church’s ‘freedom under the Word’ (1/2, § 21.2), Barth 
discusses the church’s interpretation of the Bible.^* Here Barth makes it clear that good 
exegesis is thus not only a matter of technical skill, but of free obedience to God and 
receptivity to the ongoing divine act of self-revelation.^^
In this context, Barth’s states what he calls the principle of ‘subordination’ as the 
primary rule of the theological interpretation or exegesis of Scripture. ‘The necessary and 
fundamental form of all scriptural exegesis . ..  must consist in all circumstances in the freely 
performed act of subordinating all human concepts, ideas and convictions to the witness of 
revelation supplied to us in Scripture.’^ ** This principle is of great relevance, not only for 
understanding Barth’s way of engaging with Scripture, but also for understanding Barth’s 
theological method as a whole.
Barth says that the theologian must submit to Scripture as a way of submitting to its 
unique subject matter, the God who speaks through it.^ * But how do we do this? We cannot
comments on the question of how to translate Gegemtand (here rendered ‘object’) in Barth’s dogmatics (I/l, 
viii).
The subject-matter principle, according to Barth, is h ue on the level o f ‘general hermeneutics’ (I/l, 465ft).
Yet Barth claims that the source o f this hermeneutical insight is not ‘general’ but scriptural; there is no special 
biblical hermeneutics, but we get the general hermeneutics from the Bible (466). One reason Barth gives for 
this claim is that the Bible is marked by an ‘unusual preponderance of what is said  in it over the word as such’ 
(468).
There is a mutual relation between the text and its subject matter. We need the word to ‘get to’ the object, but 
we also need the object to ‘grasp’ the words rightly (1/2,465).
1/2, 695-722.
Barth also says; ‘To the question: How does God’s Word come to us men in Holy Scriptuie and how does it 
exercise sway in the Chui ch of Jesus Christ? We . . .  answer, that it happens through free obedience’ (1/2,666).
1/2,715.
This point implies several other claims. We do not subordinate ourselves to Scripture in the same way as we 
do to God, but rather we submit to his witnesses in Scripture for the sake of God (7171). As we submit to the 
human authors in this way, the Word of God interprets itself to us (718). The object o f Scripture, permits no
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abandon our intellectual framework, Barth says, any more than ‘we can free ourselves from
our own shadow.Rather ,  we remain ourselves, with our intellectual framework, but we
simply subordinate all that we are to the thoughts, ideas and convictions we find within the
Bible.*^  ^ To try to ‘abandon’ our own ideas for some alleged position of neutrality would be
more an act of arrogance than humility. Rather, reverent subordination is letting our ideas,
thoughts and convictions be challenged and confronted. The following passage makes clear
what Barth has in mind.
Subordination implies that the subordinate is there as such and remains there. . . It 
cannot mean that we have to allow our ideas, thoughts and convictions to be 
supplanted, so to speak, by those of the prophets and apostles, or that we have to 
speak the language of Canaan instead of our own tongue. In that case we should not 
have subordinated ourselves to them, but at most adorned ourselves with their 
feathers. In that case nothing would have been done in the interpretation of their 
words, for we should merely have repeated them parrot-like. Subordination, if it is to 
be sincere, must concern the purpose and meaning indicated in the ideas, thoughts, 
and convictions of the prophets and apostles, that is, the testimony which. . .  they 
wish to bear. To this testimony of their words we must subordinate ourselves—and 
this is the essential form of scriptural exegesis. '^*
Note that subordination to Scripture does not mean that Theology is a matter of quoting Bible
verses. Rather, that would be to repeat Scriptural proof texts parrot-like, without them
genuinely transforming us or our ideas. With the attitude and action of subordination, the
intellectual and moral framework we bring to the Bible is transformed and effected from the
inside out. ‘The decisive point,’ Barth says, ‘is that in scriptural exegesis Scripture itself as a
witness to revelation must have unconditional precedence over all the evidence of our own
being and b e c o m i n g . A s  we interpret Scripture, we must allow God to put us humans in
our proper place. Of course, this humble attitude rests on assumptions that run directly
counter to much of modern theology and surely against the Enlightenment notion of the
unconditional autonomy of the rational self (see section 4 below). Another quotation helps to
illuminate this point.
other kind o f free human activity in relation to it than that o f subordination (715f). The fog of our intellectual 
life (and even that of the human authors of Scripture!) needs to become clear in the light o f God’s Word (716). 
"M/2,718.
This perspective is evident in Barth’s early work, such as his 1916 essay ‘Strange New World Within the 
Bible’ (Barth 1957: 28-50).
“^ 1/2,718.
1/2, 719.
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The message which Scripture has to give us, even in its apparently most debatable and 
least assimilable parts, is in all circumstances truer and more important than the best 
and most necessary things that we ourselves have said and can say/^
If we do not recognise this, Barth believes that Scripture and its world and witness remain
largely inexplicable. The world of the Bible is only fully accessible, so to speak, ‘from the
bottom up’—by the subordination in which one freely places oneself under the word. Such
subordination comes by faith. Barth admits that there is a ‘relative understanding’ that is
possible of the Bible without faith and subordination, namely, the kind of understanding
‘possible between representatives of different w o r l d s . T h i s  understanding can yield many
helpful results, as Barth’s affirmation and controlled use of higher critical methods and
results would testify (see subsection 4.3.2 below). Yet the Bible is best understood, in its
proper theological depth, by ‘a human intellectual world the inner security of which has been
shaken, and which has become yielding and responsive to the biblical world.’ In the end, no
matter how much readers understand Scripture intellectually—even if they appreciate its
‘inner consistency’ and meaningfulness—they miss the theological raison d ’être of Scripture
if they do not accept what they understand and ‘give way’ to it.
For Baith, this rule of subordination is the ‘basic rule’ from which all other principles
of sound theological interpretation must follow.^* Such subordination implies that all our
theological formulations are provisional and révisable in the face of an ongoing quest for the
abiding witness of Scripture. We are never allowed to assume that we have fully
subordinated ouiselves to Scripture, nor that anyone else has. It is rather a goal towards
which the Christian theologian and the church as a whole must continue to press forward.
2.2.3. Barth’s three phases of interpretation 
With Barth’s principle of subordination in mind, we may now turn to his account of 
the ‘three phases’ of interpretation, an account that directly follows his comments on 
subordination. Barth stresses that all three phases (or aspects) of interpretation are 
interrelated, mutually inter-dependent, and perichoretically united. They are not to be
^1/2,719.
"’ 1/2,719.
68 1/2, 722.
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conceived of in a strictly linear fashion as separate temporal stages, but rather as interrelated 
aspects of Barth’s way of engaging with Scripture theologically.
The first phase of interpretation is what Barth typically calls ‘observation’ [expUcatio, 
or Beobachtung].^^ Observation involves not only discerning or making intelligible the 
verbal sense of the text in its historical situation (treating the Bible as a human text), but also 
involves presenting (re-presenting) the self-presentation of the Word of God (treating the 
Bible as a witness to the Word). Thus, observation may begin on the plane o f ‘general 
hermeneutics’ with historical criticism as its ‘presupposition and most important instrument,’ 
but later moves beyond this to the object of the text. To be faithful to the object of the text is 
not contrary to higher-criticism, but its ultimate ftilfîiment—letting the text’s object have 
sway over us ‘without any restrictions.’^ **
The second distinguishable phase of biblical exegesis is what Barth calls ‘reflection’ 
{meditatio, or Nachdenken; literally, ‘thinking after’).^ * ‘Reflection’ marks the crucial 
mediating phase between observation (or ‘explication’) of the text and its use or 
appropriation. As such, it is parallel to the role of the discipline of dogmatic theology in 
‘mediating’ the tasks of biblical theology and practical theology.^^ In the act of reflection, 
the interpreter takes the meaning of the text and relates it to his own thinking, his own 
‘philosophy.’
Barth’s view of reflection assumes that interpreters inevitably possess a ‘philosophy’ 
that they bring to the text and which influences their interpretation. There is no neutral 
exegesis, no exegesis without presuppositions. However, Barth believes that we can 
determine to a lar ge degree the way in which our philosophies function in our exegesis (see 
4.3 below). Barth’s main point is that we should not allow philosophy to function as a 
systematic pre-understanding (as Heideggerian existentialism did for Bultmann), but rather 
should allow philosophical categories and convictions to function on an ad hoc basis only as
The English Translation of 1/2, also sometimes uses the terms ‘investigation’ or ‘examination’ to translate 
Beobachtung, which Barth treats in 1/2, 722-727.
1/2, 726.
”  1/2,727-736.
”  1/2, 766ft; see also our relevant comments on the distinction between biblical and dogmatic theology in and 
2.3 below. On how the entire theological enterpreise is for Barth a form of Nachdenken, see the work of Alan 
Torrance (e.g., 2000: 72f, 89).
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they are helpful in genuinely understanding and responding to the text and its subject matter. 
In other words, all our reasoning and philosophical inclinations need to be relentlessly 
subordinated to the text and its object.
The third phase or aspect of interpretation that Barth identifies is ‘appropriation’ 
{applicatio, or Aneignung)P This is similar to what we are calling the ‘use’ of Scripture in 
this thesis, which for Barth means primar ily the theological use of Scripture in dogmatics. 
According to Barth, the word that is declared in Scripture must not only be understood, but 
must become ‘our own.’ In order for this to happen, we must move beyond reflecting on that 
word to in some way thinking it ourselves—the ultimate hope of scientific theology. '^* We 
must think within its categories and with its convictions. To do so is not to respond to 
Scripture merely as an external norm (heteronomy), but as those have made the scripturally- 
mediated divine Word their own internal criterion (autonomy). Rather than parrot-like 
imitation, such reverent autonomy is the proper goal of scriptural interpretation.^^
Our obedient application of Scripture is rightly a vehicle of this divine act, the act in 
which the Word of God wills to cross our threshold as the Lord.^  ^ Ultimately, we can only 
‘use’ Scripture rightly, when we let it ‘use’ us.^  ^ In the next subsection, we turn to a more 
specific explanation of what is involved in Barth’s use of Scripture in dogmatics and how this 
relates to ‘exegesis.’
23. Concepts Related to Barth’s Use of Scripture in Dogmatics
2.3.1. ‘Exegesis’ and dogmatics 
Barth clearly thought that ‘exegesis’ {Exegese), understood broadly as the 
interpretation and use of the Bible, was crucially important for all branches of theology, 
including dogmatics.^* Often Barth uses the terms ‘exegesis’ or ‘scriptural exegesis’ 
{Schrifterklarung; sometimes translated ‘scriptural exposition’) in this comprehensive sense. 
This is seen in his inclusion of the second and third phases of interpretatation (‘reflection’
I/l, 736-740.
1/2, 736.
One implication of this will often be emphasised in this thesis, namely: reverent subordination to Scripture is 
often best expressing in a theology that is biblical in an indirect rather than a direct manner. |
1/2,738. i
”  1/2,738. I
His final parting words to his students in Bonn in 1933 were ‘Exegesis, exegesis, and again, exegesis  |
Then, certainly take care for systematics and dogmatics.’ (Barth, as cited in Jiingel 1986: 40). I
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and ‘appropriation’), not merely the first, under the one process o f Schrifterklarung. 
However, Barth fi-equently uses the term Exegese in other more narrow senses. This begins 
to clarify why at times he refers to the work of dogmatics as something distinct fi*om or 
extending beyond exegesis—even though he consistently speaks of how dogmatics must in 
some way be based upon exegesis or exegetical theology. This is a point that we will return 
to below.
What is clear is that Barth consistently understands exegesis in both its narrow and 
broad senses as ‘theological exegesis.’ According to his own definition given in Credo, 
theological exegesis is exposition of Scripture that occurs ‘within the pale of the Church’ and 
which asks the question ‘To what extent is there given to us, here in this text, witness to 
God’s wordT^'^ Two important points are made by this definition. First, by speaking of it as 
exegesis within the pale of the church, Barth rules out secular exegesis done by the non­
believer, with its presumption of neutral scientific objectivity; theological exegesis is self- 
mvolving and ecclesial.*** Second, Barth considers this theological exegesis to be the ‘norm’ 
(rule, criterion, or basis) for Dogmatics.**
To avoid possible confusion arising from Barth’s diverse uses of the term ‘exegesis,’ 
we will now provide our own definition of the term. We will use ‘exegesis’ to refer to the 
direct (and usually detailed) theological exposition of a specific biblical text or group of 
texts.*  ^ Although this remains a relatively broad definition, it distinguishes exegesis from 
other possible ways of interpreting or using Scripture in dogmatics. Specifically, it 
distinguishes exegesis from the indirect uses of Scripture in dogmatics—i.e. uses that appeal 
to themes or patterns in Scripture without reliance on the citation, interpretation or use of 
specific texts.
2.3.2. Direct and indirect ways of using Scripture authoritatively
We may clarify this distinction between the direct and indirect ways of interpreting 
and using Scripture in dogmatics in several ways. First, sometimes Barth uses the term
Barth 1935: 177 (Barth’s italics).
Barth 1935: 177. Barth goes on to say that the theological exegete works with the dual presupposition that (1) 
the church has heard the Word of God in the Bible ( ‘recollection’) and that (2) he or she will also hear in the 
Bible God’s Word for his or her time (‘expectation’).
Barth 1935: 177f.
^ This is similai* to the use o f ‘exegesis’ in Bachli’s work (1987; see chapter 1, subsection 2.3).
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‘direct’ for what we are here calling ‘indirect.’ For example, Barth speaks about a particular 
view of God’s eternity ‘forcing itself upon us . ..  directly [unmittlebarY in our reflection on 
the Bible.*  ^ However, the complex view he describes in this connection is certainly not one 
that can be read directly off of any passage in Scripture. Rather, it is better described as the 
identification of a complex pattern in Scripture that is then translated freely into dogmatic 
terms—all of which involves what we would call an indirect authorising relation between 
Scripture and dogmatics.
Second, at least in the context of Barth’s theology, an indirect use of Scripture—no 
less than a direct use—is a way of using Scripture as a decisive authority for dogmatic 
theology. When Scripture is used to ‘authorise’ a certain theological conclusion, we may call 
that ‘scriptural authorisation.’ Indirect scriptural authorisation still allows Scripture to 
determine, often decisively, the content of dogmatics. For example, even though Barth 
arrives at the doctrine of the Trinity by means of the indirect scriptural authorisation provided 
by biblical patterns (see 2.1.2), the biblical witness to revelation still has a decisive effect on 
the shape of his view of the Trinity. Even an indirect use of Scripture can still involve a kind 
of coercive pressure of the content of Scripture upon the reverent reader.*'*
Third, our use of the term ‘indirect’ needs to be distinguished from the sense in 
which, according to Barth, all dogmatic ideas are ‘indirectly’ related to Scriptuie. That is, 
one could say with good reason that Barth teaches that, strictly speaking, the only ‘direct’ 
norm and basis for theology is Jesus Christ, the revealed Word of God who is distinguishable 
from the words of Scripture in themselves. In this respect, the relationship of theology to the 
text or words of Scripture is always ‘indirect,’ even when specific passages are cited or 
interpreted. However, we will not typically use the terms ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ in this sense. 
Yet when we refer to direct scriptural authorisation, we should not forget that, apart from the 
divine action of revealing, Barth does not believe that even Scripture can provide the final or 
all-sufficient justification or authorisation for any doctrine.
^ II/l, 621. See our comments on this passage in oui- discussion o f ‘eternity’ in chapter 6, subsection 3.4.1. 
This paragraph provides further support for the critique of David Kelsey we offered in chapter I (subsection
2 .2).
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Fourth, the great importance of the indirect mode of scriptural authorisation in Barth’s 
dogmatic work relates to his consistent stress that dogmatics is not a matter of parrot-like 
repetition of the words of Scripture. Rather, our reverent subordination to Scripture is 
ultimately subordination to Scripture’s personal subject-matter, the Word of God speaking 
through Scripture. This subordination is a matter of free and even creative obedience. As we 
reflect on or ‘think after’ {Nachdenken) the biblical witness to God’s self-revelation, we are 
transformed in our thinking. As we are transformed, we are also set free from the specific 
words of Scripture to state the content, message or Word of Scripture in our own terms and 
for specific purposes.
2.3.3. Conceptual terms and theological judgements 
A helpful distinction made by theologian David Yeago can illuminate the difference 
between ‘vain repetition’ and faithful adherence to the scriptural message. Yeago 
distinguishes between theological ‘judgements’ that a passage of Scripture makes and the 
specific ‘concepts’ or ‘conceptual terms’ in which it renders those judgements.*^ Yeago 
explains:
We cannot concretely perform an act of judgement without employing some 
particulai', contingent verbal and conceptual resources; judgement-making is an 
operation performed with words and concepts. At the same time, however, the same 
judgement can be rendered in a variety of conceptual terms, all of which may be 
informative about a particular judgement’s force and implications.**’
Thus, the biblical writers and a contemporary theologian like Barth can render essentially the
same judgement in quite different conceptual terms. As such, Barth can remain faithful to the
message of Scripture (its judgements) without falling into vain repetition o f its precise ways
of wording and conceiving of things. Of course, Barth recognises that these precise ways of
wording and conceiving of things must be carefiilly attended to if the judgements of Scripture
are to be accurately understood. But once those judgements are understood, one can—indeed
one should—‘re-describe or re-render those judgements’ in one’s own conceptual or
philosophical terms.*^ For example, Yeago argues that the statement that Jesus shares
Yeago 1994: 159ft: Childs (1997: 16ft) and Vanhoozer (2000: 83) offer positive assessments of Yeago’s 
article and his distinction.
Yeago 1994: 159. Yeago’s distinction is roughly parallel to that o f Hunsinger when he speaks (in his 
definition of Barth’s ‘rationalism’) of the difference between ‘the surface content of scriptuie’ on the one hand, 
and ‘scriptur e’s deeper conceptual implications and underlying unity,’ on the other hand (Hunsinger 1991: 5).
Yeago 1994: 163.
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equality with God the Father in Phil 2:6ff and the statement that ‘the Son is of one substance 
with the Father’ in the Nicene Creed are two forms of the same judgement. In this thesis we 
will consider how many of Barth’s theological claims are such redescriptions of judgements 
that Scripture already affirms.
2.3.4. The difference between dogmatics and biblical theology 
Barth speaks of the difference in unity. . .  of the two theological tasks’ of biblical 
(exegetical) theology and dogmatic theology.** The differences that Barth saw between these 
two theological disciphnes can be illuminated by oui' definitions of ‘exegesis’ and the direct 
and indirect forms of scriptural usage or authorisation.
Biblical theology is preoccupied primarily with what we have called exegesis—i.e. 
with drawing theological conclusions that can be directly authorised by appeal to specific 
biblical texts. Biblical theology may also appeal secondarily to Scripture in more indirect 
ways, but even such indirect uses of Scripture are regarded as closely ‘accountable’ to 
exegesis.
The relation of dogmatics to Scripture is marked by roughly the opposite priorities as 
biblical theology. Hence, the primary concern with dogmatics is, as Barth notes, with the 
content or subject matter to which Scripture witnesses. Accordingly, the relation of 
dogmatics to Scripture is primarily indirect. Only secondarily and occasionally are the main 
claims of dogmatics supported or justified by exegesis of specific biblical passages.
Certainly such exegesis is sometimes significant in Barth’s dogmatic work (surely more 
significant than it is in the work of most modern or contemporary theologians!), but indirect 
modes of scriptural authorisation usually form the grounds of Barth’s main conclusions.*^
This way of defining the difference between biblical and dogmatic theology involves 
a degree of overlap between the tasks and methods of the two disciplines. Generally 
speaking, the major method of biblical theology is the minor method of dogmatics, and vice 
versa. In each case, engagement with Scripture is crucial, but it tends to take different forms.
1/2, 821. See also Barth’s rhetorical question on 1/2, 767: ‘How can there be dogmatics unless exegesis not |
only precedes but is included in it?’ {
See Barth’s comments on ‘Dogmatics and Exegesis’ in Credo (1936: 177-179), where he (again) speaks of I
theological exegesis as the criterion o f dogmatics. What Barth calls ‘theological exegesis’ here is probably best j
seen as incorporating both direct and indirect forms of biblical authorisation. |
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Speaking more loosely, biblical theology emphasises the interpretation of Scripture in itself, 
whereas dogmatic theology emphasises the use of Scripture, the specific contemporary 
appropriation of its teaching.^**
At the same time, dogmatic theology’s concentration on the content of the church’s 
distinctive God-talk enables it to unpack the internal logic or rationality of the scriptural 
witness and the revelation to which it points.*** As such, dogmatic theology does not need to 
spell out explicitly the direct and detailed exegetical grounding of all of its discourse about 
God. To do so would be impractical and would even distract it from the overall ‘implicit 
logic’ (Frei) or the ‘scope’ or ‘mind’ (Athanasius) of Scripture which is its concern. The fact 
that Barth continues to appeal to Scripture in his dogmatics, whether directly or indirectly, is 
an expression of his adherence to the Protestant Scripture principle.
The relationship between direct and indirect authorisation, and thus between biblical 
and dogmatic theology, is one of mutual interdependence. On the one hand, the procedure of 
indirect authorisation (i.e. the typical dogmatic use of Scripture) is dependent on direct 
authorisation (i. e. exegesis of specific texts) to provide it with a detailed exegetical 
grounding or basis or justification.**  ^ For example, when Barth employs a Trinitarian pattern 
of God’s self-revelation in Scripture as the biblical basis of his version of the doctrine of the 
Trinity in CD I/l (a case of indirect authorisation), one can ask the further question of how 
one could ground that biblical Trinitarian pattern itself in the exegesis of various specific 
biblical texts. Barth (rightly) does not regard it as necessary to spell out fully such an 
exegetical grounding in his dogmatics (at least not in his explicit treatment of the Trinity in 
I/l); rather, he is concerned with the content of this Trinitarian pattern and its expression in 
the creedal statements of the Trinity. However, biblical theology should rightly search out 
this exegetical basis for this content, and dogmatic theology is indirectly dependent on this.
See Kelsey 1999: 202f.
Accordingly, Frei said the following in respect to Barth’s dogmatic redescriptions of Scripture: ‘Barth goes as 
far, I believe, as one can in articulating the largely implicit logic governing the sensus literalis’ (1992: 44).
^  ‘[T]he requirement o f a biblical attitude in dogmatics is not interchangeable with the task o f reproducing and 
explaining the text of the Bible. In theology, this is not the task of dogmatics but of exegesis. Biblical exegesis 
is the decisive presupposition and source o f dogmatics’ (1/2, 821; italics added).
Barth says that dogmatics ‘will have to keep the text of the Bible continually and constantly in view in its 
contenf (1/2, 821).
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On the other hand, we can say that the procedure of direct authorisation is dependent 
on the procedure of indirect authorisation, and thus biblical theology is dependent on 
dogmatic theology. In particular, since the exegete is not without presuppositions or 
‘philosophy,’ one could say that the exegete’s aim should be to have presuppositions that 
ar ise from the subject matter (or object or content) to which Scripture as a whole testifies and 
which dogmatics elaborates. Since Barth regards even the most ‘historical’ aspects of 
exegesis to be concerned with the text’s subject matter, this ‘dogmatic’ question cannot be 
bypassed in biblical theology or exegesis. Detailed contextual exegesis depends on some 
conception of the theological (and, for Barth, Christocentric) content which these passages 
discuss and how it is related to the whole of Scripture. In relation to the Trinity, Barth would 
say that one needs both the overall pattern evident in Scripture taken as a whole (dogmatics), 
and the proper exegetical grounding of the elements of that pattern in specific passages 
(biblical theology) to arrive at the full-orbed theological justification of the doctrine.
2.4. The Two Criteria of Dogmatics and the Function of Scripture
In subsection 1.3 above, we identified Barth’s ‘Christocentric’ and ‘biblical’ criteria 
for dogmatics, criteria that distinguish dogmatics from natural theology. We conclude our 
treatment of the concepts related to the fimction of Scripture in Barth’s dogmatics by 
commenting on how these two criteria relate to Barth’s use of Scriptur e. While the biblical 
criterion of dogmatics obviously relates dir ectly to Barth’s use of Scripture, the 
Christocentric criterion is relevant to the specifically Christocentric way that Barth interprets 
and uses Scriptrrre.
In respect to Scripture, the two criteria function as two hermeneutical rules, which can 
be stated as follows. '^* (1) The dogmatic theologian should always interpret and use the Bible 
according to its ‘Christo logical sense,’ its relationship to the Cliristological centre of the 
Bible, thus avoiding a disjointed and non-theological interpretation of Scripture. (2) The 
dogmatic theologian should always interpret and use the Bible according to its ‘verbal 
s e n s e , t h u s  avoiding ‘eisegesis’ under the guise o f ‘exegesis.’**^
These rules are gi*ounded in our observations of Barth’s dogmatic practice. 
See our comments on ‘verbal sense’ in subsection 1.3 above.
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The first Christocentric rule is an expression of the Christocentric subject-matter or 
content of dogmatics. It corresponds primarily to the indirect mode of scriptural 
authorisation, since much of Scripture is not directly about Chiist (e.g., the verbal sense of 
much of the Old Testament). Of course, Barth sometimes does authorise his Christocentric 
proposals quite directly by means of citation or exegesis of specific biblical passages, 
especially the ‘theological statements’ (see 2.1.2) and the narratives of the New Testament. 
For the most part, however, Barth’s hermeneutical Christocentrism arises from his 
consideration of the themes and patterns of Scripture that lead him to a synoptic 
Christocentric construal of Scripture as a whole. As such, Barth is free to diaw from 
Christocentric ecclesial and theological tradition in his dogmatics, without needing to justify 
such tradition at every point by appeal to the exegesis of Scripture (see 3.4 below).
The second implicit hermeneutical rule is that Scripture must be interpreted in 
accordance with its ‘verbal sense.’ This is part of what it means for the interpretation of 
Scripture to be genuinely ‘biblical.’ This rule expresses the concern that theological 
interpretations of the Bible, even when they claim to be ‘exegesis,’ often wind up being 
forms o f ‘eisegesis’—i.e. occasions in which some idea or meaning or content is read into 
Scripture which is not really there. Barth himself affirmed the distinction between exegesis 
and eisegesis in various ways.**^  Even though Barth regarded it as impossible for the 
theologian to avoid eisegesis entirely, he still regarded ‘exegesis’ (in broad sense o f ‘reading 
out,’ not merely in the narrow sense defined in 2.3.1) as an appropriate goal for theological 
engagement with Scripture.^* Accordingly, in teaching that the fundamental method of 
revealed theology (as opposed to invalid natural theology) was ‘the exposition of Holy 
Scripture,’ Barth associates natural theology with eisegesis (see 1.3 above). Appeals to
For a similar perspective on theological interpretation of Scriptui e to that presented in this paragraph, see 
Watson 1997: see 95-126 (esp. 123f)- Watson derives the metaphor o f ‘the centre’ from Barth (he cites IIP I, 
24).
Barth himself recognised that the line between ‘exegesis’ (in the sense o f ‘reading out’ o f the text what is 
there) and ‘eisegesis’ is often difficult to discern (I/l, 106), a point that is all the more obvious in the face of 
post-modern hermeneutics. A related point of clarification may be in order. The distinction between exegesis 
and eisegesis need not be construed in terms of modern preoccupations with ‘authorial intention.’ Rather the 
text itself can be regarded as having relatively stable semantic content, which the interpreter can either attend to 
or disregard. While Barth sometimes appealed to authorial intention, at other times he appealed to the meaning 
of the text that transcends the intention o f its human authors.
See Barth’s comments on this point on I/l, 106.
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Scripture cannot be the act of letting one’s engagement with Scripture ‘occasion’ the 
development of ideas that are quite independent of or foreign to the text. To do so would be a 
tacit refusal to subordinate oneself to Scripture as an authority. ‘Eisegesis’ runs counter to 
Barth’s adherence to the Protestant Scripture principle. Insofar as the dogmatic theologian 
interprets specific texts of Scripture, he must, in Barth’s words, aim at ‘a representation’ of 
the text that ‘will allow even the detailed words of the text to speak exactly as the stand.
This does not rule out more indirect ways of handling Scripture, but even those ways need to 
be distinguished from ‘reading into’ Scripture, from eisegesis and natural theology.
3. Categories for Tradition and its Theological Functions
In this third section of the chapter we will follow much the same pattern as we did in 
section 2 on Scripture. Thus, we will move from concepts related variously to the construal 
of tradition (3.1), the interpretation and use of tradition (3.2)***** and the relation of the 
Christocentric and biblical criteria for dogmatics to the function of tradition (3.3). In this 
thesis we are concerned with theological tradition that Barth cites or tradition by which he is 
influenced (with or without explicit citation) in his doctrine of God in CD. Theological 
tradition is that subset of Christian church tradition composed of that tradition’s various 
theological writings.
3,1. Concepts Related to the Construal of Tradition
In a way similar to our way of organising concepts under the construal of Scripture in 
section 2, we must distinguish between Barth’s construal of tradition as a whole and his way 
of construing the various parts or aspects of tradition.
3.1.1. The construal of tradition as a whole
In contrast to his treatment of Scripture, Barth offers no extended treatment of 
‘tradition’ in CD.**** More precisely, he does not do so in a single section under the name
1/2,726; cf. Watson 2000: 58f and 1997: 123f. Again, although Barth recognised that we could not escape 
bringing our own presuppositions to the text, he believed that those presuppositions could be revised and 
overturned by an encounter with the objective reality o f the text and the referent that it mediates to us (1/2: 
724f).
Unlike our account of Scripture in section 2, we treat interpretation and use together in this section and the 
next one (sections 3 and 4 respectively).
Cf. Dean 1963:27.
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‘tradition.’***^ However, Barth does frequently comment on church or theological tradition, 
albeit often under other names. Thus, despite the non-systematic character of Barth’s 
construal of tradition, there are certain characteristics he consistently applies to tradition as a 
whole, i.e., to all instances of tradition.
Barth treats theological tradition primarily under the general category of church 
proclamation, one of the three forms of the Word of God.***^  The writings of theological 
tradition (including past attempts at dogmatics) are thus an aspect of the past proclamation of 
the church. As such, theological tradition can possess an authority for the church that is real, 
though secondary to that of Scripture.
The fact that Barth tends to construe ‘tradition’ under the category of ‘church 
proclamation’ is a manifestation of his ‘Protestant’ inclinations. Church proclamation is 
oriented to the exposition or preaching of Scripture. As such, it is accountable to and 
subordinate to Scripture as a ‘norm magisterially confronting the Church.’***'* Barth thus 
refers to tradition (especially in the form of church ‘confessions’) by means of the metaphor 
of a ‘commentary’ on Scripture, for to be anything more than a ‘commentary’ is to ‘try to 
stand on the same level as Scripture.’***^ By this Barth means to ensure that that tradition 
does not create any ‘new articles of faith’ whose fundamental content is not grounded the 
content of Scripture. Certainly, traditional formulations can be new in the sense of being 
spoken in the language and conceptuality of new historical periods, but they are not to create 
completely new objects of belief. Accordingly, Barth consistently resists that idea of 
tradition that aims to speak antecedent to or independently of an engagement with God’s 
written word in Scripture, for such church proclamation is essentially ‘the Church’s dialogue 
with itself,’ rather than an obedient response to revelation.***^
‘"’ See Barth 1936:179-183.
See I/l, 88-99 and 1/2, chapter IV (743-884). For Barth, the paradigmatic case o f church proclamation is 
preaching, but it also includes ecclesial practices such as the administration of the sacraments.
I/l, 106.
1/2,62If. See Leslie 1991: 134-38, who critiques Barth for construing tradition as ‘commentary’ (166fi.
I/l, lOSfif. In the light of the above paragraph, it is not accidental that Barth offers his main comments on the 
church’s theological tradition (§ 20, ‘Authority in the Church’ and § 21, ‘Freedom in the Church’) in the context 
of his doctrine of Scripture in CD, chapter III (§§ 19-21). This provides indirect evidence that we are correct to 
understand the use of Scripture as primary in Barth’s method and to understand his use of tradition largely in 
this context.
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Barth uses some of the same key terms he used for Scripture to characterise tradition, 
or past church proclamation: namely, ‘witness’ and ‘authority.’ Yet his conviction that 
tradition must be hermeneutical and derivative vis-à-vis Scripture now causes him to qualify 
the sense of these terms. First, Barth uses the concept of tradition as a testimony or witness 
to biblically-attested revelation. This is evident in Barth’s tendency to construe much of the 
church’s theological tradition along the lines of one of its specific historical forms, namely, 
‘confession.’***^ For, much like the self-understanding inscribed in the historic Protestant 
confessions of the faith, Barth understands normative orthodoxy in terms of adherence to 
Scripture. Tradition is a kind of secondary witness to revelation, which follows from the 
primary witness of Scriptuie.****
Accordingly, Barth understands theological tradition as capable of expressing the 
church’s authority that is subordinate to Scripture, its ‘authority under the Word.’***^ This 
authority is real, especially over individual Christians. Yet it is at most indirect (mediate), 
relative and formal authority, rather than the dfrect, absolute and material authority that 
Scripture has when it is functioning as the Word of God.**** Even the authority the church 
does have can only operate insofar as it submits to Scripture and applies itself to the reverent 
interpretation of Scripture. * * *
3.1.2. Construing tradition according to its diverse forms 
Besides offering an explicit or implicit construal of tradition as a whole, Barth also 
offers a way of construing various parts or ‘subsets’ of tradition. We can discuss this point 
by means of several different schemes of organisation.
One way which Barth construes theological tradition is according to the main genres 
or forms of tradition which existed throughout church history. * *^  Besides the church’s 
recognition of the canon of Scripture,**^ Barth gives two main examples of theological 
tradition. First, there are the theological works of individual theologians, the ‘ecclesiastical
1/2, 620-660. See Barth’s definition o f ‘confession,’ given in 3.1,2 below.
Thus, tradition is the church’s confession that is limited and established by Scripture’s ‘confession’ (1/2, 
545ft 573ft 
1/2, 585-660.
""1/2,516-526; 538.
1/2, 695-740.
Cf. 1/2, 597-660.
1/2,597-603.
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teachers, i.e., specific expositors and preachers of the Bible.’ ^  Such works, while they may 
be influential, do not represent the ‘confession’ of the church as a whole or even a branch of 
the church, though some have approached such a status (e.g. Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae or 
Calvin’s Institutes). As such, they have relatively less authority than ‘corporate’ statements 
or confessions of the church (see below). One way of organising this vast portion of 
theological or dogmatic tradition is by the historical period from which the statements or 
works of an individual theologian comes. We will use the following rough historical 
categories in this thesis: the church fathers (100-500), the medieval theologians (500-1500), 
the reformers (1500-1564**^), the period of Old Protestant Orthodoxy, including both 
Lutheran and Reformed theologians (1564-1750“ )^; and the Modem Period (1750-20^^ C.). 
This manner of périodisation is a reflection of Barth’s priorities, which clearly stress (a) 
Western theology over the thought of the Christian East (Eastern Orthodoxy), at least from 
the Medieval period onwards, and (b) Protestant thought from the Reformation onwards.
Second, there is Barth’s category o f ‘confessions,’ which we may define broadly as 
the corporate statements or works of the Clnistian church as opposed to the statements or 
works of the individual theologian. For Barth, ‘A church confession is a formulation and 
proclamation of the insight which the church has been given in a certain direction into the 
revelation attested by Scripture, reached on the basis of common deliberation and 
d e c i s i o n . W e  can divide such ‘confessions’ into ‘creeds’ and ‘confessions proper.’ In our 
usage, creeds are the early ecumenical summary statements of faith (like the Apostle’s Creed 
and Nicene Creed) and the statements of certain councils (like the definitions of Chalcedon). 
These may carry the most authority of all instances of tradition in Barth’s work.^*  ^
Confessions proper are those specific non-ecumenical statements of doctrine that define the 
various divisions of belief among those who call themselves Christians (like the Heidelberg 
or Augsburg Confessions)—which brings us to our next way of categorising tradition.
1/2, 603-620.
“  ^ 1564 is the date o f the death of Calvin. 
116 In the context of a treatment of Rousseau, Barth speaks o f ‘the new age in the middle of the eighteenth 
century’ (2001: 160).
""1/2,620.
‘ Within his account of the Trinity, see Barth’s reflection on fourth century Nicene orthodoxy (1/1, 375ff) and 
his use of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed (1/1, 423).
Another way of organising the theological tradition that Barth employs is to speak of 
various sub-traditions. These sub-traditions are distinguished by their distinctive theological 
views, rather than their genre or historical period. Thus, sub-traditions are especially 
important for identifying theological works produced after the Reformation, when 
distinctions between different streams of Christian Tradition become more important. There 
are four main sub-traditions that appear in Barth’s work: (1) Roman Catholicism, (2) Liberal 
Protestantism (or Neo-Protestantism, or simply Modern-Protestantism) (3) Greek (Eastern) 
Orthodoxy, and, his own tradition, (4) ‘Evangelical’ Protestantism.^*^ The first two are 
typically Barth’s opponents and thus constitute negative examples of where the church has 
strayed from its proper adherence and subordination to the revelation attested in Scripture. 
The third is largely neglected.*^** The fourth, the ‘Evangelical’ sub-tradition includes the 
Reformed, Lutheran and Anglican Churches. The first of these, the Reformed, is the specific 
tradition with which Barth most readily identifies himself, although his dogmatics are meant 
to be more broadly ‘evangelical.’*^* Thus, we can generally call Barth’s own views as 
representing a Cliristocentric version of the ‘Reformed-Evangelical’ theological sub- 
tradition.*^^
3.2. Concepts for the Interpretation and Use of Tradition
3.2.1. Introduction
Barth’s interpretation and use of tradition differs in several ways from his 
interpretation and use of Scripture. To begin, the question of '"which tradition?’ is far more 
significant in respect to tradition than the corresponding question (‘which Scripture?) is in 
respect to Barth’s interpretation and use of Scripture. Although Barth believes that Scripture 
is in some ways varied in its contents, he regards the scriptural canon as fundamentally 
unified in a way that tradition is not. Specifically, Barth interprets the theological tradition 
that he cites in either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ ways, while Scriptuie is treated as uniformly
CD, 1/2, 822-830.
The few exceptions show that Barth is decidedly Western in his theological preferences (except in relation to 
the patristic period). E.g. 11/1,33 I f  has some rather negative comments on certain Eastern theologians and their, 
supposed theological tendencies (cf. Barth’s defense o f the filoque in 1/1,4808).
CD, 1/2, 83 Iff; cf. 1/1, xv-xvi. We note that the ‘evangelical’ character of Barth’s dogmatics allows him to 
be positively engaged not only with Reformed thinkers, but with orthodox Pietists (see our comments on Bengel 
in 3.3.2 below).
That said, Barth states that no single tradition ‘has all the truth’ (as quoted in Godsey 1963: 97)
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positive and thus authoritative. Some tradition positively witnesses to the prior witness of 
Scripture to the revelation in Christ, and some tradition stands as a negative example that is 
unfaithful to Scripture and revelation. Insofar as tradition is interpreted positively, it 
functions as a guide for Barth’s dogmatic theology. Insofar as tradition is interpreted 
negatively, it fonctions as a foil for his theology. In the rest of this subsection, we will 
explain further this twofold use of tradition, giving examples of tradition functioning as either 
a guide or as a foil.
3.2.2. The positive function of tradition as a ‘guide’ for dogmatics
When we speak of the positive ‘guiding’ function of tradition, we must clarify the 
varying ways in which a given instance of tradition might ‘guide.’ Barth could use tradition 
as a guide in terms of theological content in one case and in terms of theological method in 
another case. In addition, there are varying degrees to which an instance of tradition might be 
evaluated positively. One could have a case of tradition in which Barth detects no flaws. 
Alternatively, there might be a case of tradition that is objectionable in many respects but 
positive, and thus capable of functioning as a guide, in one or two respects.
An example of tradition functioning positively as a guide for Barth’s dogmatic 
theology is his use of the ancient Trinitarian and Christological creeds of the church (see 
subsection 3.3 in chapter 1). The Apostles’ and Nicene Creeds, together with the 
Chalcedonian Christological formulation, offer theological construals and interpretations of 
scriptural teaching against various heretical counter-construals and counter-interpretations 
(see 3.3.1). In this way, these creeds function both as a hermeneutical guide (a guide for the 
interpretation of Scripture) and as a guide for theological construction in relation to 
challenges to the integrity (i.e., unity, purity, catholicity or apostolicity) of Christian doctrine. 
In this way, Barth recognises the possible role of church tradition—especially in its 
ecumenical creeds—in guiding the interpretation and application of Scripture, even though he 
refuses to regard tradition as a second material source for doctrine alongside Scripture.
This ‘hermeneutical authority’ of tradition is not always clear in Barth’s very ‘Protestant’
It is worth noting that several contemporary Catholic theologians, such as Karl Rahner, appear to share a 
similar position with Barth in this respect, particularly in their rejection of the older, possibly Tridentine, two- 
source view o f Scripture and tradition (the view that Barth has in his sights in 1/2). See Rahner 1970.
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theoretical comments on the priority of Scripture over tradition. That said, Barth’s practice 
often converges with his theory in that he frequently makes the effort to show how the 
‘correct interpretations’ offered in the creeds are actually grounded in Scripture and its ‘self­
interpretation’ as the written form of the Word of God.
Another example of the positive, guiding use of theological tradition is Barth’s use of 
the Protestant reformers, whom Baith refers to as ‘modern’ church fathers. Barth cites Luther 
more than any other theologian, and is indebted to Luther in many of the important themes of 
his theology.*^"* Calvin is also crucial for Barth as the father of Barth’s own Reformed sub­
tradition. As with other positive instances of tradition, however, Barth aims to look to the 
Reformers not as independent authorities but specifically for their ability to interpret and 
illuminate Scripture. He also ft eely critiques them when be believes they fail to measure 
up to Scripture.
3.2.3. The negative function of tradition as a ‘foil’ in dogmatics
In addition to the positive function of tradition in Barth’s theology, it can also have a 
negative function. By this we mean that tradition can show what one should not do in 
theology. The decisive methodological reason why Barth judges certain instances of tradition 
negatively is that he believes that they fail either to be Christocentric, or biblical, or both.'^^
In this thesis, we will concentrate on the failure of a given instance of tradition to be biblical, 
i.e. to be a faithful exposition of Scripture.
See Hunsinger’s essay ‘What Karl Barth learned from Martin Luther’ (2000: 279-304; see 3.3.1 below).
Paul McGlasson draws attention to some possible exceptions to this generalisation. In relation to Barth’s use 
of Luther and Calvin, he says: ‘The point is not just that Barth was guided in his exegesis of the Bible by his 
reading of classical Christian biblical exegesis, though this too is an interesting and noteworthy fact. But the 
point is also that Barth did so in principle, that is, that he considered the mutual fit o f his own biblical exegesis 
and classical Christian exegesis as a basic requirement’ (McGlasson 1991: 95f). While this is slightly 
overstated, it does speak of the degree to which Barth’s practice (like his theory) revered Luther and Calvin as 
teachers who possess secondary but real authority.
For example, in his account of God’s holiness, Barth makes tiie following comments about Luther’s tendency 
to regard the revelation of God’s law, holiness and wiath as separate from the revelation of divine grace: ‘In this 
respect we do not follow Luther because this scheme cannot honestly be maintained in the face o f th e . . .  
testimony of Scriptm e’ (11/1, 363). Also, Barth’s critique of Calvin on election is well known. That it is based 
upon Scripture is evident in the words of Barth’s preface to volume 11/2: ‘1 would have preferred to follow
Calvin’s doctrine of predestination much more closely, instead of departing from it so radically But 1 could
not and cannot do so. As 1 let the Bible itself speak to me on these matters, as 1 meditated upon what 1 seemed 
to hear, I was driven irresistibly to reconstruction’ (11/2, x).
As indicated above, that a doctrine is insufficiently Christological is often, to Barth’s mind, an indication that 
it is insufficiently biblical— for the basic orientation or ‘scope’ o f Scripture is Christological.
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In referring to Barth’s negative use o f ‘tradition as a ‘foil,’ we mean that Barth 
critiques examples of theological tradition, not simply for the sake of critique, but specifically 
to ‘set up’ his own view on a given theological loci as superior and free of the problems of 
the view criticised. This happens frequently with his interactions with Modern Roman 
Catholicism and Neo-Protestant Liberalism. It also happens quite often with his treatments of 
the texts of medieval or later protestant scholasticism, especially when these texts involve 
what we have called (in chapter 1) ‘classical’ conceptions of God. These classical 
conceptions of God, in fact, are the most prominent case of Barth’s use of tradition as a foil 
within Barth’s doctrine of God in II/1. We must now turn to a fuller explanation of these 
‘classical’ views, fulfilling the promise we made to do so in chapter 1.
3.2,4. Defining ‘classical’ concepts of God 
We will generally employ the concepts o f ‘classical theism’*^* or ‘the classical 
concept of God’*^  ^to refer to a relatively consistent conception of God that emerged largely 
as a result of efforts to synthesise (a) certain classical Greco-Roman philosophical views 
about what divmity is like and (b) the biblical testimony to God.'^ ** This definition of 
‘classical theism’ needs to be qualified and explained. We will do so in the form of five 
observations.
The first observation is that, historically speaking, it is often more precise to refer to 
classical concepts of God (in the plural), since accounts of the divine nature drawn from a
H. P. Owen (1971) presents and defends ‘classical theism’ (which he often refers to simply as ‘theism’) over 
other view’s of God such as pantheism or panentheism. He defines theism as ‘belief in one God, the Creator, 
who is infinite, self-existent, incorporeal, eternal, immutable, impassible, simple, perfect, omniscient and 
omnipotent’ (1). On the basis o f classical theism (as defined in pages 1-48), Owen presents an evaluation (both 
positive and negative), o f Barth (98-107) and other twentieth centuiy theologians.
The introduction of Gunton 1978 (1-7), sets forth a way o f defining ‘the classical concept of God’ which lays 
the foundation for his comparative exposition of the doctrines of God of Charles Hartshorne and Barth, He 
employs Aquinas as the representative example of the classical concept.
Cf. Owen 1971: 1, where he says ‘As far as the Western world is concerned, theism has a double origin: the 
Bible and Greek philosophy. All o f the divine properties . . .  are implied in the Bible; but the expression and, 
still more, the amplification of them were due to the influence of Greek philosophy.’ Owen speaks of the three 
phases o f ‘attempts to present Scriptural revelation through philosophical concepts’: (1) the Jews o f the 
Diaspora before the New Testament, such as Philo; (2) the early Christian apologists, such as Justin Martyr; and 
(3) the ‘climax’ of synthesis in Augustine and especially Aquinas (Owen 1971: If).
The average dictionary will contain two definitions o f the term ‘classical’ that are relevant to Theology 
or are commonly used in Theology. (1) That which is o f endui ing or traditional significance; and (2) that which 
related to the ancient Greek or Roman world. Although some connotations of the first definition may be present 
in the use o f ‘classical’ in this thesis, the second definition is more specifically relevant. Again, ‘classical views 
o f God’ are a product of a ‘synthesis’ o f the ‘classical’ Greco-Roman and biblical views o f God or divinity.
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‘biblical-classical synthesis’ obviously vary according to historical period and individual 
theological creativity.*^* There are important differences, for example, between the ‘classical’ 
doctrines of God of Augustine and Anselm, or Aquinas and Duns Scotus. For this reason, we 
will, where necessary, refer to classical concepts of divine unity, immutability or eternity.
The second observation, in some tension with the first, is this: on the conceptual level, 
there is a significant and sometimes remarkable similarity that can be observed between the 
doctrines of God represented by various thinkers like Anselm and Aquinas that makes it 
appropriate to call them ‘classical’ theologians. At the least, there is a crucial set o f ‘family 
resemblances,’ that distinguish classical views from other possible views. In fact, we can 
legitimately speak (as philosophical theologians often do) of an ‘ideal’ classical concept of 
God that consists in a set of logically connected, mutually supporting concepts. This 
complex concept is rooted in shared metaphysical intuitions or assumptions about God as the 
‘first cause’ or ‘most perfect being.’ Therefore, we can legitimately speak o f ‘classical 
theism’ or the ‘classical concept of God’ in many contexts, even if no historical figure 
perfectly exemplifies the ideal classical view. *^^
A third observation about our use of the term ‘classical’ in relation to concepts of God 
is specific to Barth, namely, that our use o f ‘classical’ specifically designates views that 
involve what Barth called ‘natural theology.’ This is based on Barth’s patterns of argument 
rather than his specific use of the term ‘classical.’ Barth does not use the adjective klassisch 
(translated as either ‘classical’ or ‘classic’ in English) very frequently, and does not appear to 
use it in a consistent way to refer to a particular kind of view of God. However, Barth 
consistently critiques natural theology, whether in incipient or obvious forms, within what he
Process theologians sometimes use the term ‘classical theism’ in a historically dubious manner to describe a 
view that they wish to critique. In a review o f a work by Schubert Ogden, Langdon Gilkey has remarked that 
‘what process philosophers of religion call “classical theism” is a strange hodgepodge that bears little historical 
scrutiny’ (Gilkey 1967: 449). He also states that ‘the argument is very dubious that. . .  there has been a 
dominant conception of God in Christendom characterised by Thomist atti ibutes.’ Our second observation in 
this subsection qualifies the value of Gilkey’s comment. See also the comments of William Placher, to the 
effect that ‘classical theism’ is more a modern (17* centuiy) phenomenon than an ancient and medieval one 
(Placher 1996: 11 and elsewhere). Oni: fifth observation above clarifies how we depart from Placher on this 
point.
Brian Leftow’s comments on ‘classical theism’ in a recent article (1998) confirm this way o f defining 
classical theism as an ‘ideal type’ which does not depend upon historical thinkers fiilly instantiating it. Owen 
attempts to state a contemporary version of such an ideal classical position (1970).
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more often refers to as ‘traditional’ {traditionell) views of God.*^  ^ We choose to use the term 
‘classical’ to refer to this sub-set of traditional views of God that Barth judges negatively 
because of their alleged infection with natural theology. In this thesis, then, the term 
‘classical’ will have a primarily negative connotation.*^"* Such classical ‘natural theology’ 
results in a view of God that derived significantly from Greek philosophy and not easily 
compatible with revelation. Specifically, it is the product of idolatrous and arrogant human 
speculations rather than being derived from the witness of the plain verbal sense of Scripture 
and its Christocentric subject matter, the ‘biblical’ (methodological) and ‘Christocentric’ 
(material) criteria of Barth’s theology. *^^
A fourth observation is that scholastic concepts of God are typically the fullest and 
clearest expressions of classical conceptions of divinity. Thus, although Barth sometimes 
critiques the teachings of church fathers for tending towards a ‘classical’ version of natural 
theology, he more frequently critiques scholastic theologians in his doctrine of God. That 
said, Barth is by no means consistently critical of scholasticism, as is evident in his often 
positive assessment of Medievals like Anselm and Aquinas, and the Post-Reformation, 
Protestant scholastics.
Our fifth observation is that we need to clarify the relationship o f ‘classical’ concepts 
of God to modernity. In this thesis, we will typically restrict the use of ‘classical’ to pre­
modern theologians and their views of God,*^  ^in keeping with our concentration on the role 
of pre-modem tradition. *^  ^ Again, we will include post-reformation Scholastics like Polanus 
under the category of pre-modern theologians.
Meijering (1993) claims at several points that one of the main differences between Barth and the Chui'ch 
fathers is that the latter affirmed ‘natural theology.’
It is certainly possible that thinkers who synthesise the biblical and Greco-Roman views of God are 
decisively more biblical than Greco-Roman in content, using the Greek language and conceptuality in the 
service o f the God of revelation. This is evidently what Barth thought of Athanasius’ contributions to Nicene 
creedal orthodoxy. But the thinkers that Barth treats in his doctrine o f divine perfections he normally assessed 
more negatively.
For Barth, the biblical portrayal of God resists any kind o f substantive (rather than merely terminological) 
synthesis with philosophical or natural views o f God. It is all the more problematic for Barth, when he identifies 
metaphysical views o f God that appear to take precedence over feithfulness to the biblical witness to God’s 
identity and character.
See Placher 1996, for a different view o f the relationship of classical concepts of God to modernity.
When we do comment on modem thinkers, our comments will tend to go in one of two directions. (1) 
Following Barth, we will occasionally comment on the indebtedness of modern theologians to pre-modern 
metaphysical concepts of God. (2) We will raise the question of the extent to which Barth is helped by or 
indebted to modem thinking in his critique of classicism. Especially relevant is the new anti-substantialist,
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3.3, The Two Criteria of Dogmatics in Relation to Tradition
3.3.1. The Christocentric criterion of dogmatics in relation to tradition
One of the main factors that determines how Barth relates to tradition is the degree to 
which that tradition is ‘Christocentric.’ As a general rule, Barth evaluates and employs 
tradition in a positive manner if it is Christocentric, and negatively if it is not.*^  ^ In what 
follows, we provide some examples of the positive use of Christocentric tradition as a guide 
for Barth’s theology.
Although Barth’s own style of Christocentrism is distinctive, it also draws on 
historical precedent, either explicitly or implicitly. The most ancient roots of Barth’s 
Christocentrism lie in the New Testament itself, including its reinterpretation of the Old 
Testament along Christological lines. This point speaks of the way that the Christocentric 
and biblical criteria often converge in Barth’s theology. But Barth’s approach also follows 
certain post-biblical Christocentric traditions of Scripture interpretation and of theology in 
general. Of special significance are the ancient creeds (Apostles,’ Nicene, etc.) which 
defined a certain kind of Christocentrism as basic to Christian orthodoxy. The Chalcedonian 
formulation continued in this vein by ruling out various heterodox ways of conceiving of 
C h r i s t . B a r t h ’s theology follows such ancient ecumenical Christocentric construals of 
Christianity in his theology. Even so, these traditional formulations are not adequate to 
account for the distinctive features of Barth’s Christocentrism.
Luther is perhaps the theologian who influenced Barth the most in respect his 
distinctive Christocentrism. George Hunsinger argues that it was primarily the soteriological 
Christocentrism of Luther, rather than the later (more formal) Christocentrism of 
Schleiermacher and Herrmann, that Barth absorbed in his theology.*"*** Barth’s
‘dynamic’ and ‘historical’ metaphysical thinking o f Hegel (and Dorner after him) and the anti-metaphysical 
tendencies of thinkers as varied as Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard, Ritschl, Herrmann, Cremer and Buber.
Exceptions to this rule relate to the degree to which an instance of tradition is biblical. Thus, Barth views 
non-biblical Christocentrism negatively.
See Hunsinger on the Chalcedonian character of Barth’s Christology (2000: 131-147; see also the same essay 
in Webster 2000: 127-142). For a significant argument that qualifies the legitimacy o f calling Barth’s theology 
‘Chalcedonian,’ see McCormack 2002. In this paper, McCormack emphasises the modem actualist and anti- 
substantialist tendencies that emerge especially in volume IV of C D , tendencies that are not neai ly as marked in 
volume II/1.
Hunsinger 2000: 283-286, That said, we should not underrate the significance of Herrmann in Barth’s CD, 
which frequently alludes to the structure and emphases of Herrmann’s writings without actually citing him (I am 
indebted to Trevor Hart for this point; see also Dorrien 2000). We should also note that, according to
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Christocentrism also goes beyond Luther’s in different respects. In some ways, Barth 
radicalises Luther’s Christocentrism.*"** In other ways, Barth qualifies Luther’s 
Christocentrism by means of a Reformed emphasis on adhering to all parts of the biblical 
canon (e.g. the book of James), rather than only those parts that ‘preach Christ’ and attest 
clearly to the gospel of justification by faith.
Before we turn directly to how the second, ‘biblical’ criterion relates to tradition, it 
may be helpful to offer some transitional comments on the Christocentric traditions of 
interpreting Scripture. Both Luther and Calvin regarded Christ as the central unifying subject 
matter of all of Scripture,*"*  ^and Barth follows them on this point. As such, the 
Christocentric-soteriological material principle of the Reformation is a form of the traditional 
Christocentric ‘ruled readings’ of Scripture, hermeneutical applications of the ‘rule of faith’ 
that shape the church’s understanding of the ‘plain sense’ of Scripture.*"*"* Barth is guided 
significantly by such a ruled, Christological construal of Scripture as a whole, especially 
when he makes global statements about ‘what Scripture teaches.’ In such cases, the 
indirect—but potentially decisive—scriptural authorisation of theological proposals is 
especially important. This way of employing Scripture in dogmatics is drawn to a large 
extent fi'om Barth’s own Neo-Reformational, Christocentric tradition.
3.3.2. The biblical criterion of dogmatics in relation to tradition 
Besides Barth being guided by tradition to be Christocentric, Barth is also guided by 
tradition to be ‘biblical,’ and to make being biblical a crucial criterion of his theology. Of 
course, the primary traditional influences on Barth’s thought in this respect are the Reformers 
and their theological followers. Sola Scriptura constituted the ‘formal principle’ of the 
Reformation, the ‘Scripture principle.’ Even if sola Scriptura involves the primacy rather 
than the exclusivity of Scripture over tradition and other potential theological authorities, 
Barth joins historic Protestantism in emphasising the need for subordination to Scripture in
Hunsinger, Barth’s Christocentrism follows Luther more than Calvin, since Barth draws on Luther’s ‘theology 
of the cross’ (2000:287-290).
" ‘ Hunsinger 2000:283.
Generally speaking, Luther and Lutheranism tended to stress the material principle of the Reformation 
(soteriological Christocentrism), while Calvin and the Reformed tradition tended to stress the formal Scripture 
principle o f the Reformation (the ‘biblical’ criterion for theology).
Frei 1974:20.
Green-McCreight 1999: 5ff; 22.
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theology and church. Barth’s preoccupation with Scripture over tradition is not a matter of 
anti-traditionalism, but is itself influenced by a certain (Protestant) ecclesial-theo logical 
tradition.*"*^
More specifically, the Reformed tradition within ‘Old Protestant Orthodoxy’ was 
particularly influential in respect to Barth’s view of Scripture and scriptural interpretation. In 
what follows we will make this point by comparing the treatments of ‘Holy Scripture’ in 
Heinrich Heppe’s anthology. Reformed D o g m a t ic s and Barth’s CD, 1/2. We will see that 
Barth did not follow the Reformed tradition slavishly, which we will indicate partly by noting 
correspondences between Barth’s biblical hermeneutics and those of non-Reformed thinkers 
like Augustine and the Pietist J.A. Bengel.*"*^
Barth affirmed several of the ‘properties’ of Scripture defined by Reformed 
Orthodoxy: authority, perspicuity (clarity of meaning and interpretation), and effectiveness or 
power. We could also add Barth’s affirmation of the ‘unity’ of Scripture, which Reformed 
orthodoxy assumed with other pre-moderns. Yet these shared points coexist with other points 
in which Barth qualified or critiqued Reformed orthodoxy’s teachings on Scripture, such as 
Scripture’s inspiration and perfection.*"***
Of more immediate relevance are the hermeneutical principles that Barth shared in 
common with Reformed orthodoxy. To begin with, Barth agreed with Polanus and others
In this connection, it is important to note Barth’s consistent rejection of anti-haditionalist forms of biblicism, 
which is to be distinquished from the more tradition-friendly biblicism of the Reformers and of the great Pietist 
biblical scholar J.A. Bengel (1/2,6078). On Bengel, see our comments below.
Heppe 1950 (ET). Bartli used this book as one of his primary sources in preparing his first lectures in 
dogmatics at Gottingen in the 1920’s. His rather positive assessment of the Reformed scholastics is evident in 
his forward to Heppe, written in 1935 (Heppe 1950: v-vii).
Bengel lived from 1687-1782, and is cited with relative fiequency by Barth in CD (for some illuminating 
comments on Bengel, see Frei 1974: 175-179). Donald Dayton of Azusa Pacific University informed me in 
personal conversation (in June 2002) that a copy o f Bengel’s Gnommon on the New Testament is on the shelf of 
Barth’s (well preserved) personal library in Basel. This circumstantial evidence confirms what careful study of 
the CD urges: that Pietism sometimes fonctions as a positive formative influence on Barth’s theology. Barth’s 
own autobiographical comments about the revision of his ‘theological foundations’ in his early work add 
additional confirmation o f this point, especially in relation to the impact of the of the two Blumhardts. For 
example, he say that the ‘very strong influence of Christoph Blumhardt. . .  first lead me back simply to more 
concrete biblical exegesis'" (italics added; Bromiley 1982b; 157f; cf. 154),).
Heppe 1950: 21-33.
hi general, there are two main ways in which Barth’s perspective on Scripture stood against the mainstream 
of Reformed orthodoxy. First, Barth distinguished between the Word of God and Scripture (Heppe 1950: 148). 
Second, he differed from the view that Scripture was ‘objectively’ inspired by God and therefore infallible and 
innerant (Heppe 1950: 16-21). As a result, Barth does not affirm Scripture’s ‘perfection,’ although he does 
affirm its ‘sufficiency’ vis-à-vis tradition (Heppe 1950: 30).
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that to affirm the perspicuity of Scripture does not exclude the need for exposition. Several 
other principles of interpretation stated by the Reformed scholastics appear to inform Barth’s 
practice. First, the Scripture’s perspicuity or clarity only appears as such to the one who 
‘reads it with a believing mind, i.e. according to the régula fidei et caritatis.'^^^ Barth 
suggests something like this both in his general faith-seeking-understanding approach to 
theology and specifically in his rule of subordination (see 2.2.2 above). Second, ‘the obscure 
passages of Scripture are to be explained by the unambiguously clear ones,’*^  ^such that 
‘Scripture is its own mterpreter.’ In slightly different terms, obscme passages can be 
explained by the analogia fidei which the Reformed writers regarded as itself based upon the 
clear (versus obscure) biblical passages. Third, ‘the Holy Spirit is the only interpreter of 
Scripture,’*^"* as its divine author. Barth retains the main force of this point, but qualifies it 
with his more dynamic understanding of inspiration. Fourth, Scripture ought to be 
interpreted according to the ^constant consent and authority of the church,’ with the 
qualification that the church does not have ‘judicial power by which to control faith and 
doctrine.’ This last point shows that the relative authority o f ‘catholic’ or ecumenical 
tradition was aheady affirmed before Barth by representatives of the Reformed tradition.
4. Concepts for Understanding Reason or Rationality and its Theological Functions
Following a similar pattern of organisation as sections 2 and 3 of the chapter, this 
section will explicate concepts relevant to the construal of reason (4.1), the use of reason 
(4.2), and the relationship of the two criteria of dogmatics to reason (4.3).
See CD, 1/2, 714; Heppe 1950: 33. For a similar combination of perspecuity and the need for exposition, see 
Bengel (1971 [ET], xii-xiv).
Heppe 1950: 34; cf. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, III.3.5,111.9.14, and III. 10.14. See also Bengel, who 
regarded uprightness of heart as essential to understanding Scripture’s own clear meaning (1971 : xii-xiii).
Heppe i950: 34; cf. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine., 11.10.14.
Heppe 1950: 34.
Conf. Helv. 1.2, as cited in Heppe 1950: 34. The connection between the Spii it and the Scriptures was so 
close in Reformed orthodoxy, that this statement (according to Heppe) was regarded as another way o f saying 
that ‘Scripture is its own interpreter.’
Conf. Helv. 1.2, as cited in Heppe 1950: 34.
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4.1. Concepts Related to the Construal of Reason
4.1.1. Some Definitions
In this thesis, we will use the term ‘reason’ (and related terms like ‘rational’ or 
‘rationality’) in two main senses, ‘descriptive reason’ and ‘normative r e a s o n . I n  its 
descriptive meaning, reason is simply the human intellectual (or rational) capacity for and 
activity of forming judgements and making inferences. In this sense, humans use reason 
all the time, in virtually every aspect of life. In its normative meaning, reason refers to the 
standards or norms for correct reasoning. In this sense, something is ‘rational’ only if it 
conforms to certain norms for justification, truth or knowledge: e.g. the laws of logic, 
correspondence to reality, and so on.
We will now apply these two senses of reason to Barth. On the descriptive level, 
reason includes Barth’s construal and use of logic (e.g. deductive and inductive inference), 
certain uses of his imagination (e.g. Barth’s frequent use of ‘pattern-recognition’ in relation 
to Scripture and tradition) and the intellectual aspects of his experience of God’s Word.*^ ** 
Reason also includes Barth’s use of the terms and conceptual resources of philosophy and of 
other aspects of his intellectual heritage, such as theological tradition. On the normative 
level, Barth regards theology as rational because it is ‘description of what is in fact the case’ 
and in this sense ‘is concerned to say what is true.’*^* That is, theological claims can be true 
knowledge. The truth of theological statements is determined primarily by ‘correspondence’
We follow John Frame (1987:329-332) in making this distinction. More indirectly, we follow Barth himself 
in his book on Anselm, where he offers one of his most extended analyses of the nature of theological rationality 
(Barth 1960: AA&m à passim', cf. Gunton 1978: 1208; 126f and McCormack 1995: 428-441, esp. 429-434). 
Barth here speaks of three senses of reason or rationality: (1) ratio fidei, the internal rationality of the creed or 
Scripture; (2) ratio veritatis, the ontic rationality o f Jesus Christ, the Word, enacted in ongoing events of self­
revelation (and veiling); and (3) ratio intellectus (human intelligere or Nackdenken, thinking-after or reflection, 
on the ratio fidei and ultimately on the ratio veritatis). At the risk of oversimplification, our ‘descriptive 
reason’ corresponds to the ratio intellectus and our ‘normative reason’ corresponds to the ratio veritatis. To 
explain further would involve a more detailed exposition of Barth’s book on Anselm than is necessary, given the 
work others have done in this regard. Besides the above sources, see Pugh 1990.
Barth describes this sense o f reason {ratio) as ‘the primary capacity o f dealing with experience, of 
formulating conceptions and judgements’ (1960:44f).
Barth uses logic, adhering to the law of non-contradiction, especially in his effort to show forth the internal 
coherence of doctrines with each other (see Barth 1960: 55; cf. McCormack 1995:436f and Hunsinger 1991:
28 If). However, Barth’s use of standard logic is qualified by the dialectical character of his theology, as we will 
see below.
John Macquarrie regards Barth as possessing ‘architectonic reason,’ ‘an imaginative reason comparable to 
that of a great architect’ (1966: 15).
Barth includes intellect under the ‘experience’ in which a person’s whole self-determining existence 
(including their thinking) is determined by the Word of God (1/1,202f).
Gunton 1978: 126f.
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to the divine subject matter (i.e. the object or content) of theology and secondarily by its 
‘coherence’ with other doctrines (a coherence qualified by the mysterious and dialectical 
nature of theology). Insofar as theology is true, it is a form of knowledge—knowledge 
that rests on and is imbued with faith.
The above observations indicate that, for Barth, being ‘rational’ is different from 
being ‘rationalistic.’ To be rationalistic would be to develop as system of a priori principles, 
independent of actual revelation. The rationality evident in Barth’s theology is largely a 
posteriori in character (in relation to the ongoing reality of revelation), which leads him to 
understand theological proposals as provisional, open-textured or open-ended.*^"*
Drawing on the work of Steven G. Smith, we can develop other conceptions of the 
use of reason that are complementary to the descriptive and normative senses. In chapter 1 
(subsection 4.2), we noted that Smith argued that there were roughly three concepts of reason 
at work in Barth’s theology. Translating Smith’s work into our own idiom, we can refer to 
the following three concepts of reason: (1) instrumental reason (the neutral use), (2) corrupted 
reason (the negative use), and (3) reconciled reason (positive use).
At least in theology, Barth would say that the ‘neutral’ (or strictly formal) use of 
reason always works in tandem with either (or both) its negative or its positive uses. Such 
neutral rational capacity may be involved in theology, but it is not sufficient to explain how a 
theologian forms theological judgements. Faith and the theological knowledge derived from 
it is not neutral, but ‘self-involving’ and ‘person-specific.’**’^  Also, observation of Barth’s 
theological practice shows that his social and historical location, and especially the church 
and its traditions, shapes his view of what is ‘rational.’ The actual use of reason in
Hunsinger 1991: 28If. The correspondence or ‘analogy’ between theological statements and God’s being is 
ultimately created on an occasional basis by divine actions. As McCormack says, ‘knowledge o f God is an 
event’ (1995: 432f).
See CD 1/2,483, 86If; c f  Gunton 1978: 124 and Hunsinger 1991: 51ff
See A. Torrance 1996: 3 Iff; see also our comments below.
See Hunsinger 1991: 50f
This is no doubt true of any thinker. As Trevor Hart puts it, ‘Reason is . . .  better construed as an intellectual 
tool working within the horizons provided by particular sets of assumptions about what is possible, credible, 
meaningful, etc., than as some transcendent set o f truths to be applied with equal validity to any time and place’ 
(Hart 2000: 3). Hart appropriately draws on Alasdair Maclntyi e in support of this view, and the related concept 
that rational inquiry is ‘tradition-constituted’ and ‘tradition-constituting’ (see MacIntyre 1988: 349-349).
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theology, far from being neutral, is implicated in the dramatic conflict between God’s 
gracious work and human sinfrilness.
In its non-neutral theological exercise, then, human reason is not exempt from the 
inevitable corruption of the whole person that comes with sin; there are ‘noetic’ effects of sin. 
This corruption of the mind requires the reconciling work of God to be overcome. As is 
typical of the ‘actualistic’ elements in Barth’s theology, no theologian can ever presume that 
his reason has reached a state of being finally ‘healed’ or ‘reconciled.’ Rather, the Christian 
theologian must await the unfolding of the ever-repeated miraculous event in which God’s 
self-revelation overcomes the inadequacy of her provisional ways of thinking and 
speaking.
The positive, reconciled use of reason in Barth’s conception of theology can be 
divided into two primary functions: the ‘critical’ and ‘constructive.’*^  ^ In its critical 
function, reason can be profitably employed in the critique of various theological arguments 
or positions, such as those represented by classical conceptions of God’s attributes. In this 
critical role, a reconciled use of reason, based on and trained by God’s self-revelation attested 
in Scripture, can properly judge theological proposals. For Barth, a theological proposal can 
be judged inadequate because it fails to attend to the distinctive rational norms of theology 
found in God’s self-revelation in Christ as attested in Scripture.*^ ** Instead it falls into enors 
such as speculation about God and rationalistic systématisation. This is what happens in 
natural theology, which is for Barth the paradigmatic expression o f ‘corrupted reason.’ The 
critical role of reason, far* from involving an ‘autonomous’ or ‘independent’ use of reason, is 
rather a critique of any such claims to autonomy.
This is an example of the way in which logic and other forms o f human theological rationality are 
conditioned by the actualistic Realdialectik of God’s ontic veiling and unveiling (see McCormack 1995:432f, 
4361).
In making this distinction we are again drawing on Smith (1991), but are using different terms for what he 
referred to as the ‘constraining’ and ‘freeing’ frmétions of reason (see chapter 1, subsection 4.2). See also 
Hunsinger (1991: 5) on Barth’s ‘rationalism.’
Macquarrie (1966: 14f) describes the main theological uses of reason as ‘speculative reason’ (both a 
priori and a posteriori), and ‘critical reason’ (both ‘elucidatory’ and ‘corrective’). He associates the quasi- 
speculative category o f ‘architectonic reason’ specifically with Barth (15). The ‘elucidatory’ aspect of  
Macquairie’s ‘critical reason’ might aptly describe much o f Barth’s use of reason, but the ‘corrective’ aspect 
(autonomous reason capable of critiquing revelation-claims) would not (15f; cf. 90fif).
Such faulty theological proposals often attempt to impose improper (non-theological) norms upon theological 
judgements and inferences, such as the ‘general norms’ of science (see 1/1, 8ft).
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In its constructive function, by contrast, reconciled reason constructs theological 
proposals and arguments by various procedures that move from faith to understanding. As 
Hunsinger states, for Barth there is ‘no faith without knowledge,’ for faith possesses intrinsic 
and distinctive cognitive content.*^ ** Barth’s constructive use of reason is ‘constructive’ in 
only a weak sense, since it is based upon the subordination to and reception of the revelation 
attested in Scripture. It is not (or at least it does not aim to be) constructive in the strong 
sense of producing speculative or metaphysical truths entirely out of the resources of one’s 
own autonomous intellect. However, rather than merely passively receiving and repeating 
revelation in a parrot-like manner, Barth does use his mind actively and creatively to 
explicate the content of revelation and, specifically, to interpret and apply Scripture rightly.
Barth clearly uses mainly ‘internal’ rather than ‘external’ norms of reason or 
rationality in his dogmatics. In other words, the norms of theology are usually drawn from 
within the sphere of the church and its God-talk rather than being derived from without or 
being shared with all spheres of human rational activity. This is because the thinking and 
speaking of theology are derived from Christocentric revelation, which is known by faith. 
There is a limited sense in which Barth recognises that certain rational norms are shared by 
theology and other disciplines or forms of fife outside of the practice of theology: e.g. the 
rules of grammar and, to a large extent, the rules of logic. This is what enables theology to 
be largely intelligible to non-Christians and non-theologians. However, Barth’s 
particularistic impulse causes him to be ever-ready to overturn the rational norms appropriate 
for other subject matters in order to conform his theological reasoning to the unique subject 
matter of God and his revelation.
Hunsinger 1991: 54f. 
See 2.2.2 above,
172 In his discussion o f ‘secular parables to the truth’ and the ‘lesser lights’ Barth does argues for relative 
analogies between theological truths and the truths of wider human experience and reasoning (see IV/3,38-165 
and Hunsinger’s fine exposition in 1991:234-280). Theology has a secondary task of relating its claims to non- 
theological realities and truths (see Dalferth 1989).
In this respect, T. F. Torrance correctly understands Barth’s basic rule of rationality as ‘conformity to the 
object o f knowledge’ whether it is divine or created (see 1962: 182f; 1990: 52-60; cf. Barth 1960: 53 f  and I/l, 
190). Since the nature of the object (or subject matter) varies considerably the appropriate rational norms can 
vary considerably. Rationality as conformity to the object is related to Barth’s ‘objectivism’ (Hunsinger 1991 : 
35-39).
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4.1.2. A construal of the rational intelligibility of the gospel
Aspects of Barth’s construal of reason are evident in a passage in CD, IV/3 on the
Christian community’s explanation of the gospel. Although this passage comes late in CD, it
appears to shed light on the way Barth understood reason in the earlier volumes, such as II/1.
In context, Barth is unfolding of the claim that, in the ministry of witness that it does in the
power of the Holy Spirit, the church is called not only to declare the gospel, but to explain
it.*^ "* To explain the gospel, is to show forth its inherent perceptibility and intelligibility. The
human work of explaining is not autonomous, but rests on and follows the prior divine work
in which the Word of the Gospel explains itself. Yet there is still a human work of explaining
to be done, and this is a rational work. Barth emphatically avers that the church’s human
witnesses must discard ‘the illusion that [theological] knowledge is possible only in the form
of a sacrificium intellectus.'^''^ Rather the gospel message is rational and human reasoning is
part of what is required to show this, as the following quotation shows.
For it is surely possible for even the most obstinate of unbelievers, whether or not 
they can come to a knowledge of the truth, at least to appreciate the inner consistency 
and to that extent the meaning of the evangelical message. If they do not, the 
community is well advised to ask itself whether this is not because of a deficiency in 
its own attention to the inner clarity, rationality and perspicuity of the Gospel on the 
one side and neglect of the human means at its disposal on the other. It is thus 
advised to seek the fault in itself rather than on the wicked world, and therefore with 
new zest and seriousness to make now and more energetic efforts in this direction.
But it is generally intelligible and explicable. For its content is rational and not 
irrational.
In this passage, Barth distinguishes between ‘knowledge of the truth’ of the gospel that is 
open only to believers and an appreciation of the ‘inner consistency’ and ‘meaning’ of the 
gospel which is open to believers and unbelievers alike. If unbelievers do not appreciate
the ‘intelligibility’ of the gospel (its inner consistency, rationality and perspicuity), Barth 
implies that this is the fault, not of the gospel nor of the unbelievers, but of the church.
Barth’s speaking of the ‘inner consistency’ of the gospel is illuminating, and can be 
unfolded dialectically. First, it is Hnner consistency.’ In that sense, it may not be consistent
IV/3, 846-850.
IV/3, 848.
One could argue that a non-believer’s appreciation of the inner consistency o f the gospel requires an 
imaginative recognition of the meaningful pattern within it. This makes communication between believers and 
non-believers possible.
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with human knowledge at large; it is internal rationality. It is concerned rather with 
interpreting the mysterious world of revelation, the ‘strange new world within the Bible.
The truth of the gospel is often at odds with the conclusions of history, philosophy and 
‘natural theology.’ Yet, second, the intellectual world of the gospel possesses ‘inner 
consistency.' It remains intelligible. Possessing this inner consistency, theology is 
meaningful. In this respect, Barth’s theology is marked by what George Hunsinger calls a 
‘weak’ form o f ‘Anselmian coherentism.’ By this Hunsinger means that, for Barth as for 
Anselm, ‘no cognitive assertions can be justified independently of other theological 
assertions and beliefs’*^** It is weak coherentism, since it is not purely the internal coherence 
or consistency of these proposals that grants them meaningfulness or justification. Rather, 
doctrinal beliefs are ‘thought to be justified also and primarily because they are suitably 
grounded in revelation as normatively attested in Scripture.’*^** Hence, the ‘consistency’ he is 
concerned to affirm is qualified by correspondence to the dialectical nature of revelation and 
of our Hmited human understanding of it.*^ *
4.2, Concepts for the Use of Reason
In this subsection, we will describe various critical and constructive functions of 
reason. In his use of various rational ‘tools,’ Barth consistently aims to subordinate himself 
to Scripture and its subject matter.
Barth 1957: 30ff.
As such, Barth differs from Wolfhart Pamienberg (1968 and 1991) and other theologians who lay great 
emphasis on demonstrating the compatibility between the truth-claims of theology and the truth-claims of other 
non-theological disciplines (history, philosophy and science). But Barth is not simply a fideist. The reason is 
that he does claim the rationality and general intelligibility o f the Gospel and of dogmatics. Barth simply 
regognises that the rational grounds that enable a person to come to knowledge o f theological truth are rooted in 
revelation, as it is received in faith.
Hunsinger 1991: 55; cf 28If. On Anselm in this respect, see Barth 1960: 55f.
Hunsinger 1991: 281. This is Barth’s incorporation of elements of the correspondence theory o f tiuth and is 
related to his concern for ‘hermeneutical adequacy’ (Hunsinger 2000: 19It). Moving beyond what Hunsinger 
has shown, we can offer a couple of further provisional observations. First, the implicit approach to or ‘theory’ 
of meaning evident in Barth’s theology seems to be largely ‘coherentist.’ This is what allows a non-believer 
who is not personally acquainted with the divine referent o f theological language to grasp its internal 
meaningfulness and intelligibility—even for its first-order discourse. Second, Barth’s implicit theoiy of truth 
seems to be largely a ‘correspondence’ theory o f truth. Revelation supplies the reality to which theological 
statements must correspond to be true. Barth’s implicit theory of justification (Hunsinger’s concern) involves 
elements of both coherence and correspondence theories.
See McCormack 1995: 432f, A related point is that Barth appears to believe that no human theory or system, 
in any discipline, can be totally without internal contradictions (II/1, 105; 580; cf. Hunsinger 1991: 282).
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4.2.1. Hans Frei on the three levels of discourse and ‘conceptual redescription’
In his posthumously published work entitled Types o f Theology, Hans Frei employs 
several helpful categories for the analysis and compar ison of various theologians and 
theologies. One set of categories is his reference to first-order, second-order and third-order 
discourse. Barth’s theology has a certain way of relating these thr ee levels of discourse in his 
theology, which sets it apart from other types of theology.
We may define the three levels of discourse briefly as follows. First-order discourse 
is both ‘first-person direct address to God, speaking and acting in his presence’ and the 
basic testimony to God’s self-revelation found in biblical narratives, especially those about 
Jesus. Such self-involving statements are at the heart of the church’s native language of 
prayer and worship, its distinctive language-game. Second-order discourse is reflective ‘talk 
about God’ which typically takes the form of conceptual analysis or redescription of the self­
involving first-order statements about God. This is the heart of the language and task of 
theology. Thfrd-order discourse is formal and technical philosophical language, which Barth 
employs in a qualified manner within his theology.
Frei obseiwes that, in Barth’s theology, the relationships between these tliree levels of 
discourse are ad hoc rather than systematic. This has several specific implications. For one 
thing the first two orders of discourse ‘ar e not nearly so sharply distinguishable as they are 
for some other theologians.’*^"* This means that theological language, even if it is 
predominantly second-order ‘conceptual redescription,’ is also self-involving. As the 
church’s self-criticism, it is still the language of the church and of faith. *^  ^ The second-order 
speech of theology is essentially Christian ‘self-description, ’ a sort of description and 
analysis of the rules that govern the theological discourse of the Christian community. In 
addition, Barth employs philosophical-conceptuality freely on an ad hoc basis, but in a way 
that retains the primacy of the distinctive theological subject matter and discourse (see 4.2.3
Frei 1992: 39. See A. Torrance (1996) on the significance of the doxological (first-order) aspect of God-talk 
and how Barth ought to have emphasized it more.
See Frei 1992:41.
Frei 1992: 39.
Again, see Hunsinger 1991: 50f.
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b e l o w ) . I n  sum, Frei regards Barth’s CD as primarily second-order redescription or 
conceptual analysis of first-order language of the biblical text, with the use of third-order 
discourse that aids this analysis.
Although Frei’s interpretation of Barth is basically accurate and insightful, it does 
need to be qualified in one respect. This qualification concerns how Frei refers to the second- 
order discourse of theology as ‘self-description.’ The trouble with this language is that Barth 
believes that this Christian God talk is, at its best, not merely the self-expression of a 
particular religious community but is genuinely grounded in and expressive of God’s self­
revelation.*** Barth’s theocentric realism leads him to consistently speak of the objective 
theological referentiality of theological language, rather than any anthropocentric reduction 
of it to the self-enclosed world of a cultural-linguistic system. **^  Barth repeatedly declares 
that, because of the ongoing gift of revelation, theologians can be set free to talk not only 
about themselves but about God. At times Frei seems aware of this point, but sometimes, 
(like George Lindbeck) he does not give sufficient attention to Barth’s theological realism—
i.e. to his unswerving commitment to the adequate connection between theological language 
and the extra-textual, trans-communal reality of God.*^ **
Thus, there is a polemical point implicit in the title of this thesis: ‘Redescribing God.’ 
Barth’s theological method surely involves redescription of first-order Christian language, 
but in faith this is properly seen as in some sense ‘redescribing God' albeit dialectically and 
provisionally—and not merely another effort at communal self-description. Understood 
correctly, ‘redescribing God’ in obedient response to God's own self-description, i.e. his self-
Indeed, Frei claims that, for Barth, ‘One not only can but must make use of technical philosophical schemes 
of a metaphysical sort in the process o f using Christian language in its descriptive or assertive mode’ (1992; 41),
Frei 1992:44; cf. 81, 125. See the work of Paul McGlasson (1991), who, probably being influenced by Frei 
(Frei taught at Yale, where McGlasson did his Ph.D), calls ‘conceptual analysis’ the primary exegetical method 
that Barth uses, at least in the first two volumes o f CD (see chapter 1, subsection 2.4).
In a relevant comment, Frei says that if  Barth ‘sounds like a traditional metaphysician . . .  the impression is
misleading He is indeed talking about knowledge appropriate to reality, but there is no theory o f reality and
no theory of [the] classes of assertions involved’ (45). Jenson (1969; 1997) is one interpreter of Barth who is 
more quick to speak of Barth as offering a metaphysic or theory of reality, and this his view differs somewhat 
from Frei’s. But even Jenson is well aware that if  Barth is doing metaphysics, it is surely a distinctive 
theological kind,
Webster appropriately associates this with ‘ecclesial subjectivism’ (1995: 27).
This point is made with exceptional force by Webster (1995:26-33), who critiques Lindbeck (1984 and 
1986), and to a lesser extent Frei, in the light of an exposition of Barth’s unique revelational realism. See also 
Hunsinger’s helpfiil comments on the motif of ‘realism’ in Barth (1991:43-49 and 2000:210-225 [a reprint of a 
1987 article].
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revelation in Jesus Christ attested in Scripture, is the primary goal of Barth’s theological 
method. **** This is the telos of Barth’s distinctive and disciplined way of integrating the roles 
of Scripture, tradition and reason within his theology. We will observe this ‘realist 
principle’ at work in the remainder of the thesis.
4.2.2. Barth’s use o f ‘logic’ and ‘argument’ in CD
We will now examine some of the various ways of using logic and argument that 
Barth employs in CD. To begin, we will consider why we think it is appropriate to use the 
term ‘argument’ as a way of characterising what Barth is doing in CD.
Some interpreters have regarded ‘argument’ as inappropriate to Barth’s theological 
method. For example, Frei says that ‘Barth’s theology proceeds by narrative and 
conceptually descriptive statement rather than by arguments or by way of explanatory 
theory.’***"* But Frei’s statement does not hold if we define the term ‘argument’ broadly, as 
something like ‘making a case for a particular view,’ such as a lawyer might do on the basis 
of varied pieces of forensic evidence. This is the kind of informal ‘argument’ that the 
linguistic philosopher Stephen Toulmin had in mind in his book The Uses o f Argument, the 
concepts of which David Kelsey helpfully applies to the uses of Scripture in theology.***^  
There are a great variety of ways that one can make a case for various conclusions, and hence 
a great variety of kinds of argument. When we forego a monolithic conception of what 
arguments are, then perhaps ‘conceptual description’ can itself be a form of argument—an
The term ‘redescribing God’ admittedly stands in danger of overstate the ‘realism’ of Barth’s approach and 
understating its ‘eschatological reserve.’ We could perhaps make the same point by speaking of ‘reinterpreting 
God’s self-interpretation’ or ‘re-articulating God’s self-revelation.’
This is especially important m relation to Scripture, and again, Webster’s comments get to the heart of the 
issue. In some contrast to the work of Lindbeck and Frei, he says: ‘For Barth, it is not Scripture as text, and 
certainly not Scripture in its use by a determinate religious community, which is o f overarching significance, but 
Scripture as normative testimony to the absolute act o f God’s self-manifestation in fi’ee grace. Barth’s 
understanding o f Scripture as the ‘basic text’ is inseparable from his emphasis on the divine action by which it 
becomes God’s Word’ (Webster 1995: 31; the reference to Scripture as ‘basic text’ [Urtext] alludes to Barth’s 
comment on 1/1, xii).
This realism in human theological language (see Hunsinger 1991:43-49) is rooted in the ontic ‘realism of 
revelation.’ This ontic realism, as Gunton says, ‘provides the ontological grounding for Barth’s understanding 
of revelation and therefore for his doctrine o f God’ (1978: 129). Hunsinger discuses this ontic realism largely 
under the category o f ‘objectivism’ (1991: 35-39).
Frei 1992: 161. The context of this statement is Frei’s legitimate claim that the divine-human relationship can 
be narrated and redescribed, but cannot be proven by argument or by a general explanatory theory of possibility. 
Frei’s point is directed against arguments resting on general a priori assumptions about reality, and may not 
apply directly to informal arguments rooted in a posteriori assumptions (like those rooted in specific narratives). 
‘ Toulmin 1964; Kelsey 1999: 122-147. Toulmin regards formal arguments (strict syllogistic logical 
arguments) as of limited value in the analysis o f how people argue in ordinary speech or in many disciplines 
other than Logic.
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argument that follows and traces out the internal logic and conceptual implications of the 
revelation attested in Scripture.
According to Toulmin, and Kelsey after him, the variety of informal alignments 
nonetheless tends to involve a fairly stable set of elements, each of which plays of particulai' 
role in making a case for a particular conclusion. Kelsey shows how Scripture tends to 
play certain roles rather than others, and we can say the same for tradition. Reason is at work 
in different ways in all aspects of an argument, forming judgements and making inferences 
under the constraint of certain rational norms.
The key insight afforded by Kelsey’s analysis of Barth’s arguments**** is that there are 
multiple sources and resources that a theologian like Barth might employ to authorise a single 
theological conclusion. Indeed, it is unlikely that a single strand of the ‘threefold cord’— 
even Scripture—authorises Barth’s theological conclusions all by itself. Scriptuie does not 
play all the authorising roles of the argument. Rather, Barth’s typical informal ai gument 
involves Scriptuie, tradition and reason with each playing a distinctive but essential role. In 
subsection 4.3, we will comment on how it is nonetheless true that Scripture usually retains a 
certain primacy in authorising Barth’s theological proposals.
4.2.3. Barth’s use of philosophy in theology 
Barth’s theoretical comments, obsei*vations of his actual practice, and the 
interpretation offered by others, ai e all relevant to the process of developing concepts about 
how philosophy functions in his theology. *^ ^
We begin with his theoretical comments on the role of philosophy in theology, drawn 
from his discussion of the phase o f ‘reflection’ in the theological interpretation of Scripture 
(see 2.2.3 above).^ **** The following is our summary of Barth’s five points about the role of 
philosophy in biblical interpretation,^*** which can also illuminate the circumscribed role that 
Barth saw for philosophy in his biblically-oriented dogmatic theology.
David Ford’s use of the term ‘argument’ in relation to Barth confirms this (1985: 12).
See Kelsey 1999: 125-134. The elements identified are data, warrant, backing (for the warrant), qualifiers, 
rebuttal and conclusion.
See especially Kelsey 1999: 133f.
See chapter 1, subsection 4.3, especially for relevant secondary literatiu e.
See also Barth’s helpful comments on ‘dogmatics and philosophy’ in Credo (1936: 183-186).
1/2, 730-735.
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1. Given that everyone has a philosophy (or philosophies), a theologian needs to be 
aware of her philosophy and how it affects her scriptural interpretation.
2. A philosophy should be no more than a révisable hypothesis.
3. Philosophy should not become an end in itself, an independent interest.
Otherwise, it becomes dangerous, and transforms interpretation into the support of 
an ideology.
4. There is no essential reason for preferring one philosophy or scheme of thought to 
another; all of them are fallible and provisional.
5. Using a philosophy is fruitful only when ‘it is determined and controlled by the 
text and the object mirrored in the text.’^ **^ Only then is it rightly self-critical.
These comments are fairly self-explanatory. The restrictions that Barth imposed on the use
of philosophy are clearly in keeping with the non-systematic and revelation-based character
of his theology.
With these theoretical directives of Barth in mind, we may now consider some 
examples of his actual use of philosophy. We will concentrate on his use of Kant and (neo-) 
Kantian philosophy. There are several ways that Barth is indebted to Kant and Kantian 
philosophy. First, Barth uses Kantian terms and conceptual forms. We noted in chapter 1 
that Barth makes use of Kantian distinctions such as: analytic and synthetic and a priori and a 
posteriori. Barth does not always use these terms in the same way that Kant used them, but 
rather adapts them for use in theology, often using them more loosely and casually. In fact, 
Barth sometimes uses the conceptuality of Kant without using Kant’s terminology, thus 
concealing his indebtedness to Kant to some degree.^ **^  Second, interpreters of Barth have 
regarded Barth’s overall epistemology and view of rationality as a distinctive theological 
form o f ‘critical realism.’ The adjective ‘critical’ highlights the influence of Kant and his 
followers (such as the Marburg Neo-Kantians) upon Barth.^ **"* Third, and most significantly
1/2, 734.
George Hendry believes this point applies generally to Barth’s use of philosophy, not only to Kant and 
Hegel: ‘It became Barth’s practice to conceal his philosophical obligations by translating them into general and 
less technical terms’ (1984: 213; cf. 219).
However, Barth’s ‘critical realism’ is distinctively theological and does not result from an a priori adherence 
to a general view of epistemology or rationality (see McCormack 1995). Also, we might note that, considered 
broadly, the ‘critical’ aspects of Barth’s theological epistemology include categories such as ‘imagination’ 
(understood as the capacity to recognise or construct meaningful patterns) which would be more closely 
connected with Kant’s Third Critique {The Critique o f  Judgement). We are here using the term ‘critical’ in the 
sense developed by the Kantian tradition, which is somewhat different than the way we defined the ‘critical’ 
function of reason above (see subsection 4.1.1).
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for our purposes, Barth employs certain quasi-Kantian transcendental arguments in his 
theology, not least within his account of divine perfections/**^
It is worth examining this last ‘Kantian’ feature in more detail. In his Critique o f 
Pure Reason, Kant famously used the transcendental method of argument to move from the 
factual claim that humans made ‘synthetic a priori judgements’ to the conditions of 
possibility of this fact. The key distinguishing characteristic of such an argument is that one 
starts with a statement of fact, describing what is actually the case, and then infers the 
conditions that make it p o s s i b l e For Kant to move from the actual to the possible rather 
than the other way around signalled a ‘move toward “concreteness” that offered an 
Epistemology less dependent on speculation about what is abstractly possible.’ *^*^ In this 
respect, the transcendental method is congenial to Barth’s theology, which consistently tends 
to move from particular actualities to general possibilities, rather than vice versa.^ *** The 
main difference between Kant and Barth is that Barth draws his initial factual claims, not 
from general human experience, but from God’s self-revelation known by faith.^ **^  By 
transcendental reasoning, Barth then aims to show forth the inherent intelligibility and 
rationality of such a claim of faith. The result is that, instead of Kant’s ‘religion within the 
bounds of reason alone’ Barth aims at a use of reason that is within the bounds of revelation 
alone.
A closing comment about Barth’s use of philosophy is this: the fact that Barth uses 
philosophy at all—in its terms, ideas, or forms of argument—is another indication of how his
See Hendry 1984; see also our comments on such arguments in chapter 3. W. S. Johnson offers a loose 
statement of a transcendental argument in Barth (1997: 45,200). More generally, see Roderick Chisholm’s 
philosophical analysis o f the transcendental procedure (1982: 96f).
Hunsinger describes this same kind of argument or inference as the rational procedure o f ‘grounding,’ which 
is a part o f Barth’s ‘rationalism’ (1991: 57f). He points out that this kind of procedure is typical in Barth’s 
doctrine of the knowledge of God (11/1, 63-178). For here the actual fact of human knowledge is grounded in 
the divine freedom, as known by revelation, which provides the necessary and sufficient conditions of the fact of 
knowledge.
Frame 1987: 175. Also, if Schwobel is correct, an actuality-possibility order is typically pre-modem, which 
would (sui prisingly) make Kant an atypical ‘modern’ thinker in this respect—together with Barth (Schwobel 
2000:29f).
See Hunsinger on Barth’s ‘particularism’ (1991: 32-35) and A. Torrance on Barth as a ‘methodological 
actualist’ (1996: 47).
Hendry 1984:221. Kant did not believe God could be an object of knowledge at all. Barth did, but only 
because God makes himself an object o f our knowledge. Also, Barth denied immediate knowledge o f God, 
affirming that we know God only through the signs he has appointed to reveal (and conceal) him (see 11/1, 16f, 
49).
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dogmatic claims are often authorised by biblically-attested revelation in an indirect rather 
than direct manner.
4.3. The Two Criteria in Relation to Reason
We now turn to the concepts pertinent to understanding the relationship of reason to 
the biblical and Christological criteria of Barth’s dogmatics. In keeping with our relative 
concentration on Barth’s method over his content, we will give more space below to the 
consideration of the more methodologically-oriented biblical criterion of dogmatics.
4.3.1. The primacy of Scripture in theological arguments 
We may now clarify in what sense Scripture has an overall primacy among the 
tlireefold cord in authorising Barth’s dogmatic proposals. Some steps in Barth’s informal 
ar guments for his proposals will not be directly based upon Scripture, but even these steps are 
often at least indirectly based upon Scripture. This is part of what allows Scripture to retain 
primacy, without exclusivity, in the grounding of Barth’s claims. This point may be clarified 
by making some observations related to a distinction that Kelsey makes between ‘macro­
arguments’ and ‘micro-arguments.’^ ***
Macro-arguments provide a ‘gross anatomical structure’ of argument that incorporates 
several more specific micro-arguments.^* * The micro-arguments justify, support and ground 
aspects of the macro-argument. As such, the micro-arguments can stand on their own 
(although their significance may be restricted to a very narrow scope), but the macro­
arguments depends on these micro arguments.
This ‘bottom up’ (rather than ‘top down’) structure of epistemic justification sheds 
light on the way Scripture functions in Barth’s theology. Most of the claims supporting 
Barth’s wide-ranging macro-arguments often do not take the form of direct quotations or 
exegeses of specific passages of Scripture. In other words, Barth’s macro-arguments usually 
operate mostly or entirely by means of indirect scriptural authorisation. However, this 
indirect scriptural authorisation in principle could be supported, and sometimes is supported.
Kelsey 1999: 130f.
Kelsey 1999: 130f.
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by the direct scriptural authorisation of many micro-arguments/*^ This is in keeping with 
Barth’s claim that biblical (exegetical) theology is principally concerned with the ‘basis’ of 
the church’s God-talk (see 1.1 above).
However, because Barth is doing dogmatics, rather than biblical theology, he does not 
provide this kind of foil exegetical basis for all his doctrinal claims. (If he did, CD would be 
even more massive and prolix than it is!) Yet Barth does offer a large number of exegetical 
micro-arguments in CD, often by means of excursuses which provide evidence for part of a 
macro-argument. At times, he provides such a micro-argument inadvertently in another 
context and volume of CD. Yet Barth often uses indirect biblical authorisation even for 
micro arguments. This confirms that, even in Barth’s CD, it is very difficult to find an 
argument that is truly an example of direct scriptural authorisation fi'om beginning to end/*^
4.3.2. Barth’s use of the historical-critical approach to biblical interpretation 
Our consideration of the concepts relevant to the intersection between Scripture and 
reason in Barth’s work includes Barth’s appropriation of aspects of the modem historical- 
critical approach to interpretation. A good place to start is Christina Baxter’s excellent 
discussion of the issue of Barth’s relationship to the historical-critical approach to 
interpretation.^*"* In short, Baxter argues that Barth’s usage of historical-critical methods is 
ad hoc. As with Barth’s use of philosophy, Barth uses higher-critical methods when they are 
consistent with and helpful for accomplishing his theological purposes. This is the basic 
position that will be both assumed and corroborated in this thesis. This view stands in 
contrast to other interpretations of Barth, either those that affir m that Barth’s practice shows a 
basic rejection of the higher-critical approach (despite the superficial acceptance of it in his 
theoretical comments) or those that hold that there is an incoherent dualism in Barth’s 
thought on the matter/*^ It is clear that no matter how much Barth used higher-critical
We use the concept o f ‘direct authorisation’ in a slightly less restrictive way than Kelsey does (1999: 139ft). 
For example, it seems appropriate to allow direct authorisation to include exegetical summaries or paraphrases 
of specific texts rather than only direct quotations of them. See our definitions in 2.3 above.
See Kelsey 1999: 139ft:
Baxter 1981: chapter 1. See Barth’s comments about ‘Exegesis and the Science of History’ in Credo, which 
offer a qualified critique of historical-criticism (Barth 1936: 186-191). See also McCormack 1991.
Baxter 1981: 72ft
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methods or conclusions, he did not follow them slavishly, but always subjected them to a 
searching theological critique/
There are two main ways in which Barth tends to depart from the typical methods and 
conclusions of historical criticism. First, Barth has a strong orientation to and reverence for 
the canonical form of the text as a theological witness, and does not wish to probe behind the 
text to discern its historical pre-history. Accordingly, Barth’s is concerned to interpret the 
verbal sense of this final form of the text, not some critically reconstructed form.^^  ^ Second, 
Barth believes that historical-critics are often guilty of neglecting the central Christological 
object or subject matter of Scripture.^ Clearly, Barth believes that the theological
interpretation of Scripture is ‘Christocentric,’ as with all of theology, and he does not believe 
that higher-criticism has the authority to override this.^*  ^ So long as Scripture is interpreted 
with reverence for the text and in light of its subject matter, then higher criticism can be 
profitably used as a rational tool for uncovering the meaning of the text.
4.3.3. The relation between Barth’s Christocentrtsm and his use of reason
We now turn to the primary material criterion of Barth’s dogmatics, that it be 
Cliristocentric. The role of reason in Barth’s dogmatic theology is constrained by this 
criterion just as it is by the biblical (methodological) criterion.
In our comments on the construal of reason above (in 4.1.1) we noted that Barth uses 
reason in both critical and constructive ways. We can apply this distinction to Barth’s 
concern that dogmatics be Christocentric. An example of the Christocentric-critical function 
of reason is found in Barth’s emphatic rejection of the analogia entis of much scholastic 
theology and of Roman Catholic theology. This rejection has to do largely with Barth’s 
actualistic, non-substantialist perspective in which it is only in the act of the incarnation that 
God ‘shares being’ with the created order.^^  ^ Although this is basically a material claim, it is 
not without methodological import (as in Barth’s rejection of natural theology).
Baxter 1981: 62; cf. CD, 1/2, 715f; 1/2,466; I/l, 283-6.
This is one among several respects in which Brevard Childs is similar to Barth (see Scalise 1994; c f  Childs 
1997).
1/2,466ff.
In this respect Barth is very similar to his friend Wilhelm Vischer, who wrote approvingly of Barth in his The 
Witness o f  the Old Testament to Christ (Vischer 1949:28fl). Likewise, Barth cites Vischer approvingly on 
many occasions and often follows his exegesis (eg. 1/2, 80; cf. 47,68, 87; II/1, 118, 412),
See McCormack 2002,
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An example the Christocentric-constructive fiinction of reason is found in Barth’s 
broad tendency to develop what we might call ‘Christocentric metaphysics.’ In the words of 
Robert Jenson,
In Barth’s interpretation of reality, the life-history of one human person has taken the 
place held in the West’s traditional metaphysics by . . .  the Ground of Being. The 
Church Dogmatics is the first grand system of Western metaphysics since the collapse 
of Hegelianism, but a thoroughly revisionary one. It casts a vision of reality founded 
in a particular temporal entity [i.e. Jesus Christ]...  an encompassing, flexible, and 
drastically coherent christological interpretation of reality.
Whether or not we agree with the details of Jenson’s comments (Is Barth’s really the first
grand metaphysic since Hegelianism? Is it best to call it a ‘system’?), he makes a worthwhile
point about the extraordinary creative and constructive capacities of Barth’s Cliristocentric
use of reason. We wish to add that Barth’s ‘metaphysics’ are ‘biblical’ as well (the other
criterion of dogmatics), for Barth would not be interested in a Christological metaphysic that
was not well grounded in Scripture.^^^
As a final comment on Barth’s Christocentric use of reason, we wish to reemphasis
the close connection of Barth’s Christocentrism to his use of tradition. That is, we wish to
stress that Baith’s Chiistocentric way of reasoning is not simply the product of his own mind,
or even his own reading of Scripture. Rather, it is in large measure shaped by his
appropriation of Christocentric theological traditions and theii* Christocentric ways of using
reason. Thus, even though Barth’s appropriation is in some ways novel and creative (and
thus is tradition-constituting), it also draws from a tradition-constituted theological
understanding of rationality that aims to place Christological revelation as the centre of
reality (see 3.4 above).
5. Conclusion: Moving from Conceptual Categories towards a Conceptual Framework
In this final section of this chapter, we will attempt to draw out some important ways 
in which the various concepts we have described in this chapter can be inter-related within 
Barth’s theological method. Our key claim is that Barth’s theological method is marked by 
five key features. It is: (1) reverent (2) Christocentric, (3) textually-based, (4) ecclesial, and
Jenson 1997: 31; cf. 28-32.
It is along these lines that David Ford speaks of Barth’s doctrine of God in II/1 as ‘metaphysics in support of
story’ (1985; see our comments in chapter 3).
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(5) creative/^^ As we expound these five features we will give some indication how they are 
prioritised and interrelated. The first feature of reverence towards revelation is a kind of 
‘master feature’ and it is expressed in the other features according to two sets of two features 
each.
5,1, The Basic Stance of the Theologian: Reverence towards Revelation
According to Barth, the fundamental attitude or disposition of the theologian should 
be one of reverence and subordination towards God’s revelation. Since the time of his early 
break with Liberal theology, Barth proclaimed the fundamental axiom: ‘God is God.’ The 
reverence implicit in this statement is the first and most basic feature of Barth’s theological 
method. The other four features, which are forms of subordination to God and God’s 
revelation, result in some sense fi-om this feature.
Among the five features, this feature touches most directly on what we could call the 
‘spirituality’ of Barth as a theologian. In accordance with his Reformed ecclesial 
background, Barth stressed the spiritual discipline or ascesis of Bible r e a d i n g . I n  Barth’s 
distinctive view, proper theological reading of the Bible means reading with an expectation 
that one will hear God himself speaking though Scripture.^^^ In CD, Barth also jfrequently 
speaks of the importance of prayer for the theologian.^^^ In this way, Barth may be drawing 
in a qualified way on the Pietist tradition. In any case, both Scripture reading and prayer are 
expressions of Barth’s basic reverence to God and God’s self-revelation.
Another specific expression of this reverence before God and God’s self-revelation is 
Barth’s a posteriori rather than a priori approach to theological questions and concerns.^^^ 
Barth consistently refused to attempt to settle questions about what God could or must be like 
before or apart from observing what God has actually revealed in Jesus Christ. God is God, 
so we must defer to that which God, in his fi-eedom, has determined to reveal of himself 
rather than projecting anthropomorphic conceptions of possibility and necessity upon God.
For an explanation of these five features in relation to Barth’s theological use of Scripture in particular, see 
Pokrifka-Joe 2001.
See Ford 1981: 165ff.
See T. F. Torrance 1990: 83ff
Barth also emphasises the link between prayer and theology in his book on Anselm (Barth 1960,31 ff, esp. 
39).
See Gunton 1978: 124ff; 130, and passim.
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This is an ongoing requirement, because, in keeping with Barth’s actualism, our knowledge 
of God is an event that depends on the event of God’s self-revelation/^^ Such actualism, 
grounded in God’s freedom, leads to methodological particularism/^^
Finally, Barth’s hermeneutical principle of subordination to Scripture and to its 
subject matter is another clear manifestation of basic reverence/^® Without such 
subordination, the reader of Scripture conforms Scripture to his own thought forms rather 
than vice versa. Whether or not he is successful, Barth always strives to let the text and its 
object continually revise his worldview.
5.2. The Principal Expressions o f  the Theologian ’5  Reverence: a theology that is 
Christocentic and Textually-based
Barth’s reverence for God and his revelation expresses itself clearly in two features of 
his method that we have already encountered: namely, that theology should strive to be 
Christocentric and based in the text of Scripture. For this God has in fact chosen to reveal 
himself in Jesus Christ and this revelation is definitively attested in Scripture. Put precisely, 
the ‘textually-based’ character of Barth’s method is an aspect of the ‘biblical’ criterion of his 
theology, and is most clearly seen in instances o f ‘direct scriptural authorisation’ in which a 
close exegetical analysis of specific texts is brought to bear upon his theology.^^' Here we 
need only to draw together a few relevant strands of our discussion in anticipation of what is 
to come in the later chapters.
In chapters 3-6, we will see that within his account of God’s perfections—and 
specifically God’s unity, constancy and eternity—Barth’s dogmatic theology can be both 
biblical and Christocentric in either direct or indirect ways. This leaves us with the following 
four options within Barth’s theological practice at a given moment (the examples given point
forward to future chapters).
1. Directly biblical and directly Christocentric: e.g. Barth’s exegesis of Philippians 2 
in his account of constancy (chapter 5).
2. Directly biblical and indirectly Christocentric: e.g. Barth’s treatment of Old 
Testament texts on God’s repentance in his account of constancy (chapter 5).
See McCormack 1995: 432ff.
^  See chapter 3, subsection 2.3.1 for fuller support of the last two paragiaphs.
See section 2.2.2 above.
The other four features of his theology, including his Christocentrism can also be seen as expressions of the 
‘biblical’ criterion of Barth’s method, as forms of indirect scriptural authorisation.
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3. Indirectly biblical and directly Christocentric: e.g. Barth’s assertion that ‘God’s 
being is in act’ (chapter 3).
4. Indirectly biblical and indirectly Christocentric: e.g. Barth’s proposed connection 
between God’s simplicity and faithfulness (chapter 4) or Barth’s thematic 
treatment of ‘salvation history’ in his account of constancy (chapter 5).
This analysis is arranged in the relative order of occurrence, from the least frequent to the 
most frequent. This highlights a significant point about Barth’s theological method in CD,
II/1, namely, that it involves (in the words of our thesis statement) ‘a predominantly indirect 
way of relating Scripture and theological proposals’ (see chapter 1, subsection 6.1).
5.3. Two Further Derivative Features of the Theologian*s Reverence: the Fcclesial 
and Creative Character of Dogmatics
Our strong emphasis on the first three features of Barth’s method in this chapter does 
not mean that there are no more significant features of Barth’s method besides these three. 
Instead, we need to attend to the ecclesial and creative features of Barth’s theology to have an 
adequately comprehensive and accurate account of his work.
The ecclesial characteristic of Barth’s method refers to how it is rooted in and 
oriented to the church as his basic community. Accordingly, this feature partly corresponds 
to Barth’s use of theological tradition (respect and engagement with the church of the past), 
but it also goes farther by emphasising Barth’s respect for and ongoing involvement with the 
church of his day.^^  ^ The church, and not the academy, was the primary community by 
which he was shaped and for which he wrote; hence, the title of his great work: Church 
Dogmatics.
The ‘creative’ feature of Barth’s work describes the imaginative and innovative nature 
of Barth’s theological reasoning. As such, it is closely related, though not restricted, to his 
distinctive use of reason in his theology, his way of making intellectual judgements and 
drawing inferences. Although it is perhaps not immediately obvious, the creative character of 
Barth’s approach to theology is also an expression of his basic reverence to God and God’s 
revelation. The reason for this is two-fold, with a divine side and a human side.^^  ^ On the 
divine side, God’s revelation continues to take place in new divine actions, and thus.
See Bai*th’s comments on the ‘confessional’ and ‘churchly’ attitudes required of tlie theologian (see 
subsection 1.2 above).
For further, more general, reflections on the divine and human sides of revelation and theological response, 
see chapter 7, subsection 2.2.
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reverence for God requires that we creatively adapt to the ‘newness’ of God’s free acts of 
revelation in new situations and contexts. On the human side, our response to God is an 
ongoing response of active and free obedience. Therefore, theology is a matter of freely 
reflecting on the ‘spirit’ of God’s Word rather than a legalistic repetition of the ‘letter’ of 
God’s Word. Along with the other four features, the creativity of Barth’s theological method 
will become clearer in the remaining chapters of this thesis.
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Chapter 3:
Scripture, Tradition and Reason 
within Barth’s Doctrine of God
This chapter provides on overview of Barth’s doctrine of God, with particular 
reference the function of the ‘threefold cord’ within this doctrine. This will provide a 
background for the more detailed exposition of divine unity, constancy and eternity that will 
follow in chapters 4-6.
The chapter has four sections. In section 1, we will comment on Barth’s doctrine of 
the Trinity, which forms the background of his doctrine of God proper. Then, in sections 2-4 
we will survey Barth’s doctrine of God proper, as found in chapter VI (‘The Doctrine of the 
Reality of God’). Our primary concerns thi oughout this chapter are expressed in the 
following two questions: (1) ‘what are the main distinctive features of Barth’s doctrine of 
God?’ and (2) ‘how do these relate to Barth’s theological method?’
1. Background: Barth’s Theological Method and His Doctrine of the Trinity
LI. Introduction: Method, Trinity and Revelation
Several scholars have noted, for good reason, that Barth’s account of the doctrine of 
the Trinity is crucial for understanding his dogmatics as a whole.' Barth himself said that ‘a 
Church dogmatics derives from a doctrine of the Trinity.’^  Regardless of the extent to which 
these claims are true, it is definitely true that Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity forms the crucial 
background for Barth’s ‘Doctrine of the Reality of God,’ and specifically his account of divine 
perfections. Others have made this point, either in general terms^ or in respect to particular 
divine perfections.''
We will pay particular attention to the theological method that Barth employs within 
his doctrine of the Trinity. If Barth’s doctrine of God is thoroughly Trinitarian, then it would 
make sense for the theological method that he employs here to shed light on the theological
' Jüngel 1976, Williams 1979, Leslie 1991 and A. Torrance 1996 and 2000. 
"11/1,261.
" Gunton 1978: 127-185.
Hunsinger 2000: 186-209 (on divine eternity; see chapter 6 below).
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method he employs in his doctrine of God as a whole. We will pay special attention to the 
role of Scripture in his work, but wül also comment on the roles of tradition and reason. As 
we do so, we will also note various features of the material content of Barth’s doctrine of the 
Trinity, which are interwoven with these methodological features. In this way we will provide 
the necessary methodological and material background for understanding his doctrine of God 
inII/1.
Barth’s doctrine o f ‘the Triune God’ is found in CD, I/l, §§ 8-12. It is the first part of
chapter II, a long chapter on ‘The Revelation of God,’ which Barth continues in 1/2. Further,
his account of the Revelation of God occurs within his first volume of CD, on the ‘Doctrine of
the Word of God.’ It is significant that Barth unfolds his doctrine of the Trinity in the context
of his accounts of the Word and Revelation of God.
The Trinity-revelation connection is obvious in §8 (on ‘God in his Revelation’), with
which Barth opens his account of the Trinity.^ The opening boldface ‘thesis statement’ that
summarises Barth’s argument in this paragraph reads as follows:
God’s Word is God Himself in His revelation. For God reveals Himself as the Lord 
and according to Scripture this signifies for the concept of revelation that God Himself 
in unimpaired unity yet also in unimpaired distinction is Revealer, Revelation, and 
Revealedness.
We ought to notice several things about what Barth is saying in this dense formulation. First, 
the doctrines of the Word of God and of God’s revelation are doctrines about God himself 
and, in that sense, are aspects of the doctrine of God. This is related to the point that, for 
Barth, God’s revelation is j;g^revelation.^ Second, and more specifically, ‘God’s reveals 
himself the Lord.' Barth later explicates this statement as ‘the root of the doctrine of the 
Trinity.’^  Third, ‘according to Scripture,’ this statement that ‘God reveals himself as the 
Lord’ implies or ‘signifies that God Himself. . . is Revealer, Revelation and Revealedness,’ a
' 1/1,295-347.
 ^ Indeed, Barth appears to assume that God’s revelation is not only primarily self-revelation (which has been 
true of many Christian thinkers since the early church) but exclusively self-revelation (a modern idea probably 
initiated in definitive form by Hegel). See Pannenberg 1968: 3ff.
’ 1/1,304-333.
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threefold characterisation® that corresponds to the Father, Son and the Holy Spirit. Put 
differently, reveals Himself. }lQVQNQdi\s\mmQ]î through Himself. He reveals
Barth says that the reality of revelation requires us to ask three interrelated questions: 
who is the self-revealing God, how does it come about that God reveals himself and what is 
the result of this revelation in humanity?'° All three of these questions converge in a single 
point, namely, that Barth grounds his doctrine of the Trinity in his doctrine of Revelation, and 
only m the doctrine of revelation. In Barth’s words, Tt is only—but very truly—by observing 
the unity and the differentiation of God in His biblically-attested revelation that we are set 
before the doctrine of the Trinity.’"
But how does Barth ground his distinctive doctrine of the Trinity in revelation? What 
theological method does Barth use to authorise his doctrine of the Trinity? What is the role of 
Scripture, tradition and reason in this authorisation? This is a set of questions that has 
received a wide variety of answers by Barth’s interpreters and critics. We will only be able to 
answer these questions by care&lly attending to what Barth actually says and does in I /l .
What we will find is that Barth understands his Trinitarian doctrine to be an attempt to be 
faithful to what Scriptuie teaches about God and God’s self-revelation. Accordingly, Barth’s 
practice gives primacy to Scripture, with ‘supporting roles’ provided by tradition and reason.
1.2. The Role of Scripture within Barth *s Doctrine of the Trinity 
For Barth, the doctrine of the Trinity is an expression of what could be called 
exposition of Scripture—whether Barth’s own exposition or that of past theologians of the 
church.'^ This ‘exposition,’ taken in a broad sense, does not mean that Trinitarian doctrine is 
simply the exegesis of individual biblical texts, although this is part of what Barth does here.
In the main, it means that Barth indirectly authorises his Trinitarian doctrine on the basis of
Eberhard Jüngel paraphrases this as ‘revealer, becoming revealed, and being revealed’ (1976: 27).
"1/1,296.
FI, 295ff.
" I / l ,  299.
More specifically, Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity is a combination of the acceptance o f the theological 
exposition of Scripture performed by others such as Athanasius (as such it is an acceptance of an aspect of 
theological tradition) and his own creative theological exposition in the context of the contemporary church. 
Barth’s prior ‘settling’ of fundamental exegetical-theological matters (i.e. the ‘double-homoousion,’ the unity 
and distinction of the immanent and economic Trinities) in respect to the Trinity in I/l allows him to assume 
these Trinitarian conclusions in the context of the divine perfections in 11/1, chapter VI.
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Scripture. We now wish to summarise several relevant aspects of Barth’s account of the 
Trinity in I / l .
From the beginning of his doctrine of the Trinity, Barth states his intention to link 
revelation and Trinity in terms of the interpretation and use of Scripture. On virtually every 
page we find phrases that attest this. For example, in the first subsection of his treatment of 
the Trinity, we find the phrases: ‘measured by Holy Scripture,’ ‘by subordination to 
Scripture,’''' ‘the biblical answer to the question,’'^  ‘according to the direction of the whole 
Bible,’ and ‘guided by the Bible.’ Put simply, Barth does not wish to pursue his own idea 
of revelation, or even the church’s idea of revelation, but to enquire into ‘what Holy Scripture 
attests as revelation,’'® or ‘the concept of revelation taken from the Bible'^^ or simply what he 
calls on several occasions "'biblical revelation.’^ ''
How in more specific terms does Barth say that Scripture should fiinction as an 
authority in the doctrine of the Trinity? Barth believes that the Bible presents a certain 
concept or doctrine of revelation and that this doctrine of revelation is ‘the root of the 
doctrine of the trinity’ {Dei Wurzel der Trinitatslehre]f As we noted above, Barth 
summarises this ‘root’ in the statement: ‘God reveals Himself as the Lord.’ And as we 
indicated in chapter 2 (subsection 2.1.2), this statement is best seen as a summary of a certain
"1/1,295.
I/l, 296.
"1/1,297.
" I/l, 298.
" 1/1, 300.
"1/1,304.
" I/l, 332.
That this is Barth’s intention does not guarantee, or course, that Barth is successful in carrying out this 
intention. But here, as elsewhere in this thesis, we are not concerned with evaluating Barth’s success, but with 
describing the nature of his methodological practice. Also, we will continue to expect that his theory is 
consistent with his practice, unless it is obvious that it is not.
I/i, 304-333. While Barth uses ‘root’ {Wwzel] much more frequently, he appears to uses it more or less 
interchangeably with ‘ground’ [Grund\, as in the phrase ‘the root or ground of the doctrine of the trinity’
(332).
I/l, 306. In using the term ‘concept of revelation’ [OffenbarungsbegrifJ] in this context, Barth refers to a 
complex pattern of judgements (i.e. a doctrine), rather than a unitary linguistic concept or conceptual term (see 
chapter 2, section 2.1). This is what R. Kendall Soulen has in mind when he says that the statement ‘God 
reveals himself as the Lord’ occuis on the ‘conceptual’ level o f Barth’s dogmatic analysis, as distinct from both 
the ‘exegetical’ level [e.g. the compound divine name Yahweh-Kyrios] or the level o f the church doctrine of the 
Trinity [e.g. the Nicene Creed] (Soulen 1999: 36fl. In relation to the Trinity, then, Barth and Soulen use the 
terms ‘concept’ and ‘conceptual’ in a way quite different from Yeago 1993, who uses ‘concepts’ or 
‘conceptual terms’ to refer primarily to the specific linguistic forms in which a judgement may be stated in 
either Scripture or theology (see chapter 2, subsection 2.3.3). Yet the three authors are making similar 
substantial points.
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pattern in Scripture—the pattern having to do with the character of revelation. As such, it is 
not a direct quotation or literal translation of any one passage of Scripture.
Rather, Barth states that the relationship between the biblical root or ground to the 
Trinitarian doctrine is one of ‘indirect identity.’ Being indirectly identical with the biblical 
root, there is no identity or repetition on the textual level between Scripture and the church 
dogma of the Trinity.^  ^ As such, the Trinity is only an ‘interpretation’ of Scriptuie and of the 
revelation to which Scripture witnesses; Scripture does not contain the doctrine of the Trinity 
explicitly. Yet as indirectly identical with each other, Barth can say that the biblical doctrine 
of revelation and the doctrine of the Trinity say ‘the same thing’ in different words, or that the 
latter draws out some of the implications of the former.^'' Thus, Barth regards the Trinitarian 
dogma ‘as a necessary and relevant analysis of revelation, and we thus think that revelation 
itself is correctly interpreted by the d o g m a . A s  such, the Trinity is rooted in biblical 
revelation; there is ‘an authentic and well-established connection between the two.’^  ^ Yet 
again, tliis ‘well-established connection’ does not rest primarily on explicit references to the 
Trinity in the Bible (eg. Mt 28:29, 2 Cor 13:13, etc.), even though these passages ‘prefigure’ 
the problems that the later Trinitarian doctrine addressed. Indeed, Barth regards this indirect 
relationship between the Bible and church dogma (or doctrine) to be typical of the relationship 
between the Bible and other dogmas.^^ We will return to the church’s trinitarian dogmas 
themselves below, as an instance of the role tradition in his work.
We can see that Barth wishes to use Scripture indirectly, but decisively, to authorise 
the doctrine of the Trinity by the ‘mediation’ of the biblical doctrine of revelation, ‘the root of 
the Trinity.’ But what are the concrete contours of this mode of authorisation? For one thing, 
we must ask the ‘historical question’ of how ‘biblical revelation and the [church] doctrine of 
the Trinity are interconnected,’ of ‘how the second could and did proceed out of the first.
The background of this question is Barth’s assumption that in both biblical revelation and the
I/l, 308; cf, 3 13f, In the terminology of Yeago 1993, there is no strict identity or continuity on the level of 
terminology or ‘conceptual terms’ (see chapter 2, subsection 2.3.3).
Again, in Yeago’s terminology, there is an identity or continuity on the level of theological judgements 
(1993).
"^1/1,310.
""1/1,311.
""FI, 310.
I/l, 314.
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doctrine of the Trinity there is roughly equal emphasis on both the oneness of God and the 
‘threeness’ of God. Thus, ‘The God who has revealed himself according to the witness of 
Scripture is the same in unimpaired unity and yet also the same thrice in unimpaired 
distinction.’^  ^ An initial indication of this point is found in Barth’s belief in the equal material 
importance of God the revealer (subject), God the revelation (the predicate) and God being 
revealed (the object)—a schema that corresponds roughly to the Father, the Son and the Holy 
Spirit in their equality. But Barth says that historically (i.e. in the historical development of 
the doctrine in the early centuries of church history) these three aspects of the reality of 
revelation ‘do not have the same importance’^ '' and indicates that this has relevance for 
understanding how Scripture grounds the doctrine of the Trinity. ‘The true theme of the 
biblical witness is the second of these concepts, God’s action in revelation.’ In other words, 
the Bible is primarily about the verbal predicate ‘reveals’ in the statement ‘God reveals himself 
as the Lord.’ For Barth, this is another way of saying that the biblical doctrine of revelation 
and the development of the doctrine of the Trinity are both marked by a decisive 
Christocentrism, which we must now explain m more detail.
According to Barth, the questions of identity of the Revealer and the nature of 
‘revealedness’ to humanity should only be pursued in the course of answering the primary 
question of how God revealed himself in Christ, the embodiment o f ‘God’s action in 
revelation.’^ ' The common Christological starting point and focus of the doctrines of 
revelation and Trinity imply a shared order or structure: Christ (Son) first, then God (Father) 
and then the Holy Spirit.^  ^ This is the typical order of revelation, the order in which the 
Trinity is known.®  ^ The Father and the Spirit are known through Jesus Christ, the Son. In our 
words, Barth presents the following in this order: God’s self-unveiling (the Son; the 
resurrection), God’s unveiling as the one who remains veiled (the Father; Good Friday), and 
God’s impartation to humanity of this self-unveiling (the Spirit; Pentecost).^'' This is the kind
"M/1, 307."M/1, 314.1/1,315.
""1/1,315. Cf. 2 Cor 13:13.
33 This ‘order of knowing’ (essentially Barth’s ‘economic Trinity’) is distinct from the ‘order of being’ (Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit).
I/l, 315-332. In parentheses, we have included the mode o f being (i.e. person) and event that Barth 
associated with each aspect o f revelation.
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of pattern that Barth has in mind when he says that ‘the threefold yet single Lordship of God 
as Father, Son and Spirit, is the root of the doctrine of the Trinity. In other words, the biblical 
concept of revelation is itself the root of the doctrine of the T r i n i t y . O n c e  again, Barth’s 
method here is best conceived of as bringing Scripture authoritatively but indiiectly to bear 
upon the formulation of doctrine.^^
1.3. The Roles of Tradition and Reason within the Doctrine of the Trinity 
The role of tradition within Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity is perhaps more obvious to 
readers of the CD than the role of Scripture. Although the ultimate, authoritative basis of the 
doctrine is found in the revelation attested in Scripture, the doctrine of the Trinity is clearly a 
doctrine that was formulated by the church and stands at the heart of orthodox Christian 
tradition. Barth receives the doctrine from the church and, with some qualifications, preserves 
it in the form in which he has received it—including most of the traditional philosophical- 
conceptual language used in the creeds.^^
However, Barth does sometimes depart from what might be regarded as the ‘majority 
view’ of Christian tradition, as is so when he prefers the term ‘ways’ or ‘modes’ of being 
[Seinsweise'] over ‘persons’ to refer to the Father, Son and Holy Spfrit.^ ® This shows that his 
adherence to theological tradition, while generally present in his work, is not slavish or 
automatic. Rather, Barth generally follows the traditional ecumenical consensus on the Trinity 
because he believes it follows the revelation attested in Scripture. For example, we have 
alluded to how Barth believes that the Christocentrism of the traditional Trinitarian 
developments and formulations matches the Christocentrism of God’s self-revelation attested 
in Scripture. Yet it is also clear that Barth is definitely willing to depart from the theological
"  1/1, 334.
See Barth’s own statement of the indirect rather than direct nature of the relationship between Scripture and 
Trinitarian doctrine in his summary of the biblical-revealed root of the doctrine of the Trinity (I/l, 332f).
In particular, Barth retains the Western form (with the filoque clause) of the Niceno-Contantinopolitan 
Creed (see I/l, 423ff). Leslie (1991: chapter 4) believes that Barth is overly and inconsistently concerned to 
retain the specific traditional wording of the Trinitarian creeds, but Leslie’s argument is somewhat overstated 
(see below and also chapter 1, subsection 3.3).
We should emphasise here that Barth opts for Seinsweise partly because he believes it is actually more 
faithful to the meaning and intention of the early Trinitarian formulations (e.g. the use of hypostasis), and that 
modern language about ‘persons’ obfiiscates this meaning. See Bromiley’s comments on the translation of 
Seinsweise in his editorial preface to CD, I/l (page viii).
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tradition insofar as it fails to uphold biblically-attested revelation/^ The authority of 
Trinitarian creeds is derivative, and it thus subject to scripturally-based critique.
In sum, we could say that tradition is the direct or proximate basis for Barth’s doctrine 
of the Trinity, whhe Scripture is its indirect basis. While the direct and relative authorisation by 
tradition is easier to grasp, the more decisive and normative authorisation for his doctrine is 
indirect, and is provided by Scripture.
Barth’s distinctive use of reason is also evident in his Trinitarian doctrine. Barth 
clearly does not appeal to reason as an independent authority. But Barth’s entire doctrine of 
the Trinity, as with all of dogmatics, is the product of a rigorous process of reasoning. Barth’s 
Trinitarian doctrine can be described as an attempt to unfold the internal logic or rationality of 
God’s self-revelation, as attested in Scripture.
Wohhart Pannenberg, Jurgen Moltmann and others draw on the orderly logical 
character of Barth’s Trinitarian doctrine in order to critique Barth. Specifically, they say that 
his doctrine is rooted in a logical development of the ‘idealist’ concept of divine self-revelation 
rather than in careful attention to the actual revelation of God in history.'"' Whether or not this 
is the case, it surely was not Barth’s intention. Barth’s intention is well described in the words 
of Alan Torrance, who is particularly critical of Moltmann’s evaluation of Barth: ‘Barth’s 
argument is not that any self-revelation will possess a triadic structure and thus afBrm divine 
triunity. Rather, he is suggesting that the specific dynamic o f revelation to which Scripture 
attests requires, as a matter of fact, to be interpreted in terms of a trinitarian logic.’ Whether 
Barth’s way of reasoning is more akin to ana priori deduction (Pannenberg and Moltmann), 
an a posteriori analysis (A. Torrance), or some mixture of the two, it is clear that Barth is 
employing a distinctive pattern of reasoning in his doctrine of the Trinity.
Trevor Hart shows that Barth’s preference for Seinsweisen over ‘persons’ is not merely a matter of surface- 
level terminology, but involves a feirly significant departure from the ‘logic’ o f the Trinitarian creeds, which 
Hart thinks is to the detriment of Barth’s doctrine (1999: 102-109). Barth no doubt intends for his doctrine to 
be more relentlessly attentive to revelation than preceding doctrines, whether or not he succeeds in carrying out 
that intention.
Pannenberg 1980: 96-111 and 1988: 295ft 304; Moltmann 1981: 139-144, See also the related critique of 
Williams 1979. For a comparison of Barth and Pannenberg (and of both to Hegel) on the Trinity, see 
Bradshaw 1989. For a critical analysis of Moltmann, see Colwell 1989:208-214 and A. Torrance 1996 and 
2000 (see below).
Torrance 2000: 77.
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Pannenberg and Moltmann are at least correct on one point: that implicit in Barth’s 
doctrine of the Trinity is the influence of the modern understanding of God as a free, self- 
identical personal Subject, which Barth develops in terms of the idea of God’s threefold self- 
repetition [Wiederholung]. Even though the church fathers may have employed a subject- 
predicate logic or grammai’ in their Trinitarian doctrines, Barth’s modem way of conceiving of 
God stül distinguishes his doctrine from theirs/^ All of this raises an evaluative question about 
Barth’s method, and specifically about the use of ‘reason’ within it. Is Barth’s use of such a 
modern ‘philosophical’ perspective better characterised as: (a) a helpful ad hoc 
commandeering of conceptual forms in the service of a lucid interpretation of revelation or (b) 
as the entrapment of revelation within a materially-foreign set of metaphysical judgements.''^
In his discussion of the vestigia trinitatis, Barth thoroughly spells out his theoretical resistance 
to and ideas about God’s triunity that are not exclusively governed by the revelation of God in 
Christ, as attested in Scripture.'''' The debate will no doubt continue about whether Barth’s 
practice in his doctrine of the Trinity contravenes this theoretical commitment.
1.4. Some Influences of Barth ’5  View of the Trinity on his Larger View of God
The Trinity provides a foundational perspective for understanding Barth’s doctrine of 
God as a whole. It identifies the God about whom Barth wishes to speak in his Theology. 
Against the classical tradition, Barth says that our conceptions of the essence of God ‘ought 
never to have been an abstraction from the Trinity, and that means from the act of divine 
revelation.’''^  In placing the Tiinity before the rest of the doctrine of God (i.e. the doctrine of 
God) Barth follows only two major theologians (Peter Lombard and Bonaventura),''^ and sets 
his dogmatics on a different course from the classical tradition represented by Aquinas (the 
first to reverse Lombard’s order) In what follows we will highlight some of the more
See Hart 1999: 104-107 and Frei 1992: 124f; cf. A Torrance 1996: 103 f.
See Colwell 1989: 21 Iff See also his comments on the distinction between a priori and a posteriori 
necessity, which bear on what kind o f ‘logic’ is at work in Barth’s Trinitarian account (22 If).
I/l, 333-347. Many would argue that Barth’s Trinitarianism (or perhaps any consistent Trinitarianism) 
involves a critique o f ‘classical’ metaphysics in response to revelation (e.g. Gunton 1978, T. F. Torrance 
1990).
11/1,261.
'•"I/l, 300.
See Jüngel 1976: 4ft where he interprets Barth’s dogmatic order as implying that the Trinity is the 
hermeneutical foundation for dogmatics (5; cf. Leslie 1991). For more comments on the issue of order, see 
chapter 4, subsections 1.2 and 2.2).
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important ways that Barth’s distinctive treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity influenced the 
rest of Barth’s doctrine of God.
First of all, Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity manifests a certain way of relating the being 
and act of God—or, in the language more typical of Trinitarian theology—a certain way of 
relating the ‘immanent Trinity’ and the ‘economic Trinity.’ Put simply, these two ‘sides’ of 
the Christian doctrine of God stand in a dialectical relationship to each other. On the one 
hand, Barth believes that God himself is present in his self-revealing action in the economy of 
creation and salvation (in his works ad extra) and that therefore, there is no ontic or noetic 
gulf between the ‘economic Trinity’ and the ‘immanent Trinity.’ Further, the only way for 
humans to know the ‘immanent Trinity’ is through the ‘economic Trinity,’ and so the order of 
knowing must proceed fi*om divine act to divine being or essence. But on the other hand, 
God’s internal being is by no means ‘swallowed up’ or ‘exhausted’ in his external actions.''® 
Rather, the ‘ontic basis’ of the work of God in the earthly economy is God’s eternally free 
being, an inexhaustible fi*eedom which resides in God’s immanent Trinity. Again, the reason 
why we need to affirm God’s immanent Trinity, is not because we wish to speak of a God 
essentially other than the God revealed in his revelatory action, but simply to remind ourselves 
that God’s actions have a basis in the fi'ee decisions of God. In the words of Colin Gunton’s 
summary of Barth; ‘God’s reality is not exhausted by his acts. If he is to be a gracious God, 
this giving of himself must be a free, unnecessitated act.’''^  We wiU see in the course of our 
considerations of Barth’s doctrine of God, that Barth places great emphasis on the divine 
freedom, yet in a way that does not detract from the unity between God’s being and acts that 
is necessary for divine reconciling love.
Many of the same points made above are clarified further by the ‘Christological 
concentration’ of Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity. The supreme free act of God in relation to 
the world is his act of revelation and reconciliation accomplished in Jesus Christ. This act is 
the unifying centre of all of the other divine acts ad extra. Indeed, Barth believes that God 
cannot be known other than through Christ—and this includes God the Father and God the
See II/1, 260 and our comments in 2.1.1 below.
Gunton 1978: 147. Barth says that God’s works ‘are bound to him but He is not bound to them’ (11/1,260; 
cf. 1/1, 371). Paul Molnar (1989, 1996, and 2002) underscores at length the significance of the immanent 
Trinity in Barth’s work in relation to God’s freedom.
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Holy Spirit. Barth implies that Scripture provides no independent, non-Christological 
testimony to God, even in the Old Testament; there is no other way to jSnd out who God is ad 
intra.
We may further clarify the Christocentrism of Barth’s understanding of the dialectical 
relationship between the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity by commenting on 
Barth’s Christological doctrine of election. For the supreme unifying self-revelatory act of 
God in Jesus Christ proceeds from the ‘eternal’ act in which God decides to elect humanity in 
Clirist. In fact, in the distinctive view Barth unfolds in his ‘doctrine of election’ in II/2, the 
God-man Jesus Christ (and not merely the Son as logos asarkos) is himself the Subject of 
election, not only its object.^" By this daring move, Barth wishes to ensure that there is no 
speculation about another different God behind the God known in Jesus Christ.^' In this 
respect, Barth’s Christocentric doctrine of election is significant for understanding his doctrine 
of divine perfections in II/l, even if he does not consistently draw out the implications of his 
view there.^^ It is at least cleai’ that Barth understands God’s perfections as manifestations or 
expressions of the God who is known to have elected humanity in Jesus Christ, which Barth 
regards as a summary of the gospel. This is fitting for Barth, who included the doctrine of 
election within the doctrine of God.^^
McCormack 2000: 93-95.
Barth was influenced to make this ‘daring move’ by a lecture of Pierre Maury in 1936 (although Maury 
himself did not make this move) and thus moved into the final Christocentric phase of his theological 
development (McCormack 1995: 453-463).
Although Barth wrote his detailed account of election in II/2 after he wrote his account of the perfections, 
there is evidence (both internal and external) that the ‘germ idea’ of Christocentric election had already taken 
hold before he wrote the ‘doctrine of the reality of God in II/1, VI’ (see McCormack 1995: 461). McCormack 
believes that Barth was never fully consistent with his Christocentric view of election in this and other parts of 
his work (2000: 101-104; cf. McCormack 2002).
A couple of points are in order in regard to McCormack’s overall argument regarding Barth’s election 
(especially in his 2000 essay). McCormack shows clearly that, on both ontic and noetic levels, Barth’s view of 
election argues that there can be no logos asarkos that is in any sense separate fi-om or independent of the 
logos sarkos (a parallel point could be made about the relationship between the immanent Trinity and the 
economic Trinity). But McCormack does not offer a compelling argument as to why this would require that 
Barth believes that the decision of God to be incarnate constitutes the eternal being of God (what we might call 
the ‘actualist’ constitution-thesis) rather than being constituted by God’s eternal being (the ‘essentialist’ 
expression-thesis). McCormack think it is inadequate to say that the being of the logos asarkos (or the 
immanent Trinity) is perfectly expressed in and present in God’s acts in the logos ensarkos (or the economic 
Trinity)? This view appears to be Barth’s dominant view in II/1: God is one whose being ''is in act,’ not 
necessarily one whose being 'is act’ or whose being is constituted by act (see section 2 below).
See Gunton 1974.
109
2. A Summary o f ‘The Reality of God’: God as ‘One Who Loves in Freedom’
We now turn to Barth’s doctrine of God proper. This Barth calls the doctrine of the 
‘Reality’ {Wirklichkeit) of God, because this term Wirklichkeit ‘holds together being and 
act.’^ '' Barth unfolds the two-fold reality of God—a reality conjoining being and act—in the 
course of chapter VI. In Gunton’s words, in this chapter Barth states ‘the things that we have 
to say that God really is if we are to be true to what happens in r ev e la t io n . In  general, 
Barth’s presentation of the doctrine of God in chapter VI starts with fairly abstract statements 
about God (e.g. his description o f ‘The Being of God m Act’ in §28.1) and moves to 
progressively concrete statements (such as his accounts of twelve specific divine perfections in 
§§30 and 31).^  ^ He begins, in §28, with a summary of this doctrine of God under the rubric 
of ‘The One who loves in fieedom,’ which will be our concern in this section of the chapter.
Barth notes that the statement that ‘God is’ is the basis and content of the rest of 
dogmatics (257).^^ Despite its wide-ranging significance, a particular development o f ‘God 
is,’ i.e. a doctrine of God, is both possible and necessary. We cannot adequately describe 
God’s actions and working (say, in the doctrines of Creation and Reconciliation), without 
understanding the God who is their incomparable Subject (258Q.
2.1. The Being o f God in Act
2.1,1, Introductory Reflections
The first section of §28 on God as the ‘One who Loves in Freedom’ is entitled ‘The 
being of God in Act’ (§28.1). Barth’s comments in a brief excursus near the beginning of this 
section may help to orient us to Barth’s understanding of the proper method and role of the 
doctrine of God in dogmatics. The excursus concerns two errors of Melanchthon, ‘the first 
dogmatician of the Evangelical [i.e. Reformational] Church’ (259). Melanchthon’s first error, 
in his Loci of 1521, was to ‘suppress the special doctrine of God in order to turn at once to
II/l, 262.
Gunton 1978: 186.
This observation about Barth’s abstract-to-concrete order of presentation should not be construed as a 
contradiction of his methodological ‘Particularism’ (see Hunsinger 1991), in which he moves from the 
particular to the general. This is so for two reasons. First, Hunsinger rightly notes that it is possible for an 
abstract claim to be a ‘particular’ (1991: 284ft n. 2). Second, the order in which Barth presents his 
conclusions is not necessarily the same as the order in which he arrived at those conclusions (i.e. what we are 
calling his ‘method’).
The numbers in parentheses from this point forward in this chapter refer to CD, II/l.
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the statement of the bénéficia Christi [benefits of Christ].’ Against this, Barth wishes to 
develop a special doctrine of God—largely in order to understand the Subject whose acts 
result in Chiist’s benefits. Otherwise, one risks reducing theology to the anthropocentric 
exploration of the subjective benefits of God’s acts.^ ® Melanchthon’s second and more serious 
mistake, committed in a later version of the Loci, was to develop a special doctrine of God, 
but to ‘create it from another source than fi*om the revelation of God, namely, fiom an 
independently formed and general idea of God.’ As such, Melanchthon developed an a priori 
doctrine of God that was detached from the proper basis for knowing God in his revelation . 
and his benefits.^^ Barth wishes to avoid assiduously any such independently formed, general 
conception of God and to base all that he says about God on what God has actually revealed 
of himself, i.e. one needs to speak of God’s being only on the basis of God’s works (260).^"
The transcendental condition or presupposition that makes Barth’s distinctive 
approach to the doctrine of God possible is this: that God’s being is in act.^  ^ If God’s being 
were detached from and not wholly present in his actions, then God’s actions would not 
provide a reliable basis for knowing his beiug.^  ^ But God’s being is ‘in act’—i.e. God’s being 
is fully present in God’s actions in the world. (Indeed, as we will see, God’s eternal being 
apart from the world is inherently active in some sense; it is not ‘in act’ simply as a 
consequence of having created a world to act in.) This is a clear example of how Barth’s 
method of rooting all dogmatic statements in revelation is closely linked to and grounded in 
the material content of his doctrine of God.
Before we turn to a fuller explication of Barth’s concept of God’s ‘being in act,’ we 
may glean insight from another illuminating excursus in which he critiques theological 
tradition. Barth regards the fundamental error of the ‘older theology’ and ‘Protestant
Barth states that we should not revolt against speaking of God’s ‘being,’ since ‘God is not swallowed up in 
the relation and attitude of himself to the world . . . ’ (260). Yet it is God and not ‘being’ that is our subject, or 
else ‘being’ only as it is defined by God (260f), by God in his act o f revelation. It is in this vein that Barth will 
later show a preference for God’s more concretely defined ‘eternity’ and temporality over God’s ‘being’ in his 
account of God’s eternity (609ft see our chapter 6 below).
In this way, Barth says, Melanchthon followed ‘late medieval scholasticism’ and thus afforded ‘a disastrous 
example to the whole of Protestant orthodoxy’ (260).
This is a point that Barth has already made clearly earlier in CD, especially in II/l, chapter V, ‘The Doctrine 
of the Knowledge of God.’ Here he argues that God is known only by God, through his ‘secondary objectivity.’ 
See our comments on Barth’s transcendental arguments and method in chapter 2, section 4.
See the similar point made by Johnson (1997: 44ff).
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Orthodoxy’ (forms of what we have called ‘classical’ doctrines of God) to be that they began 
elsewhere than ‘God’s act in His revelation’ (261). Rather than starting and remaining with 
the God’s revelation attested in Scripture, natural a priori axioms are ‘interwoven . . . with .
. . biblical reminiscences.’ Barth regards the need to base one’s doctrine of God in revelation 
as inseparable for the need to have a Trinitarian doctrine of God (see 1.3 above). Barth 
believes we must remain ‘vigorously aloof from this classical tradition and its speculations.
The foregoing points lead Barth to a series of statements that, he claims, are 
progressively concrete explications of the statement that ‘God is,’ statements that we will now 
explicate in turn.
2.1.2. The reality of God in the act of revelation (actualism)
The first proposition Barth presents is that "'God is who He is in the act o f His 
revelation' (262). Again, Barth is concerned to articulate the concept {Begriff] o f ‘the Reality 
of God’ [Die Wirklichkeit Gottes], which holds together being and act [Sein und Tat\ unlike 
the concept o f ‘essence’ [Wesen]. In his act of revelation, God declares his reality, not only 
for us [pro nobis] but also God’s reality in himself [a se].
What does Barth mean by saying that, in revelation ‘we have to do with God’s act 
(262)? This act is an event [Ereignis], but a unique event that is ‘in no sense to be 
transcended.’ This event of self-revelation is not only past (i.e. completed), but also present 
(contemporaneous) and future. As such, it is in time, but it transcends the usual limitations of 
time. Although Barth does not use the term here, we could say that God’s act of self­
revelation is an ‘eternal’ act, in Barth’s distinctive sense o f ‘eternal’ (see chapter 6). Barth 
appeals to Hebrews 13:8 (‘Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, today and forever’) to ground 
this view, an indication of his attempt to be both biblical and Christocentric (262). Barth 
repeats the point that the act of God in his revelation is also Trinitarian: God in his threefold 
self-repetition is its subject (the revealer), predicate (the act of revelation) and object (the 
revealed) (263).
Barth’s description of God as one whose being or reality is ‘in act’ leads to the 
question of whether it is appropriate to say that Barth is a theological ‘actualist’ or whether he 
is marked by ‘actualism.’ The answer to this question depends on one’s definition of
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‘actualism.’ If one means generally that God’s reality must be described in the language of act
or event, then it seems clear that Barth is an ‘actual is t .Bar th  goes as far as to say that
‘With regard to the being of God, the word “event” or “act” is final’ and that ‘God’s Godhead
. . .  is an event’ (263). However, if by actualism one means that God’s being or reality is
‘reduced’ to God’s works, his acts ad extra, then Barth is not an actualist.^'' This is plain in
the following comment of Barth:
God is who He is in His works. He is the same even in Himself, even before and after 
and over His work, and without them. They are bound to Him, but He is not bound to 
them. He is not, therefore, who He is only in His works. Yet in Himself He is not 
another than He is in His works (260).
Barth here expresses the view that God has an antecedent reality that is expressed in (rather
than constituted by) his works. Yet, at the same time, God’s antecedent, eternal reality itself
has an ‘ event-character’ ; it is best described in terms of the categories of decision and act.
For Barth, the category o f ‘act’ is closely related to the category of God’s ‘life.’^ ^
Unlike Barth’s indirect conceptual redescription of God under the category of act, tliis claim is
rooted directly in the Bible’s witness to ‘the living God’ (263). From the point of view of a
method of theology rooted in Scriptui e, then, Barth says: ‘The definition we must use as a
starting-point is that God’s being is life’ (263; italics added). For Barth, the biblical
affirmation that God is ‘the living God’ is no metaphor [Gleichnis], but a description
[Bezeichnung] of God, even of God as he is in hirnself (263).^ *^  Barth develops this point in a
later comment, where he says, ‘As we remember fi-om the doctrine of the knowledge of God,^^
not only some but all human standpoints and concepts, even those used by scripture, are
See Hunsinger’s account of Barth’s ‘actualism’ (1991: 30ff)-
This appears to be the reason behind A. Torrance’s rejection of the claim that Barth is a theological actualist 
(2000: 90, n. 28; cf. Gunton 1978: 147f and McCormack 2000 and 2002). Elsewhere however, Torrance does 
refer Barth’s ‘methodological actualism’ and relates this to the sense of actualism used by some analytic 
philosophers (1996: 47).
Jüngel regards the claim that ‘God’s being is in becoming’ (his paraphrase of Barth) is ‘an attempt to think 
out theologically how far God is the living Cod’ (1976: vii).
Barth unfolds this point in two brief excursuses. In the first, Barth cites and comments on many biblical 
citations as well as positive references to traditional theologians who made statements in keeping with the 
biblical affirmation of God’s life (263). In the second, Barth broadens his consideration of the issue of 
‘anthropomorphism’ beyond the phrase the ‘living God.’ He says that many of the biblical expressions 
designated anthropomorphic such as ‘remembrance and forgetting’ are not mere simile or metaphor; they are 
not attributa metaphorica. In chapter 5 (subsection 3.2) we will consider Barth’s related comments on Old 
Testament passages referring to divine repentance.
Barth is referring to his comments in II/l, 222ft cf. 286 and 369f.
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“anthropomorphisms'" (265; emphasis added). Even anthropomorphisms in the narrower and 
more typical sense are ‘specially adapted to describe the special life and being of God, 
although quite useless to describe the highest ideal in Plato’s teaching’(265).
2.1.3. God’s act and life as free and unique (particularism)
So far Barth has argued that God reveals himself‘as event, as act and as life’ (264). 
But Barth believes it is necessary to be more precise, so as to avoid confusing God with ‘a 
sum or content of event, act or life generally.’ God’s act in revelation is a particular action. 
God is thus not only actuspurus, but is actuspurus et sinsularis. As such, God’s acts 
‘contradict’ all other acts or events. Neither is God’s transcendence a ‘dialectical 
transcendence’ that "must be understood with equal strictness as immanence’ (264; emphasis 
added). Divine Freedom is the ‘undialectical transcendence,’ a ‘saving contradiction of God 
found in His revelation’ that ‘cannot be removed dialectically’ (265).'’® Put simply, God is 
subject to no external necessity whatsoever. Therefore, ‘God is in Himself free event, free act 
and free life’ (264).
Barth wishes to be yet more specific about the nature of God’s ‘specific freedom’ and 
how it distinguishes God’s act and life from aU other non-divine expressions of act or life. To 
do so, Barth first states how the difference between the divine and non-divine is not to be 
conceived. It is not to be construed along the lines of a various duaUstic ontologies. In 
Barth’s words, ‘The differentiation of the divine happening from the non-diviue does not 
coincide in Holy Scripture with the distinction between nature and grace, soul and body, inner 
and outer, visible and invisible’ (265). Against the ‘idealistic’ assumptions that God’s act is to 
be coiKistently and exclusively associated with the ‘spiritual,’ Barth insists that the event of 
revelation has a natural, outer, historical element. God is not to be confused with the spiritual 
world or even with absolute spirit, for spiritual reality (in the general sense) is also created 
reality (265Q.^  ^ Accordingly, ‘The divine being must be allowed to transcend both spirit and
See Cross 1991: 177f.
Barth notes that Scripture speaks unashamedly of God’s bodily parts—his nose, back, and so on. Instead of 
glibly following Polanus and others who understood such passages ‘non- theologically’ or ‘figuratively’ 
(uneigentlich), Barth wishes to take them as depicting something true about God. Like all theological 
language, it is both anthropomorphic and descriptive. Otherwise, Barth says, we will have to raise questions 
as to the appropriateness of other more basic terms such as: Father, Son and Holy Spirit! Barth believes that 
Protestant orthodoxy (e.g. Polanus) has here been determined by the classical philosophy of pagan antiquity, 
and, as such, paves the way for the Enlightenment (266).
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nature, yet also to overlap and comprehend both’ (266). Here Barth states his belief that ‘pure 
spirit’ cannot really act in this world. According to this more holistic ontology, ‘Acts only 
happen in the unity of spirit and nature.’ The concept of ‘Spirit’ acting alone is best 
considered to be an idolatrous ‘hypostatisation of our own created sphit’ (267). Such 
statements appear to be attempts to state, in ontological terms, the impHcations of the fact of 
the incarnation for understanding God’s reality.
2.1.4. God’s being as ‘personal’ (personalism)
Yet Barth does regard the freedom of God as ‘the freedom of the spirit’ in some sense 
(267). God’s own special spiritual freedom ‘is n o t . . .  accident or necessity’ and ‘it does not 
have the orderliness or fatality of a natural event, although nature is not excluded.’ Rather, ‘it 
is the freedom of a knowing and willing I,’ i.e. the freedom of a personal subject. ‘The 
particularity of the divine event act and life is the particularity of the being of a person' (267).
Before we unpack what Barth means by God’s personal being, we would do well to 
review the flow of Barth’s thought in his treatment of ‘the Being of God in Act.’ Using the 
‘motifs’ that George Hunsinger identifies in Barth’s work, we can say that Barth has moved 
fi om actualism (the being of God is in act or life) to particularism (the being of God is specific 
and free act or life), and now to personalism (the being of God is personal being—personal act 
and life),^"
What does Barth mean by saying that God’s being is ‘being in person’? In clarifying
his meaning, Barth states that the nature of the event of revelation leads us to reject both a
‘false spiritualising on the one hand and a false realism on the other’ (268). False
spirituahsing, as we have noted above, denies the presence o f ‘nature’ in God’s act. False
realism, by contrast, makes nature and spfrit equal and symmetrically-related. The following
passage clarifies the nature of Barth’s opposition to false realism.
[T]he peak of all happening in revelation, according to Holy Scriptui e, consists in the 
fact that God speaks as an I, and is heard by the thou who is addressed. . . In this 
happening the world of natuie and sense is undoubtedly subordinate. It is the servant.
It is the component which is not important and necessary for its own sake, but only in 
its relationship and function (267).
See Hunsinger 1991: 4ft 30-35,40ff. The motif o f objectivism, and other motifs, are also implicit in Barth’s 
account of God’s dynamic being in §28.1.
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We could say that, in order to reveal himself, God commandeers the natural order. In this act, 
the natural order is necessary (how else could God’s self revelation be mediated to humans 
who exist as a part of this order?), but God is free in using it as he pleases.^' This implies a 
certain Christocentric theological-ontological claim.^^
A similar emphasis on God’s freedom is found m Barth’s definition of a person as one 
who is ‘self-moved’ and ‘self-motivated’ (268fi)/^ God is entiiely self-moved and entirely 
unmoved by anything or anyone outside himself. Therefore, Barth thinks that only God is, 
properly speaking, a person (271). The Triune God’s being is self-disposing and self-sufficient 
and in this is the meaning of the biblical claim that ‘God is spirit’ (Jn 4:24) (268). In being 
‘self-moved,’ the transcendent God is different from either nature or spiiit, which, are 
ultimately either ‘unmoved’ or ‘moved,’ but never ‘self-moved’ (269) In God’s revelation 
we recognise that, despite our relative capacity to move and motivate ourselves or other 
beings, we are not absolutely self-moved and self-motivated, as only God is.^  ^ Furthermore, 
God’s works are in no sense reducible to human ‘movements’ (270f).^^ ‘No other being exists 
absolutely in its ac t . . .  in its own conscious, willed, executed decision’ (271).^  ^ Therefore, 
‘the real person is not man but God . . .  God lives from and by Himself (272).
Cf. II/l, 267f.
""To elaborate more fully, Barth appears to have an ontological perspective in which God’s acts (at least acts 
ad extra) require both spirit and nature, but in which nature is clearly subordinate to spirit. This way of 
relating spirit to nature is not a general ontology (i.e. applicable to all reality), but ought to be interpreted as a 
way of speaking of God in particular. It is derived from the particular divine act of the incarnation in which 
the human nature of Christ is necessary, but is subordinate to the divine person-in-act. We may thus speak of 
the hypostatic Christological ‘inclusion’ of the ‘natural’ order within the divine being in the act of revelation 
or reconciliation. We will see that Barth’s treatments o f divine unity, constancy and eternity demonstrate a 
similar ontological pattern (which we summarise in chapter 7, subsection 1.1). Aspects of this ‘Christological 
ontology’ are illuminated by what Ingolf Dalferth refers to as Barth’s ‘eschatological realism’ (Dalferth 1989). 
"" That this applies also to human persons is evident in Barth’s account o f ‘experience’ in I/l, 198ff.
In a brief excursus, Barth launches a polemic against ‘naturalistic or spiritualistic Deism’ and ‘mystical 
Pantheism’ in which God is an unmoved being identified with an abstract view of either nature or spirit as the 
measure of all things (269). On this point, Barth sounds similar to LA. Dorner (1994: 1 lOf), as at other points 
(see our comments in chapters 4 and 5).
"" Donna Bowman’s article (1999) notes that despite their drastically differing methods, Barth and Whitehead 
converge in their affirmation of divine self-determination. Yet even this convergence in content must be 
qualified by Barth’s distinctive understanding of God’s personal sovereignty. God is only voluntarily (and 
never necessarily) ‘passible’ or affected by what happens in the world (see Paul Fiddes 1992).
"" In a page-long excursus, Barth shows the flaw of any view of God that is equivalent to shouting ‘man’ loudly 
(269f). Barth treats Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher and Ritschl in this light (270).
"" Such a quotation does not imply that Barth believes God’s freedom is arbitrary. We will see that God’s 
freedom is in some sense constrained internally by his determinate loving character (see II/l, 284ff and oui" 
comments below).
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In afSiining God’s unique self-determining personliood, Barth makes explicit an 
implicit transcendental argument that has been running thiough this whole subsection 
(§28.1)/® That is, God’s being totally self-moved is what makes it possible for God’s being to 
be ‘in act.’ Otherwise, God’s actions would (like ours) be moved partly by external 
influences; as such, God’s being would not be fully present in his action. But since God is 
totally self-moved, God and God alone can be totally faithful to his character or being in all his 
actions.
2.1.5. Barth’s theological method in §28.1
With his affirmation of God’s unique personhood, Barth concludes this introductory 
section of his doctrine of the Reahty of God (§28.1). We may conclude our treatment of this 
section of CD by asking how Barth’s theological method has been evident within it. Once 
again, we will do so by asking how Scripture, tradition and reason function in this section.
If we ask which strand of the threefold cord is primarily at work in in §28.1, the most 
natural answer is probably: ‘reason.’ This is because Barth is principally concerned to do a 
kind o f ‘conceptual analysis’ of the ideas most appropriate to describing God’s being as 
known in revelation. In fact, this section is about as close as Barth comes to doing theological 
metaphysics or ontology, which is an instance of the constructive use of reason.®" While Barth 
does engage Scripture and tradition quite often in this section, it is mainly in his excursuses 
and affects the large print discussion only in a highly indirect manner. That said, when Barth 
does appeal to Scripture, he takes it as an authority that shows him the true nature of God and 
God’s self-revelation. As such, reason remains clearly subordinate to Scripture. Tradition 
does as well, functioning primarily in a negative way in this section. Tradition is here subject 
to a critique that aims to be based on revelation as attested in Scripture.
" See Johnson 1997: 44ft 200. To use the language of Paul Ricoeur, it is possible (as it is not for us humans) 
for God’s ‘idem-identity’ and ‘ipse-identity’ to fully converge (see our excursus on Barth and Ricoeur in 
chapter 5, subsection 2.4).
Barth’s development of God’s unique capacity to ‘act out’ his decisions qualifies David Kelsey’s claim that 
Barth develops a ‘rudimentary ontology o f personal agency’ here in II/l (1999: 134). While Barth does 
develop a definition of a ‘person’ that applies to humans in a derivative way, the specific claims that Kelsey 
associates with this ‘ontology’ fiilly apply only to God and not to personal agents in general.
Jüngel indicates that Barth makes ontological statements but is not doing ontology (1976: 62), at least not in 
the typical systematic or comprehensive sense.
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But again, it is the role of reason that is most prominent in this section of CD. Reason 
is present both in its critical and constructive capacities in this section, although the 
constructive function is probably primary. Barth incorporates insights of idealism and realism 
on an ad hoc basis.®^  Barth strives to ensure that he uses reason in such a way that it is 
conformed to the unique demands of its subject matter, rather than subjecting God to the 
illegitimate strictures of a priori general concepts. For example, he concludes with a reminder 
that when we speak of God as the living God, ‘our quality of life can never be confused with 
His, or compared or contrasted with it as commensurate’ (272). Such confusions will be 
avoided, Barth says, if we are clear about the rule that all further statements about God ‘are 
found alone in his ac t . . . because only in His act He is who He is. ’ We will not go wrong if 
our thoughts are in this way ‘grasped by God’s action’ instead of being about ourselves.
2.2. The Being of God as One who Loves (CD, §28.2)
Now that Barth has sketched the divine essence m relatively abstract and formal terms 
as his being in act, he now pursues further the specific content of this being in act: ‘We must 
now further enquire what is this act of His’ (273). God’s revelation is self-revelation, and, as 
such, teUs us more than simply that ‘God is God.’ It is rather the revelation of his name, a 
personal name that we cannot ‘go behind,’ Barth is here referring to the Triune name of God, 
his identity as Father, Son and Holy Spirit (274). The question is ‘what this name has to say 
about the particular being of God in His act’ (273). Using our own terminology, we could say 
that Barth is asking about how one can relate the question of identity—the question of who 
God is, which is answered by the Triune ‘name’—to the question of character—the question 
of what God is like. Barth’s answer is: ‘This name definitely has this primary decisive thing to 
say to us in all its constituents: that God is He who, without having to do so, seeks and creates 
fellowship between Himself and us (273). In other words, God is One who loves.
‘God is He who, without having to do so, seeks and creates fellowship between 
Himself and us.’ In other words, God loves in freedom—as Barth will say later. More 
specifically, Barth says that God’s internal fellowship within the eternal Trinity overflows, as it
In this process o f incorporating philosophical ideas, Barth employs the rational procedure o f ‘assimilation’ 
in which the ideas are transformed so that they may be appropriate to the distinctive subject matter of theology 
(Hunsinger 1991: 6111).
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were, towards us and includes us. This overflow is neither the product of internal nor external 
necessity, but is entirely self-moved.
But Barth’s primary concern in this section (§28.2) is not with God’s fi’eedom, which 
he will unfold in §28.3, but with a positive statement of God love, his seeking and creation of 
fellowship (273Q. Put differently, Barth is here concerned with the content of the verb that 
best sums up God’s action for us (i.e. that God loves) rather than the adverbial modifier of that 
verb (i.e., that God loves in freedom).
Barth begins by showing how all the great works of God ad extra are works of love 
for us. The act of creation is already an expression of this love, this fi*ee seeking and creation 
of fellowship. Yet this work of love is ‘is heightened in the work of revelation itself and 
‘finds its crown and final confirmation in the future destiny of mankind as redeemed in Jesus 
Christ’ (274).*  ^ In addition, Barth notes that ‘what God does in all this he is’; God’s being 
and his act, his character and his work, are inseparable.
To say that God loves means that God ‘wüls to be ours, and He wills that we should 
be His’ (274). God desires a relationship of fellowship, of koinonia, of mutual belonging. In 
this loving, God remains Creator and we remain creatures. God remains the judge who hates 
sin. God remains the Lord over us and all creation. Yet in all his works, God is always the 
one who wills this one thing—to have fellowship with us (274f). In fact, this seeking and 
creation of fellowship—this one thing—is the divine, the divinity or essence of God [fVesen 
Gottes] found in the revelation of his Triune name (275). In his eternal being, God has 
fellowship in himself. In giving us fellowship with him, God gives us himself. God is one who 
loves.
In a brief excursus, Barth makes some exegetical comments on the biblical statement 
that ‘God is love’ (I John 4:8 and 16) that illuminate the nature of his theological use of 
Scriptur e. Specifically, Barth points out that taking the phrase ‘God is love’ out of its context 
is ‘forced exegesis’ (275). Against the comment of historical-critic Martin Dibelius that ‘God 
is love’ provides ‘an equation of God,’ Barth show how the context of this statement defines
Here Barth refers to how God’s love is God’s motivating factor in the three great works of creation, 
reconciliation (revelation) and redemption. Also, although this passage contains one of few explicit references 
to Jesus Christ in §28, Barth’s whole conception of God’s being revealed in his act of revelation is implicitly 
Christocentric (and Trinitarian) throughout.
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God’s love specifically by reference to the acts of God in Jesus Christ (see I Jolin 4:9 and 15). 
Bai’th identifies a similar pattern at work in John 3:16. Thus, Barth appeals to a contextuaf^ 
interpretation of Scripture in order to show that, as far as our knowledge of God is concerned, 
God’s concrete acts o f ‘loving’ (the verb) are prior to any abstract claims that we might make 
about God’s love (the noun). Accordingly, Barth’s efifort to interpret Scripture carefully and 
contextually goes hand in hand with his more general principle that we know God’s unique 
being only through God’s works. Barth speaks of this principle as making a ‘decisive turn’ to 
revelation as the only proper basis of the doctrine of God. This methodological turn implies 
that we must not now take our general concept of love and impose it on God (275Ç.
Therefore, we cannot reverse I John 4’s statement and say that ‘love is God.’ This principle of 
the ‘non-reversibility’ of the Subject-predicate order runs throughout Barth’s doctrine of 
God. '^^  Since Scripture is the only adequate and reliable witness to God’s self-revelation, 
Barth’s appeal to the specific features of this scriptural witness is his concrete methodological 
alternative to speculative attempts to define God’s being on the basis of speculative, general 
concepts of predicates such as ‘love.’
Barth further elucidates this love of God found in revelation in four theses (276-283), 
which we will now examine in turn. In the fikst thesis, Barth speaks of the inherent goodness 
of God’s love: ‘God’s loving is concerned with a seeking and creation of fellowship for its 
own sake’ (280). Barth explains, ‘God is n o t . . .  the Good first, and then the One who loves,’ 
but is good in the very act of divine loving. ‘The “positively good content” [Thomasius] of 
God’s personal life does not exist behind or apart fiom His communication, but consists in the 
fact that it is the self-communicating life as such’ (277). By giving the loved the gift of love, 
God gives us himself. The Gift is the Giver.
Barth’s second thesis about God’s love states that ‘God’s loving is concerned with a 
seeking and creation of fellowship without any reference to an existing aptitude or worthiness 
on the part of the loved’ (278). Here Barth speaks about the basis of God’s love—a basis 
found entirely in the Lover, not in the loved. ‘God’s love always throws a bridge over a
Barth here demonstrates his capacity to critique and transcend the older ‘proof-texting’ method of Scripture 
usage through attention to its immediate literary context and its larger canonical context.
^ For some helpfiil reflection on the issues raised in this paragraph, see Hart 1999: 188ff.
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crevasse.’ In an excursus, Barth supports this second thesis by appealing to several scriptural 
passages. He begins by citing texts in the gospels that speak of Jesus Christ as one who came 
to seek sinners—the sick and the lost among humanity (Mt 15:24; Lk 5:31, 19:10). He also 
notes Pauline texts such as Rom 4:5 (the justification of the ungodly) and Rom 5:8 (God’s 
love for his enemies). In this same excuisus, Barth critiques Protestant scholastics Polanus 
and Quenstedt for suggesting that God’s love is motivated by some ‘preceding pleasure in the 
loved’ (278). Such a conception, Barth thinks, is based not on the cross of Chiist or other 
aspects of the biblical view of God’s love, but on a problematic general concept of love (2781). 
According to the revelation attested in Scripture, God’s love is grounded in God himself, in 
‘the event in the triune God himself in all eternity’ (279).
The third thesis speaks of the purpose of God’s love: ‘God’s loving is an end in itself 
not a means to an end (279). God’s love is not subordinate to other goals as self-glorification 
or the achievement of human salvation (279). Indeed, God loves in eternity within the Trinity, 
where such ad extra purposes are not inherently necessary. Barth supports such claims, once 
again, by appealing to scriptural passages in an excursus. Barth cites several passages which 
show that God’s saving acts are based upon God’s prior love, not vice versa (Deut 7:8, Jer 
31:3, Isa 63:9). Again, Barth moves directly fi*om the quotation of such passages to a 
(scriptural) critique of theological tradition that he thinks has departed fi"om the point of these 
passages. In this case, Baifh criticises Ritschl’s view of God’s love as grounded in God’s 
purposes for humanity. According to Barth, Ritschl forsakes God’s transcendent fi-eedom by 
riveting God inflexibly to Ins specific pmposes in the economy of salvation (2791). What God 
does in fi*ee love is dissolved into ‘inflexibility of pmpose’ (280).*^
Barth’s fourth and final thesis about God’s love is that ‘God’s loving is necessary, for 
it is the being, the essence and the nature of God’ (280). In speaking thus about the necessity 
of God’s love, Barth makes clear that no external necessities are imposed on God; rather, he 
speaks of an internal necessity. The point of speaking of this internal necessity is to ensure 
that the concept of God’s fieedom does not lead to the view that God’s fi*ee decisions and
This is relevant to Barth’s view that God’s ‘constancy’ is flexible and informed by free decisions, unlike 
classical immutability (see chapter 5).
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actions are libertine or arbitrary/^ nor that God’s being is finally indeterminate. Rather,
Barth here shows that God has a stable, determinate character; God is necessarily loving in his 
being and his acts. Yet God is entirely fi*ee in the sense of being entirely self-determining.
‘We are tied to God, but not God to us’ (281). God fi*eely chooses, however, to take us up 
into his eternal love, his eternal fellowship and blessedness. Put differently, God fi*eely 
chooses to allow his eternal love within the Trinity to overflow into our temporal humanity. 
God necessarily loves (this is his eternal nature or character), but he does not necessarily love 
us (for even our existence is an expression of his freedom).
These four theses show in various ways that God ‘loves as only He can love’ (283). 
When God’s love is understood in all its richness and concreteness, then we understand that aU 
talk about God must be a development of this basic definition that God loves (284).
Barth concludes his consideration of God’s being as ‘one who loves’ in §28.2 with a 
fuller explanation of his claim, made first in §28.1 (see 2.1.4 above), that ‘God is a person’ 
(284f). God is the person, and we only become persons in virtue of God’s love for us (i.e. we 
are dependent, derivative persons). God alone is the ‘I’ who is fully able to love in himself. 
Furthermore, Jesus Christ is the human person who shows us what it means to be a human in 
aU its fullness (286). Such an understanding allows us to take the Bible at face value when it 
speaks of God in personal terms (286). For God really is a person to the core of his being, the 
perfect person. Again, who God has revealed himself to be to us is who God truly is in his 
eternal being (287). There is no tension in God’s being between his ‘personality’ and his 
‘absoluteness.’ God is one, and in this unity of his being he is the one who loves.^’ And ‘the 
one God is revealed to us absolutely in Jesus Christ’ (297).
Commenting on the diversity of conceptions of divine freedom at work in Barth, Hendiy says that caprice or 
arbitrariness is ‘the only conception of freedom that [Barth] expressly eliminates’ (1978:236; cf. IF l, 318 and 
II/2,26). While this may be time, we believe (contra Hendry) that the varying nuances of Barth’s view of 
divine freedom can be coherently related under the rubric o f ‘self-detennination.’
Barth concludes §28.2 with a lengthy excursus on the modern discussion of the personality of God (287-297; 
see Gordon Clark’s exposition in 1963: 33-38; cf. 1/1,403 on his objection to ‘persons’). Barth starts with the 
ancient pagan historical origins of this problem in the Middle Ages in which the Trinity was placed after the 
nature and attributes, and in which people began to speak of God apart from revelation and Scripture (i.e. apart 
from his being as one who loves). This led first to the error of understanding God as three human personalities 
and then to a reduction o f theology to anthropology. We do not need to affirm that God has or is a 
‘personality’ (although we may do so), but only that he loves. Barth clearly regards God as one person (and 
perhaps one personality), not three.
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2.3. The Being of God in Freedom (CD, §28.3)
In this subsection we turn from love to freedom, from one side of the dialectic of 
Barth’s doctrine of God to the other. As noted earlier, Barth tends to speak of God’s freedom 
in adverbial terms, as that which modifies God’s frmdamental activity of loving. God loves in 
freedom. In a more obvious way than in the last two subsections, we will focus in this 
subsection on Barth’s method, and specifically on the methodological implications of his 
conception of divine freedom. To do so, subsections 2.3.2-2.3.4 will employ the rubric of the 
‘five features’ that we introduced at the end of chapter 2.
Despite our methodological concentration in this subsection, we do not wish to neglect 
the essential contours of Barth’s understanding of God’s freedom. Therefore, we will begin 
with a summary of some of the main concepts that Barth uses to unfold his understanding of 
God’s freedom.
2.3.1. Important distinctives of Barth’s view of divine freedom
Barth employs several terms to speak of God’s freedom. Some of the most frequent 
are lordship (301), aseity or self-existence (302), sovereignty, and absoluteness (see below). 
Perhaps Barth’s most significant way of defining divine freedom is his affirmation 
(encountered above) that God is self-moved or self-determining. Barth frirther clarifies the 
meaning of this concept by making a distinction between God’s primary and secondary 
freedom. God’s primary freedom is his positive freedom to be ‘grounded in [his] own being, 
to be determined and moved by [himself]’ (301). As such, God is free in himself even apart 
fi'om relationship to the world. God’s secondary freedom is God’s ‘negative’ freedom from 
all external constraints and limitations—in all the works and acts he carries out in relation to 
the world. The primary positive, internal side of God’s freedom is the basis of the secondary, 
negative, external freedom (see 302f, 305, 307f).^*
Besides his distinction between God’s primary and secondary freedom, Barth also 
clarifies the relationship between divine freedom and the concept of causation. Barth thinks 
that it is inappropriate to speak of God ^  self-caused or self-realised. Rather God should be 
seen only as the cause of the particular existence of all things other than himself. God does
This is an aspect of the more general point we have noted above about the ontic priority of the immanent 
Trinity over the economic Trinity in Barth’s doctrine of God (see 1.4 especially).
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not cause himself because God ‘is in no need of origination’ (306)/^ God already is all that he 
is, for he is eternally actual in his Triune being. We need to keep tliis in mind when Barth uses 
terms like ‘self-determination’ or ‘self-positing’ in relation to God. Although Barth has a 
dynamic, actualistic conception of God, he does not believe in God’s ‘self-realisation’ in a 
sense that implies fundamental growth or change m God’s identity.^^
Barth also uses the concept of God’s absoluteness to clarify the nature of divine 
freedom (309ff). Barth uses this concept specifically to illuminate God’s secondary freedom, 
the freedom or lordship God has in his relationship to the world. Barth distinguishes between 
God’s noetic and ontic absoluteness (310fi). God’s noetic absoluteness resists placing God 
under any general concept (being, personhood, love, freedom etc.) in which God is grouped 
together in a genus along with non-divine objects of knowledge. This noetic absoluteness, 
Barth says, is grounded in God’s ontic absoluteness, his self-sufficiency and independence in 
relation to all that is not God.^  ^ Here Barth wishes to maintain what Kierkegaard called the 
‘infinite qualitative distinction’ between God and the created order, while at the same time 
showing that God is free to be immanent in the world. Barth explicates the dynamic and 
flexible character of God’s freedom in an effort to show the inadequacy of all static and 
mutually-oppositional views of God’s otherness or transcendence (314fy.
2.3.2. Methodological reverence and particularism 
We will now turn to the more distinctly methodological aspects or implications of 
Barth’s view of divine freedom. To begin, we wish to underline how Barth opens his 
consideration of God’s freedom: namely, by saying that God being, act and love are ‘His own’ 
(297). In other words, they are unique to God and flow from God’s own self-determination. 
Barth moves from this point to the methodological implication that the theologian must always 
retain a proper respect for God as a unique object—or, more precisely, as the unique Subject 
who freely makes himself an object for our thought and speech in his own way. ‘This object 
permits and indeed commands us to speak of a life and a love, of a living and loving I . . .  Bu t . 
. . He also requires us to understand and name Him beyond all our insights and ideas as the I
Cf. Hunsinger 2000: 193.
This matter will be clarified in chapter 5 on God’s ‘constancy.’
Robert Brown (1980) argues, against Barth, that noetic absoluteness does not follow from ontic absoluteness. 
However, Brown’s critique is largely misplaced (see Colwell 1989: 187).
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who lives and loves in His unique way^ (298; emphasis added). A respectful recognition of 
God’s freedom leads to a kind of methodological ‘particularism,’a tendency to form 
judgements about God only on the basis of his particular acts of self-revelation. We may ask: 
"what is God’ ‘only if we are aware that with the greatest childlikeness which in this 
connection is also the greatest, the only possible, profundity, we are again asking: Who is He?’ 
(298; emphasis added) .When this is remembered, theological inquiry does not proceed 
according to ‘universal criteria and standards’ but according to ‘the reality revealed to us by 
God himself.’
In another passage, Barth draws out the link between a reverent approach to theology 
and a particular spirituality marked by disciplines such as hearing the Word and prayer. In 
respect to the question of God’s ‘necessity’ or ‘necessary existence,’ Barth distinguishes 
between two methods, the first of which marks the ‘classical’ and modem Catholic doctrines 
of God, and the second, which is Barth’s preferred approach. In his words, ‘The former 
proceeds automatically from the development of an idea, but the latter can be won only from 
the hearing of the divine Word in prayer and supplication, from the experience of the struggle 
between the flesh and the spirit, from the real overcoming of real temptation’ (307). One such 
‘real temptation’ is ‘wishing to cling to something [i.e. some idea of God] supposedly higher 
and better than the God who in freedom lives as He who He is.’ The theologian must always 
resist this temptation, deferring always to what we know on the basis of God’s sovereign self- 
revelation.
2.3.3. Chiistocentrism and Textual-Basis
Barth’s methodological reverence—his continual deference to God’s seh-revelation— 
expresses itself decisively and primarily in two concrete features of his theological method: its 
Christocentrism and its textually-based character (see chapter 2, section 5). We will now 
consider how these two features appear in Barth’s discussion of God’s freedom.
For Barth, the content of God’s sovereign self-revelation is always to be understood 
primarily in terms of what God has done in Christ, and God’s Christocentric self-revelation 
manifests God’s freedom. Barth unfolds these truths in an illuminating passage (304fy. God
To refer to the proper theological attitude as ‘childlikeness’ speaks of humility that is willing to let the 
reality of God’s self-revelation overturn one’s own pre-concieved notions of God.
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chooses to love creatures distinct from him and thus chooses to let those creatures know him 
and have fellowship with him. Since this has taken place, we know that it impossible for it to 
take place—i.e. we know that what has happened ‘lies within the scope of God’s freedom’ 
(304)/^ God ‘shows and proves in His revelation His freedom to begin with Himself.’ That 
is, in the ‘event’ of Christ, God acts wholly by himself and out of his own self-determination: 
‘this is the freedom of His incarnation in Jesus Christ foreshadowed in his election and rule of 
Israel’ Indeed, in Jesus Christ, God ‘proves his own existence.
The textually-based character of Barth’s theology, as we have said, is the ‘exegetical’ 
part of the larger phenomenon of the role of Scripture within Barth’s method. While indirect 
scriptural authorisation pervades much of this section on divine freedom, these directly 
exegetical engagements with Scripture are relatively rare, perhaps due do the relatively 
abstract character of much of this section.^  ^ That said, such references sometimes appear at 
important points. For example, when Barth begins to unfold the meaning of divine freedom as 
self-determining Lordship, he turns to an excursus that explains its textual basis. The excursus 
opens like this:
There is no plainer description of the divinity of God than the phrase which occurs so 
frequently in the Pentateuch and again in the Book of Ezekiel “I am the Lord.” It is 
followed hard by that other, analytical phrase “I am the Lord your (or thy) God,” and it 
has its exact New Testament parallel in the “I am” of the Johannine Jesus. It is, of 
course, obvious that in this biblical “I am” the Subject posits itself and in that way 
posits itself as the living and loving Lord, in doing so, this Subject is God. He who 
does this is the God of the Bible (301Q.
In this quotation, the direct and indirect modes of scriptural authorisation are interwoven, so
we need to discuss both in relation to each other. While specific passages are quoted, they are
set in the context of a biblical pattern that might not be obvious to all readers; at the least it
requires a Nicene-Chalcedonian interpretative grid (see 2.3.4 below). Barth sees a coherent
theological pattern at work in the biblical repetition of a set of related phrases in which God,
We note again the transcendental method that Barth employs here.
In this context Barth refers to Anselm’s so called ‘ontological proof of God’s existence as an attempt to 
testify to God’s prior ‘self-demonstration’ in his revelation (305). This, of course, expresses the interpretation 
of Anselm Barth made famous in his 1931 book on Anselm.
That said, Barth does use terms like ‘the biblical idea of God’ feirly frequently in this section. This is a kind 
o f ‘shorthand’ for the view of God that he derives from Scriptui e, either directly or indirectly.
126
as Subject, posits himself Barth goes on to say that because God posits himself as nothing 
else does, ‘everything outside of him depends on His good-pleasure or its opposite’ (302). 
Barth follows this with a series of ‘proof-texts’ that speak of what we could refer to as God’s 
uniqueness, sovereignty and ‘aseity’—all terms that Barth will use later in his exposition of 
divine freedom. In this excursus, then, we see two different ways (identification of patterns 
and citations of specific texts) in which Barth grounds his view of divine freedom in Scripture.
2.3.4. Ecclésial and creative 
The remaining two of the five main features of Barth’s method are that it is ‘ecclesial’ 
and ‘creative.’ We begin with the ecclesial character of Barth’s treatment of divine freedom. 
For example, Barth appeals frequently to the church’s theological traditions in his account of 
divine freedom. While Barth’s treatment of church tradition is largely negative in this section 
(due to the ‘classical’ tendency to define God’s freedom according to general a priori ideas), 
positive uses of church tradition are also evident. For example, Barth’s interpretation, 
mentioned above, of the “I am” sayings of Jesus seems to be guided by the early church’s 
Ncene creed and Chalcedonian formulation. His positive reception of the Trinitarian and 
Christological heritage of the early church enables Barth to regard the “I am” statements of 
Jesus as standing in an ‘exact parallel’ to the “I am” statements of God in the Old Testament 
(302; see our comments above). Also, we have already noted Barth’s positive assessment of 
Anselm and his ‘proof (305).^  ^ Barth’s negative assessments of theological tradition are 
evident in his critique of the scholastic tendency to interpret God’s ‘aseity’ almost exclusively 
in terms of God’s independence (302) or its related tendency to define God’s transcendence 
strictly in terms of opposition to the world (303f).^ *
The creative character of Barth’s theological method is evident mainly in his creative 
use of reason to construct and expound his own position.^^ This is evident in his fiexible use
^  While Barth’s use of the language of philosophical idealism to speak of God here (‘the Subject posits itself), 
he redefines these terms somewhat in light o f the unique God of the biblical witness.
See Gunton 1978: 117ff.
In relation to the ecclesial character of Barth’s work, we could recall that, as we noted in oui" account of 
Barth’s reverence above, Barth’s approach to the doctrine o f God implies a spirituality of prayer and hearing 
the word o f God. This suggests that the theologian ought to be actively involved in the practices of church life. 
^ We ought not to forget the critical role of Barth’s use of reason in his doctrine of divine freedom that is 
manifest in his criticism of theological tradition that we have already mentioned. Barth continually exposes 
the tendency of various thinkers to ‘deify’ their own human concepts rather than subordinating their ideas to 
God’s actual self-revelation. For example, Barth critiques the Neo-platonic concept of God as ‘a hypostatised
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o f ‘idealistic’ concepts such as the ‘self-positing’ of the Absolute in relation to God. To use 
the example again that we employed above, Barth’s creatively redescribes the ‘I am’ 
statements in John as evidence that Jesus is the divine Subject positing himself (302). Such 
rational reconstruction presupposes the constant deconstruction or critique of inappropriate 
ways of conceiving of God, but also moves beyond deconstruction to develop an 
understanding of God on the basis of revelation. More generally, Barth explicates God’s 
internal relations by using certain conceptuality of the modem idealist subject: self-realisation, 
self-aflBrmation and self-confirmation (306). As such, Barth uses imaginative resourcefiilness 
in critically-appropriating philosophical terminology in the service of the interpretation and 
apphcation of revelation.
3. The Perfections of God
3.1. Introduction to Barth *s Account of Divine Perfections
In this section of the chapter, we turn to Barth’s account of the perfections (or 
attributes) of God {CD, §§29-31). Barth offers a general treatment of God’s perfections in 
§29, and then turns to his accounts of specific perfections in §30 and §31.
Scripture, tradition and reason each have important functions in Barth’s account of 
divine perfections. Barth’s relatively abstract and general description of God’s perfections in 
§29 (like his understanding of God’s ‘being in act’ in §28.1) could be seen as an example of 
‘scriptural reasoning,’ a highly indirect form of the scriptural authorisation of doctrine formed 
in critical dialogue with theological tradition. Specifically, Barth’s theological language of 
‘perfections’ follows indirectly from the scriptural testimony to God as (1) uniquely perfect, as 
(2) both ‘one’ and ‘many’ and as (3) describable in an ordered dialectical pattern of love and 
freedom. We will consider the first two of these three elements in the remainder of this 
subsection and the third in much greater length in subsections 3.2-3.5.
The opening synopsis of Barth’s paragraph on the ‘Perfections of God’ (§29) reads as 
follows:
summary of His non-being in relation to all other kind of being, a God who is certainly conceivable as an 
idealisation of man . . ,  (305).
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God lives His perfect life in the abundance of many individual and distinct perfections. 
Each of these is perfect in itself and in combination with all the others. For whether it 
is a form of love in which God is free, or a form of freedom in which God loves, it is 
nothing else but God Himself, His one, simple, distinctive being (322).
From this synopsis and the statements that follow, we see that Barth regards God as ‘the
perfect being,’ as the only being who lives a ‘perfect life’ (322). Barth reinforced this
foundational assumption by stressing the language of divine ‘perfections’ rather than the more
typical language of divine ‘attributes’ or ‘properties.’ That God alone is perfect implies that
God alone has perfections. In Barth’s words, ‘How can He be anything except in perfection,
and what can be perfect except in Him?’ (323). Clearly, Barth uses the term ‘perfections’ in
order to emphasise God’s uniqueness. ‘Attributes’ or ‘properties,’ while they can be used to
describe God, can also be used to describe non-divine beings. But only God’s being can be
described as a ‘multitude of perfections’ (322).
Another issue that arises from the above quotation is the question of how God can be a
plurality o f ‘individual and distinct perfections’ and also that each perfection ‘is nothing else
but God Himself, His one, simple, distinctive being.’ That is, how can God be both one and
many? The short answer is that Barth does not tell us how this is possible. Rather, he simply
declares that, according to revelation, is it actually the case: God is ‘who he is and what he is
in both unity and multiplicity’ (323). The longer answer is that this combination of oneness
and multiplicity is bound up with a Trinitarian understanding of God—a God who is both one
and three (323). We will pursue these matters further in chapter 4, where we consider Barth’s
conception of divine unity. There we will see that Barth has a concept of divine ‘simphcity’
(God’s undivided and inseparable oneness) that is capable of including a diversity of
perfections within it. The key point we need to be aware of here is that Barth wishes to avoid
carefully the classical tendency to undermine the full reality of diverse divine perfections, an
error that he refers to a ‘nominahsm’ and ‘ semi-nominalism. ’ The diverse perfections of God
are not merely names or metaphors that we humans improperly impose upon a God who is
really an undifferentiated unity. Rather, they are aspects of God himself that are made plain in
the revelation of God attested in Scripture.
See Barth’s extensive consideration o f the issue of how God is both one and many in II/1, 322-355, to 
which we will return in parts of chapter 4.
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3.2. The Perfections o f Love and Freedom
3.2.1. Introductory questions
After addressing the question of the sense in which God is marked by a multiplicity of 
individual and distinct perfections, Barth turns to the question of how we are to conceive of 
these perfections and how they are related to one another. In the traditional language, Barth 
raises the question of the ‘derivation and distribution of the divine attributes’ (335). In other 
words, what are the ‘contours of God’s being?’ (336).
For our purposes, there are two key questions that Barth raises in this connection.
First, Barth asks on what basis and in what sense we are to affirm these perfections as real in 
God? In sum, Barth’s answer is that God’s revelation leads us to affirm with confidence that 
God is ‘almighty, eternal, just, wise, merciful’ and so on "not merely for us but in Himself 
(336). Yet this objective knowledge of God is provisional, not a once-for-all reality in our 
control. Barth wishes to ensure that the theologian is ever reliant on ongoing divine acts of 
revelation—acts that freshly authorise our language about God’s perfections. As Barth says, 
when we are ‘authorised by his revelation to name Him with these words of ours’ then we can 
be confident that ‘we are moving in the sphere of truth and not falsehood so long as we are 
always willing to allow Him to be Himself the interpreter o f these human words which He has 
placed upon our lips'' (336; emphasis added). Thus, we can speak of God’s real perfections 
(which are true of God a se rather than simply pro nobis) only by means of a trustfirl 
subordination to ongoing divine action in which God places words upon our lips and then 
interprets those words for us. We can see Barth’s actualism and his dialectical understanding 
of revelation and religious language at work in his method here. °^^
For Barth, the dialectical or eschatological reserve with which we must speak of God 
does not does vitiate confidence in the real objectivity and rationality of our God-talk. Barth 
says, ‘The objectivity of God in His revelation has to be taken seriously, so that in regard to 
God we cannot be content merely with a devout silence or a rapturous whisper’ (336).^ ®^  The 
use of human reasoning and speech to understand God’s revelation is fiilly appropriate, so
See McCormack 1995: 428-441 for a helpful commentary on these themes in relation to Barth’s account of 
Anselm’s theological method.
See Hunsinger on Barth’s ‘objectivism’ (1991: 35-39).
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long as it remains obedient to that revelation and does not speculate beyond it.'”^  Therefore, 
although God remains mysterious and hidden even in his self-revelation, the question of the 
nature and organisation of God’s perfections is not meaningless (335fif), and this leads us to 
the next question.
Second, Barth raises the question of whether our account of God’s perfections ought 
to be ‘organised’ in any particular way, and if so, what is the basis for this organisation of 
them. Barth’s answers to these questions can be summarised in the following way. Revelation 
leads us to organise God’s perfections in a two-fold series, which is most adequately done 
under the rubric of the perfections of divine loving and the perfections of divine freedom (337- 
344). Because Barth believes in the perichoresis of the divine perfections, no divine 
perfection is exclusively a manifestation of either love or freedom. Yet certain perfections are 
more fittingly associated (per appropriationem, as it were) with the divine loving (even 
though they also partake of divine freedom) and other perfections ai e more fittingly associated 
with the divine freedom (even though they also paitake of divine loving). Further, despite the 
perichoretic interpentration of the perfections, and of love and freedom, the order in which the 
perfections are presented is important rather than wholly arbitrary. The knowledge of God 
that revelation grants to us itself urges us to begin with the perfections of love and to conclude 
with the perfections of freedom.
3.2.2, Love, freedom, and the ‘threefold cord’
In this subsection, we wül explain Barth’s proposal about the love-freedom 
arrangement of the divine perfections in more detail. In doing so, we will pay special attention 
to the role of Scripture, tradition and reason in his theological method. The key question is 
this: In what concrete ways does revelation suggest a twofold rational account of the
A few pages later, Barth will emphasise both ‘the obedience of knowledge and the humility of ignorance’ 
(342). In other words, a reverent response to revelation requires a forthright acknowledgment of both what 
revelation gives us to know and what it does not give us to know.
The dissertations of Currie 1976 and Cross 1991 are among the most helpful in doing an exposition of this 
aspect of Barth’s work, not to mention other aspects o f Barth’s doctrine of God. Currie 1976 explicates clearly 
the nature of the integration of and interplay between freedom and love in the account of perfections. Currie 
also speaks helpfully o f other matters such as the relation of the perfections to the Trinity and to their 
Christocentric centre. T erry Cross (1991:176-201 and 209ff) offers an illuminating discussion of the role of a 
specific form o f ‘dialectical method’ within Barth’s account of divine perfections.
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perfections of God in which the perfections of love are treated first and only then the 
perfections of fi*eedom?
In answering this question, Barth gives extended consideration the church’s theological 
tradition, evaluating it both negatively and positively. The negative side of Barth’s assessment 
of tradition is evident in his rejection of any approach insofar as it aims to ‘define and order 
the perfections of God as though they were the various perfections of a kind of general being 
presupposed as known already’ (337). Against this, Barth wishes to recognise fiilly that each 
one of God’s perfections is ‘the characteristic being of God Himself as He discloses Himself in 
His revelation.’ Barth continues his critical dialogue with tradition in an extensive excursus 
that outlines three problematic modern ways of organising the doctrine of divine perfections 
into ‘psychological,’ ‘religio-genetic’ or ‘historical-mtuitive’ categories (337-341). In each 
case there is a problematic anthropocentrism that dimmishes the proper theocentric objectivity 
of God’s perfections as they are disclosed in revelation.
The positive side of Barth’s evaluation is evident in his reference to ‘a classical, and to 
some extent ecumenical, line of theological reflection’ (337) in which God’s perfections are 
organised within some kind of two-fold series.*®^  Bai*th’s version of this ‘better way’ (340) is 
the love-fi’eedom series. But this finds precedent in other versions of the two-fold series. In 
Protestant orthodoxy, the perfections were classed as either negative or positive, absolute or 
relative, or incommunicable or communicable. Yet even beyond Protestant orthodoxy, Barth 
believes there was an ecmnenical theological consensus that God needs to be described in a 
two-fold manner. On the one hand, we need speak o f ‘God’s aseity, absoluteness and 
fi-eedom’ a se in distinction fi'om all of creation (341). On the other hand, we need to speak of 
‘the love of God, of the activity of His personal being.’
Following his evaluation of theological tradition, Barth moves into the more directly 
constructive phase of his account of perfections. In this aspect of his work, Barth employs a 
constructive use of reason in the service of an argument in which Scripture indirectly 
authorises his theological proposals.
We note that Barth’s use o f ‘classical’ here is different from our typically negative use of it in this thesis 
(see chapter 2, section 3).
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How does Barth rework the tradition of organising the perfections in a two-fold series 
in the light of scriptural revelation? One of the most important ways is that Barth relates the 
categories of God’s love and freedom to the dialectic of God’s self-disclosure and God’s 
hiddenness in revelation (341ff). In this way, Barth uses dialectic as a rational tool by which 
to speak appropriately of GodT^ God is known first as one who acts in love and yet as one 
who, in his fi eedom, remains hidden—even in his act of revelation. Barth thus closely relates 
the dialectic of unveiling and veiling in revelation to the dialectic of God’s love and freedom. 
In both dialectics, ‘opposing’ ideas exist in ‘complete reciprocity’ to each other. In Barth’s 
words.
Each of the opposing ideas not only augments but absolutely fulfils the other, yet it 
does not render it superfluous or supplant it. On the contrary, it is only m conjunction 
with the other—and together with it affirming the same thing—that each can describe 
the Subject, God (343).
This perichoretic kind of dialectic is crucial for understanding not only the relationship of love 
and freedom in Barth’s doctrine of God, but also for understanding the relationship of each 
perfection to each other and to God’s being as a whole.*®^
3.2.3. Further observations 
In the latter part of §29, Barth makes three observations that help to clarify the 
distinctive character of his proposed love-freedom model. Firstly, he points out that freedom 
and love are not to be strictly identified with transcendence and immanent self-giving 
respectively. Due to the perichoresis between freedom and love in God’s being, God’s love 
describes God’s transcendent being a se, and God’s freedom is expressed in God’s self-giving 
immanence. In the end, the distinction between ‘God in himself and ‘God for us’ can have 
only ‘heuristic rather than essential significance’ (345).*“^  There is no absolute rift or 
separation within God’s being. The God known in Christ is emphatically the same as the God 
who exists a se.
On ‘dialectic,’ see chapter 1, subsection 4,4.
See Cross 1991: 186f, etc.; Hunsinger ably expounds the same dialectic in other terms: as a ‘trinitarian 
pattern’ o f ‘dialectical inclusion’ (1991: 58, 86, etc.).
Barth considers problematic the traditional pairs for the two categories of divine perfections (absolute and 
relative, incommunicable and communicable, and so on) because they imply that this distinction is essential, 
rather than merely heuristic.
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Secondly, Barth observes that we need to avoid ‘attempted epistemological 
deductions’ that attempt to move from the created realm to conceptions of God’s perfections. 
Specifically, Barth considers the traditional doctrine of the ‘threefold way’ or via triplex: (1) 
the ‘way of negation’ (via negationis or via negativa), (2) the ‘way of eminence’ (via 
eminentiae) and (3) the ‘way of causation’ (via causalitatis) (346f). Regarding the third way 
(causation), not as a third method, but as a ‘common presupposition and crown’ of the first 
two methods, Barth concentrates on the first and second ways. He notes the temptation of 
regarding knowledge of perfections of divine freedom as the epistemological result of the 
application of the way of negation, i.e. the simple denial of created concepts (finite become 
infinite, temporality becomes timeless eternity, etc.). The trouble with this is that, when we 
pay attention to revelation, ‘God’s freedom is not in any way identical with God’s being over 
against the world’ (347).^ ®^  Likewise, Barth sees the possible temptation of thinking that the 
perfections of divine loving can be derived from the application of the way of eminence, i.e., 
by choosing certain concepts from the created order (i.e. human love, patience, and so on) and 
fitting them to God (taking them to a superlative degree and removing any objectionable 
qualities in them). But again, when we consider the God known in revelation, we realise that 
God’s unique ways of loving are not simply quantitatively different than ours. Furthermore, 
God’s love, because it is an eternal feature of his being, ‘is in no way coincident with His being 
for us’ (347). Barth concedes that, in the appropriate context of the reception of revelation, 
the theologian may well employ something like the methods of negation or eminence,’ ®^ but he 
is emphatic in his denial that these methods (and those humans using them) have any inherent 
capacity to speak adequately about God (347Q. Again, our correct use of theological 
concepts is ultimately an event of correspondence with God constituted by God’s ongoing 
revelatory action.
Last but not least, Barth observes that ‘the order in which these two series of divine 
attributes aie formulated is not a matter of indifference.’ Indeed, it is significant enough that
In the chapters to follow, we will see that this point is a repeated feature of Barth’s critique of classical 
concepts of God.
We will see in chapter 6 that Barth refers to God as ‘supremely temporal’ (CD, III/2,437), which sounds 
like the via eminentiae. That said, such language is not typical o f Barth, who more commonly wishes to 
emphasise the uniqueness of God’s perfections in contrast to creation (see his denial o f analogia entis, at least 
in a static form).
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Barth wishes to reverse the order typical of the traditional or ‘classical’ two-fold
airangements. Barth wishes to treat the perfections of love (associated loosely with the
traditional ‘relative’ or ‘communicable’ attributes) before the perfections of freedom
(associated loosely with the ‘absolute’ or ‘incommunicable’ attributes), rather than after them,
as had been typical. For Barth, ‘[t]he fundamental error of the whole earlier doctrine of God
is reflected in this [traditional] arrangement’ (348). The reason is that, the practice of
considering the perfections of God’s freedom or aseity first tends to lead to abstract
speculations about what God must be like in himself, apart from God’s revelation. Instead, we
must start with the God who loves us, the personal Triune God. Only from that point may we
move to considerations of God’s sovereign self-existence."' In the following passage, Barth
makes this point as well as others that serve to summarise this subsection.
[W]e must first say that it is as the personal triune God that He is self-existent; as the 
One who loves that His is the One who is free. If there is full reciprocity [between 
love and freedom], as we have seen, this order obtains even in the full reciprocity, not 
signifying a difference of value between the two aspects of divinity, but the movement 
of life in which God is God, corresponding exactly to His revelation of Himself as 
God. And in our apprehension and exposition of the perfections of God, we must 
adhere to this sequence (348).
In this passage we see that Barth wishes to affirm two complementary dynamics in his doctrine
of divine perfections: (1) the perichoretic reciprocity of love and freedom (and also of each
perfection to the other) and (2) the revealed order of God’s being and life, an order of love
first and then freedom."^ We will see these two dynamics at work throughout our frirther
exposition of individual divine perfections.
3.3. "The Perfections o f Divine Loving* (§ 30)
We now turn to a survey of Barth’ six perfections of divine loving. Since oui’ primary 
concern in this thesis is with three of the perfections of divine freedom, we need only to
Thus, it is the need to begin with God’s concrete loving acts of self-revelation that leads Barth to start with 
God’s love rather than freedom. This is a more adequate explanation than David Ford’s suggestion that ‘the 
relationship between the two moments’ o f love and freedom ‘is to be understood through the crucifixion and 
the resurrection’ (Ford 1981: 139). Ford continues, ‘It is the resurrection which demonstrates the freedom of 
God in the loving act of the crucifixion; and the irreversible order of the two events in their rendering of one 
identity shows how such atti’ibutes as God’s judgement. .  . and grace are to be held together.’ There may be a 
kind of analogy between the crucifixion and resurrection and God’s love and freedom (which, by the way, is 
not strictly parallel to the relationship of grace and judgement), but there is no evidence Barth regarded this as 
the basis o f the order of the doctrine of the perfections. Ford’s speculative claim here is indicative of his 
attempt to overstress the significance o f biblical narrative in Barth’s theological method.
Again, see Cross 1991: 185ff.
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indicate some structural and methodological features of his account of God’s love. The 
following general pattern is evident in §30. The six perfections of divine loving are organised 
into three pairs: grace and holiness, mercy and righteousness, and patience and wisdom. The 
first members of each pair (grace, mercy and patience) are perfections that abundantly 
emphasise God’s love or ‘relationahty’ in his act of self-revelation, while the second members 
of each pair (holiness, righteousness and wisdom) are perfections that speak of the freedom or 
‘integrity’ of God that is apparent when God acts in love (see 3521).'"
Any adequate consideration of Barth’s account of divine perfections must address the 
questions of selection and arrangement. Why does he select these perfections, and why does 
he place them in this arrangement? In 3.2, we have already considered some reasons for 
Barth’s selection and arrangement on the macro-level. We saw that Barth’s interpretation of 
God’s self-revelation causes him to select love and freedom as two macro-categories or meta­
perfections by which to organise his account of perfections. We also saw how, against the 
grain of the ‘classical tradition,’ he believed that revelation urged that they stand in the order 
of love-freedom, rather than freedom-love. On the macro-level, the relationship between the 
revelation attested in Scripture and Barth’s proposals of selection and arrangement was 
indirect. There were no direct appeals to specific biblical passages. Rather, Barth appealed 
to overall patterns evident in God’s revelation and drew implications from these.
With a few qualifications, the same pattern of indirect scriptural-revelational 
authorisation is present on the micro-level: i.e. on the level of Barth’s selection of specific 
perfections and his arrangement of these. Again, there is a carefiil balance between the 
theologian’s freedom and constraint under revelation (see chapter 2, subsection 1.2). Barth 
clarifies this point in a brief excursus (352f) within his introductory comments on ‘the 
perfections of divine loving’ (§30).'" Barth states: ‘Every doctrine of God’s perfections has 
to come down, in detail, to a certain choice and grouping of concepts—a choice and summary 
which as such will not be able to appeal to any direct intimation o f Holy Scripture nor to the
The terms ‘relationality’ and ‘integrity’ are taken from W. S. Johnson 1997: 52ff. While these terms are 
helpful in drawing out certain aspects of Barth’s ‘love’ and ‘freedom’ respectively, they are liable to neglect 
other aspects of Barth’s terms. Therefore, we will employ Johnson’s terms only occasionally in this thesis, 
where they seem appropriate and illuminating.
As we will note later, a very similar excursus is found at the beginning of his consideration of the six 
perfections of divine freedom (44 If).
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voice o f any sort o f relative authority* (352). In this way, Barth affirms his freedom as a
dogmatic theologian to work in a way that does not follow the direct precedent of either
Scripture or church tradition (the prime example of a ‘relative authority’). The church’s
theological traditions show great variety on these matters, and Scripture ‘does not anywhere
give authoritative directions.’ According to Barth, this is a ‘specific form of the problem that
has already arisen regarding the order of dogmatics as a whole.’ In the following passage, he
highhghts the significance of this comparison.
Methodus arbitraria was our conclusion then, and we repeat it now.'" The kind of 
choice and grouping which we must now attempt can always have the basic character 
only of a trial and proposal. But it must not on that account be arbitrary [Willkürlich\ 
i.e., unreasonable [sinnlos] or perverse [eigensinnig] (352)."^
Clearly then, despite Barth’s apparently positive use of the traditional phrase methodus
arbitraria, Barth does not actually believe that either his account of the order of dogmatics or
of the specific order of the perfections is ‘arbitrary’ in any strong sense. True, the relevant
order or selection is in neither case directly prescribed by any theological authority, and
therefore can only be provisional. Yet Barth does wish to be guided m some indirect sense by
such authorities—especially Scripture—in making responsible, rather than capricious,
dogmatic decisions.
What kind of indirect function does scriptural revelation have in shaping Barth’s 
decisions about the selection and arrangement of the perfections of divine freedom? Barth 
suggests an answer to this question when he explains (on 352) the two questions that he kept 
in mind in his attempt to make tliis selection and arrangement.
1. ‘[B]y what specific determinations \Bestimmungen] does the love of God—not love 
according to a general conception, but the love of God in Jesus Christ, as attested in 
Holy Scripture—become for us an event and reality so that we may and must infer in 
consequence that these are the determinations of the divine being?’
2. ‘[I]n what determinations does the freedom of God stand—again not a universal idea of 
freedom but the freedom of God in Jesus Christ—when his love is actualised for us?’
Barth’s answers to these two questions take the form of two series of three perfections each. 
The first question is answered by grace, mercy and patience, the first members of the three
See CD, 1/2, 860f; cf. 869, where Barth refers to the ‘fundamental lack of principle in the dogmatic 
method.’
A more accurate translation o f the last phrase would be ‘arbitrary, i.e. senseless and obstinate’ {KD, II/1. 
396).
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pairs of attributes Barth considers in §30. These three attributes could be called the leading 
attributes of divine mercy. The second question is answered by holiness, righteousness, and 
wisdom, the second members of these three pairs. These three attributes emphasise what we 
might call the freedom-side of God’s love. Thus, Barth’s presentation interweaves discussion 
of both (a) the concrete forms or determinations of divine loving itself and (b) the concrete 
forms or determinations of divine freedom in the context of God’s love in act. Barth has given 
careful thought to ensure that a counterbalancing dialectic of love and freedom is maintained 
in the very selection and order of the perfections of divine loving. As such, Barth aims to be 
faithfril to the main themes and contours of Christological revelation to which Scripture 
witnesses. Barth reinforces this point by saying: ‘Whether these two answers are correct, 
satisfying or compelling, and whether our proposal is serviceable, can be seen only from our 
exposition itself, or from [its] relationship to the biblical witness to revelation* (352; 
emphasis added). Clearly, he wishes to stand in an accountable relationship to Scripture on 
these matters of dogmatic selection and organisation, even though it is a basically indirect 
relationship.*"
This does not mean that there are no direct supports for Barth’s selection and 
arrangement of certain perfections—despite what he says in his comments at the beginning of 
§30 (352fy. Barth later mentions a series of biblical passages that could be construed as a 
‘direct’ basis pattern of selection and arrangement, and thus may constitute an exception to the 
typicaUy ‘indirect’ character of this relationship. At the beginning of his account of divine 
patience, Barth says: ‘In view of certain specific scriptural passages, there is a clear necessity 
that after speaking of God’s grace and mercy, we should consider the perfection of divine 
patience as a special perfection of the love and therefore the being of God’ (407). In a brief 
excursus here, Barth cites a series of Old Testament texts (e.g. Exodus 34:6, Joel 2:13, Jonah 
4:2, etc.) that lift up these three perfections as a special and almost formulaic set of ‘distinctive 
marks of the God revealed and active in Israel.’
Ultimately, the dogmatician is responsible not to Scripture itself, but to God—the divine ‘object’ to which 
Scripture witnesses (353). The dogmatic theologian’s reverent and rational form of obedience to God, then, 
requires a ‘certain degree of systématisation’ yet one that is ‘controlled as far as possible by this object in its 
self-manifestation.’ We will see Barth maintains the same methodological commitment in his treatment of the 
perfections o f divine freedom.
II/l, 407; cf. 1/2, 68.
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3.4. "The Perfections of Divine Freedom* (§31)
We now turn to a survey of Barth’s consideration of the perfections of divine freedom. 
This is crucial for this thesis, since it provides the immediate context of the three perfections 
on which we have chosen to concentrate our attention in the next three chapters: unity, 
constancy and eternity. Although we wiU provide a detailed exposition of those three 
perfections in these upcoming chapters, we now wish to include brief characterisations of them 
along with the other three perfections with which they are paired. Here is a summaiy of the 
six perfections of divine freedom in the order in which Barth treats them.
• Unity: ‘The word oneness has two meanings, uniqueness and simplicity. As a statement 
about God it must in fact mean both’ (442). God’s uniqueness means that ‘God alone is 
God’ (442). For God to be simple ‘signifies that in all He is and He does. He is wholly and 
undividedly Himself and ‘in Himself there is no separation, distance, contradiction or 
opposition (445). ‘His uniqueness . . .  is based upon his simplicity.’
• Omnipresence: This is ‘the sovereignty in which, as the One He is, existing and acting in 
the way that corresponds to His essence. He is present to everything else, to everything 
that is not Himself but is distinct from himself. It is the sovereignty on the basis of which 
everything that exists cannot exist without Him, but only with Him, possessing its own 
presence only on the presupposition of His presence’ (461). Omnipresence includes both 
‘remoteness’ and ‘proximity.’ ‘God’s omnipresence, to speak in general terms, is the 
perfection in which He is present, and in which He, the One, who is distinct from and pre­
eminent over everything else, possesses a place. His own place, which is distinct from all 
other places and also pre-eminent over them all’ (468).
• Constancy: This perfection means that ‘the one, omnipotent God remains the One He is’ 
(491). In God ‘there neither is nor can be . . .  any deviation, diminution or addition, nor 
any degeneration or rejuvenation, any alteration or non-identity, nor discontinuity’ (491).
• Omnipotence: This is ‘the perfection in which He is able to do what He wills’ (522). 
Omnipotence includes both God’s de facto and his de jure ability to do what he wills 
(526). Included in the discussion of omnipotence is God’s omniscience, his ‘omnipotent 
knowledge,’ which is ‘complete in its range’ and is ‘the one unique and all-embracing 
knowledge’ (552).
• Eternity: ‘The being is eternal in whose duration, beginning, succession and end are not 
three but one, not separate as a first, second, and a third occasion, but one simultaneous 
occasion as beginning, middle and end. Eternity is the simultaneity of beginning, middle 
and end, and to that extent it is pure duration. Eternity is God in the sense in which in 
Himself and in all things God is simultaneous, i.e. beginning and middle as well as end, 
without separation, distance or contradiction . . . Eternity has and is the duration that is 
lacking to time. It has and is simultaneity’ (608).
• Glory: This is God’s ‘dignity and right not only to maintain, but to prove and declare, to
denote and as it were to make Himself conspicuous and everywhere apparent as the One 
He is. He does this negatively by distinguishing himself from what He is not, and 
positively by naming Himself, pointing to Himself, manifesting Himself in various ways. It 
is further his right to create recognition for himself. . . .  To sum up, God’s glory is God
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Himself in the truth and capacity and act in which He makes Himself known as God’
(641).
In respect to these perfections of divine freedom, we need to ask the question of 
selection and order, much as we did in relation to the perfections of loving. The explicit 
answer that Barth provides to this question is almost identical to what he said in respect to the 
perfections of divine loving: that ‘method is arbitrary’ in this context. Yet the selection and 
arrangement of the perfections of freedom are again in some sense indirectly authorised by 
Scripture and the revelation to which it witnesses."^ Hence, Barth says that in regard to these 
questions ‘we certainly cannot rely on, or appeal to, any direct (or verbal) precept of Holy 
Scripture or even to the precedent of any other dogmatics’ (441). Therefore, the selection and 
aiTangement can only ‘have the character of an attempt or a suggestion.’ Here again, one 
would expect that the selection and arrangement of the divine perfections would remain at 
most indirectly authorised by Scripture or tradition. In fact, this ‘indirectness’ is more 
obvious here in §31 than it was in §30, where Bailh’s actual selection and arrangement of the 
divine perfections showed some direct precedent in Scripture, against his exphcit 
programmatic comments (352f; see 3.3 above).
But even now there are important, indirect precedents to Barth’s decisions, though this 
time they are found in tradition rather than in Scripture. This is evident in Barth’s choice of 
unity, constancy and eternity as the ‘leading’ perfections of divine freedom, for one finds in 
Medieval and Protestant scholasticism a strong emphasis on God’s unity (simplicity), 
constancy (immutability) and eternity (thnelessness). In fact, one even finds evidence in such 
classical treatments for an ordering of these attributes similar to Barth’s; at least, it was 
common to begin with a treatment of God’s unity or simplicity and to treat other attributes 
(including immutability and eternity) later."** That said, the manner in which he expounds
Compare the very similar wording and emphasis of Barth’s excursus on the selection and arrangement of 
the perfections of freedom (44 If) with the parallel excursus on the perfection of loving that we discuss above 
(352f).
In his doctrine of the nature of God in the Summa Theologiae (Aquinas 1963 [vol. 2]), Aquinas treats 
simplicity first (Ft. 1, Q. 3). Then, after dealing with several other questions, he turns to God’s 
unchangeableness (Q. 9) and eternity (Q. 10). Finally, he closes his comments on the nature of God with a 
treatment of God’s oneness, another way o f treating God’s unity and underlying its importance (Q. 11). See 
Wolterstorff 1992 on the theoretical fecudity of simplicity, especially as illustrated in Aquinas. See also 
Heppe’s collection of the comments of various Reformed dogmaticians on the ‘incommunicable’ attributes, 
which begins with God’s simplicity (1950: 62-68). On the role o f these attiibutes of God in ‘classical theism’ 
more generally, see Leftow 1998: 98ff.
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each of these three perfections, as the next three chapters show, represents a rigorous 
scripturally-based critique of and alternative to some influential classical traditions. Similarly, 
there are no direct precedents for Barth’s precise selection and creative dialectical 
arrangement of six perfections of divine freedom.
3,5, The Threefold Cord in §30 and §31
We may conclude this subsection with some generalisations about the role of the 
thieefold cord within §30 and §31, with an emphasis on comparing Barth’s method in the two 
paragraphs.
We begin with the role of Scripture. Scripture plays an important role in both
paragraphs, but m somewhat different ways. In §30, Scripture directly authorises Barth’s
claims to a much greater degree than he does in other parts of his doctrine of the reality of
God. The reason for this is that it is fai’ easier for Barth to appeal to specific scriptural
passages to authorise claims about those characteristics of God that are directly expressed in
the divine acts of love, for it is with this that Scripture is primarily concerned.
In Barth’s account of the perfections of divine freedom in §31, by contrast, his
dogmatic claims are only rarely directly authorised by Scripture. The reasons for this have to
do with how the claims Barth makes in this context have a more abstract or even
‘metaphysical’ character than his statements about the perfections of divine loving. The
discourse found in §31 (largely a mixture of second or third-order discourse) is rather different
than the discourse of Scripture (largely first-order discourse). Some comments of David Ford
about §31 are illuminating in this regard:
It is under the heading of God’s freedom, as understood by Barth, that traditional 
“general” ideas about God such as transcendence, independence and infinity arise, and 
Barth’s interpretation of them is perhaps the most severe test of his story-centred 
method. His solution is what might be called a descriptive metaphysics in support of 
the overarching story."'
If we alter ‘story-centred method’ to ‘Scripture-centred method’ (in order to account for the
variety of genres in Scripture that are important to Barth), then this statement is an accurate
and insightful estimation of the challenge Barth faces in §31 as well as his solution to it. Ford
rightly sees that see that, in contrast to the perfections of freedom, ‘the perfections of the
'2' Ford 1981: 139.
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divine loving lend themselves fairly straightforwardly to being given their content by the story 
of Jesus Christ’ (139)."^ Barth’s solution to the challenge of how to relate the revelation 
attested in Scripture to the perfections of freedom is appropriately described as a kind of 
‘descriptive metaphysics,’ to which we will return below in our comments on the role of 
reason.
Tradition also plays somewhat different roles in §30 (love) and §31 (freedom). In §30, 
Barth interacts with theological tradition somewhat less frequently than in §31. In particular, 
Barth spends significantly less time critiquing various classical conceptions of God in his 
treatment of the perfections of divine loving. The main reason is that Barth usually regards the 
classical tradition’s treatment of these attributes of love to be more or less faithful to 
Scripture, and thus in little need of correction. This stands in contrast to Barth’s extensive 
criticism of certain classical accounts of the perfections of divine freedom, as we wül see in the 
next several chapters of the thesis. But these are only differences of emphasis; tradition 
functions in the same basic ways throughout §§30 and 31 and the rest of Barth’s doctrine of 
God. For example, the ancient Trinitarian and Christological formulations consistently guide 
and shape Barth’s doctrine, whüe Barth consistently remains allergic to any hint of natural 
theology.
The role of reason remains relatively consistent in Barth’s doctrine of God, always 
showing a concern to develop a distinctive theological rationality that is constrained by the 
particulars of revelation. However, there are some differences of emphasis m §30 and §31.
For example, Barth more frequently employs an ‘exegetical’ use of reason in §30 (i.e. the use 
of reasoning in the context of exegetical excursuses) and a more frequent ‘constructive’ 
(though not speculative) use in §31. Barth’s theological work in §31 can be seen as 
‘descriptive metaphysics’ in the following qualified way. It is "descriptive metaphysics’ 
because it is an attempt to conceptually redescribe what is found in scripturally-attested 
revelation, rather than being a speculative metaphysics rooted in autonomous rational 
reflection .N either is it a rigorously systematic metaphysics. It is ‘descriptive metaphysics,*
Again, however, we would add that Bai th is not simply concerned to authorise these perfection by means of 
Christological ‘story’ but also the wider witness of Scripture.
The term ‘descriptive metaphysics’ was defined influentially by British philosopher P. F. Strauson (see his 
1959 work Individuals) as ‘the actual structure of our thought about the world,’ and hence an a posteriori
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not because it imposes an established philosophical metaphysical system upon Scripture and 
revelation, but because it offers a view of reality that freely uses and adapts metaphysical 
concepts and categories (drawn from third-order discourse Mke that of philosophy) in an effort 
to describe the revealed reaUty of God encountered in Scripture.
Despite these shght shifts in the fimction of Scripture, tradition and reason between §§ 
30 and 31, Barth’s overall theological method remains consistent and stable. Scripture retains 
primacy as the ‘norming norm’ over tradition and reason, tradition retains a two-fold (positive 
or negative) character, and reason remains consistently hermeneutical and subordinate to 
Scripture and revelation (whether in its critical or constructive modes). We will need to test 
these claims in the course of our ‘close reading’ of Barth in the next three chapters.
endeavor that stands in contrast to ‘revisionist metaphysics.’ For comments pertinent to Barth’s 
‘metaphysics,’ see Frei (1992: 45) and Jenson (1969; 1997: 3 Iff), as well as J. Webster’s references to Barth’s 
theological and moral ‘ontology’ (1995: 4 and passim).
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Chapter 4: Barth’s Doctrine of Divine Unity
In this chapter, we begin the expository analysis that forms the core of this thesis. In 
this and the next two chapters, we wiU examine Barth’s treatments of three specific perfections 
of the divine fi'eedom: unity, constancy and eternity.
This chapter will unfold in three main parts. First, we will describe Barth’s own 
presentation and critique of classical notions of God’s unity, focusing on the concept of divine 
‘simplicity.’ Second, we will describe Barth’s alternative account of divine simplicity. Third, 
we will examine the particular role that the theological interpretation and use of Scripture 
plays in Barth’s work, both in his critique of classical traditions and in his own constructive 
alternative to them. The next two chapters will follow a similar pattern.
For Barth, God's unity (or ‘oneness,’ Einheit) has two main senses: uniqueness 
{Einzigkeit; singularitas) and simplicity {Einfachheit; simplicitas)} In Barth’s thinking, these 
two senses of God’s unity mutually interpret each other, each depending on the other for its 
full meaning. Thus, it is impossible completely to separate his treatment of one fi*om that of 
the other. However, uniqueness and simplicity are still relatively distinct concepts. We will 
focus primarily on his presentation of simplicity, because it is more illuminating for 
understanding his theological method.
1. Barth’s Presentation and Critique of Classical Notions of God’s Simplicity
1,1, Introduction
Barth’s presentation of classical notions of divine unity is inseparable fi*om his critique 
of them. Thus, Barth’s presentation—including his selective citation and description of the 
classical view—is not a ‘neutral’ account. As such, it may be challenged by alternative 
construals and interpretations of doctrinal history and of classical theological texts. Yet in 
keeping with the purpose of this thesis, we will take Barth’s representation of the past at face 
value without questioning its soundness as an historical account. Rather, we will ask how he
 ^God’s unity is the first o f what Barth calls the ‘perfections of the divine Freedom.’ Barth’s division of the 
term into simplicity and uniqueness has a long history which appears to date as far back as Tertullian (Stead 
1977: 182 [citing R. Braun]) and which was likely mediated to Barth through the medieval and Protestant 
scholastics (see Barth’s early use of the distinction in GD, 428-432).
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evaluates and critiques the theological past and how this relates to his overall theological 
method.
Before we turn to his treatment of divine unity as simplicity, we should say a few 
words about Barth treatment of divine unity as uniqueness.^ Barth regards the main classical 
theologians (he makes reference, among others, to Origen, Tertullian, Irenaeus, Anselm, 
Aquinas, and Calvin) as having admirably testified to the uniqueness of God, even when they 
employed Hellenistic philosophical categories to do so. Thus, although Baith’s treatment of 
divine uniqueness includes negative evaluations of non-Christian religious traditions like Islam 
and even Judaism,^ he has virtually nothing negative to say about the Christian theological 
tradition at this point. Rather, he employs the statements of traditional Christian writers in his 
own constructive development of God’s unique unity, seeing them as helpful ways of drawing 
out the scriptural truth that God is unique.
But as we will see, Barth does not believe that such theologians always remained true 
to their affirmation of divine uniqueness in their accounts of divine simplicity. Barth tends to 
subsume various traditional treatments of divine simplicity under a certain type in an effort to 
draw out the main tendencies of the view he wishes to critique. We will call this view the 
‘classical view of simphcity,’ the ‘classical approach to simplicity,’ or just ‘classical simplicity,’ 
recognising that it may not correspond in every respect to the historical view of any one 
thinker. Sometimes we will refer to ‘classical views of simplicity’ to indicate something of the 
plurality of historical views lying behind Barth’s critique.'^
 ^Despite our focus on simplicity in this chapter, uniqueness is probably even more prominent in Barth’s 
discussion of unity in II/1. David Ford comments, ‘In the unity of God Barth sees two aspects, uniqueness and 
simplicity, but as the latter was dealt with in his doctrine of the Trinity he concentrates on the uniqueness’ 
(1985: 180). The uniqueness-aspect of God’s unity is central to Barth’s whole account o f God’s freedom, as 
when he speaks of God’s freedom under the affirmation that ‘God is uniquely who He is’ (CD, 297; KD, 335). 
God’s being unique means that ‘God alone is God’ (CD, 442; KD, 498). See also Webster 1995: 41ffon 
God’s uniqueness.
 ^ In an excursus, Barth offers a pointed critique of Islamic monotheism, as ‘a good example of the absolutising 
of “uniqueness”’ (CD, 448; KD, 504). Monotheism is an idea that can be ‘constructed without God,’ and apart 
from revelation, as the pagan ‘religious glorification o f the number “one”’ (CD, 448f; KD, 504f). According to 
Barth, nothing separates Islam and Christianity ‘so radically as the different ways in which they appear to say 
the same thing—that there is only one God’ (CD, 449; 505). In another excursus, Barth calls the monotheism 
of Islam the ‘later caricature’ of the ‘Jewish monotheism’ that existed at the time of Jesus (CD, 453; KD, 510).
* See our comments on ‘classical’ in chapter 2, subsection 3.2.4.
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i.Z  Barth on Classical Simplicity: Departures from a Good Beginning
For Barth, that ‘God is simple’ signifies that ‘in all He is and does. He is wholly and 
undividedly Himself (445; 501)/ The classical position associates simplicity with God’s 
undividedness, but tends to regard the primary meaning o f ‘simple’ as ‘non-composite.’^  Also, 
such classical writers are different fi-om Barth in the way in which they construe the relation of 
the doctrine of simplicity to other parts of the doctrine of God.
To understand Barth’s critique of the classical approach to simphcity, we must begin 
where he begins. The proper starting point for any understanding of God’s unity, according to 
Barth, is the view of unity that emerges from the Trinitarian and Christo logical doctrines of the 
ancient church. Barth beheves that the early Christian church correctly worked out its 
understanding of divine simplicity in the context of these doctrines. In his words, ‘the early 
battle for a recognition of the simphcity of God was the same as [the battle] for the 
recognition of the Trinity and of the relation between the divine and human natures in Jesus 
Christ’ (446; 502). Whether or not Barth’s comment is accurate as an historical assessment,^ 
clearly he wants to highhght the theological point that the only concept of simphcity he 
regards as appropriate is a one that is closely connected with the Trinitarian and Christological 
doctrines of the early church. As we saw clearly in chapter 3, Barth regards the Trinitarian 
God of the creeds as the same as the God who revealed himself in Jesus Christ. Thus, the 
reason Barth beheves the early church ‘began weU’ is because it began with the unique God 
known in revelation.
Yet, in Barth’s view, it did not take long for the church’s doctrine of God to go awry. 
In his words, ‘the later theology of the Church appeals to hQ o f a purely logical and 
metaphysical kind" (446; 502; emphasis added). Here, as is often true of Barth, he speaks in 
somewhat exaggerated terms to intensify the rhetorical force of the point he is trying to make. 
The crucial point for Barth is that the church’s doctrine had departed from proper theological
 ^Here and in the remainder of this chapter (and also in chapters 5 and 6), the first page number in parentheses 
refers to the English translation in CD, II/1 and the second to the German original in KD, II/l,
^Wolterstorff 1992: 134.
’ Stead’s comments on the Trinitarian context of the early Christian discussions of divine unity seems to 
confirm Barth’s interpretation of history (1977: ISOfQ.
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method (rooted exclusively in revelation), in exchange for a method that was dominated by
philosophical conceptions of God that were not derived from revelation.
Barth‘s citations of passages fr om Augustine and Anselm are helpfiil in identifying
what he regards as problematic about their ‘classical’ approach. A passage from Augustine
(which he cites without significant comment) provides Barth’s first example of this negative
development within the doctrme of God’s simplicity. This passage draws out one of the
axioms of classical simplicity, namely, that whatever we predicate of God we predicate of God
as a whole, not as a part of God, because God is simple and is not divided into parts.^
For to [God] it is not one thing to be, and another to five, as though he could be, not 
living; nor is it to Him one thing to hve and another thing to understand, as though He 
could hve, not understanding; nor is it to Him one thing to understand, another thing to 
be blessed, as though He could understand without being blessed. But to Him to hve, 
to understand, to be blessed are to be?
Barth then quotes disapprovingly several passages from Anselm on divine simphcity (the same
Anselm whom he earher cited approvingly in respect to God’s ‘uniqueness’). Barth cites the
foUowing passage from the Proslogion, where, after hsting a series of God’s attributes,
Anselm says:
How, then, O Lord, are You ah these things? Are they your parts, or, instead, is each 
one of them whohy what You are?
Now whatever is composed of parts is not absolutely one but is in a way many 
and is different from itself and can be divided either actuahy or conceivably 
(intellectu). But these consequences are foreign to You, than whom nothing better 
can be thought. Therefore, there are no parts in You, Lord. Instead of being 
composite You are something so one and so identical with yourself that in no respect 
are You dissimilar to Yourself. Indeed, You are Unity itself, divisible in no 
[conceivable] respect {nullo intellectu)}^
Fohowing these quotations from Augustine and Anselm, Barth concludes his survey of 
‘classical’ understanding of simphcity by commenting on the treatment given it by the 
Protestant scholastics. He asserts that ‘the older Protestant orthodoxy, too, usuaUy adopted 
much the same arguments and explanation when it placed and expounded the simphcity of
 ^Wolterstorff describes this claim as the ‘theistic identity claim,’ stating that ‘God has no properties distinct 
from God’s essence’ (1992: 145; cf. 145ff). For discussion of an early form of this claim in Irenaeus, see 
Stead: 1977, I87ff.
’ Augustine City o f  God, 8.6 (Augustine 1977: 148; emphasis added). Earlier (II/1, 263) Barth cites more 
approvingly a similar passage from Augustine’s Confessions 1.6.10.
Proslogion 18 (Anselm 1974: 1051). For further discussion of this and related passages in Anselm, see 
Padgett 1992: 46ff.
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God first among the divine attributes.’'^  It is important to notice that Barth draws attention to 
the order in which these Protestant theologians presented the doctrine of God. Simphcity was 
presented at the head of the doctrine of God before ah the other attributes, just as in medieval 
scholasticism.'^
In hght of the Trinitarian and Cliristological doctrines, then, Barth presents the
fohowing critique of this classical version of simphcity represented by Augustine, Ansehn and
the Protestant scholastics.
There could be no objection to the logic, metaphysics and mathematics of these lines of 
thought if they had been used only to perform the service of explanation—a service 
which it is quite possible and even up to a point necessary to render in this way. But 
we cannot read these things in the older writers with unmixed joy. The trouble is that 
they are put at the head, and not, as we are trying to do here, in their proper turn.
They thus give the impression that what is argued and considered is the general idea of 
an ens vere unum and not the God of the doctrine of the Trinity and of Christology— 
although this is in flat contradiction to the way in which this recognition originally 
forced itself on the church (447; 503).
This passage indicates several things about the nature of Barth’s criticism of the classical
version of simplicity. First, he is not concerned about the theological use of logic or
metaphysics per se, but rather that logic and metaphysics had failed to be simply tools ‘used
only to perform the service of explanation.’ He implies that the logical mid metaphysical
reflections of theologians like Augustine and Anselm on divine simplicity had become ends in
themselves, rather than expounding the revealed nature of the Triune God. The proper
hermeneutical function or role of the doctrine and its use of reason had been lost. Second,
Barth makes a related point about the placement of the doctrine. Theologians placed
simphcity at the ‘head’ of the doctrine of God, rather than at some later point. This is
problematic because of the false ‘impression’ (Eindruck) this order gives, namely, that for
much of the doctrme of God one is talking about a general idea of God (i.e. ‘god’) as ens vere
unum (‘a being truly one’), instead of the distinctly Christian God, the Triune God revealed in
He cites the definition of simplicity given by Lutheran scholastic J. Wolleb as typical: ‘Simplicity is that by 
which God is understood as a being that is truly one and fi'ee fi’om all composition.’ This English translation 
is provided by Harry M. Hine of the School o f Greek, Latin and Ancient History at the University of St 
Andrews, Scotland.
Protestant orthodoxy appeared to follow Aquinas’ account o f simplicity (Summa Theologiae, la, 3). 
Although Barth begins with divine unity in his treatment o f perfections of divine freedom, it follows his 
tieatment of the six perfections o f divine freedom (see chapter 3, section 4).
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Christ. When it was placed before rather than after the doctrines of the Trinity and 
Christology, the doctrme of simplicity failed to ftmction properly as an ‘explanation’ of the 
only true God. This is an example of how Barth sometimes regards the order and structure of 
dogmatics as important and accountable to revelation.
This ‘misplacement’ of the doctrine, both in dogmatic order and dogmatic role leads to 
larger and more serious distortions in the whole doctrine of God’s perfections or attributes. 
Starting with a general or abstract concept of God and God’s simplicity ‘leads to a nominalism 
or semi-nominaHsm in the doctrine of the attributes’ (447; 503). Barth makes this point at 
greater length in his general account of divine perfections (II/l, §29). Barth cites Eunomius 
(the Arian), William Ockham, Gabriel Biel, and (with some hesitation) Schleiermacher as 
representatives of the ‘strict nominalist thesis’ and John of Damascus, Aquinas and Calvin as 
representatives o f ‘semi-nominahsm’ (327ft; 368ft). Barth recognises the good intentions of 
the semi-nominahsts, ' ^  but beheves that they water down the fiill reaUty of the diverse divine 
perfections that ai e attested to in Scripture. In virtuaUy all of these cases, an abstract logical 
view of divine simphcity was responsible for nominahstic tendencies that undercut God’s 
‘many and distinct divine perfections’ (322; 362).
The multiphcity and unity of the perfections should be understood, not primarily in 
terms of general rational schemes of logic or metaphysics, but in distinctively Trinitarian terms. 
Barth does not wish to deny the strong affirmation of God’s oneness or simphcity that is 
present in the passages cited above. He simply wants to resist the kind of philosophical logic 
that tends to deny that the one God can also have many real perfections.
Despite ah of the dangers Barth uncovers within the classical doctrine of simphcity, his 
criticism of the classical tradition on simphcity remains relatively moderate in comparison to 
his criticism of other parts of his doctrine of God.*"' This is because he regards the traditional 
affirmation of God’s simphcity—at least if we define it as God’s ‘undividedness’—as a 
necessary and important recognition. The church rightly has always faithfiihy resisted tri-
For example, Barth says: ‘there is no desire simply to abandon and deny the attributes of God’ (328; 369) 
and ‘the themes suggested by the Bible were not simply abandoned’ (329; 370f).
As compared, for example, with his radical criticism of classical versions of immutability (chapter 5).
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theism or any other view that would separate God into par ts .Rather  than a wholesale 
rejection of the doctrine of simphcity, then, Barth aims ‘to give it a more distinctly bibhcal and 
therefore Christian basis than it had in the Early Church, the Middle Ages and Protestant 
orthodoxy’ (447; 503). In this new methodological orientation, Barth wih make much the 
same affirmations about God’s simphcity as the classical treatments of it did, but does so in a 
manner that restores their proper Trinitarian and Christological context (see sections 3 and 4 
below).
L3, Barth *s Methodological Critique o f the Classical View of Divine Simplicity
Barth’s critique of classical simphcity, as we have explained it thus far, involves and 
presupposes a methodological critique, which we must now examine more closely. In this 
way, we wih gain a deeper appreciation for the reasons why Barth feels an alternative 
approach is necessary in the doctrine of God’s unity and the other divine perfections.
We have seen that Barth retains the language of ‘simphcity,’ but aims to give it ‘a more 
distinctly bibhcal and therefore Christian basis.’ This intended re-conceptuahsation stands in 
contrast to ah attempts to define God, the Subject, by means of an independently defined 
predicate of ‘simphcity.’ The theological methods of many classical theologians fi*om the early 
church to the post-Reformation scholastics have failed to be true to their understanding that 
God is absolutely unique. Barth declares, ‘[Tjhe assertion of the simphcity of God is not 
reversible in the sense that it could equahy weh be said that the simple is God’ (449; 505).
The irreversibihty of the defining relation between God the subject and God’s perfections as 
predicates is a kind of methodological axiom for Barth: ‘The relation between subject and 
predicate is an irreversible one when it is a matter of God’s perfections’ (448; 504). Barth 
recites this axiom in respect to virtuahy every perfection of God"  ^in order to ensure that every 
predicate ascribed to God is uniquely defined by God as its subject. This axiom is an instance 
of Barth methodological ‘particularism,’ his insistence that theology starts with the particular
As we will see in our exposition o f Barth’s own view of simphcity, Barth’s main concern is to ensure that 
God ‘remains himself rather than being a divided and potentially self-contradictory self. There is no ‘God 
against God’ in Barth (Berkouwer 1956: 3071).
See Camheld 1947: 70. For a helpful discussion of Barth’s view of divine love in this respect (in 
comparison to other theologians), see Hart 1999: 173-194.
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act or acts of God’s self-revelation rather than with general philosophical ideas of what a
divine being must or must not be like.
In the course of his critique of the use of general human ideas of simplicity, Barth
makes another point that is important to his polemic against classical concepts of God
throughout the doctrine of divine perfections. Tt is not true,’ he says, ‘that the simple as such
. . . can be unequivocally . . . contrasted as that which is divine with what is not simple but
complex’ (449; 506). That is, a methodology that simply contrasts God with an aspect of
creation as its opposite, is just as much a symptom of ‘natural theology’ as to identify God
with an aspect of creation.'^ In either case, a preconceived human idea of the nature of
‘divinity’ controls our picture of God, rather than God’s own self-revelation.
Two further quotations clarify the methodological aspects of Barth’s critique of
classical versions of divine simphcity and direct us to an alternative method grounded in God’s
self-revelation. Classical orthodoxy, Barth says,
seemed to imagine that the simphcity of God can be attested and presented—more 
simply than by reference to God himsell—by ah kinds of speculation on the idea of the 
uncomposed and indivisible as such and in general. It did not see that the scientific 
accuracy necessary to present the object requires us absolutely to accept God Himself 
in His revelation attested in Scripture as the absolutely simple One, the One who is in 
fact uncomposed and indivisible, and to allow Him to assert Himself as such’ (457f; 
515).
This passage manifests several of the basic assumptions and motifs of Barth’s theology.'® 
Perhaps most importantly, we see the force of Barth’s methodological particularism in his 
reference to ‘the scientific accuracy necessary to present the object,’ namely the unique God of 
Scripture. As we ‘redescribe God,’ we ‘aUow Him to assert Himself’ In a closely related 
passage, Barth says.
If we examine its treatment of the simplicitas Dei, we can only be amazed at the way 
in which orthodox dogmatics entered on and lost itself in logical and mathematical 
reflections. For the results reached it naturally could not produce a single scriptural 
proof, and yet this was to form the fimdamental presupposition of its whole doctrine of 
God and therefore finally of its whole Christian doctrme (457; 515).
17 On this point, see Gunton (1978: where he identifies this logic of contrast between God and creation as
integral to ‘classical theism.’ Similarly, William Placher (drawing from Kathryn Tanner) speaks of a |
‘contrastive’ conception of divine transcendence, but does not regard such a view as typical of classical pre­
modern thinkers (1996: 11 Iff).
To use George Hunsinger’s categories, we see in this passage Barth’s particularism, objectivism, and 
rationalism (Hunsinger 1991).
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This passage summarises many of the key themes of Barth’s critique of classical simphcity as 
we have presented it. It highhghts how classical orthodoxy lost itself in reflections on general 
ideas rather than reflections on the object (or subject matter) of revelation. As such, 
orthodoxy was occupied with logical and mathematical reflections that were not in the service 
of genuinely theological explanation. These reflections yielded results for which ‘it naturally 
could not produce a single scriptural proof (Schriftgrund)}^ Since the interpretation and use 
of Scripture is the primary way in which dogmatics comes to understand God as its proper 
subject matter, Barth wants to restore and develop the scriptural grounds of all traditional 
doctrines. Furthermore, the lack of scriptural underpinnings in the classical doctrine had 
particularly disastrous potential in the case of simplicity, since the doctrine was placed at the 
foundational starting point of the doctrine of God and thus in a position where it could distort 
the entirety of Christian doctrine. We hasten to add here that Barth did not think that classical 
simplicity, for the most part, actually exercised such a pernicious influence. ‘Fortunately,’ 
Barth says, the ‘subsequent progress’ of orthodox dogmatics ‘was generally better than its 
customary beginning’ in the simplicity of God (457; 515). ‘Later it said everything about God 
which has to be said if scripture is g u i d e .B a r th  hopes to develop a view in which Scripture 
is the guide also of the doctrine of divine simplicity itself.
2, Barth’s Alternative Doctrine of Divine Simplicity
2,1, The ^ClassicaT Aspects o f Barth *s Doctrine of Divine Simplicity
Despite Barth’s critique of the classical view on simplicity (as he understands it), 
Barth’s opening definition of simphcity at first appears to place him very close to the classical 
treatments of the doctrine. That God is simple, Barth says.
‘Scriptural ground’ or ‘basis’ would be a better translation, avoiding the ‘geometric’ connotations o f ‘proof 
in English.
Thus, Barth can follow Protestant scholastics like Polanus (Reformed) and Quenstedt (Lutheran) as his 
guides in most o f his doctrine of God (see 426; 479). He continues, ‘It is a pity that this happy inconsistency 
did not survive in the teaching o f a later period’ (457; 515)— and here he presumably refers primarily to the 
Modern Neo-Protestantism of Schleiermacher and his followers. Yet despite the benefits o f an older orthodoxy 
whose ‘happy inconsistency’ resisted reduction to a uniformly non-biblical approach to the doctrine of God, 
Barth does lay the blame on this orthodoxy for starting the church off on the wrong foot. For this bad start 
afforded ‘a later period the possibility o f deducing from this unhappy starting point far more unhappy 
consequences.’ Again, we see the link Barth makes between earlier classical errors and modern ones.
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signifies that in all that He is and does, He is wholly and undividedly Himself.
At no time or place is He composed out of what is distinct from Himself. At 
no time or place, then, is He divided or divisible (445).
Another passage is even more forceful: ‘God is simple without the least possibility of either
internal or external composition. . . He is absolutely simple’ (447; 504). These descriptions
of God’s absolute simplicity manifest a strong continuity with the language and conceptuality
used for simplicity by the classical writers. Classical thinkers like Anselm (see the quotation
above) and Aquinas defined the concept of simplicity primarily as the absence of all
‘composition’ or parts, whether ‘internal’ or ‘external’ (i.e., ‘composed out of what is distinct
fi*om himself). Barth clearly picks up and employs this terminology. Yet the primary concept
that Barth uses for God’s simplicity is not ‘non-composition’ but the concept of God being
‘undivided’ and ‘indivisible’ (445; 501 and tliroughout). This concept is also closely allied to
the classical notions of simphcity, although it appears to offer slightly more logical and
semantic ‘flexibihty. ’ Barth exploits this flexibility, and invests the old classical terminology
with new connotations and emphases.
For Barth, God’s simphcity includes at least three distinct but related conceptions; in
God there is (1) an absence of division, (2) an absence of separation and (3) an absence of
contradiction. This rich concept of simphcity is a concept that is basic to the shape of Barth’s
overaU doctrine of God.^'
If God’s simphcity is defined in such apparently classical terms, then in what sense
does Barth develop the concept of simphcity in a more ‘biblical and thus Christian’ manner
than classical orthodoxy does? The main ways in which Barth’s view is distinctive he not so
much in his terminology or in his affirmations themselves, but rather in what Barth regards as
the proper conceptual relationships between simphcity and the other aspects of the doctrine of
God. Such conceptual relationships are what give Barth’s doctrme its distinctive ‘non-
classical’ meaning.
Terry Cross beheves that ‘there seems to be in Barth’s God a primacy of his unity’ by which he means 
primarily God’s complete freedom from ontological self-contradiction, despite any apparent contradictions 
(Cross 1991: 199; cf. 197).
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2,2, The Relationship Between Simplicity and Other Aspects o f the Doctrine of God
The differences between Barth and the classical thinkers on the relationship of 
simplicity to other doctrines begin with the different judgements about where to place 
simplicity in dogmatic order. Instead of placing simplicity at the beginning of the doctrine of 
God, Barth places it after the doctrine of the Trinity (I/l) and his initial Christological 
reflections (1/2). Furthermore, he treats the unity of God after his doctrine of the knowledge 
of God (II/l, §§ 25-27), his general account of God’s being and perfections (§§ 28-29), and 
his account of the perfections of divine loving (§31). He also purposefiilly treats it as the first 
of the perfections of divine fi*eedom.^  ^ The placement of the doctrine of simplicity is not 
arbitrary or insignificant for Barth. Rather the placement of divine simplicity (and unity as a 
whole) in a particular dogmatic location yields at least the following four important 
implications.
1. Most obviously, Barth’s account of simplicity presupposes both that God is Triune and 
that God has multiple perfections, in virtue of his treating of simplicity (and unity in 
general) afl;er his accounts of these two doctrines.
2. This results in the distinct hermeneutical or ‘redescriptive’ function of the doctrine of 
simplicity. Since this function is to explain the revealed God,^  ^the doctrine of simplicity 
(as indivisibility or inseparability) must presupposes rather than deny what revelation 
asserts about God, including God’s real internal multiplicity (whether in divine persons, 
perfections, or actions).
These first two claims imply two further more general methodological claims.
3. Barth’s treatment of a given doctrine (e.g. divine simplicity, or divine unity as a whole) is 
shaped significantly by its relation to his treatment of other doctrines.^"' In this sense, 
Barth’s dogmatic theology is ‘systematic.
4. Despite point 3, complete logical consistency or coherence is neither possible nor proper 
for theology. Thus the aim to have consistency in the sense of fi'eedom fi^ om 
‘contradiction’ must be subordinated to the aim to have theology that is descriptively and 
hermeneutically adequate in correspondence to the unique God who is its revealed
In treating unity (uniqueness and simplicity) first among the perfection of freedom, Barth does follow the 
classical order to some degree (see chapter 3, subsection 3.4). This speaks of the foundational role that his 
revised doctrine of unity, and specifically simplicity, has within his doctrine of divine freedom.
Barth speaks of simplicity as the "explanation (Erklarung) of the diversity and unity of His perfections’ (447; 
503).
More tentatively, we could say that a given doctrine (e.g. divine unity) is shaped primarily and uniquely by 
doctrines treated in the text before it (e.g. the Trinity and the general ti eatment of divine perfections) and 
secondarily (and in a different way) by those doctrines treated after it (e.g. the doctrine of reconciliation).
^  See Gunton 2000: 143. See chapter 2, subsection 1.2.
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object/^ This results in Barth’s ‘dialectical’ approach in which incomplete, and sometimes 
apparently contradictory, perspectives of God are juxtaposed. As such, God remains 
mysterious.
The most significant result of these fom* points is probably that, according to Barth, simplicity 
does not and cannot require any weakening of the affirmation that God has a real multiplicity 
within himself. We must dialectically assert both God’s unity on one side and God’s diversity 
on the other. The kinds of diversity in God that have been typically thought to threaten God’s 
absolute simplicity are (1) ‘the distinctions of the divine pe rsons ,and  (2) ‘the real wealth of 
[God’s] distinguishable perfections.’ We will now treat these two kinds of diversity in turn, 
which will enable us to see how the four points stated tersely above are ‘fleshed out’ 
concretely in Barth’s own account of simplicity.^®
2.3. The Mysterious Unity o f Trinity
By mentioning the ‘divine persons’ eaiiy in his exposition of divine unity, Barth makes 
clear that his doctrine of unity is from the start a doctrine of the Triune God known in Christ. 
We recall that this recognition, according to Barth, constituted the ‘good beginning’ of the 
early church in regards to God’s simphcity. Barth ensured that this beginning was stmcturally 
incorporated into his CD by treating the Trinity in Volume I, before his formal doctrine of God 
and divine perfections in Volume 11.^  ^ This has several impUcations.
As noted above, one crucial effect of this arrangement is that Barth’s concept of 
simphcity retains a quahty of mystery. This is clarified by what Barth said in his consideration 
of the Trinity in I/l : ‘The unity of God’s oneness-in-threeness and threeness-in oneness’ is a 
unity for which ‘we have no formula, but which we can know only as the incomprehensible 
truth of the object itself.’^ '' The Trinitarian background and character of Barth’s concept of 
simphcity stands in contrast to what we find, for example, in Aquinas, who is representative of 
classical scholasticism. In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas does not refer to the Trinity in his
Hunsinger 2000: 191f.
It is interesting to note that Barth uses the term ‘persons’ (Personen) here (445; 501) instead of his typical 
preference for the term ‘modes of being’ (Seimweisen).
See the Appendix to this thesis for further comments about how divine unity is related to diversity, and how 
this relates to broader stiuctures within Barth’s doctrine of God that finds parallels his accounts of divine 
constancy and eternity.
Barth also began to discuss God’s simplicity within his treatment of the Trinity in I/l (Ford 1985: 180).
I/l, 368. Rather, we can and must state that God is both one and three ‘only in interpretation of the 
revelation attested in the Bible and with reference to this object’ (I/l, 367).
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discussion of God’s simplicity and does not treat the doctrine of the Trinity until much later/' 
In contrast, Barth construes God’s simplicity itself in Trinitarian terms. Barth takes the 
approach that Aquinas and other scholastics had for doctrines like the Trinity (i.e. treating it as 
a revealed mystery) and applies it to the whole doctrine o f God, and ultimately all o f  
dogmatics. For Barth, all doctrines are equally revealed doctrines, i.e. given by grace and 
transcending the corrupted rational capacities of natural humanity.^  ^ The revealed Triune God 
always remains mysterious or ‘hidden,’ even in self-revelation. Theology must be dialectical, 
for no human concept (of unity, love, etc.) can express at once the fullness and richness of 
what needs to be said of God in correspondence to revelation.^^
2.4. The Unity o f Diverse Divine Perfections
According to Barth, our understanding of God’s many perfections and their unity 
stands in ‘an exact parallel’ to the Trinity (326; 367). George Hunsinger summaiises well how 
Barth’s carrying the Trinitarian pattern over into the doctrine of perfections distinguishes him 
from the classical tradition: ‘Barth separates himself from the venerable theological tradition 
that regards simplicity as more basic in God than multiplicity.’ Hunsinger continues, 
‘Traditionally, it has typically been held that because God’s simplicity is proper to his being, 
multiplicity can only be ascribed to his bemg improperly.’^ '' In contrast to this, Barth wants to 
say that God is properly both simple and multiple, just as God is properly both one and three 
in the Trinity.
As noted above, Barth’s account of perfections involves a constant effort to resist the 
‘nominalism’ and ‘ semi-nominalism’ that, he thinks, marked the classical treatments of the 
divine attributes.^^ While clearly affirming God’s simplicity, Barth also desires to develop the
Aquinas treats simplicity in ST la, 3, and the Trinity in ST  la, 27-32.
Recent accounts of Aquinas have shown that Aquinas is closer to Barth in this respect (and others) than has 
traditionally been held either by Thomists or their critics (see especially Rogers 1995). However, this should 
not be taken to deny that Aquinas’ work displays a much greater tendency than Barth’s to treat many doctrines 
in philosophical terms (as in the ‘negative theology’ dominating his discussion of simplicity), rather than in 
significant dependence on revelation or Scripture.
See I/l, 369; cf. Hunsinger 2000: 189-197.
Hunsinger 2000: 194f. Barth treats these matters in a fascinating excursus (327-330; 368-372). Again, see 
our general discussion of CD, §29 in chapter 3, section 3.
At their best, classical theologians resisted nominalism by asserting that the distinctions between perfections 
were real, or distinctionae formates and not merely ‘mental conveniences, or distinctionae rationis 
ratiocinatae (Hunsinger 2000: 196, note 11). Barth either does not fully recognise this resistance to 
nominalism within orthodoxy or else he judges their strategies to be unsuccessful.
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truth of ‘the multiplicity, individuality, and diversity of God's perfections.Indeed, he says 
that one of the proper functions of the doctrine of simplicity is to be the ^explanation 
(Erklarung) of the diversity and unity of His perfections’ (447; 503). Simplicity, then, should 
explain not only the unity of the perfections, but their diversity as well. More generally, Barth 
does not want to develop a system that excludes or attenuates any part of what one needs to 
say about God on the basis of revelation. Accordingly, Hunsinger notes that Barth 
subordinates systematic coherence or consistency to ‘descriptive adequacy.Thus ,  it is more 
important to affirm that the God of Scripture (a) has both multiple perfections and (b) is one 
than it is to affirm how (a) and (b) are logically consistent with each other. Barth does not, for 
example, say that these two propositions ar e true on different logical levels, nor does he deny 
that this is the case. Rather, Barth employs a ‘strategy of dialectical interconnection and 
juxtaposition’^ ® which moves back and forth between God’s unity and the distinctness of the 
perfections, and shows their ‘perichoretic’ interconnection (a relation of ‘mutual indwelling’) 
with each other. ‘Both the unity and the distinction describe God’s being as a whole, not two 
separate parts that constitute the w h o l e . T h e  interconnection between both sides of this 
dialectic, or generally between various doctrines, does go some way to showing their 
coherence and consistency with each other. But it is not the consistency of a system of logic 
in which all paradox is eliminated. Rather it is a consistency of method (the disavowal of any 
ideas of God except those derived from Christological and scriptural revelation) and subject 
matter (the God revealed in Christ and Scripture) that allows for mystery. Thus, the oneness 
of God—the oneness that exists between the divine perfections and the three persons of the 
Trinity—is a mysterious and paradoxical oneness. On the one hand, the diverse perfections or 
persons are not parts of a whole, but in some sense the whole itself. On the other hand, these 
multiple forms of the whole somehow do not add up to more than one whole.'"' But as
II/l, 330. He does this by means o f three propositions, which are stated and developed on 331-335.
Hunsinger 2000: 191ff. See also Hunsinger 1991: 28If.
Hunsinger 2000: 193.
Hunsinger 2000: 193.
See Hunsinger (I99I: 58, 107ff) for his related description of Barth’s ‘Trinitarian pattern’ o f ‘dialectical 
inclusion.’ In this pattern, ‘the part is included in the whole and the whole in the part’ (58). In our present 
discussion, simplicity/unity is included within the whole o f God’s diverse perfections and the whole o f God’s 
diverse perfections are included within God’s simplicity/unity. The term ‘part’ cannot be taken strictly here 
because it actually refers to the whole, and is a ‘reiteration’ or ‘form’ or ‘mode’ of the whole (the persons of
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difficult as such things are to grasp, Barth believes they are warranted by revelation, a 
revelation in which ‘multiplicity, individuality, and diversity do not stand in any contradiction 
to unity’ (332).
2.5. The * Inclusive* and * Personal* Logic o f Barth *s Approach to Divine Simplicity
We have seen how Barth is more comfortable then the classical writers he cites with 
affirming that there are real ‘distinctions’ in God's being and actions. Yet he is clear that the 
internal distinctions in God do not involve any real divisions in God; there is no true 
‘separation’ or ‘opposition’ in God. This can be understood better by reflecting on the nature 
of the ‘logic’ Barth employs in his account of simplicity, an aspect of his distinctive use of 
reason.'”
Barth’s theology is marked by what we could call an ‘inclusive’ rather than ‘exclusive’
logic. The following quotation summarises well the inclusive dialectical logic that marks
Barth’s doctrine of divine unity, and of divine perfections as a whole.
God’s being transcends the contrast of simplicitas and multiplicitas including and 
reconciling both . . . .  [W]e cannot emphasise either his simplicitas or his 
multiplicitas as though the one or the other in abstracto were the very being of God, 
as though the one inevitably excluded the other. We can only accept and interpret 
God’s simplicitas and multiplicitas in such a way as to imply that they are not mutually 
exclusive but inclusive, or rather that they are both included in God himself (II/l, 333).
This passage points to the idea that true correspondence to the reality of God (in which both
simplicity and multiplicity are included) requires a revision of the way concepts for God are
understood and related to each other. These concepts need to be understood according to a
‘Trinitarian’ logic of ‘mutual indwelling.’ Otherwise, they would inevitably come into conflict
with each other and ultimately with the God whom they are meant to describe. When Barth
articulates various divine perfections, each perfection has a range of meaning marked by a
clear centre that makes it distinct from other perfections, but with ‘fuzzy’ or permeable
the Trinity and the perfections ought not to be called ‘parts’ o f God). Hunsinger also points out that in this 
pattern of dialectical inclusion, each form is not superfluous, but makes a distinctive and irreplaceable 
contribution to the whole (107).
By ‘logical’ and ‘logic’ in this section, we refer to the highly infonnal and implicit patterns of and 
evaluative criteria that characterise the conceptual relationships in Barth’s theology. When we speak of such 
‘logic,’ we are striving to discern and articulate what conceptual relations and inferences Barth thinks are 
appropriate and inappropriate and, if  possible, why he thinks so. This is related to Barth’s (implicit) view of 
language in general, a view of language which is, among other things, ‘strongly revisionist’ (Hunsinger 1991 : 
33), because of the need to revise the ordinary meanings of terms in light of the particularities of revelation,
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boundaries between it and the concepts of other divine perfections/^ For example, mercy 
(Barmherzigkiet) and righteousness (Gerechtigkeit) are concepts distinct from each other at 
their respective ‘centres’ (where they make distinct contributions to our understanding of what 
God is like), but they tend to converge with each other around their ‘edges’ as aspects of 
God’s love (368-406; 413-457)/^ Accordingly, there is something of mercy in the concept of 
God’s righteousness and something of righteousness in the concept of God’s mercy. These 
perfections exhibit a conceptual inter-penetration made possible by a legitimate kind of 
conceptual vagueness.
Precise and sharply differentiated concepts have the advantage of clarity, but they 
also lack the flexibility and conceptual inter-connectedness (a kind of coherence) that are made 
possible by more vague or ambiguous terms. Barth’s theology constitutes an implicit 
argument for the value of such ‘imprecise’ language in the description of theological mystery. 
Barth’s resistance to conceiving of dogmatics as a deductive, quasi-geometric system implies 
this, since one can only have a deductive system if every term in one’s system is precisely 
defined and clearly related to the others.'''' Indeed, Barth believed that when theology ‘deals 
with revelation as a systematic principle that can be worked out logicaËy and consistently,’ 
then such as theology inevitably (and ironically) becomes ‘inconsistent at some point and 
necessarily [involves] contradiction.’''^
We could add (and perhaps this is part of what Barth has in mind in some of his anti- 
systematic statements) that the procedure of precisely defining theological terms can actually 
create unnecessary contradictions between theological concepts. For example, if one defines 
God’s oneness or simplicity precisely in a way that excludes multiplicity then one has a 
contradiction when one affirms the Trinity or the divine perfections, whereas one could define
To say that words or concepts often have ‘fijzzy boundaries’ is a virtual commonplace in contemporary 
semantics and philosophy o f (ordinary) language (see Poythress 1987: 64-68, 8 If). Barth’s approach adds 
particular theological force and significance to this observation.
See chapter 3, subsection 4.1.
Such as system would seem to require that one follow Descartes in two respects: (1) one should define 
theological concepts or judgements as ‘clear and distinct’ ideas and (2) one should apply the laws of logic (e.g. 
the law o f non-contradiction and the law o f the excluded middle) to the relations between theological concepts 
or judgements without exceptions. Barth resists both o f these strictures for theology, as is evident in his 
rejection of H. Scholtz’s general requirements for theology to be a ‘science’ (I/l, 4ft). Gordon Clark (1967) 
critiques Barth for failing to adhere to such a (Cartesian) geometric-deductive conception of theological 
rationality.
II/l, 106, cf. 105ft". See also Hunsinger 1991:282.
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these terms in more loose and inclusive ways that would not ‘generate’ such a contradiction 
(even if it does not remove all mysteiy). Such ‘contradictions,’ once generated, can too easily 
be ‘resolved’ in favour of a consistent system that clings to only some, but not all, of the truths 
of revelation—e.g., that God is one but is not really multiple (Trinitarian modalism or semi­
nominalism in regard to the perfections).
Barth’s dialectical theological method, by contrast, shows attentiveness to the 
particularities of God’s revelation in Scripture and resists facile harmonisation of apparent 
tensions between them. Yet Barth also believes that the diverse aspects of the revealed God 
are all ontologically interrelated and unified in God. Barth’s inclusive logic helps to make that 
partially epistemologically and linguistically understandable. But an element of paradox and 
mystery, and thus an appropriate degree of conceptual vagueness, will always be present in the 
human endeavour of theology. Although humans cannot fully comprehend God’s unity and 
especially how it relates to the ‘multiplicity’ in God, Barth believes the scriptural testimony to 
God yields the conclusion that God is simple, and that is adequate waiTant for him to assert it.
The nature of Barth’s inclusive logic is fiirther illuminated when we stress that it is a 
‘personal’ logic.''^ The various aspects of who God is and the nature of God’s relation to 
humanity are best understood when we regard God as a ‘person,’ so long as we see that the 
meaning of ‘person’ here must be decisively determined by God as the unique Subject, rather 
than ordinary ideas of person-hood or personality.''^ Therefore, the nature of Barth’s account 
of God’s simphcity is illuminated by an appropriately-qualified conception of ‘narrative 
personal identity’ as explored by Paul Ricoeur and others (see our excursus one Barth and 
Ricoeur in chapter 5). The following quotes fi*om Barth appear to speak of God’s simphcity in 
primarily personal rather than impersonal terms (another difference from the classical views). 
Barth avers that ‘m the specific things [God] is and does. He never exists in such a way as to 
be apart from  other things that He also is and does’ (445; 501). Barth also asserts here that 
‘every distinction of being and working is simply a repetition and corroboration of the one
See Cole (1983) for an account of the kind o f ‘personal logic’ that seems to underlie much of Barth’s work. 
For Barth, we recall, that if  a person is ‘being in act,’ then ‘by the concept of the being of a person, in the 
strict and proper sense, we can understand only the being of God’ (271). We also recall Barth’s preference for 
Seinsweise (‘mode of being’ or way of being’) over Person to refer to the hypostases of the Trinity. See 
chapter 3, section 1.
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being.’''® These assertions would probably not be sufficient to keep God from being 
‘composite’ according to the impersonal and substantialist terms used by Anselm, Aquinas and 
other scholastics for God’s simplicity. The reason is that the ‘repetition’ (Wiederholung) that 
Barth speaks of is not primarily about strict sameness (Ricoeur’s Wem-identity) but implies a 
^e^continuity of the more dynamic kind, like that present in rendering a subject in a narrative 
(Ricoeur’s zp^se-identity). Such personal self-identity is ‘inclusive’ of variation and distinction 
within God’s being. For example, Barth emphasises often in his dogmatics that when God 
became incarnate, he became human as he was not before, yet he did not become any less 
God. In light of the mystery of the inclusion of humanity in his simple identity, the 
‘perichoretic’ unity of the perfections is easier to comprehend.
These reflections on Barth’s ‘logic’ enable us to expand further on how his theological 
method differs from classical method. We noted above that the ‘irreversibility’ of the 
statement that ‘God is simple’ is, among other things, a clear manifestation of Barth’s 
persistent methodological ‘particularism’—his constant tendency to ensure that theological 
claims are rooted in the particular, concrete and mysterious revelation of God attested in 
Scripture instead of general ideas not derived from revelation.''^ We may add here that this 
‘particularism’ gains special grounding within Barth’s discussion of God’s unity. The reason 
is this: the ultimate hasis for Barth’s method of particularism is his substantive affirmation that 
God is absolutely unique. Because God is unique, our methods of knowing and speaking of 
God must correspond to that uniqueness. Theology therefore must have a distinctive method, 
for we cannot expect to know a unique God with the methods we apply to other objects of 
knowledge. This method is one of obedience to God’s self-revelation as attested in 
Scripture.^" God’s uniqueness (one aspect of divme unity) must govern our understanding of
We recall the significance of the concept of such ‘repetition’ (Wiederholung) for Barth understanding of the 
Trinity and also for the divine perfections (again, see chapter 3, section I).
See Hunsinger 1991: 32-35, for his helpful account o f Barth’s ‘particularism.’ Barth strives to move from 
the particular to the general rather than from the general to the particular, and to do so in such a way that he 
never leaves the particular behind when he gets to the general (see II/l, 602). Hunsinger points out that ‘a 
specific statement might well be abstract and a general statement might well be concrete’ (1991: 284).
God only becomes an object o f our knowledge because God chooses to be so in a prior act of self-revelation; 
that is, God is an object only as a Subject, as the unique Subject of all that is. God’s uniqueness is also why 
Barth prefers the term ‘perfections’ (of God, the only one who is Perfect) to ‘attiibutes’ (322f).
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God’s simplicity (the other aspect of God’s unity)/' The God revealed in Jesus Christ is 
simple in a way that no created thing is, or could be, simple.
2.6. Conclusion: The Significance o f Simplicity in Barth *s Doctrine o f God
We close this section with one final question: what is the significance of God’s 
simplicity for Barth’s view of God and ultimately his whole theology? For Barth, simplicity 
(and unity in general) is what holds together our understanding of God. Without the concept 
that God is undivided and that no aspect of God is separable firom another, he thinks that we 
might have a God of self-conflict. Simplicity understood in this way is a fundamental feature 
of Barth’s doctrine of God.^^
From one perspective, Barth speaks of simphcity as the foundation of God’s 
uniqueness, for a God who is divided would no longer be unique, but would be allowing a 
second or third ‘god’ to arise as a genuine rival (445ff, 500ff). Thus, Barth can speak of 
simplicity as ‘the basis of His uniqueness’ (447; 501). In the same context, Barth shows the 
significance of simphcity for Barth’s doctrine of God as a whole. Simphcity is ‘the explanation 
of the diversity and unity of His perfections, and finahy the criterion for understanding his 
relation to the creature.’ The last phrase presumably refers to how God’s incomparable 
simphcity sets God apart fi*om everything in the created order, which strictly speaking cannot 
be ‘simple.’ As we wih see in section 3, this incommunicable simphcity of God is revealed in 
God’s unparaUeled faithfulness and trustworthiness shown in Christ.
Now that we liave a good understanding of Barth’s view of divine unity and 
specificaUy of simphcity, we must ask to what extent his view is bibhcal. If his view is not 
fimdamentahy grounded in the Bible, it would be virtuahy impossible for him to say that it is 
nonetheless grounded in the particulars of revelation; for Barth’s understanding of revelation is 
‘textuahy-mediated. ’ Is Barth’s distinctive non-classical understanding of simphcity truly a 
‘more bibhcal’ development of the doctrine, in accordance with his stated aim? And if so, in 
what way is it bibhcal?
As we stated at the beginning o f the chapter, the two main senses of God’s unity are interdependent. As 
such, simplicity can also be seen at the basis o f divine uniqueness, as Barth explicitly states: ‘His uniqueness 
too is based on his simplicity’ (445; 501). Indeed, Barth stresses that the irreversibility of subject and predicate 
applies to uniqueness as well. We cannot say ‘the unique is God,’ as Barth believes Islam does (448f; 504fi, 
for then we would only be absolutising a human conception or ideal.
Again, see Cross (1991: 199; cf. 197): ‘there seems to be in Barth’s God a primacy of his unity.’
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3. Reflections on the Role of Scripture in Barth’s Account of Simplicity
We have surveyed the overall landscape of Barth’s critique and constructive alternative 
to classical simplicity. We now focus our attention on a particular feature of that landscape, 
namely the function the Scripture has in all of it. In all of Barth’s treatment of divine unity,^  ^
he does not undertake an extensive exegesis of a passage of Scripture. However, Scriptui e 
comes into play in other important ways.
Barth employs a mixture of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ ways of grounding doctrine in 
Scripture in liis treatment of divine unity (see our use of the distinction between ‘direct’ and 
‘indirect’ in chapters 1 and 2). First, Barth supports his theological claims directly by citing 
and briefly commenting on collections of biblical texts. Second, he supports his theological 
claims indirectly by offering descriptions of biblical themes or patterns and without the citation 
of specific texts. The direct (text) approach and the indirect (theme) approach are inter­
related. The two approaches aie often interwoven in a way that is difficult to separate. 
However, sometimes themes are more prominent and at other times the citation of specific 
texts comes to the fore.
We will reflect on these approaches and their interrelationship in our treatment below. 
We will treat Baifh’s construal of two scriptural themes or patterns (in 3.1 and 3.2 
respectively). In each case, we will begin with his general descriptions of that pattern (3.1.1 
and 3.2.1), and then turn to his handling of specific biblical texts related to the given theme 
(3.1.2 and 3.2.2). Once again, we will concentrate on Barth’s use of Scripture in respect to 
the simplicity-aspect of the divine unity rather than on divine uniqueness.
3.1. Divine Simplicity as Divine Faithfulness or Trustworthiness
3.1.1. The Biblical Motif of God’s Faithfulness or Trustworthiness
In Barth’s theory and practice, the Bible is the normative and authoritative testimony 
to God’s self-revelation as ‘one’ or as ‘simple.’^ '' But it is only in the concluding excursus of 
his treatment of God’s unity (457-461) that he explicitly turns to the biblical roots of his
This treatment is found primarily in CD II/l, 442-461 (our focus above), and secondarily and more difiusely 
in his general account of divine perfections in 322-350 or in his account of the unity of the Trinity in I/l.
Turning to Scripture is the concrete way that Barth as theologian is able to attend to God’s own self­
revelation as the basis of his view of simplicity: "In scripture the utterly simple is 'simply' God Himself in the 
actuality [and] the factuality in which He is present as God and deals as God with the creature, with man’
(457; 514; emphasis added).
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understanding of simplicity/^ That said, Barth regards these biblical roots as under-girding his 
doctrine of simplicity from the beginning. For it is primarily by means of a ‘biblical’ method 
that Barth arrives at his conclusions about simplicity.
What, then, does Barth understand the biblical witness regarding simplicity? Barth 
begins to answer tliis question with what we could call a narrative account of God’s personal 
identity. The God of the Bible ‘is simply the One of whom all prophets and apostles 
explained that they had heard his voice and had to obey him’ (458). God is the Lord, ‘the 
Subject of creation, reconciliation and redemption’ (458).^  ^ Barth then makes the point that 
this God, though witnessed to in different forms and at different times, is always the same 
God. This same God is characterised by the prophets and apostles as gracious and holy, 
patient and wise, omnipotent and eternal. Barth says that ‘He is all this indivisibly; 
indissolubly and inflexibly.’
Barth employs the bibhcal motif of God’s trustworthiness or faithfulness as the key 
concept by which he wishes to estabhsh the link between ‘the testimony of the Bible’ and the 
theological concept of simphcity. Barth assumes that trustworthiness and simphcity are
conceptual terms that are at some level commensurable with one another, an assumption that 
we whl analyse in subsection 3.3 of this chapter. At this stage, we turn our attention to the 
nature of the conceptual relationships between trustworthiness and simphcity as Barth 
describes them.
Barth speaks of at least three distinct conceptual relationships between trustworthiness 
and simphcity in the course of his discussion in this excursus. First, Barth equates simphcity 
with trustworthiness, or vice versa. For example, he declares that ‘[God] is trustworthy in his 
essence . . .  and this is His simphcity’ (459; 516). Second, trustworthiness is dependent 
upon simphcity; or, in other words, simphcity is the basis o f  trustworthiness. ‘If [God] were
However, he had made reference to many bibhcal texts and themes earher in regard to God’s uniqueness.
Again, see the account of ipse identity described by Paul Ricoeur (see chapter 5, subsection 2.4).
See our comments in chapter 3, section I on Barth’s ‘root of the Trinity’ in I/l : ‘God reveals himself as the 
Lord.’
Following Barth’s usage, we will use either ‘trustworthiness’ or ‘faithfiilness’ below to refer to one rich 
concept that includes notions of God’s ‘fidelity’ or ‘truthfiilness.’
As is evident in the first part of this quotation, Barth regards God’s trustworthiness as a non-negotiable 
datum o f the revelation attested in Scripture. Nearby in the context he writes, ‘The God of the prophets and 
apostles is trustworthy’ (458; 516).
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divisible, dissoluble, or flexible, He would not be trustworthy’ (458; 516)/'' Third, and the 
apparent ‘opposite’ of the last point, simplicity is dependent upon trustworthiness; 
trustworthiness is the basis o f  simplicity. ‘The faith&lness and truthfulness of God are to be 
regarded and understood as the real meaning and basis o/his simplicity’ (460; 518; emphasis 
added).
Barth does not explain how these three conceptual or logical relationships between 
God’s trustworthiness and God’s simplicity coherently co-exist with one another. However, 
our discussion above of Barth’s inclusive logic (in 2.5) should give us pause before we easily 
assume that these logical relationships are contradictory to one another. Rather, a more 
proper hermeneutical goal would be to try to interpret them as complementary ways of 
speaking, and to call them contradictory only if this proves impossible. As such, we could say 
that biblical trustworthiness and doctrinal simplicity are mutually-dependent, each being the 
basis of the other in dflfermg ways. Further, they are united (if not literally equivalent as 
Barth’s language would indicate) in highlighting similar aspects of the same reality, the God of 
self-revelation. (We will return to these conceptual relations further in subsection 3.3.2 
below.)
Regardless of whether this interpretation of the conceptual links between faithfulness 
and unity correctly portrays Barth’s view, it is clear that Barth develops the close tie between 
simplicity and God’s self-identity in ways that touch on the unity of the whole biblical 
message. He states, ‘God’s simplicity reveals itself and consists in His continual self­
confirmation and self-attestation in his speech and action’ (460; 518).^' ‘This involves’ he 
says, ‘the repetition and fulfilment of His promise’ and ‘the unity of His promise and His 
command, of the Gospel and the Law.’ He goes on state how God’s continual ‘self­
confession’ involves ‘the unity of the election and calling’ of Israel and the church, and ‘the
^ Although Barth does not spell out what he means here, we presume he is reasoning something like this: that 
without simplicity there could be a division in God, for example, between a part of God that made a promise 
and another part that was not committed to keeping that promise.
Note again the fittingness o f Ricoeur’s concept of self-identity or ?pje-identity to describe Barth’s language, 
which is, in turn, an attempt to ‘conceptually describe’ (Frei’s terms) the biblical language. Barth (and 
indirectly Ricoeur) is similar to Isaak A. Dorner in that he refers to God as ‘self-positing’ and ‘self- 
establishing,’ language which Dorner wants to distinguish from mere self-sameness (Einerleiheit) in God. In 
this way, Dorner anticipated Barth’s critique of a conception of divine simplicity in which God is a ‘rigid dead 
substance’ that is ‘motionless in itself (Dorner 1994: 1361). See more on Dorner below and in the concluding 
section of chapter 5.
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unity of grace and holiness’ and of all his perfections. (Barth concludes by pointing out how 
this divine unity is known especially in Christ, but we will leave that point until the next 
subsection.) For Barth, then, a major theme of the Bible is that God is faithful and completely 
simple, rather than self-divided and unreliable. Barth relates this to the unity of the message or 
witness and overall narrative of the two-testament biblical canon, because Barth regards the 
undivided God as the one in whom the Bible finds its unity.
3.1.2. Biblical Passages on God’s Faithfulness or Trustworthiness 
Barth cites a number of biblical passages under the theme or pattern of God’s 
simplicity as trustworthiness and faithfulness (459f; 517f). He begins with two passages fi*om 
Deuteronomy, where God is called the ‘faithful God’ Ç'der getreue Gotf; Deut 7:9) or ‘God 
of truth’ Qein Gott der Treue*; 32:4; translated ‘a faithful God’ in the NRSV). In Kantian 
language, Barth states that the affirmation that God is faithful in these passages ‘may be called 
an analytical judgement’ (459; 517). By this Barth means ‘a biblical statement [e.g. that God 
is faithful] in which a bibhcal concept [e.g. the ‘general’ bibhcal concept of God] is clarified 
but not expanded informatively by the addition of fiirther c o n c e p t s . I n  both the Old and 
New Testaments, Barth points out how God is known as faithfiil by his self-demonstration in 
word and action within the context of covenant relationship. Accordingly, Barth draws 
attention to the fuher statement of God’s faithfulness given in Deut 7:9: The Lord is one who 
‘keeps covenant and mercy with them that love him and keep liis commandments to a 
thousand generations.’ Likewise, it is because God has redeemed the psalmist that God is 
called the ‘God of faithfiilness [Treue]* (Ps 32:5). In the New Testament, Paul affirms that 
‘God is faithfiil’ in the context of God being the one who calls the believers into the fellowship 
of Christ (1 Cor 1:9) and the one who will guard them fi*om evil (1 Thess 3:3). 1 John 1:9 
affirms God is faithful to forgive and cleanse the behever fi-om aU unrighteousness. By 
reference to these passages, Barth wishes to offer some direct scriptural grounds for the basic 
theological judgement that God is faithful.
McGlasson 1991: 90 (comments in brackets added). McGlasson describes this as what ‘Barth usually means 
by an analytic judgement’ (90). Barth’s usage of analytic and synthetic, he says, ‘roughly corresponds to the 
famous definition . . .  in the preface to Kant’s Critique o f  Pure Reason, but Barth was no doubt aware o f the 
history of the distinction in Protestant orthodoxy.’ Barth uses the terms more loosely than Kant, as is typical of 
his use of philosophical terms (see Hendry 1984 and chapter 2, section 4).
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Barth also draws attention to an illuminating pattern, namely how often Scripture 
states God’s faithfulness in ‘contrast to men’s unfaithfulness’ (459; 517). Citing a number of 
passages that demonstrate this pattern (including Rom 3:3 and 2 Tim 2:13), he notes that the 
‘analytical judgement’ that God is faithful and humans unfaithful involves the recognition of 
the unworthiness of those to whom God has shown his faithfiilness. By God’s grace, humans 
can show a measure of faithfulness (Ps 33:4), but they must always remember the truth of 
Rom 3:4: ‘God is true, but every man a liar.’ These passages show that the biblical concept of 
God’s faithfulness or truth is fundamentally a moral category that involves a contrast with 
human moral corruption.^^
In Barth’s description of the theme of God’s faithfulness and in the passages that he 
discusses in relation to this theme, we have seen something of the biblical grounding 
(Schriftgrund) which Barth aimed to give to simplicity. In subsection 3.3, we will explore 
further this linkage between faithfulness and simplicity. We now turn to liis treatment of 
another biblical theme or pattern, namely, the Christological and Trinitarian nature of God’s 
unity or simplicity.
3.2. A Christological Interpretation o f Divine Unity
3.2.1. The Biblical Motif of the Christological Unity of God 
We begin with a reminder about the relation of Christology to the Trinity for Barth. 
Despite fi*equent references by Barth’s critics to his ‘Cliristomonism,’ Barth’s 
Christocentrism—his ‘Christological concentration’—is a way of being thoroughly Trinitarian. 
To speak of Christ and his incarnation as the centre of the biblical witness presupposes a 
Trinitarian understanding of God. Christ reveals not simply himself (his own ‘way of being’), 
but the whole Trinity. Thus, for Barth to speak of how the biblical witness to Christ 
supremely manifests God’s unity is a way of saying that Christ manifests the unity of the
Dorner develops the concepts of God’s ethical immutability (parallel to Barth’s ‘constancy’) and ethical seif- 
sameness (parallel to Barth’s simplicity). He does so with reference to scriptural references to God’s ‘unity’ 
and especially ‘God’s truth and steadfastness’ (1994: 88f). The similarities between Dorner and Barth are 
difficult to explain as accidental. The correspondence between the two thinkers is confirmed by their reference 
to many of the same scriptural passages (Sherman 1997 has pointed this out in respect to divine immutability 
or constancy, but not in respect to divine simplicity or unity). Shared references to God’s steadfastness, 
trustworthiness or faithfulness include virtually all the New Testament passages cited above, namely: Rom 3:3, 
1 Cor 3:9, 2 Tim 2:13, and 1 Jn 3:9 (Dorner 1994: 89). Again, see the concluding subsection of chapter 5, an 
excursus on Barth and Dorner.
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Trinity—a point that Baith’s conception of simplicity is specifically designed to accommodate. 
We will see the integral relation of Barth’s Christocentrism and the doctrine of the Trinity 
when we observe how he interprets the passages cited below. '^’^
We may begin unpacking Barth’s Christocentric use of the Bible by considering the last 
part of the exegetical excursus with which Barth closes his section on God’s unity (457-461; 
515-18). Barth makes a subtle reference to a Christocentric conception of God’s faithfulness 
and thus simplicity in the following statement. Tt is precisely God’s faithfulness and 
truthfulness and therefore His simplicity which in a special way characterise God Himself as 
the One who gives Himself to man to be His God’ (459f; 517; emphasis added). This is 
reference to God as he reveals himself in Christ. Accordingly, the whole group of passages 
wliich follow this statement are Christo logical passages fi*om the New Testament (see 460; 
517Q. We will consider some of these passages below. But before we do that, we must fill 
out Barth’s general description of the biblical motif of the ‘Christological concentration’ of 
God’s revealed unity.
We saw above (in 3.1) that Barth speaks of God’s faithfulness and simplicity as his 
‘continual self-confirmation’ in word and deed, as attested in Scripture. Barth concludes this 
discussion by saying: ‘But the name in which this witness to His unity is made is the name of 
Jesus Christ. . .  All the lines we mentioned, promise and fulfilment. Gospel and Law, Israel 
and Church, the love and fi*eedom of God, are not separate, but meet and unite in Christ’ (460; 
518). Barth is sketching the rudiments of a Christocentric ‘biblical theology,’ an account of 
the economy of salvation in which a series of scriptural themes (that have sometimes been 
deemed ‘contradictory’) are harmoniously inter-related and united in Christ. Barth does not 
merely wish to argue that the works of God in the economy of salvation {ad extra) are united 
and that this can be seen in the centre in Jesus Christ. Rather, Barth wants to say that in 
Christ’s works and person there is a perfect manifestation of the eternal unity and simplicity of 
God in himself {ad intro). Again, God’s acts reveal God’s being (see chapter 3).
^ Subtle indications of the relationship between Barth’s Christocentrism and his Trinitarian commitment 
appear throughout his treatment of God’s unity, in places besides his treatment of biblical texts. For example, 
he indicates in one place that God’s work in the incarnation presupposes the unity o f the Trinity and thus is a 
work of the whole Godhead, not simply of the Son (460; 518).
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This ‘revealed’ simplicity of God is known thi'ough faith in Jesus Christ.^  ^ In the very 
last sentence of his treatment of the perfection of divine unity in II/l, Barth makes the 
following strong claim. The true and simple faith of the Christian ‘does not deviate a hair’s 
breath fiom its committal to the name of Jesus Christ’^ ® and this commitment is ‘the conditio 
sine qua non of a knowledge of the simple God’ (461 ; 518). In this case, where Barth ends 
his dogmatic presentation is actually where, according to his Christocentric particularism, he 
has begun his dogmatic reflections: namely, with the particular biblical testimony to God’s 
action in Jesus Christ, the centre and pinnacle of God’s self-revelation. In Barth’s theological 
method, there is a clear distinction between formulations or reflections and the subsequent 
presentations of such formulations.
3.2.2. Biblical Passages on the Christological Unity of God 
When Barth states that the biblical witness to God’s unity is ‘made in the name of 
Jesus Christ,’ he adds, ‘as all the New Testament passages cited above show’ (460; 518). 
Specific biblical passages and the patterns implicit in them aie the intended basis of Barth’s 
Christocentric understanding of God’s unity. We will highlight Barth’s treatment of the 
passages that best illuminate his Christocentric claim that the faith&lness of Jesus is the 
faithfulness of God, which Barth here continues to relate closely to God’s unity or simplicity. 
As is often the case in his use of Scripture, Barth does not discuss any of these passages in 
detail, but organises them into certain arrangement and then quotes them or cites their 
references, making occasional comments or paraphrases. Barth apparently regards the 
interpretation of these passages as relatively self-explanatory.
Barth quotes a collection of related passages in the book of Revelation, where Jesus 
Christ is called ‘true’ (Rev. 3:7), ‘faithful and true’ (19:11) and the ‘true witness’ (1:5 and 
3:14), Picking up on the understanding of Christ as ‘true witness,’ Barth offers the following
Barth ends this concluding excui sus (and thus his whole treatment of divine unity) with a discussion of faith 
as the Christian’s ‘simplicity’ that corresponds to God’s unique simplicity (460f; 518). Saying that God’s 
simplicity is known by faith is another way in which Barth resists the idea that such simplicity is subject to 
general rational criteria.
By referring to the ^mme of Jesus Chi ist,’ Barth is employing a kind of idiomatic expression that has roots 
in Scripture and which appears frequently in Barth’s writings. The sense o f the phrase is to place the emphasis 
on Christ, on the one hand, as one who is revealed and known (one whose name we know) and yet, on the 
other hand, to stress that this name is to be identified with the (eternal) person of Christ himself. In CD, II/1, 
see Barth’s references to the name of God (59, 273, and 647) and the name o f Jesus Christ (153,249, 373f,
517, and 615).
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paraphrase of John 3:33: ‘those who receive the testimony [of Christ] confirm that God is 
true' (460; 517; emphasis added).^^ This brings out Barth’s key point that Christ’s words and 
actions reveal the truth or trustworthiness of God. He quotes 1 Jn 5:20, in which the 
identification of the faithfiilness or truth of Jesus and God is yet more plain: ‘He has come and 
“hath given us an understanding that we may know him that is true, and we are in him that is 
true, even his Son Jesus Christ.’” (460; 517). Jesus Clirist ‘is true’ in the sense that he is 
included in the unique identity of the God who is true. We know that ‘God is true,’ Barth 
says, ‘because Jesus Christ is “in truth arisen” according to Luke 24:34.’ If we read between 
the lines, Barth’s reference to this passage in Luke indicates that, for him, the resurrection, as 
perhaps the supreme revelatory act of God, speaks of the undivided unity that exists between 
God’s promises and his carrying out of those promises, and this unity in turn manifests the 
unity of God’s own personal being. A similar train of thought is evident in Barth’s reference 
to 2 Cor 1:18-20. This is a passage that for him speaks decisively of the Christological unity 
of the biblical witness, including its apparent tension between law and gospel.^® Barth says 
that it is because of Jesus Christ that Paul was able to speak a message that was not ‘a Yes and 
No, but a word of truth and therefore a simple word’ (460; 517). Barth then quotes the 
passage, which concludes with Paul’s statement: ‘For all the promises of God in him [Christ] 
are yea and in him, amen’ (2 Cor 1:20). In Christ, there is no division between the God of 
Israel and the God of the Christian church. Nor is there in Christ any other potential division 
tliat might sever various parts of God’s life-giving message. There is one Lord whose 
gracious promises are all ‘yes’ in Christ.
We conclude our treatment of Barth’s ‘Christological’ use of specific biblical passages 
by noting Barth’s use of a passage that shows the link between Barth’s ‘ Christocentrism’ and a 
Trinitarian reading of Scripture. It occurs in the context of an excursus in which Barth
See Barth’s extensive treatment of Christ as ‘true Witness’ in CD, IV/3.
^  Here as elsewhere Barth regards the unity of the biblical witness to God’s revelation, the unity of God’s 
narrated ‘history,’ as a reliable indicator of the unity o f God’s personal identity.
See also Barth’s allusions to 2 Cor 1 : ISff in the context of his argument denying that the Bible offers 
contradictory perspectives on the question of natural theology (II/1 ,105Q.
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articulates a Christian conception of God’s unique oneness in contrast to that of Jewish 
monotheism/^
Barth’s treatment of two passages in particular highlights the Christological and
Trinitarian aspects of the scriptural testimony to God’s unity: 1 Cor 8:6 and 1 Tim 2:5/^
For us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, 
and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist 
(1 Cor 8:6).
For there is one God; there is also one mediator between God and humankind, Christ 
Jesus, himself human, who gave himself a ransom for all (1 Tim 2:5f).
For Barth, these passages make plain that the knowledge of God’s singleness and uniqueness,
properly conceived, stands or falls on ‘Jesus the Messiah, rejected by monotheistic Judaism’
(455; 512). Barth highlights the two-fold structure that the two passages share: (1) a
confession of the one God, which is followed by (2) a confession of the one Lord or mediator,
Jesus Christ. We should not understand either passage, he says, ‘as if a second unique being is
being named alongside the first.’ In other words, these passages do not postulate a kind of
‘bi-theism.’ Rather, the second Christological affirmation, according to ‘a common usage’
found in both passages, merely ‘emphasises and interprets what stands in front of it.’ ‘Thus,’
Barth states, ‘mention of the One Lord and Mediator simply expresses the fact and extent that
God the Father is the unique being,’ a point not inconsistent with Christ also being identified
with or included within the identity o f ‘the one unique b e in g .W h ile  this identification of
God and Christ may be problematic to natural reason, Barth believes it is fundamental to the
knowledge of God that comes by faith.
Clearly, Barth here employs a conception of theological exegesis and reasoning that is
guided by the ancient Trinitarian church creeds, especially the Nicene Creed.^  ^ In any case.
™ In a programmatic statement, Barth claims that what primarily distinguishes ‘these two possibilities’ of 
monotheism ‘is the resurrection and of Jesus Christ, the outpouring of the Spirit and faith’ (454). We also note 
that for Barth ‘Jewish monotheism’ is not to be equated with the monotheism of the Old Testament, which can 
be interpreted in ‘Christian’ terms as well, as the witness of the Jewish-Christian writers of New Testament 
would indicate.
Both passages are cited here in the NRSV translation. Barth cites the relevant parts of both verses in Greek 
(455; 512). These two passages may allude to Deuteronomy 6:4: ‘Hear O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is 
one.’
^ For an independent confirmation of this conclusion of theological exegesis, see Bauckham 1998: 25-42.
That said, Barth does not repeat the tradition slavishly, for he uses his own terms and conceptuality to 
interpret and apply the tradition.
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Barth here assumes a high degree of commensurability between traditional Trinitarian 
discourse and biblical discourse. As Paul McGlasson’s says, Barth’s exegesis and theology are 
marked by the ‘seemingly unquestioned assumption of the mutual fit of biblical language and 
traditional Christian theological language . . . The mutual fit, the mutual addressability . . .  is 
the condition for the possibihty of the kind of biblical exegesis that Barth does.’^ "^ Tins is a 
sub-set of the larger issue of the commensurability of extra-biblical theological discourse and 
biblical discourse, to which we now turn.
3.3, The ^Commensurability* o f Scriptural and Dogmatic Discourse
3.3.1. An orientation to the problem 
We conclude this chapter with a consideration of the question of the manner and 
degree of comparability or commensurability between scriptural and dogmatic discourse in 
Barth’s theology. As we will see, this question touches on the nature of the relationship 
between Scripture, tradition and reason in Barth’s work.
We begin by defining our terms. Simply put, different tilings (entities, theories, 
concepts or viewpoints) are commensurable if they are capable of being compared with one 
another and incommensurable if they aie not. Since the early 1960’s, this terminology has 
been widely applied to scientific theories and traditions,and, more recently, has been applied 
to philosophical, moral, and theological traditions.^^ How does Barth assess the degree of 
‘semantic distance,’ the differences in meaning, between (1) biblical discourse (terms, 
sentences and texts) and (2) theological discourse (terms, sentences and texts)
We have noted above how Barth moves rather easily back and forth between the 
biblical language of God’s faithfiilness^  ^and the theological language of God’s simplicity.
McGIasson 1991: 94,
In the philosophy of science, Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend both put forth versions of what is often 
called the ‘incommensurability thesis.’
See especially the works of Alasdair MacIntyre (1988 and 1990).
Consideration of this question involves a sub-question about the relationship between the terms and concepts 
of theological tradition and Barth’s own theological terms and concepts. If Barth is going ‘back to the Bible’ 
for his understanding of God, one might ask what hangs on keeping classical theological language of 
‘simplicity.’ Does Barth place independent value of maintaining traditional language? We can offer a 
tentative affirmative answer to this question, since Barth tends to treat the tradition as ‘innocent until proven 
guilty’ and thus worthy of maintaining unless it fails to witness to the revelation of God attested in Scripture.
Although Barth treats the biblical motif o f God’s trustworthiness or faithfulness most extensively in his 
treatment of divine unity (with specific reference to simplicity), he also speaks of it as an important biblical 
foundation for the doctrine o f God’s constancy (see chapter 5) and, perhaps to a lesser extent, God’s Eternity 
(see chapter 6). All three attr ibutes appear to presuppose or imply God’s faithful self-identity.
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Barth sometimes treats faithfulness and simplicity as if they were virtually equivalent, and 
always regards them as easily comparable and ‘relatable.’ This feature of Barth’s work is 
objectionable to some readers, who regard Barth as blurring the lines of two incommensurable 
discourses or conceptualities. In fact Barth’s own theoretical comments about the relationship 
between Scripture and theology might be interpreted so as to bring his practice into question 
here. Specifically, Barth could be seen as engaging in a form of ‘eisegesis’ (or even ‘natural 
theology’) in which he reads theological concepts into biblical concepts, e.g. reading simplicity 
into the biblical afSimation of divine faithfiilness.^^ Although we will not definitively refute 
this charge, we will show in the next subsection that Barth can be interpreted as avoiding 
‘eisegesis.’
3.3.2. Reading between the lines: an interpretation of Barth on commensurability
In the effort to understand Baith better, we turn again to Paul McGlasson’s reflections 
on the question to the relationship of biblical and theological language in his study of Barth’s 
biblical exegesis.*” McGIasson observes rather uncontroversially that biblical exegesis stands 
in ‘conceptual interdependency’ with doctrinal presentation in the Church Dogmatics. 
Accordingly, he correctly points out that the kind of exegesis that Barth does is most 
commonly an ‘explication of the text’*^  in the form of ‘conceptual analysis.’*^  In referring to 
‘conceptual analysis’ McGIasson draws on Hans Frei, who uses this phrase as a synonym for 
‘conceptual (re-) description.’*"^ Accordingly, Barth assumes that there are ‘theological’
Barth might also be seen as reading biblical concepts into theological ones (e.g. reading feithfiilness into 
simplicity or radically redefining simplicity in terms of feithfiilness), with the ultimate result that the 
theological concepts become superfluous repetitions of semantically-equivalent biblical concepts. Consider the 
following set of critical questions raised by Nicholas Wolterstorff in regards to Barth’s account of simplicity.
If simplicity is grounded in God’s ti ustworthy character, then Barth has to show how simplicity 
follows fi om that, or give it up. What hangs on keeping simplicity, and is it really still simplicity? He 
is probably working with very different intuitions than the Medievals, and his use of traditional 
terminology conceals that.
These are unpublished comments (handwritten on the author’s unpublished paper on the topic of divine 
simplicity in Aquinas and Barth) made in 1998 by Wolterstorff in private communication with the author. 
Although he referred to the last sentence as an ‘uninformed hunch,’ the questions he raises are instructive.
“  McGIasson 1991.
McGIasson 1991: 80.
See McGIasson 1991: chapter 4 on ‘The Explication of the Text.’
^ McGIasson 1991: 81-97 and passim  (see 1992).
See Frei 1992 and our comments in chapter 2, section 4.
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judgements and concepts in the biblical text that are commensurable with the theological 
concepts and judgements of dogmatic theology of the past or present.*^
But what exactly does this ‘mutual fit’ or commensurability involve in Barth’s work?
In order to escape the abstractions that might result from trying to answer this question in 
general terms (as Barth says, Latet periculum in generalibusf^), we will begin our inquiry by 
asking a more specific question: ‘What is the nature of the alleged conceptual 
commensurability that exists between the biblical concept of divine faithfulness and Barth’s 
doctrinal concept of divine simplicity?’ Above (in subsection 3.1.1) we interpreted the 
conceptual relationship between biblical faithfulness and doctrinal simplicity to involve both 
mutual-dependence and equivalence o f referent andjudgement. Such a relationship implies a 
real and significant commensurability between biblical discourse and Baith’s dogmatic 
discourse. We must now explain this further.
First, Barth’s statements about simplicity and biblical statements about divine 
faithfulness are mutually-dependent on each other. This means that when Barth says that 
‘God is simple’ and the Bible says ‘God is faithful,’ each of these statements provide the 
ground or basis for the other in different ways. We may apply George Hunsinger’s description 
to two of the rational procedures that Barth’s employs to make sense of this. First, it seems 
accurate to say that Barth implicitly employs the ‘procedure of grounding’*^  to ground the 
biblical statement of fact that ‘God is faithfiil’ in the transcendental condition of its possibility, 
namely, that ‘God is simple.’ The dogmatic statement ‘God is simple’ provides the necessary 
and sufficient (ontological) condition for the biblical statement that ‘God is faithful.’ More 
generally, this is an example of the move from faith to understanding, from the first-order 
biblical faith claim of God’s faithfulness to understanding something of its doctrinal 
ontological grounds. In this way, we could say that Barth regards God’s faithfulness as 
ontologically dependent on God’s simplicity (the order of essence or being; ordo essendi). 
Second, Barth also appeal's to employ the ‘procedure of deriving’** to derive the statement 
‘God is simple’ at least partly from the statement ‘God is faithfiil.’ As such, Barth’s doctrine
See McGrath (1990: 58ff) on the relationship between the biblical text (especially narrative) and doctrine.
Barth, IF2,48f, 51. I
Hunsinger 1991: 57f |
Hunsinger 1991: 55ff. j
I
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of simplicity is hermeneutically-based in the biblical text, not only directly in assertions such as 
‘God is faithful’ but also indirectly in its ‘essential underlying conceptual patterns.’*^  We 
could say that the knowledge of God’s simplicity is epistemologically dependent on the prior 
knowledge of God's faithfulness (the order of knowing or ordo cognoscendi).
With the help of Hunsinger’s categories, then, we are able to see at least one coherent 
way in which it would be possible for doctrinal simplicity and biblical faithfulness to be 
mutually-dependent on each other in different respects. This, in turn, shows an aspect of the 
complex view of commensurability or mutual fit of biblical and theological language implied 
within Barth’s doctrine of simplicity.
The second thing that our analysis above (in 3.1.1) showed is that the relationship 
between biblical faithfulness and doctrinal simplicity in Barth’s work involved an equivalency 
o f referent and judgement. By this we mean that, when the Bible says that ‘God is faithful’ 
and Barth says that ‘God is simple,’ (a) faithfulness and simplicity are predicates that describe 
the same ‘God’ as their subject or referent and (b) the Bible and Barth are making essentially 
the same judgment about this God, but are using differing conceptual terms.^” Claim (a) 
implies that Barth is not speaking about the ‘God of the philosophers’ but the God of the 
Bible, even when he using philosophical language (perhaps including the concept of simplicity 
itself to do so. In Barth’s method, this implies that the third-order philosophical language 
must be transformed so that it can be fittingly applied to the unique God of revelation; i.e. so 
that the subject has sway over the predicate. Claim (b), if it is true, would imply a very strong 
sense of commensurability bordering on ‘identity.’ This strong commensurability is implied 
when Barth says that God ‘is trustworthy . . .  and this is His simplicity’ (459; 516). It is 
probably best to interpret Barth as not asserting a direct identity but an ‘indirect identity’ 
between the two concepts. In this relationship of indirect identity, Barth aims to revise the 
general concept of simplicity according to the particular biblical concept of faithfulness. If this 
interpretation is correct, then Barth’s view of simplicity means something like this: God 
remains the same, single person (or subject) in all his diverse ways of being and acting.^’
Hunsinger 1991; 56.
See Yeago 1994 and our discussion o f his distinction in chapter 2, subsection 2.3.3.
As we will see in chapter 5, this is very much like the way Barth describes God’s constancy.
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In Barth’s view, then, theological concepts from one Tanguage-game’ can be used to 
support those in another. For example, the first-order biblical language-game of covenant 
faithfulness within the economy of salvation can ground the second-order theological 
reflection about God’s essential simplicity. Both Tanguage-games’ refer to the same reality, 
the God known in Jesus Christ, and thus we could also say that biblical language and doctrinal 
language are parts (jw6-language-games) vfithin the same overall language-game of Cliristian 
speech, the speech of the church.
All of these observations go some way towards showing that, while Barth’s does 
present such biblical and doctrinal concepts as commensurable, he does not do so in a naïve or 
simplistic way.^  ^ Yet this interpretation does not resolve the question of whether Barth 
overestimates the commensurabihty (or consistency) of biblical and doctrinal language or 
whether this would involve ‘eisegesis.’ Is simplicity reaUy presupposed or implied by 
faithfulness, and is this an appropriate ‘exegesis’ (in the broad sense of ‘reading out’) of the 
theological judgements of the biblical text? Or does Barth read simplicity into the text, such 
that the real basis of the doctrine is found in extra-biblical ‘philosophical’ judgements about 
what God must be like in order to be ‘faithfril’? This is a difficult question to resolve, as it 
involves a whole series of assumptions about what constitutes good and faithful theological 
interpretation of the Bible. Our tentative response is that Barth’s usage of simplicity is 
sufficiently ‘transformed’ or ‘revised’ by the biblical concept of faithfulness so as to make it 
legitimate. Barth’s version of simplicity does seem to be something that is either presupposed 
or implied by the Bible when it refers to God’s faithfulness. For example. Scripture seems to 
assume that the God who promises is the same person as the God who keeps the promise; 
these are not two ‘paits’ of God that are or even could be in conflict with each other. But it 
is not our concern in this thesis to evaluate Barth’s success, not even his success in following
^  This implies that the line between first-order and second-order discourse is somewhat blurred in Barth’s 
work, or that the rules for the transposition from first-order statements and second-order ones are ad hoc, or 
situation-specific (see Frei 1992: 39f; see chapter 2, sub-section 4.1). First-order and second-order discourse 
offer mutual justification and warrant to each other; the justification is not simply one-way. This is related to 
the ‘weak coherentism’ (rather than foundationalism) implicit in the modes of justification in Barth’s 
theological practice (Hunsinger 1991: 2811).
McGIasson is probably correct to say that ‘The Bible can, in Barth’s hands, be more or less immediately 
used to discriminate against certain traditional theological options’ (1991: 95; my emphasis). But in the case 
of simplicity Barth’s scriptural mode of critique is better described as mediate or indirect.
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his own stated methodological principles. Rather, we aim to offer a fair and accurate 
description and analysis of Barth’s Scripture-oriented methodological practice.
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Chapter 5: Barth’s Doctrine of Divine Constancy
In this chapter, we take up an expository analysis of Barth’s account of divine 
‘constancy’ in CD I I/l. We will defend the view that Barth’s rejection of a representative 
classical view of immutability proceeds primarily from a conviction that it is incompatible 
with Scripture. Accordingly, Barth’s alternative is to develop what he regards as a more 
biblical account of God’s unchangeableness, which he calls divine ‘constancy.’^
This chapter, like chapters 4 and 6, is composed of three main parts. In the first part, 
we will describe Barth’s description and critique of the classical view of divine immutability. 
In the second part, we will explain, in fairly general terms, Barth’s response and Barth’s 
alternative to the classical view. In the third part, we will undertake a specific examination of 
what in our view is the major factor driving Barth’s critical response to the classical view, 
namely, his theological use of Scripture.
1. Barth’s Description and Critique of Classical Versions of Immutability
LL Barth *s presentation and critique of Polanus
In an excursus near the beginning of his exposition of the doctrine of constancy (492f; 
553Q, Barth cites passages from Polanus and Augustine as representatives of the classical or 
traditional doctrine of divine immutability. For our purposes, Barth’s treatment of Polanus is 
most instructive.
Barth is decidedly critical of Polanus. Barth begins by quoting a number of biblical 
passages that Polanus and other traditional theologians considered crucial to formulating the 
doctrine of immutability (Ex 3:14, Num 23:19, Mai 3:6, Ps 102:25ft Jas 1:17, and Heb 
6:13ff). Barth states: ‘In both substance and terminology we are transported to quite a 
different world [than that of these biblical passages] when we read Polanus’ exposition and
 ^ Barth treatment of God’s constancy is found in CD II/l, 491-522 {KD \V \, 552-587). In the remainder of the 
chapter, we will cite these sources by means of page numbers in in-text parentheses, referring to the English 
translation first, and the German second.
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demonstration of God’s “immutability”’ (492; 553)/ Here is a translation of the full passage
Barth quotes from Polanus.
God can be moved or changed by no substance existing outside Himself; for in that 
case He would not be the prime mover and efficient cause of all the good things in 
nature. He cannot be moved or changed by some internal principle either. In 
anything that is moved or changed by some internal first cause, it is necessary that 
there be in that thing something which causes movement and something which is the 
subject of movement, and accordingly it is composed of different things. In the case 
of God, however. His absolute simplicity, his immeasurability, and ultimate 
perfection do not permit us to postulate the combination of different substances. The 
question therefore does not arise. Consequently, He is entirely immutable.^
Despite being a Reformed theologian, Polanus here offers us a typical scholastic, and largely 
Aristotelian, argument similar to what we might expect from Aquinas. Polanus considers two 
possible ways in which God might be moved to change, from the outside or from the inside. 
God cannot be changed from the outside because this would conflict with God being the 
prime mover of all tilings in nature. Further, God cannot be changed from the inside because 
that would imply a form of composition in God in which one part is being changed and 
another is doing the changing. This is ruled out by God’s perfect simplicity, or absolute, non­
composite oneness (see chapter 4). Therefore, God is entirely immutable.
Barth does not engage in a detailed, systematic critique of Polanus’ argument. It is 
enough for Barth, here and in later, to concentrate on three related points. Barth shows how 
Polanus’ view departs from what Barth thinks is the biblical view in three ways: in (1) origin,
(2) method, and (3) content.
(1) First, Barth believes the source {Quelle)—and here Barth means the ultimate, 
normative source—of Polanus’ view is not Scripture, nor even faithful church tradition. 
Rather, it is classical Greek philosophy, especially the philosophy of Aristotle—with its 
assumptions about God as the Unmoved Mover and so forth."^  With such a starting point, it is
 ^When Bailh speaks of Polanus’ world as different in ‘substance and terminology,’ the German reads ‘nicht nur 
sprachlich, sondern sachlich’ {KD, 553); hence, a more accurate translation might be: ‘not just linquistically, in 
its terminology, but in its content.’ When Barth says this, he refers to a contiadiction or perhaps an 
incommensurability between the biblical world and Polanus’ world. To use Yeago’s terms, the difference 
between the two worlds is not only in ‘concepts’ or ‘conceptual terms’ (‘terminology’) but in actual 
‘judgements’ ( ‘substance’).
 ^Amandus Polanus a Polansdorf, Syntagma Theologiae Christianae, 1609, col. 967, as quoted by Barth in CD 
11/1,492; 553f). With the exception of slight modifications, this English h anslation was provided by Prof. 
Adrian C. Gratwick of the School of Greek, Latin & Ancient History, University o f St. Andrews.
Immediately following his quotation of Polanus, Barth asks, ‘Does this derive from the biblical passage 
quoted? Is it therefore true of the God who attests Himself in His revelation? (492; 554). Barth goes on to give
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not surprising that Polanus ends up with a view of immutability that is not satisfactory. This 
leads to our next point.^
(2) Second, Barth discerns in Polanus a dangerous tendency towards what may be 
called ‘methodological anti-particularism.’ Polanus is controlled by general philosophical 
axioms about what a supreme divinity must be like, rather than following what God’s 
concrete actual self-revelation shows God to be like. Barth notes that Polanus and other 
Protestant scholastics use scriptural passages as ‘proof texts’ for their views. But Polanus’ 
proof for divine immutability stands in ‘a different world’ for that of these texts and ‘does not 
correspond in the least with the biblical passages’ (493; 554). Barth implies, therefore, that 
the classical model o f ‘proof texting’ (arguing from so called dicta probantia in Scripture), at 
least as employed by Polanus, is not sufficient to ensure that Scripture is frmctioning 
appropriately as a determinative theological authority.^
(3) Third, the problems of origin and method in the classical approach of Polanus 
result in problems with its content—problematic claims about who God is and what God is 
like. Polanus’ view of immutability is not adequately scriptural nor Christological, and thus 
it is ‘in irreparable conflict with God’s freedom, love and life’ (493; 554), which are three 
features basic to Barth’s own biblically-governed, ‘personal’ understanding of God (see 
chapter 3). If the widespread classical view represented by Polanus is true, than ‘God is the 
pure immobile' (494; 555). The classical versions of immutability as immobility replace the 
living God of the Bible with a God who is essentially dead, or, more precisely, with a view in 
which ‘death is God’ (494; 554). This obviously renders problematic all theological 
assertions about God rooted in the revelation of the living God.
his answer: ‘The source [Quelle]. . .  from which Polanus draw is different [from the passages Polanus quoted] 
and is expressly mentioned. It is his development of the idea of the ipsum em, the actus simplex et 
peifectissimus, the immensitas, the primum principium et primum movens. By definition this is necessarily 
immutabile, and immutabile in this sense, which does not correspond in the least to the biblical passages’ (492ft 
554).
 ^Before his quote fr om Polanus, Barth offers us a list o f biblical quotations fr om passages that Polanus and 
other traditional theologians considered crucial to formulating the doctrine of immutability. Barth follows this 
list with the statement ‘we are transported to quite a different world’ from that of these biblical passages when 
we turn to Polanus, a world different both in ‘substance and terminology’ (492).
 ^The reason for this may be that the proof-texting method, which can allow one to take a statement of Scripture 
out of the context o f its message as a whole, does not ensure that one take seriously the Scriptural testimony to 
God’s Christocentric self-revelation. In any case, Barth implies that Polanus is doing ‘natural theology.’ The 
frindmnental method of his theology is other than ‘exposition of Holy Scriptuie,’ and the fundamental content of 
his theology is other than the self-revelation of God in Christ (Barth 1946: 74f).
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L2. Further Development of Barth *s Critique o f Classical Immutability
After the initial critical treatment of the classical view of immutability of Polanus 
summarised above, Barth continues to delineate what he regards as the problematic 
tendencies of the classical view of God’s immutability. Barth’s critique involves both 
methodological and substantive aspects.
Barth develops his methodological critique of classical immutability (as represented 
by Polanus) as follows. Barth first points out that the divine perfection of God’s 
immutability, like all divine perfections is a predicate that must be determined by God as its 
subject, rather than vice versa. Barth consistently moves from the particular to the general, 
from the concrete, Scripturally-attested realities of God’s self-revelation in time and space to 
the more general statements about the character of the Triune God who loves in freedom.
One of the most troubling aspects of the classical doctrine of divine immutability is its 
tendency to move in the opposite direction, from abstract philosophical ideas of what perfect 
divine immutability must be, to the particular determinations and applications of that 
immutability. In the end, God and the scriptural language that witnesses to him are 
interpreted systematically in light of a priori philosophical conceptions rather than vice versa. 
Barth’s method, by contrast, is a posteriori and proceeds from the ‘bottom up,’ moving from 
the concrete particulars known in revelation to general truths about God. Barth does not 
believe that we can entirely rid ourselves of philosophical presuppositions in our 
interpretation of Scripture and efforts at doctrinal construction. But he does believe that we 
can and should consciously subordinate our assumptions to the revelation given in Scripture 
so that they may be revised accordingly.^ For Barth, a methodological ‘generalism’ marks 
much traditional theology, but it is perhaps nowhere more problematic than in the doctrine of 
immutability, where the material manifestations of a flawed methodology are so devastating.
We turn, then, to Barth’s further development of his substantive critique of classical 
immutability. In his striking words, ‘if the “immutable” as such is in fact to be God, this is 
undoubtedly the most dangerous assumption conceivable not only for the doctrine of God in 
particular but for every statement about God’ (493; 555; emphasis added). He then indicates
 ^See our comments Barth’s rule o f ‘subordination’ in biblical interpretation in chapter 2.
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some of the reasons why this is so. If the widespread classical view represented by Polanus’ 
is true, than ‘God is the pure immobile' (494; 555).* And if that is so, Barth says, ‘it is quite 
impossible that there should be any relationship between Himself and a reality distinct from 
Himself—or at any rate a relationship . ..  that includes God’s concern for this other reality.’ 
This problem in the classical view Barth is critiquing is one that he will refer to (see 2.3) 
under the rubric of a ‘dualistic’ understanding of the relationship between God and creation. 
The classical version of immutability renders problematic God’s real, personal^ relationship 
with creation. If immutability does allow for any relationship between God and creation at 
all, it would be at the most an impersonal relation of ‘pure mutual negativity,’ of mutual 
opposition .B arth  continues, ‘This being the case, it is only in the most highly figurative 
way . . .  that we can speak of God as the Creator and Lord of the world, or the work of 
reconciliation and revelation as His real work,’ of the incarnation, and so on. Classical 
versions of immutability as immobility replace the living God of the Bible with a God who is 
essentially dead. Indeed, classical immutability, by a grave reversal of subject and predicate, 
in effect says that ‘death is God.’
Thus, such traditional or classical understandings of God as ‘immutable’ come into 
conflict with basic affirmations about God that we must make on the basis of the 
Christocentric revelation that is found and attested in Scripture. For Barth, the God witnessed 
to in Scripture is, by definition, the only legitimate God of the Christian church and of 
Christian theology. ^  ^
® Barth seems to regard immobile roughly as the English ‘immobile’ or ‘inactive.’ Richard Muller is probably 
correct in pointing out that this term meant something more like ‘unmoved’ [by an external force or entity] for 
the classical theologians (1983:27). Although Barth may have misrepresented the classical thinkers somewhat 
on this terminological point re immobile, this does not undermine his overall critique of them. Baith recognises 
that classical views o f immutability speak of God as ‘acting’ or ‘moving’ in some sense, but critiques the way in 
which they construe this.
 ^Although Barth does not use the adjective ‘personal’ here, it expresses the concrete content of what Barth 
appears to have in mind in speaking of the relationship between God and the world.
This is exactly what one would expect if  God is defined purely in contrast and opposition to creation, as is the 
case in the standai d classical views o f God (see Gunton 1978:2, 190, and elsewhere). We note that Barth does 
not say that classical immutability rules out relationship with God entirely, but only that it wrongly delimits and 
characterises the nature of that relationship. This runs contra what Muller’s selective quotation and exposition 
of Barth on this point would suggest (Muller 1983: 26).
Barth supplements this primary argument from the incompatibility of classical immutability with Scripture 
with historical arguments about the deleterious effects of classical immutability. In the end, Schleiermacher’s 
anthropocenfrism and even modem atheism are laid at the door of classical immutability (494; 555f). Despite its 
occasional attempts to make contact with Scripture, the classical doctrine of divine immutability represents a 
historical trajectory of unbelief running from pagan Greece to modern atheism.
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Barth thinks that other theologians sometimes did relatively better than Polanus in 
their treatments of the nature of God’s immutability, as is evident in Barth’s more positive 
treatment of a passage from Augustine which Barth regards as ‘much nearer to the facts’
(493; 555). But on the whole, Barth finds little in the theologians who have gone before him 
that is worthy of following on the matter of divine immutability. With the exception of the 
German 19“^ century thinker Isaac August Dorner (see our comments in the excursus at the 
end of section 3), Barth must chart his own way forward on this matter. As we look Barth’s 
proposed view, we will encounter fiirther dimensions of Barth’s Scripture-based critique of 
the classical view of immutability.
2. Barth’s Development of an Alternative to the Classical View
2.1, Barth *s Basic View of Constancy Summarised
Barth develops an alternative to immutability (Unveranderlichkeit), and this is what 
he calls God’s ‘constancy’ {Bestandigkeit)}^ Barth believes that the term ‘constancy’ 
describes reality of God found in Scripture far better than the ‘suspiciously negative’ term 
‘immutability’ (495; 557).^  ^ How does Barth understand God’s constancy? Several short 
descriptions serve as an initial answer to this question. Constancy is the divine perfection by 
which ‘God remains the one He is’ (491) and ‘does not cease to be himself (491; 553).‘"^ 
Constancy also means that God lives ‘in eternal self-repetition and self-affirmation [in ewiger 
Wiederholung and Bestatigung seiner selbsf]' (492; 553). Or, in a revision of the meaning of 
‘immutability,’ Barth declares: ‘This living God in His self-affirmation [Selbstbehauptung] is
F. W. Camfield translates Bestandigkeit as ‘permanence’ in his fine summary of Barth’s treatment of this ]
divine perfection (1947: 61 ff)- ‘Permanence’ is a possible translation, but it more naturally translates the term j
Beharrlichkeit. We will use ‘constancy’ as the tianslation of Bestandigkeit, following the translators of CD, \
11/1. We note that in 1924/5, Barth was happy to use the term Unveranderlichkeit consistently in Unterricht in |
der christlichen Religion (Barth 1990: 78, 165; cf. ET in Barth 1991: 375 and 439). Evidently, Barth’s fui ther i
reflections over the next 12 years or so led him to see the value of adopting the new term Bestandigkeit for God i
in CD (although he continues to use Unveranderlichkeit in a revised sense throughout his treatment of 
‘constancy’),
Barth avoids using ‘negative terms’ for God’s perfections in all twelve of the perfections of God that he treats i
in II/l, VI. We may speculate that this is one reason why Barth did not use ‘immutability’ as his primary I
designation for the perfection of constancy. In any case, while Barth maintains the traditional terms ‘simplicity’ |
and ‘eternity,’ he changes their meaning radically—arguably as radically as the change in meaning involved in i
the shift from ‘immutability’ to ‘constancy.’
We note the similarity of this formulation to the definition of immutability given by the Reformed Scholastic i
Heidanus: immutability as that ‘by which God is necessarily that which He is and as He is’ (Heppe 1950: 68).
Barth cites this definition in his brief account of immutability in his GD (Barth 1991: 165).
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the immutable’ (495; 556). Baith’s entire exposition of God’s constancy unfolds the meaning 
of these definitions or descriptions.
Barth’s claim that ‘God remains the one that he is’ stands in a felicitous relationship 
with the other important affirmations that we must make on the basis of Scripture about 
God’s life, love, or freedom. It expresses the ‘immutable vitality’ in which God loves in 
freedom. As one who constantly loves, God’s basic character remains stable both in himself 
and in relation to the world. Yet, as a God who loves in freedom—as one who is constantly 
and uniquely free—God is free to express his constant love in a variety of changing and 
often-surprising ways. Accordingly, the constancy of the living God who loves in freedom is 
a constancy that is ‘elastic’ enough to allow God to be marked by a kind of ‘holy mutability’ 
\heilege Veranderlichkeit] (496; 557).^  ^ In keeping with his affirmation of divine simplicity 
(see chapter 4) Barth does not affirm that God is self-contradictory—i.e. that God is 
immutable mid mutable in the same respect. Rather, God is self-constant in his personal 
being (his fundamental character and purpose) yet also mutable in respect to ‘attitudes and 
actions’ (498; 560)—a distinction to which we will return in what follows.
God is thus ‘immutable’ in the sense that He ‘remains himself,’ and that ‘at no place 
or time can He or will He turn against Himself or contradict Himself (494ft 556). Tliis 
immutability is ‘the constancy of His knowing, willing and acting and therefore of His 
person’ (495; 557; see chapter 3 on Barth’s view of God as a person). This immutability is a 
positive feature of God’s being, rather than implying ‘the death of his life.’ As we will see, 
the divine constancy that Barth wishes to speak of can be fittingly described under the rubric 
of God’s personal self-identity.^^ This is the kind of constancy that he believes is present in 
Scripture’s testimony to God.
In keeping with his methodological particularism, Barth does not let a general concept 
of personhood rule improperly over the particular, concrete realities of God’s self-revelation.
For comments on how the relationship between divine constancy and (divine) mutability fit into a larger 
structural pattern in Barth’s doctrine of God, see the Appendix to this thesis.
See the excursus on ‘Barth and Ricoeur’ in 2.4 as well as Hunsinger 1991 on Barth’s use of the motif of 
‘personalism’ and Cole 1983 for an account o f ‘personal’ metaphysics and reasoning that is comparable to what 
is implicit in Baith. In a limited sense, Barth’s view includes ‘personal’ or ‘ethical immutability,’ to use the 
terminology o f Dorner (see the excursus on Barth and Dorner in 3.5 below).
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This point is clarified fijrther by a closer look at how Barth regards the relationship between 
God and creation, a relationship in which God is both free and loving.
2.2, God*s Constancy and the God-World Relation
Barth is concerned to forge a biblically-grounded answer to the question of God’s 
relation to the world that avoids either of two errors. These are the speculative metaphysical 
alternatives Barth calls ‘monism’ and ‘dualism’ (see the excursus on 500-502; 562-565).
On the one hand, Barth wants to avoid all kinds of monism {monistiche Spekulation), 
either (1) in the form of one God who swallows up the world or (2) in the form of one world 
that swallows up God. In this view God takes up the world’s mutability and change and 
suffering into his very essence (500; 562).^^ An abstract conception of God’s metaphysical 
mutability and passibility is asserted in a manner that threatens any genuine sense of divine 
transcendence.^* Monism thus undermines the truth that God loves in freedom over the 
world.
On the other hand, Barth wants to avoid all forms of dualism {dualistiche 
Spekulation)—a view in which an abstract concept of immutability is straightforwardly 
ascribed to the Creator and all mutability, in stark contrast, is ascribed to the creature (50If; 
563f)P  Classical views of immutability—such as those of Polanus and, to a lesser extent, of 
Augustine—tend to fall into such dualism. A key problem with dualism for Barth, as we 
have seen above, is that it denies the full reality of the concrete (i.e. Christologically- 
grounded and determined) personal relationship of God and the creature. Dualism 
undermines the truth that God loves in freedom.
For Barth, monism and dualism alike ‘arise from a failure to see that the world is 
freely posited by the divine love' (502; 564; emphasis added). Against monism, God is free 
in that God is under no obligation to create the world, nor does God change fimdamentally in
Barth’s understanding of monism, we note, would likely include contemporary advocates o f ‘panentheism,’ 
such as most process theologians. In his Gottingen Dogmatics, Barth identified ‘panentheism’ as an indulgent 
term for ‘a spiritualistic pantheism’ (Barth 1991; 430).
Unlike modem philosophers like Hegel and Process Theologians like Charles Haitshome, Barth definitely 
does not adopt an abstr act divine mutability as the comprehensive alternative to classical immutability. To 
affirm tiiis simple opposite o f immutability, would be one more example of letting a general metaphysical 
concept rule improperly over the particular, concrete realities o f God’s self-revelation.
This is an example of the ‘contrastive’ or ‘oppositional’ logic that infects the classical view (Gunton 1978: 
2ff, etc.). To define God in terms of a simple contrast with creation still fails to define God on his own terms.
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virtue of the act of creating the world. Accordingly, there is a unity and consistency in all of 
God’s acts in the world that is driven by God’s own will rather than being captive to the 
alterations of the created order (see 502ff; 565ff). Yet, against dualism, God also stands in a 
‘real history in and with the world created by him’ (502; 565). God stands in a real loving 
relation to creation in this history—a history in which he is free to alter his actions and 
attitudes in ways that conform and correspond to, and even respond to, the free acts of his 
creatures (cf. 496; 557 and 499; 561). Yet as the One who is constantly a free subject, ‘He 
himself does not alter in the alteration of his attitudes and actions’ (498; 560).^^
Now that we have seen how Barth avoids the dangers of monism and dualism, we 
may unfold more fully Barth’s own positive view of the God-world relation. Barth 
consistently claims that in whatever way God might be said to change in relation to the 
changing world, this does not change ‘God himself or the ‘being of God.’ The function of 
phrases like ‘God himself,’ ‘He himself,’ or ‘the one he is’ or ‘the Being of God’ are clarified 
when we recall that, for Barth, ‘the being of God is in Act’ (see our discussion of CD, § 28 in 
chapter 3, section 2). God is the ultimate Subject or Person, in whom there is no separation 
between his being and his act.
God’s central self-determining act is the act of God in Jesus Christ, and this act 
demonstrates the attitude or basic ‘disposition’ of God towards the created world. Therefore, 
it is in light of this constant attitude and this constant act that we are to understand God’s 
alterations in individual ‘attitudes and actions’ [Gesinnungen und Taten], When seen in this 
light, in fact, we will see that the alternations may in fact be a necessary expression of God’s 
constancy. As Eberhard Jungel says, ‘God’s being remains a being-in-act only in the 
constantly new acts of God’s self-affirmation.’^^  God remains who he is even in the realm of 
historical becoming. God does so only by ever new acts by which he corresponds to 
himself— i.Q. corresponds to his stable character or to one who he has determined himself to 
be in Jesus Christ. Therefore, the central act of God in Jesus Christ and its relationship to
For an exposition Barth’s view o f God’s ‘life’ and ‘history,’ see T. F. Torrance 1996: 240ff (of. Jungel 1976). 
This point occurs in the context of an excursus in which Barth does theological exegesis, much of it on 
biblical language about divine ‘repentance.’ In feet, Barth places a parenthetical reference to Psalm 102:26f at 
the end of the statement that we have cited above. See section 3 for further discussion.
Jiingel 1976: 88; cf. 95 and passim.
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God’s derivative acts governs and gives content to Barth’s claim that God ‘has a real history 
in and with the world created by him’ (502; 565)—a point that Barth goes on to explicate 
(513ff; 576fft. We will turn to the nature of the ‘Christological concentration’ evident in his 
doctrine of constancy in subsection 2.3.
Before we do so, we need to mention an important feature of Barth’s constructive 
view of the God-world relation. This feature is God’s gracious response to sin through the 
special history of salvation. Given the reality of the fall, we cannot conceive of God’s 
relationship to the world simply in terms of a general understanding of God as Creature and 
the world as created. Therefore, Barth does not rest content with his own statements that 
‘God has a real history in and with the world created by him‘ and that ‘God is the real subject 
of this history’ (502; 565). He must be more concrete and particular. God’s creation is not 
merely ‘creaturely,’ but is infected with sin and evil. God’s relates to the world not merely as 
its Creator, but as one who responds to its fallen condition. God is not only the world’s 
Creator (CD III) but also the Saviour of the world, that is, its Reconciler (CD IV) and 
Redeemer (what would have been CD V, had Barth finished it). In Barth’s view, God is 
constantly both (a) Creator and (b) Reconciler or Redeemer, and there is no conflict between 
the two (see 515; 579). Indeed, as Barth says several times in his treatment of constancy (and 
in the later volumes of CD), we only understand God’s work as Creator adequately when we 
understand it through and in relation to God’s work as Reconciler.^* This is an expression of 
Barth’s‘ Christological particularism’—his voluntary submission to the rule that one should 
always move from the particular reconciling acts of God (especially the act of God in Christ) 
to the general (in this case, the ‘general work’ of God in creating and preseiwing the world). 
This is very clear in Barth’s treatment of takes place in God’s special work in ‘salvation
As we have noted before, the foil justification (including the scriptural gi ounding) of the points that Barth 
makes here in II/l— especially about matters such a creation and reconciliation—will be found in the later 
volumes of CD.
^  Speaking of the particular Christological event in which the biblical language about God’s will gains its unity, 
Barth says: ‘We must deduce from its particularity what is always involved in the general relation between God 
and the world as determined and ordered by the divine will’ (521; 586). Barth can indicate this methodological 
rule in a simple phrase: ‘because in particular, in general too’ (513); ‘we/7 im Besonderen, darum auch im 
Allgemeinen’ (577). See the helpfol account of K. Tanner (2000) on the complex relationship between the 
general truths of creation and providence to the particular truths of reconciliation.
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history,’ a work that has Jesus Christ as its presupposition, centre and fulfilment (see 
subsection 3.4 below).
2.3. Divine Constancy and Christology
All that we have said so far about Barth’s understanding of God’s constancy can be 
definitively summarised and clarified by turning concretely to Jesus Christ. In accordance 
with Barth’s usual pattern in his accounts of the perfections of God, Barth closes his 
discussion of divine constancy by turning to the special significance of Jesus Christ, in whom 
we find God’s supreme self-revelation (512-522; 576-587).^^ Tn the investigation of the 
constant will and being of God we cannot go behind Jesus Christ’ (513; 577). Barth opposes 
any theology (like that of Polanus) insofar as it fails to speak of God’s constancy or 
immutability in a way that is decisively determined by the scripturally-attested revelation of 
God in Christ. Barth intends his view of constancy to be thoroughly Christocentric.
What, then, does Jesus Christ reveal to us about God’s constancy? The short answer 
is that Jesus Christ shows that God is one who constantly loves in freedom. How does God 
perform this ongoing act? In Jesus Christ, God ‘has become a creature,’ a human being, and 
this is the basis of God’s constant purpose of obtaining reconciling fellowship with the 
creature (514; 578). In Christ, we see the inter-personal content of God’s relationship with 
creation: ‘God has befriended and continually befriends fallen creation’ (515; 579). God’s 
gracious election of and faithful covenant love for a world that rejects him is the concrete 
content of God’s constancy.^”
Barth is sensitive to the fact that the striking language of God becoming a creature 
could be taken to imply that God has changed. At least according to ‘classical’ assumptions, 
this would raise a serious problem for God’s constancy (515f; 5791). If God has changed, 
then perhaps God has become less than divine. But along with the ‘older theology,’ Barth 
denies that God, or God’s being, changes in the incarnation.
‘Here too, then, we must speak finally and supremely about Him— not only as the Last, but as both the First 
and the Last—if  we are to speak correctly about the confirmation and manifestation of God’s immutable 
vitality’ (512; 576). Although this Christological discussion typically comes last in Barth’s order of 
presentation, there is a sense in which it is ‘the First’ in the sense of being methodologically prior to the rest of 
his discussion.
Bruce McCormack stresses the significance of Barth ’s Christological doctrine of gracious election (cf, II/2) 
for Barth’s doctrine of God in II/l (McCormack 2000 and 1995: 458-463; cf. Jungel 1976: 68-83).
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Such a denial begs for further explanation in the light of Barth’s strong critique of 
classical views of immutability. Barth offers two main reasons for the claim that God himself 
(in his divine being) does not change. The first is drawn significantly from traditional 
Christology and the second from his own constructive theological interpretation of Scripture.
First, Barth follows a line of thought present in traditional Chalcedonian 
Christology.^^ In this line of thought, God, in the second person of the Trinity, did not 
change into a human creature, but ‘assumed’—took upon himself—a human nature. Barth 
cites a passage from Polanus in support of the Word’s assumption of a human nature, which, 
like the divine nature of the Word, was ‘not abrogated or destroyed’ by this assumption into 
unity with the divine Word (515; 580). In other words, God freely unites himself to created 
humanity by assuming it, and, as such, the divine nature does not change. Thus, Barth 
‘qualifies’ the statement ‘God himself has become a creature’ with the following paraphrase: 
‘that is to say, he became one with the creature, with man’ (514). In this respect, Barth is 
following traditional Chalcedonian Christology.
However, from other aspects of Barth’s argument, we realise that Barth is not 
concerned to deny entirely that the incarnation expresses change in God. Rather, Barth 
denies ‘any alteration in the divine being’ in the specific sense of denying ‘any declension of 
God from himself (515).^* God does not become any less divine.^^
With McCormack, we observe that Barth is marked by ‘a highly actualistic, a posterioi Chalcedonianism’ 
(1995: 454). This means that Barth places traditional Chalcedonian terminology and forms of thought into a 
non-traditional interpretative framework. McCormack has since questioned whether it is appropriate to call 
Barth’s non-substantialist Christology ‘Chalcedonian’ at all (2002).
In other ways, Barth affirms God’s ‘alteration,’ at least in what he calls God’s ‘attitudes and actions.’ Barth 
even goes as for as to say that in being ‘the King of the ages’ (1 Tim 1:17), God ‘partakes in [the] alteration’ of 
the ages he rules over ‘so that there is something corresponding to that alteration in His own essence' (496;
557). Accordingly, in a more directly Christological passage later in the dogmatics, Barth distinguishes between 
(a) the legitimate ascription to God of a ‘determination of divine essence’ that comes from the hypostatic union, 
and (b) an illegitimate ascription o f ‘alteration’ of die divine nature through this union (IV/2,84J The 
determination of the essence is real, such that Barth can speak of the ‘profoundly unchristian conception of a 
God whose Godhead is supposed not to be affected at all by its union with humanity’ (85). But Barth’s denies 
that this constitutes any alteration or the divine nature of the Son, presumably because God, at some level, is has 
determined himself to become incarnate from eternity (see McCormack 2000 and 2002). Instead, he says, what 
is needed is to ‘think of the Godhead of God in biblical rather than pagan terms,’ that is, in ‘a kind of 
immutability that does not prevent Him from humbling Himself and therefore doing what He willed to do and 
actually did do in Jesus Christ’ (85). Given his extensive use of the Chalcedonian definition and other 
ecumenical formulations— formulations which include the use o f extra-biblical terms like ‘being,’ ‘nature,’ and 
‘essence’—Bartli is clearly thinking primarily o f biblical versus pagan ‘judgements’ rather than ‘concepts’ or 
‘conceptual terms’ (see Yeago 1994).
Barth avoids ‘kenotic’ understandings of the incarnation such as those of the 19^ ** century German theologians 
Thomasius or Gess. Dorner also took a strongly anti-kenotic line in his Christology (Dorner 1994: 5-9 and 49- 
81; see 3.5 below).
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Second, Barth goes a step beyond such classical Christology through his own creative 
Christological reading of Scripture. Barth asserts not only that God’s being does not 
fundamentally change in the incarnation, but also that God’s being is revealed in the 
incarnation in all its fullness and perfection (515; 580). This is the case even—or rather 
especially—in the humiliation, suffering and death of Christ. On the basis o f his 
interpretation of Philippians 2 (see subsection 3.3), Barth believes that God’s self-humiliation 
in the death of Jesus on the cross literally shows us what the constant God is like. As 
Eberhard Jüngel puts it, ‘God’s being is in becoming.’ That is, God freely chooses for his 
eternal constant being to be ‘ontologically localised’ in the changing, historical world of 
becoming—specifically, in the person and work of Jesus Christ.*” Because God’s being is 
constantly and eternally free and self-determining, God is free to become what he is not (a 
human creature) without ceasing to be who he is.
Traditional or classical Christology, especially the basis of its presuppositions of 
divine immutability and impassibility, tended to see the humiliation and passion of Jesus 
Christ as demonstrating or revealing the humanity of Christ (in the stage or mode of 
humiliation), but as saying little about the nature or determinations of his divinity. Barth 
however, wants to speak plainly of the real humiliation and self-offering o f God, albeit in a 
form of self-concealment (again, see his treatment of Phil 2:5ff below). This is closely 
related to God’s eternal decision to be the God who elects Jesus Clirist and all humanity in 
him. This Christological election and divine self-determination is clearly not an arbitrary 
decision unrelated to God’s eternal being. Rather, God’s constancy is about God’s being 
faithful to his self-determining election and act of self-revelation in Jesus Christ; and this act 
is God’s eternal being and will in action. So God does not change when he humbles himself 
in Christ’s suffering; rather, God is eternally the one who determines himself to do this.*^
Jiingel 1976: especially viif.
This paragraph raises a number of questions about the precise relation of the eternal Christological 
determination of God in election and the nature of God’s constancy. Among the most important is whether the 
election and incarnation ought to be regarded as an ‘expressing’ or as ‘constituting’ God’s eternal being, or 
perhaps both. See Jüngel 1976 for an interpretation of Barth’s doctrine of God that appears to see both elements 
as or more-or-less equal importance; cf. McCormack (2000 and 2002) for an interpretation that stresses the 
‘constituting’ option. While we will not resolve this question, we will return to issues related to it occasionally 
below.
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Christ thus reveals clearly what it means to say God is constant, that he has remained and will 
always remain Himself.*^
2.4. EXCURSUS: Barth and Ricoeur
The nature of Barth’s dogmatic theology resists a final resolution of certain kinds of 
questions, such as the metaphysical or ontological questions that arise in the effort to clarify 
the nature of God’s constancy.** That said, in this section we will address some of those 
philosophical issues. We will do so by turning in this excursus to the work of the 
contemporary French philosopher Paul Ricoeur in an effort to shed light on Barth’s view of 
divine constancy.
Although Ricoeur is known best for his work in hermeneutical theory, he has written 
a significant book on the question of personal identity entitled Soi-même Comme Une Autre, 
which in English is published as Oneself as Another (1992).*"^  In this work, Ricoeur develops 
his constructive account of human personal identity under the rubric o f ‘narrative identity.’** 
Although Ricoeur’s conceptions are concerned with human identity, we will inquire as to 
how they may be applied to divine identity, so long as the appropriate qualifications are 
made,*^ Our use of Ricoeui* will be in keeping with Barth’s view that philosophy (an 
expression of reason) can be employed positively to illuminate revelation, so long as it is not 
applied systematically but with due subordination to the divine Subject, who is known in 
Scripturally-attested revelation (see chapter 2).
2.4.1. A summary of Ricoeur’s understanding of narrative personal identity
The crucial backdrop to Ricoeur’s concept of personal narrative identity is what he 
calls the dialectic o f ‘sameness’ and ‘selfhood.’*^  This dialectic of Western thought results in
For an excellent statement of Barth’s thinking regarding the relationship between God’s constancy and the 
incarnation see F. W. Camfield 1947: 62f.
Barth does not spell out his ontological assumptions, nor does his language have the precision and clarity that 
would lend itself to rigorous philosophical analysis. However, it is possible to draw together the strands of an 
implicit ontology o f an appropriate kind by means of disciplined imaginative reflection on Barth’s work.
This book is based upon Ricoeur’s 1986 Gifford Lectures in Edinburgh.
For Ricoeur’s account of narrative personal identity see 1992: 113-168.
The author asked Ricoeur about the application of his ‘model’ o f personal narrative identity to God in a 
seminar at the University o f St. Andrews on June 1,2000. He expressed caution and a strong degree of 
agnosticism about what we can say about God. That said, we will attempt to show in what follows that there is 
much that Barth thinks we can say about God’s identity on the basis of revelation, and that much of it is very 
similar to what Ricoeur says about human identity.
Ricoeur 1992: 115.
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‘two major uses of the concept of identity’: (1) idem-ïàQrÉky {idem is Latin for ‘same’) and
(2) zpa^e-identity {ipse is Latin for ‘self)/* Since ‘selfhood . . .  is not sameness,’ these two 
types of identity ai e irreducibly different from each other.
Each type of identity provides a distinctive answer to the question of the selfs 
‘permanence in time.’ Idem-identity speaks of this permanence in static and ‘essentiaiisf 
categories; the identity of something is viewed as a ‘substance.’ It is thus variously expressed 
under the sameness-criteria o f ‘numerical identity,’ ‘qualitative identity’ (‘extreme 
resemblance’ or similitude) and ‘uninterrupted continuity’ within the same individual.*^ The 
last criterion opens up the possibility of genuine change within sameness, such as the organic 
development of the same oak tree from an acorn to a mature tree. Yet even here, the identity 
of the developing tree is described under the rubric of sameness, such as the invariable 
structural feature of the oak tree’s genetic code."^ ” Thus, idem-identity regards ‘change as 
happening to something that does not change' rather than regarding change as a series of 
events that actually constitute the identity of that something."*  ^ Under the rubric of sameness, 
then, this ‘something that does not change’—this unchanging essence, substance, substratum 
or ‘character’—is an individual thing’s identity, its permanence in and through time. Hence, 
idem-identity answers the question of what something or someone is.
But one can also conceive of identity or ‘permanence in time’ as ‘selfhood.’ Such 
ipse-identity takes the question “Who am I?” as its leading question. Thus, its model of 
temporal permanence is not reducible to the question of what I am or what someone is.
Under this model, personal identity consists not so much in constant character, but in 
‘faithfulness to oneself,’ especially as ‘keeping one’s word.’"^  ^ Indeed, such ‘self-constancy’ 
or ‘self-maintenance’ allows for a kind of ethical persistence through time—a holding to 
one’s words, promises, or commitments—which may coexist with radical changes in one’s 
dispositions, desires, or character."^*
Ricoeur 1992: 116.
Ricoeur 1992: 116f.
Ricoeur 1992: 117.
Ricoeur 1992: 118; emphasis added.
Ricoeur 1992: 118. 
Ricoeur 1992: 123f
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Ricoeur’s initially defines ‘character’ as ‘the set of distinctive marks which permit the 
reidentification of a human being as being the same.’'^ '^  But Ricoeui* develops this definition 
of character by reinterpreting the ‘distinctive marks’ of character ‘in terms of acquired 
disposition"'^^ As such, character "adds self-identity to the identity o f the same"^^ Thus, 
Ricoeur questions the ‘immutable status of character’ (pure idem-identity without ipse- 
identity) and expresses the "temporal dimension of character.Accordingly, Ricoeur offers 
a second definition of character that slightly revises the first: ‘the set of lasting dispositions 
by which a person is recognised.’"^*
Ricoeur continues, ‘In this way character is able to constitute the limit point where the 
problematic of ipse becomes indiscernible from that of idem, and where one is inclined not to 
distinguish them from each o t h e r . I n  this way, character points to an overlapping of ipse- 
identity and idem-identity, an overlapping that theoretically could be complete. We can see 
this overlapping to some degree in the notion that consistently keeping promises is a kind of 
disposition of character. Yet in Ricoeur’s view, to speak of actual human persons as those 
whose selfhood just is their sameness of character is a ‘confusion of idem and ipse" in which 
the self is in danger of being reduced to sameness.^®
It is at this point that Ricoeur brings his narrative account of personal identity into 
play. Narrative identity mediates sameness and selfhood, and brings together these two poles 
of the dialectic of identity in a way that allows their differences to be maintained. By means 
of a quasi-Hegelian pattern of argument, Ricoeur takes the thesis of idem-identity (i.e. 
character) and the antithesis of ipse-identity (i.e. self-maintenance as keeping one’s word) 
and variously affirms them, cancels them, and then reconstitutes them within a narrative 
‘synthesis’ (Aufhebung).^^ Narrative identity thus oscillates between:
Ricoeur 1992: 119.
Ricoeur 1992: 120; emphasis added. 
Ricoeur 1992: 119; emphasis added. 
Ricoeur 1992: 120.
Ricoeur 1992: 121; emphasis added.
Ricoeur 1992:121.
Ricoeur 1992: 124.
See Ricoeur 1992: 124 and passim. Aside fi'om the use of the ‘term’ dialectic, the Ricoeur does not explicitly 
employ the Hegelian conceptuality that we are using here to describe him.
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[i] a lower limit, where permenance m time expresses the confusion of idem and ipse; 
and [ii] an upper limit, where the ipse poses the question of its identity without the aid 
and support of the idemP
Avoiding both of these limits, narrative personal identity avoids the disappearance of the
question of ‘Who?’ into the question of ‘What?’ and vice versa. By examining the narration
of a self in time, one can arrive at a view of the identity that includes both (a) a properly
revised notion of character as ‘the “what” of the “who,”’^  ^and (b) a revised view of the self
as ‘the “who” of the “what.”’^ "^
Narrative identity is related to a revised view of character. For Ricoeur, ‘it is the
identity of the story that makes identity the identity of the c ha r ac t e r .One  important
implication of this point proceeds from Ricoeur’s observation that the integrity of a
narrative’s plot contains, and to some extent is threatened by, the discordant, ‘unforseeable
events that punctuate it,’ although such events are in some sense incorporated into the plot.^^
An implication is drawn from plot to character: ‘the contingency of the event contributes to
the [retroactive] necessity . . .  of the history of a life,’ and hence, contributes to ‘the identity
of the character.’
2.4.2. Constancy as divine personal identity of character and selfhood
Ricoeur’s work on personal narrative identity aids us in a deeper analysis of the nature 
of Barth’s understanding of God’s constancy. Most importantly, we will examine the role of 
the dialectic of sameness and selfhood, of idem-identity and ipse-identity, within Barth’s 
view. In our view, Barth's conception o f God’s constancy includes strong emphasis on both 
forms o f personal identity, while giving relative emphasis or priority to ipse-identity. (As we 
unfold this basic interpretation below, we will often ‘speak in Barth’s voice’ without actually 
citing Barth or mentioning his name.)
We may begin supporting this interpretation by recalling some of the basic ways that 
Barth defines God’s constancy (see 2.1 above). God’s ‘constancy’ is the divine perfection by 
which ‘God remains the one He is’ (491; 553). Such a definition allows for both sameness
Ricoeur 1992: 124.
Ricoeur 1992: 122.
This phrase is our own, but finds indirect support in several passages in Ricoeur 1992, such as 166f. 
Ricoeur 1992: 148.
Ricoeur 1992: 147.
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and selfhood, but puts the emphasis on the latter. That is, it stresses the “who” question, and 
answers that God is ‘the one who he is,’ or even, ‘the one who he determines himself to be.’^^  
We also recall Barth’s references to constancy as God’s life ‘in eternal self-repetition and 
self-affirmation [in ewiger Wiederholung andBestatigung seiner selbst]" (492; 553). Again, 
by stressing that God’s constancy is a kind of self-constancy, the faithfulness of God to 
himself, Barth is able to affirm ‘holy mutability’ in God. When Barth says that God himself 
does not alter in the alternation of his attitudes and actions, he seems to be referring to 
something like the stable identity of God’s unique self. While God’s self-identity includes an 
element of sameness—i.e. a consistently loving character—it is neither a predictable 
sameness, nor a sameness that is incapable of moving and being moved.^*
Ricoeur’s categories also illuminate Barth’s critique o f ‘classical immutability’^  ^and 
thereby clarify the nature of Barth’s constructive alternative to it. Such immutability 
(Unveranderlichkeit) represents the reduction o f the category ofpersonal selfhood to the 
category o f impersonal sameness. The following quotation from Ricoeur highlights the 
difference between such a reductionistic view and a view (like Baith’s) that gives ‘personal 
selfhood’ its due.
Keeping one’s word expresses a self-constancy which cannot be inscribed, as 
character was, within the dimension of something in general but solely within the 
dimension o f “who?
Ricoeur’s comment is in keeping with Barth’s methodological particularism and his related 
assertion that God, as the unique Subject, must govern all our predications of God. This 
implies that instead of relying on general a priori God-concepts, one must give due attention 
to God’s particulai* self-determinations in particular acts of self-revelation. Such particular 
acts may express a consistent pattern of character, but in themselves, they are irreducibly 
particular acts (e.g. particular promises to particular people). As such, all of God’s acts ar e
This is confii-med by Barth’s comments on Ex 3:15 (T am that I am’), one of the key proof texts for the 
classical view o f God and specifically o f God’s immutability. See CD II/l,495f (cf. 302), where Barth claims 
that the text speaks of a ‘'self-affirmation o f God’ that is consistent with God’s ‘holy mutability.’
See the similar comments of Gunton 1978: 147f.
Again, by this teim we refer especially to the view represented by Barth’s account of Polanus (see section 1 
above).
^  Ricoeur 1992: 123; emphasis added.
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‘miracles’ that are ‘completely new.’^ * Again, for Barth the “who?” question is prior to the 
“what?” question.
We can take our Ricoeui ian redescription of Barth’s view of constancy further, albeit 
now more provisionally. We do so by noting some possible parallels that exist between the 
dialectic of sameness and selfhood on the one hand, and Bmth’s dialectic of God’s love and 
freedom on the other (on the latter, see chapter 3, sections 2 and 3). God’s love, we could 
say, corresponds to God’s idem-identity: his stable, determinate character as one who loves. 
God’s freedom corresponds to God’s ipse-identity: his constant self-determination and his 
faithfiilness to himself.
If we follow these correspondences, we can, with some caution, transpose basic 
theological claims of Barth’s doctrine of God into statements made in Ricoeurian idiom.
Thus, Barth’s claim that ‘God is the One who loves in freedom’ becomes: ‘God is the One 
whose loving character exists in the context of free self-deterrnination.’ Or, Barth’s claim 
that ‘the divine predicate must be determined by the divine Subject’ becomes: ‘The meaning 
of God’s character-identity (e.g. that ‘God is loving") must be determined by God’s ipse- 
identity or unique selfhood (e.g. that "God is loving’ and ‘loves in freedom"). Indeed, 
perhaps the main emphasis of Barth’s account of God’s freedom is to stress God’s uniqueness 
and thus the inappropriateness of all general conceptions of ‘divinity’ or of the various divine 
perfections.
Constancy, which Barth classifies as a perfection of divine freedom, naturally places 
more emphasis on God’s freedom than God’s love. Yet, Barth does not develop God’s free 
self-constancy in a way that contradicts the affirmation that God has a determinate loving 
character and reveals himself as such. Indeed, we could say that we only know God’s self- 
affirming freedom by means of the acts of love that God has shown—acts which form a 
definite pattern, which form a coherent plot which witnesses to God’s consistent character.
CD II/l, 509 (see our comments in 3.4 above).
A similar dynamic is expressed by D. Bonhoeffer’s references to the priority o f the ‘who’ question over the
‘how’ question in Christology (see A. Tonance 1996: 71ff)-
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But as such, God’s character is still ‘the constancy of His knowing, willing and acting and 
therefore of His person" (495; 557)—a person or self who is inherently free^^
In what remains of this analysis or redescription of Barth’s view of constancy (under 
the dialectic of sameness and selfhood), we turn to an aspect of the question of what makes 
God’s personal identity different from  human personal identity. Following some remarks in 
an unpublished paper by Trevor Hart, we make the tentative suggestion that in God’s case 
‘idem- and ipse-identity coincide entirely, rather than being held in tension’ or threatening to 
fly apart.^ "^  The primary reason that Hart gives for this suggestion is the biblical witness to 
God’s faithfulness. Such faithfulness is appropriately, and perhaps necessarily, described 
both as ‘faithfiilness to his promises and purposes’ (ipse-identity) and as feithfulness ‘to his 
own character’ (idem-identity). Indeed, in the biblical story, such faithfulness can itself be 
seen as an expression of divine character, ‘as a virtue or disposition of character.
We can clarify and reinforce Hart’s suggestion that God’s character and self­
constancy are one and the same by appealing to Barth’s view that God alone is strictly and 
properly a ‘person.’ Barth’s reason for this view, we recall, is that only God is ‘a being in 
act’ in an unqualified sense.*^  ^As the only completely self-motivated and self-determined 
person, God’s being is completely consistent with God’s actions and vice versa. This means 
that, in some sense, God is his own decision, his own act. What all of this implies is that there 
can be no fundamental tension between any one act of God (say, his promise to redeem 
Israel) and God’s character (his love, or justice or freedom). Rather, all God’s acts 
(promises, judgements and so on) are consistent with God’s character (either as expressions 
of it or as that which forms and constitutes it). While the disruptions caused by ‘contingent 
events’ (such as the ‘fall’ of Gen 3) affect God’s life or narrative identity, they do not cause
Evidence supporting several o f the assertions in this paragraph is found in Barth’s account of the ‘Being of 
God in Freedom’ in II/l, 297-321 (see chapter 3, section 2 above). Here the similarity between Barth’s 
understanding o f freedom and his understanding of constancy is obvious, and the congruency o f both with 
Ricouer’s ipse-identity seems strong. For example, in the opening page of the section, Barth says ‘In his being 
and act God is who he is’ and ‘He is uniquely who He is’ (CD, II/l, 297).
Hart 1999b: 5.
Hart 1999b: 5. We note that Bartii himself seems to treat God’s faithfulness as a constant disposition in his 
treatment of it as the primary biblical ‘correlate’ for the theological concept of divine simplicity (see chapter 4, 
section 3). Barth would likely join Ricoeur in saying that all human expressions of faithfulness are too 
inconstant to allow for a complete overlapping of faithfulness as self-maintenance and faithfiilness as character 
(Ricoeur 1992: 124; see above).
^  CD n/1,271 (see chapter 3, section 3).
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God to act in any way that is inconsistent with who he is or inconsistent with his revealed 
character.^^
We close this section by responding to Ricoeur’s negative assessment of the 
possibility of a complete overlapping of idem-identity and ipse-identity in a person’s 
character. We have given reasons to think that this overlapping exists in God, but what are 
we to make of Ricoeur’s charge that such an overlapping (at least on the human level) 
represents the overtaking of selfhood by sameness? Simply put, while this charge may well 
apply on the human level, it is not at all clear that it would apply to God, the supremely self- 
determined one. We cannot assume that God faces a ‘problem’ of self-identity similar to the 
one that we face.^*
For Barth, God’s character is itself simultaneously marked by permanence of 
character and the flexibility of self-constancy, the flexibility by which God can freely modify 
his actions and attitudes (i.e. dispositions)—yet again, in ways that are in keeping with the 
broad patterns of what God is like. This capacity for ‘self-change’ is most striking in God’s 
relationship to his creation. For in this relationship, Barth says, God freely alters his attitudes 
and actions in ways that correspond to the contingent alterations of the created order (e.g. 
human actions). In this sense, God’s ‘contingent’ (i.e. free) actions constitute God’s 
character. Yet God’s character is not captive to ‘contingencies’ outside of himself Thus, 
there is a unique, ordered dynamic of ‘innovation and sedimentation’ in the divine life.^  ^
2.4.3. Constancy as divine narrative identity rendered in Scripture 
God’s constant personal identity is not only helpfully understood in terms of an 
integration of idem- and ipse-identity, but can also be specifically understood as a narrative 
identity. In Barth’s approach, we could say that God has a narrative identity in two main
See CD II/l, 503f, 507 (see sections 2 and 3 above at several points).
Hart 1999b: 4f.
See CD II/l, 496,499, and 506 and our discussion in section 2 above.
Accordingly, the divine constancy o f character to which Barth’s exposition appears to refer may not be 
obvious to human eyes; God sometimes appears to act ‘out of character.’ Even to the eyes of faith, theie is a 
level o f unpredictability to God’s actions. The question of how ‘surprising’ acts of God are in fact consistent 
with God’s constant set o f dispositions can often only be answered with hindsight, at a further stage in the story 
when faith becomes sight (e.g. the crucifixion in the light of the resurrection). This, indeed, is the hope of the 
Christian: that in the final eschaton, she will be able to see how all the alterations of God’s attitudes and actions 
were a part of a coherent ‘plot.’ This is the positive emphasis o f Barth’s largely noetic account of eschatological 
redemption (see 3.4 below).
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senses: the ontic sense and the noetic sense. That is, there is the narrative identity that God 
has, and the narrative identity that we understand God to have. On the ontic level, God’s life 
is a ‘history,’ and, as such, is a story that has a ‘direction’ that proceeds from a ‘beginning’ 
and to an ‘end.’^^  God has determined himself to be for us {pro nobis), and this involves a 
determinate pattern of actions in history. This self-determination may imply not only the 
self-determination of God ad extra, but also in some sense the determination of God ad 
intraJ^ On the noetic level, we come to know who God is and what God is like by means of 
the story we find in Scripture—and this is a faithful rendering of God’s ontic idenitity. We 
come to know God’s identity through Scripture, not so much in a series of propositions 
(although there are these), but in a story that is told. In this story we learn of God as an 
unsubstitutable subject or agent. Through God’s Scripturally-attested acts in the ‘economy of 
salvation’ (God ad extra, the economic trinity) we come to know God in himself (God ad 
intra, the immanent trinity). In several different respects, these observations are harmonious 
with Barth’s use of Scripture and mode of doctrinal construction in his account of God’s 
constancy and indeed with his wider approach to theology.^^ This will be confirmed 
especially by our exposition of Barth’s treatment of constancy of God in ‘salvation history’ 
(see 3.4).^ "^
3. The Role of Scripture in Barth’s Account of Divine Constancy
J.i. Introduction
At this point, we have a grasp of the main contours of Barth’s understanding of divine 
constancy and how it differs from the classical doctrine of divine immutability represented by
See T, F. Torrance 1996: 240ff. See also chapter 6 for a clarification of the concepts of time and eternity in 
Barth.
^  See our comments in section 2 above about eternal Christological election.
The following citations from secondary literatui e on Barth add credence to this claim. Ford asserts that 
‘constancy is a concept which develops the interpretation o f the Bible as rendering one subject" (1985: 161; 
emphasis added). Hunsinger notes that ‘the ground on which [Barth’s] Christology takes shape here is much 
closer to “narratology,” or the study o f narrative structures and sti ategies, than it is to metaphysics’ (2000: 137). 
Both Kelsey and Frei speak of Barth as employing scriptural narrative to form identity descriptions of Jesus 
Christ (and/or God) by rendering him an agent (Kelsey 1999: 39-40 and Frei 1992: 90).
New Testament scholar Richard Bauckham, in his book God Crucified (1999), presents a view of Christology 
under the rubric of divine personal identity that draws indirectly on Ricoeur. Bauckham’s way of interpreting 
Scripture is similar to Barth’s in various ways and indicates in some respects what Barth’s account of constancy 
might have looked like if  he had more openly employed the conceptuality o f ‘identity’ (which came into its own 
only after his death). The convergence between Barth and Bauckham is especially evident in their interpretation 
o f Phil 2 (see Bauckham 1998: 56-61 and 3.3 below).
199
Polanus and others. We will now develop a fuller answer to the question of why Barth’s way 
of doing theology causes him to depart from this classical view in the way that he does. We 
have already gone some way towards an answer by making reference to his particularism, 
and specifically in saying that it is Christocentric particularism. Barth’s view of constancy, 
unlike that of classical immutability, arises out o f ‘Cliristological concentration’ in which 
God’s act in Christ is the epistemological basis and hermeneutical centre for what we say 
about God. But, if we apply the method of particularism rigorously to our understanding of 
Barth’s particularism itself, then we must be still more specific or concrete about what 
methodological Christocentrism involves for him. Thus, we must reflect on the particular 
theological practices that Barth engages in order to, as it were, ‘put him in contact’ with the 
Christological particulars of God’s self-revelation. The most important of all such practices 
is the reverent theological interpretation and use of Scripture in theology.
Accordingly, we will now develop the distinctly scriptural (and, as such, exegetical or 
hermeneutical) aspect of Barth’s particularism in his account of God’s constancy—an aspect 
of Barth’s work that has been implicit in sections 1 and 2 above. Barth’s Christocentrism is 
basically a Christocentrism that aiises out of Scripture, albeit a distinctive (and 
Christological) theological way of reading Scripture.M ore generally, we will see that 
Barth’s critique of classical immutability and his alternative to it are to great extent driven by 
his engagement with Scripture.
Barth’s small-print excursuses in CD often provide exegetical substantiation for the 
dogmatic claims Barth makes in large-print.^^ At least in his treatment of constancy, Barth’s 
theological engagement with Scripture in these excursuses takes three different forms 
according to the level at which Barth engages with the Biblical text. These three forms of the 
function of Scripture in Barth’s dogmatics correspond to the next three subsections of the
The role of Scripture stands out as an independent feature of his theological method in some ways more 
important than his Christocentrism. Indeed, from one point o f view, his Christocenfrism is a sub-category o f the 
priority that he gives to testimony o f Scripture, for Scripture is the primary source and basis for Barth’s poitrait 
of who Christ is. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that that this primary source is his Christocentric reading of 
Scripture.
Indeed, in his preface to CD, Barth calls the Scripture passages in the excursuses a pointer to the ‘real ground 
text’ of all that he wants to say (I/l, Thompson tr., 1936, ix; Bromiley’s translation in the 1975 edition refers to 
Scripture here as ‘the basic text,’ xii). We note that although Barth also engages Scripture in his main print 
discussion of constancy, we will focus on his engagement with Scripture in his fine-print excursuses.
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chapter, where examples of each of the three forms will be treated. First and most commonly, 
Barth cites a group of specific passages that he has collected in a catena or group to make a 
particular point. In such cases, Barth often quotes important passages in full, but rarely 
engages in any detailed exegetical comments on any one of them (see 3.2). Second, and 
more rarely (only once in his treatment of constancy), Barth undertakes a rather extensive 
theological exegesis of a single passage and draws doctrinal conclusions from it (see 3.3). In 
the third, Barth engages in a form of theological exegesis in which primary reference is made 
not to particular biblical texts, but rather to larger biblical themes or patterns (see 3.4).
3.2. A Topical Grouping o f Texts: the Question of Divine * Repentance*
We now turn to an example of the first and most common form of Barth’s 
engagement with Scripture in Ins section on constancy—a grouping of texts related to a 
single theological i s s u e . O u r  example is Barth’s treatment of biblical texts, primarily from 
the Old Testament, that variously affirm or deny divine ‘repentance’ or that God ‘changes his 
mind.’ Barth’s engagement with these texts related to God’s repentance occur in the context 
of a four-page excursus in which Barth presents scriptural evidence against God’s nature 
being ‘motionless’ or absolutely immutable and for  God’s ‘holy mutability’ (495-99; 557- 
561). Apart from rather schematic comments, Barth does not discuss most of the passages 
that he cites or quotes on the matter of divine repentance, apparently regarding it sufficient to 
let the biblical texts ‘speak for themselves.’ This is probably related to Barth’s view that, in 
theological exegesis, the interpreter’s primary calling is to listen for a ‘witness to God’s 
word’ that is conjoined to God’s own capacity for self-witness.^*
Barth’s use of his selected texts on divine repentance falls into two groups. First, 
there are those passages that Barth believes to have been misread by proponents of the 
classical understanding of immutability—misunderstandings that Barth goes on to correct. 
Second, there are passages that Barth uses to develop his own constructive understanding of
Other examples of this form of a ‘catena’ pertaining to a specific topic are: God not growing weary in 
redemption (504f), God’s response to prayer (510%  or the passages h aditionally taken to support a doctrine of 
the divine ‘decree’ or ‘decrees’ (520f).
See Barth 1936: 177. Barth speaks of God’s capacity for self-witness in the section on constancy when he 
speaks of Polanus’ failui'e to give ear to ‘the God who attests Himself in His revelation’ (492; 554).
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God’s constancy. These passages were often not considered relevant by the classical writers 
on immutability. We will consider these two kinds of passages in turn.
First then, Barth’s critiques and corrects classical misreadings of biblical passages.
He deals with two kinds of misreadings: (1) those misreadings in which a passage is wrongly 
taken to support a classical version of absolute immutability;^^ and (2) those misreadings that 
obfuscate the meaning of a text that could prove contraiy to the classical view.*  ^ In both 
cases, Barth charges that classical interpreters misread Scripture on the basis of a priori 
philosophical assumptions about what God must be like.
One of several passages that Barth regar ds as having been misconstrued as evidence 
for absolute immutability is Malachi 3:6. In this text, the God of Israel declares, T the Lord 
change not.’ Barth points out that when this passage is read in its context, we see that the 
Lord is being contrasted with the Israelites. But the contrast between God and Israel in this 
passage is primarily a moral contrast between God’s consistently good and holy character 
and Israel’s ‘wicked inconstancy’ or ‘unholy mutability’ (496; 558). Therefore, Mai 3:6 
cannot rightly be used to support the classical view’s metaphysical assumption of a 
‘mathematical sameness’ in God’s being.** By this phrase, Barth refers to the tendency of 
classical views of immutability to regard all distinctions in God’s being and action as mere 
accidents of our perception (see the problem o f ‘nominalism’ and ‘semi-nominalism’ 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4). To do so, Barth says, is to uphold the God of Platonism, the 
God who is basically without life, word, or act. This is emphatically not the personal God of 
the Bible. God’s faithfulness to his moral nature and his covenant promises is not the same 
as the abstract Platonic immutability and Mai 3:6 cannot be used as a proof-text for the latter.
The first such passage he actually considers here is Exodus 3:14, a passage that became a sort of locus 
classicus for classical understanding of God. Barth claims that we cannot distil a motionless ipsum ens, or 
Being Itself, fi'om this passage. To do so, is to wrongly separate God’s self-declaration here from its context, in 
which God ‘approaches Moses and Israel and deals with both in a very definite mannei ’ in time and space 
(495f).
The first text he considers of this kind is the divine title ‘King of the ages’ from I Tim 1:17. Barth says that 
although God is above all ages as their Lord, as such he must ‘partake of their alteration, so that there is 
something corresponding to that alteration in His own essence’ (496), In this context, Barth says that there is 
such a thing as the ‘holy mutability o f God.’ As King o f the ages, God is constant, but he is constant in every 
change.
Barth is using ‘mathematical’ here and elsewhere in a loose sense for its rhetorical associations. But he is 
also implicitly resisting the Cartesian geometric model of knowledge and asserting that it is inappropriate for 
Theology.
2 0 2
Falling under the second category of ‘obfuscated texts’ are several Old Testament
passages which directly state that God ‘repented’ or ‘changed his mind’ (such as Gen 6:6f,
Gen 18:20ff, Ex 32:9ff). These texts, which could have served as counter-evidence to an
extreme understanding of God’s immutability, were instead interpreted figuratively as
instances of anthropomorphism. In a vigorous response, Barth declares, ‘Biblical thinking
about God would rather submit to confusion with the grossest anthropomorphism
[Anthropopathismus] than to confusion with a God who is absolutely immutable and thus
immobile’ (496; 558). Barth concludes his discussion by saying:
It would be most unwise, then, to try to understand what the Bible says about God’s 
repentance as if it were merely figurative \als nur bildlich]. For what truth is denoted 
by the “figure” [Bild\ if we are not to deny that there is an underlying truth? (498;
560; emphasis added).
Barth wishes to press into the ‘underlying truth’ pregnant within these texts. When Scripture 
says that God changed or repented, we cannot explain it away in terms of changes in 
humanity. Even if we concede that the Bible presents us with ‘figures’ or ‘pictures’ o f God, 
these figures or pictures surely stand for something about God that changes. Barth tends to 
read passages ‘literally’—even ‘anthropomorphically’—rather than ‘figuratively,’ at least 
when ‘figurative’ reading obfuscates the plain sense of the Bible.
With this hermeneutical rule in place, Barth considers the apparent contradiction 
between biblical passages that variously deny and affirm that God repents or changes his 
mind. Barth considers Numbers 23:19 in which God says ‘I am not a son of man that he 
should repent’ (or, in an alternate translation, ‘should change his mind’) and relates it to the 
passages in which God is said to repent (such as Gen 6:6f, Gen 18:20ff and Ex 32:9ff). Barth 
affirms with the classical view that these passages are indeed consistent with one another. 
However, in contrast to the classical view, he states that this consistency cannot be gained by 
giving definite priority to the passages that deny God’s repentance, writing off the force of 
the others as anthropomorphism. Instead, Barth wants to take both kinds of passages equally 
seriously, and, in this case, as equally literal or proper speech—as eigentlich rather than 
uneigentliche Rede (see 496; 558).*^
CD, II/l translates both uneigentliche (558) and bildlich (560) with the term ‘figuiative’ (KD, II/l, 496 and 
498 respectively),
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The theological result of Barth’s interpretation is that, according to Scripture, there is
some sense in which God really does repent and another sense in which God really does not
repent. God remains self-constant (‘He remains himself) even in the alteration of his attitude
and actions. Yet God is not ‘self-limited to an inflexible immobility’ that ‘deprives God of
the capacity to alter His attitudes and actions’ (498; 560). To say that would be to deny that
God is constantly free, and freedom is one of God’s unchangmg perfections! Rather, God’s
self-constancy is flexible, allowing for ‘holy mutability’—for ‘something corresponding’ to
the ‘alteration’ of the world ‘in his own essence’ (496; 557f).
How God can be said to be both mutable and immutable is clarified by Barth’s
employment of two biblical passages as positive ground for his view. We select these two
passages (Ps 18:25ff and Jer 18:1-10) because, if we read between the lines, they serve to
unlock the apparent deadlock which faces us initially in trying to reconcile the various
passages pertinent to divine repentance. They do so by showing how the biblical view of
God’s constancy is not only consistent with a kind of divine mutability but actually requires
it.*^  Barth chooses to quote these two passages in full and to juxtapose them with the other
biblical passages he quotes. In this way Barth brings these passages (which classical
interpreters apparently neglected) into fruitful ‘conversation’ with the other passages he
considers, albeit with only a minimum of commentary.
The first passage is Psalm 18:25ff, which reads as follows (NRSV):
With the loyal you show yourself loyal; with the blameless you show yourself 
blameless; with the pure your show yourself pure; with the crooked you show 
yourself perverse [or ‘shrewd,’ NIV]. For you deliver a humble people, but the 
haughty eyes you bring down.
Barth wishes to ensure that we do not explain away the force of this passage through
improper ‘figurative’ readings of it: ‘It is not . . .  a figurative [uneigentliche) but a strictly
literal [eigentlich] statement, and one which does not contradict but bears testimony to the
constancy of God.’ (496; 558). Again: ‘This is really the way that the immutable and as such
the living God acted.’ Barth does not spell out what is it about the content of this passage
Barth does not explicitly say this, nor does he refer to these passages as ‘hermeneutical keys’ this is clearly 
our own interpretation of these passages. This is our attempt to dig below the surface level o f Barth’s prose for 
the ‘deep literal sense’ of what he says, including why he quotes certain biblical passages and why he arranges 
those quotations in a certain order.
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that is so important. But we may safely assume that it is that God consistently acts in ways 
that appropriately correspond to human actions, whether bad or good. This means that 
God’s constancy is marked by an ‘elasticity [Elastizitat]" (496; 558) that allows God to act in 
different ways at different times. Indeed, if God is to be constantly righteous in response to 
human inconstancy, he must be ‘elastic’ in this way.
Barth appears to draw a similar message from another biblical passage, Jeremiah 
18:1-10 (quoted on 497; 559; cf. Amos 7:1-6, which Barth also quotes here). This is a 
passage in which God describes himself as the potter and Israel as the clay in his hands.
Verses 7 and 8 are especially pertinent, for in these verses the Lord refers to his ability to 
change his mind:
At one moment I may declare concerning a nation or a kingdom, that I will pluck up 
and break down and destroy it, but if that nation, concerning which I have spoken, 
turns from evil, I will change my mind about the disaster that I intended to bring upon 
it(Jer 18:7f;NRSV).
The passage goes on to describe how God will also repent in the case of the reverse scenario, 
in which God originally intended good for a nation, but finds it doing evil. In this case, God 
will ‘repent’ and bring judgement upon them.*'* Again, God’s personal and moral constancy 
is such that it actually requires changes, and the changes are orderly and consistent.
We have seen how Psalm 18 and Jeremiah 18 can be understood as ‘hermeneutical 
keys’ for Barth’s understanding of the biblical witness to God’s constancy, even though Barth 
does not spell out explicitly the logical connections between these texts and his dogmatic 
conclusions. But with disciplined hermeneutical imagination, these texts speak of one way in 
which Barth might ‘consistently’ and appropriately couple change with constancy in the 
being of God. For according to Psalm 18 and Jeremiah 18, God can and does change his 
attitudes and actions with respect to specific nations or persons. God does not change 
arbitrarily, but in conformity with constant patterns of relating to human action. According to 
God’s unchanging moral nature, God consistently responds to human obedience with blessing 
and to human sinfulness with opposition and judgement.
^  Cf. Joel 2:13 and Jonah 4:2, where God is called one who ‘repents of evil’ (of. Barth, 498).
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Barth’s biblical view of God’s constancy allows for divine repentance and mutability. 
But more must be said about God’s concrete and consistent patterns of relating to humanity, 
and how these are related to Scripture as a whole, as it is united in Jesus Christ. This is the 
very task Barth takes up in the latter part of his excursus (497fF; 559ffy.
Barth says, Tt should be noted that in both Amos and Jeremiah the two possibilities of 
divine repentance are put in a definite order’ (497; 559). In saying this, Barth refers to the 
possibilities of God repenting from intended evil and repenting from intended good. He 
points out how the former ‘gracious’ possibility is consistently listed first and is given the 
overall emphasis in both Jer 18 and Amos 7, and draws attention to a similar pattern in a host 
of other passages.*^ In the Bible, ‘the repentance in which God repents of evil’ always has ‘a 
position of advantage or preponderance over that other repentance,’ and ‘this preponderance 
may be observed even in Ps 18:25^ (498; 560). Barth appropriately employs this 
comprehensive biblical pattern to establish the following dogmatic point. In God’s actions 
towards us, there is a constant priority given to God’s gracious ‘Yes’ over the ‘No’ of his 
judgement or ‘chiding’ (497ff; 559ff). As such, one side of Barth’s theological application of 
these passages is to emphasise God as the one who is constantly loving and gracious, the one 
who "loves in freedom.’*^
We conclude this subsection with some comments on how what Barth has said about 
divine repentance relates to his Christocentrism. While Barth does not explicitly refer to 
Jesus Christ in this discussion, Christ is no doubt on his mind. We could say that Barth’s 
drawing out of the pattern of the priority of God’s gracious repentance over his judging 
repentance is in some sense a Christological reading of the Bible. But the priority of God’s
Barth cites Jer 26: 2-3, 13,19; 36:3; 42:10; Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2. In the New Testament, he cites and j
comments on Rom 9:21ff, which picks up the potter and clay imagery from Jer 18, and Rom 11:29 (498; 559f).
As such, Barth is quite content to speak of what we might call ‘internally-motivated’ changes in God, in a way )
that Polanus would not. More specifically, God freely changes his attitudes and actions without changing i
himself. Polanus, we recall, had ruled out any such change on the basis o f it violating a strict classical I
understanding o f God’s absolute unity or simplicity. Barth has already critiqued such an understanding of God |
in his treatment of the perfection of divine ‘unity’ (see chapter 4).
Indeed, Barth’s views of divine unity and constancy are closely related (as are his views o f eternity). i
David Ford rightly notes that ‘constancy is a concept which expands on God’s unity and so develops the |
interpretation of the Bible as rendering one subject’ (Ford 1985: 161). This means avoiding any sense o f i
dualism internal to God’s being in which an unchanging aspect of God stands opposed to a changing aspect (as |
if  there were two subjects in conflict in God). However difficult it is to grasp, Barth would want to say that any }
internal distinctions in God are hannoniously united with each other, in a way similar to the unity and plurality 
implied in God being Triune.
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grace no doubt finds support in the individual texts he cites in their contexts—including those 
of the Old Testament. Indeed, we could say that in Barth’s engagement with Scripture, there 
is a tacit Christological construal of various texts. But such construal is by no means 
imposed on those texts (as a ‘hard reading’) but is carefiilly drawn out of them in terms of 
their own ‘resources.’ Later on Barth simply makes explicit what was hitherto tacit. He says 
that all divine reconciliation and revelation are the execution and fulfilment of ‘one fixed’ 
decision (505; 567; cf. 521f; 586f). He also identifies that ‘one fixed divine decision’ with 
God’s gracious election in Jesus Christ, as attested in Scripture. Such a ‘reading’ seems to 
make the most sense of Barth’s earlier discussion of the concrete order and preponderance of 
grace in divine repentance. Accordingly, it is in Christ that we find the supreme basis for the 
key claim that God is constant as the one whose Being is in Act and as the one who loves in 
freedom. This Christological ground forms a basic perspective or framework for Barth’s 
engagement with particular biblical texts. When God changes in his attitude or actions, he 
changes in faithfulness to his own constant attitude of holy, reconciling love that is rooted in 
his election of Jesus Christ and all humanity in him.
In this sense it is appropriate to describe Barth’s theological exegesis, even of the Old 
Testament, as ‘Christocentric’ exegesis. This is so, even though we have been able to 
summarise much of Barth’s discussion of Old Testament texts on divine repentance without 
mentioning Christ. This fact shows that Barth’s exegesis is ‘Christocentric,’ not in a sense 
that requires explicit reference to Christ, but in the sense that his effort to discern the 
theological import of the verbal sense of the text is affected by an implicit relation to Christ j
as the centre of Scripture. For Barth, the God known in Christ is the central subject matter to j
which all biblical texts refer at some level, including texts about God’s repentance and non- |
repentance. |
3.3. Exegesis o f a Single Passage: Barth on Philippians 2:5-11 \
In this subsection, we turn to Barth’s treatment, in an important excursus, of |
Philippians 2:5-11.*^ This excursus occurs within a larger discussion o f the significance of i
Christ for understanding God’s constancy. To foreshadow something of the doctrinal import |
We note that when Barth wrote this passage in II/l, he had already written (in 1928) a commentary on the 
book of Philippians (Barth 2002).
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that Barth wishes to draw out of his engagement with Phil 2, we begin by quoting the passage 
that immediately precedes it.
The incarnation not only does not mean any curtailment of compromising of the 
immutable divine nature, but ..  .it means the revelation of it in its perfection, a 
perfection which we recognise in God the Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer only 
because he is the God revealed, present and active in the God-manhood of Jesus 
Christ (5161; 580; emphasis added).
In keeping with this basic Christological thesis, Barth’s exposition of Phil 2:5ff aims to show
the nature of Christ’s voluntary self-humiliation (‘he emptied himself,’ v. 7). He says the
incarnation is an act in which Jesus Christ is and reveals himself to be truly divine while at
the same time concealing his true divinity before sinful human eyes. Barth’s exegesis of Phil
2 provides part of the basis for Barth’s claim that Christ’s self-humiliation reveals the
character of God’s constant and immutable purpose and being.
Barth begins by recounting the narrative pattern of Phil 2:7-9. ‘Jesus Christ emptied
himself, taking the form of a servant, going about in the likeness of man . . .  and that as such
He humbled Himself, becoming obedient to death, even the death of the cross’ (516; 580).
Here and elsewhere in his exposition, Barth considers the claims Paul makes to be
commensurable with the claims of post-biblical theologians (see chapter 4, subsection 3.3).
Accordingly, he claims that ‘like the older theology’ Paul ‘did not believe that . . .  Jesus
Christ surrendered, lost, or even curtailed his deity.’ Barth appeals to v. 6 as his reason: ‘For
[Jesus] did it all ev morphë theou huparchôn, being in the form of God.’ Barth goes on to
make the following exegetical observation about Clu'ist’s self-emptying against the view of
the so called ‘kenoticists.’ Christ’s self-emptying is a voluntary ‘veiling’ of his deity to
humans (a noetic veiling) without any diminution of his deity (his ontic constancy).
The self-emptying does not refer to his divine being. It refers in a negative sense to 
the fact of that he did not consider or treat his equality with God as His one exclusive 
possibility. . . Positively His self-emptying refers to the fact that, without detracting 
from His being in the form of God, He was able and willing to assume the form of a 
servant and go about in the likeness of man, so that the creature would know him only 
as a creature, and he alone could know himself as God. In other words, He was ready 
to accept a position in which He could not be known in the world as God, but His 
divine glory was concealed from the world (516; 580; emphasis added).
In this passage, we see that Christ shows forth the freedom of God—a freedom that, through
Chi ist, God exercised in love through his act of self-emptying. In this way, Christ ‘did what
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man does not do because he is a sinner,’ namely, ‘He was obedient unto death.’ Not only so, 
‘he took upon Himself. . .  the curse and punishment over the rebellion which He had not 
Himself committed.’ But none of this has anything to do with ‘a surrender or loss of His 
deity.’ Rather, Christ in his self-humiliation is a true and perfect enactment of the constant 
‘free love’ of God, which ‘is the one true God himself (517; 582).
But most human observers of a man being crucified on Golgotha know none of this; 
God’s self-concealment of his deity in the humiliation of Jesus Christ veils it from their eyes. 
Since God has done this, God is free to do this; God’s freedom is the transcendental condition 
of the former fact. God is free to become a creature who is known to others only as a 
creature and to do this without becoming any less divine.
With this point established, Barth turns to an exposition of w . 9-11, which begins 
with the decisive phrase, "Therefore God also highly exalted him’ (NRSV). In Barth’s 
words,
[T]he exaltation of Jesus Christ by the power of God, and therefore the revelation of 
the divine form hidden under the form of a servant, is not introduced with a 
Nevertheless or an And but with a Therefore. The name Kyrios does not belong to 
him in spite o f the fact that the self-offering and concealment of God took place in 
Jesus Christ, but just because it took place. Because he emptied and humbled himself 
this name is His as His resurrection reveals (517; 581; emphasis added).
In his usual ‘frigal’ style, Barth repeats this passage’s motif in several variations and as such 
brings it into relationship both with another New Testament text related to the humiliation of 
Jesus Christ (Mt 11:28Q and with the inadequate Christological doctrine of the ‘older 
theology’ of the Protestant scholastics (517; 58 If). Barth perceives in the text here is 
expressed well in what he elsewhere calls a ‘teleologically ordered dialectic’ (236; 266) in 
which ‘veiling occurs for the purpose of unveiling.’** Barth is not alluding to a purely non­
temporal, symmetrical dialectic here, but to an ontic dialectic in which God’s self­
concealment exists as the necessary prelude to God’s self-revelation and in which the latter is 
the purpose of the former. The humility of Christ’s life and death exists for (and makes 
possible) the exaltation of his resurrection, ascension and heavenly session. In this we see 
that Barth’s dialectical thinking is significantly constrained by the ordered temporal pattern of
The later phrase comes from McCormack 1995: 460. See our general comments on dialectic in chapter 1, 
section 4.
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the gospel story—the narrative of Jesus’ life, death and resurrection, of his humiliation and
exaltation. Thus, the same acts by which God hides himself in Jesus Christ also bring about
God’s full and perfect self-revelation in Jesus Christ.
The truth is that it is by the incarnation that God has revealed his truly immutable 
being as free love in the perfection in which, on the basis of the incarnation, we 
recognise it again and find it confirmed in His acts as Creator, Reconciler and 
Redeemer. God is “immutably” the one whose reality is seen in His condescension in 
Jesus Christ. ..  He is not a God who is what he is in a majesty behind this 
condescension, behind the cross on Golgotha. On the contrary, the cross of Golgotha 
is itself the divine majesty, and all the “exaltation” necessary on account of his deity 
(i.e. the revelation of what He is) can reveal only . . .  that God on high is the One who 
was able and willing and in fact did condescend so completely to us in His Son. This 
free love is the one true God Himself (517; 58If; emphasis added).
In this passage we see that Barth enjoins upon dogmatics the task of rigorously revising all its
theological conceptions of divinity, exaltation and constancy in the light of the definitive self-
revelation of God in Jesus Christ attested in Scripture. Abandoning all a priori concepts of
God, the theologian can only add his humble and obedient ‘ acknowledgement and
confirmation’ to what God has already done in Christ (517; 581). Barth concludes,*^
All statements about God and His exaltation which omit or deviate from this [i.e. 
God’s humility in Christ] deny and violate His constancy. . .  We must not forget that 
the only reason why the name of Jesus is “the name above every other name” [v. 9], 
the name of God’s glory itself, is that it is the name of him who humbled and emptied 
himself (517; 582; emphasis added).
We close this subsection on Phil 2:5-11 with a consideration of two questions. First, 
how does this instance of Barth’s theological interpretation of Scripture fit into his larger 
dogmatic argument regarding constancy? Second, in what sense can Barth’s theological 
interpretation of Phil 2:5-11 be regarded as exegesis of the verbal sense of this passage?
In answer to the first question, we have seen how Barth’s exposition of Phil 2 
functions not only to underscore but also to ground the major motifs and claims of the main 
text. As such, the placement of this engagement with Scripture within an excursus cannot 
mean that its contribution is peripheral or unimportant. Rather, without such a concrete 
exegetical excursus, several of Barth’s claims could appear rather more like the general a 
priori conceptions of God that he so vigorously attacks. Part of the decisive Christological
This is the conclusion of his main argument in the excursus. Barth follows this with an important appendix in 
parentheses about the ‘practical significance’ of Phil 2:5ff, especially regarding 2:1-4.
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basis for Barth’s central claims on constancy is found in this exegetical excursus. For 
example, Barth’s theological exegesis of Phil 2 provides a key basis for Barth’s claim that, 
despite sinful human opposition to God, ‘God has befriended and continually befriends fallen 
creation’ (515; 579). This exegesis also shows us how God is both perfectly free (free to 
become what he is not, without ceasing to be who he is) and perfectly loving (loving as the 
God who humbles himself in order to seek and establish fellowship with sinners).
Our second question concerns in what sense Barth’s theological inteipretation of Phil 
2:5-11 can be regarded as a ‘proper’ exegesis of the verbal sense of Scriptuie. In other 
words, did Barth really get the theological judgements (not necessarily the concepts or 
terminology) that he makes here from ‘exegesis’ (i.e. from the biblical text), or are they rather 
the product of his own creative ‘eisegesis’ (i.e. reading into the text)? This is a crucial 
question for assessing Barth’s degree of adherence to the Reformation’s scripture principle.
It is also extraordinarily difficult to answer. That said, we offer the following tentative 
comments.
Barth’s theological claims about the self-humiliation of the constant God are not the 
straightforward result of an exegesis of Phil 2 along, taken in isolation from other texts. 
Rather, Barth’s exposition assumes a whole group of specific claims about matters such as 
the nature of the person of Christ, Christ’s relation to the Father, and about the nature of the 
revelation by which we know these things. These ‘Christological’ claims cannot be simply 
extracted from Philippians 2—even if they find a degree of support there—but require a 
certain ‘ruled reading’ of the canon of Scripture as a whole.^ ** If Barth’s exposition is to be 
called exegesis, then it must be regarded as canonical exegesis—exegesis not of an individual 
text in isolation, but of that text in the context of other biblical texts. When Barth is 
interpreting Phil 2, he is tacitly assuming certain exegetical conclusions about a whole host of 
other texts and their contexts. To a large extent this is true of all exegesis, even that of the 
‘historrcal-critics, ’ but it is of more obvious significance in an avowedly ‘theological’ 
exegesis such as Barth’s.
^ Other dogmatic or doctrinal claims, such as the Nicene homoousion, may be regarded more naturally as 
results o f the theological exegesis of Phil 2 and related passages (see Yeago 1994).
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With these observations in mind, it would seem that the conclusions that Barth 
reaches regarding God’s constancy are generally the result of legitimate but indirect relations 
between (a) Scripture as a whole and (b) Barth’s dogmatic practice. At this point, we can 
note three typical features of such indirect relations. (1) First, they are typically 
‘Christocentric’ in character, offering an overall ‘construal’ or ‘ruled reading’ of scripture 
that has its centre in the person and work of Christ, even in the case of passages where no 
direct reference to Christ is made (e.g. in the Old Testament passages regarding divine 
repentance discussed above in 3.2). (2) Second, the indirect relation between Scripture and 
dogmatics is frequently mediated by tradition (e.g. the Chalcedonian creed and subsequent 
reflection on it clearly influenced Barth’s understanding of Phil 2). We do not have a 
situation in which ‘Barth and his Bible’ produce dogmatic conclusions on their own, in a kind 
of hermeneutical vacuum. Rather, we have a situation in which Barth was guided by and 
immersed in Christian traditions of exegesis and doctrine. (3) Thii d, such mediating 
tradition, however, is ever-changing and always open to a process whereby engagement with 
Scripture exercises an abiding critical and constructive pressure upon tradition and its 
dogmatic results (e.g. Barth was able to critique certain understandings of Chalcedon and 
move beyond them).^* Thus, some of the traditions that Barth inherits and shapes— 
themselves often being traditions of biblical interpretation—arise out of the biblical text and 
are constantly open to the Scripture as their ultimate ‘norming norm.’ The next subsection 
will explore the indirect relations between Scripture and doctrine more fully.
3.4. Themes and Patterns: an Excursus on * Salvation History*
We observed above (in 3.1) that a third form of Barth’s theological exegesis is one in 
which Barth makes primary reference, not to particular biblical texts, but rather to larger 
biblical themes or patterns. In this subsection, we highlight such indirect fimctions of 
Scripture within another excursus that Barth placed within his treatment of constancy.
See McCormack 2002. We could also note here that Barth’s exposition of Phil 2 constitutes an implicit but 
significant critique o f the traditional Protestant orthodox view o f the two states of Christ. The traditional view 
regards the humiliation and glory as more or less consecutive states or stages in Christ’s action. Barth, by 
contrast, regards them as two aspects that coexist simultaneously over the whole course o f the history o f Jesus 
(on the noetic level, there is a consecutive element for Barth: transition from veiling to unveiling). For Barth’s 
fuller treatment of these matters, see IV/1, §59. Cf. Berkouwer 1956: 297-397 (especially 3 16f on Phil 2 and the 
‘two states’) for an insightful exposition and critique of Barth’s view. See also Hunsinger 2000: 141 f.
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In this excursus, Barth highlights the ‘peculiar characteristics’ of the biblical ‘history 
of salvation’ (Heilsgeschichte) as a clear manifestation that there is ‘a special act of God’ that 
stands over against the act of creation considered in itself (cf. 506-512; 569-576). This gives 
Barth an opportunity to speak about God’s constancy from the point of view all of God’s 
gracious works ad extra^^
Although Barth refers to particular biblical texts relatively frequently in this 
excursus,^^ he usually does so basically to illustrate larger biblical patterns of 
Heilsgeschichte^'^ He does not discuss any one passage in detail. Rather, Barth focuses on 
the main ‘acts of God’ in history, namely, creation (including preservation), reconciliation 
(covenant and atonement) and redemption (eschatology). He particularly attends to the 
relationships that exist between these acts in an effort to show the nature of God’s 
constancy.
God’s constancy is evident in his unchanging gracious disposition towards creation 
expressed in one covenant with humanity that Jesus Christ fulfils. We will show at the end 
of this subsection that this gracious way of relating to humanity is rooted in God’s eternal 
decision to elect humanity in Christ. But for now we need only to note that, since God’s 
constancy is not an inflexible concept of immutability, Baith is also concerned to speak of the 
genuine ‘newness’ of the divine acts of reconciliation and redemption over against creation. 
Thus, there is a kind of dialectic between two perspectives on God’s gracious relationship to 
humanity: (1) God’s way of relatmg to humanity construed as a single act (which expresses 
the unchanging stability of God’s works) and (2) God’s way of relating to humanity 
construed as a narrative plot marked by a series of distinct, new acts (which expresses the 
free, and unpredictable vitality of God’s ways).^^
^ Herbert Hartwell says that despite the standard English translation ‘history o f salvation,’ Heilsgeschichte 
actually ‘embraces . .  .God’s entire gracious dealing with man from eternity to eternity’ (1964: 38, n. 45).
He refers to particular verses about 18 times, 11 times in his treatment of prayer (51 Off; 574fif).
Kelsey overstates when he says: ‘The identification o f biblical narrative with Heilsgeschichte is expressly 
rejected by Barth’ (1999: 50). That said, Kelsey’s over-generali;^tion does point to the cautions that Barth 
sometimes raises about ‘salvation history’ construed in a certain way (cf. CD, 1/2, 12f)*
Barth later speaks of reconciliation, or the ‘covenant fulfilled in the atonement,’ as the ‘center’ o f the 
Christian message and the doctrine of creation and doctrine of the last things as the ‘circumference’ of that 
message (CD, IV/1, 3).
See CD IV /1,22-43.
See Hunsinger’s similar analysis o f ‘two temporal perspectives’ involved in Barth’s doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit (2000: 173ffl.
213
Barth unfolds the flexible constancy of God in relation to Heilsgeschichte m five key 
stages. In these five stages, Barth speaks of the relationship between God and the human 
creature in progressively more specific terms.
(1) First, Barth speaks of the fact that, after the fall, God begins to have special
relations with humanity, rather than merely general relations with humanity as part of
creation (see 507; 570). God remains ‘the Creator and Preserver of the whole world . ..  But
as such reveals Himself and acts in this new reality’ (507; 570). Barth regards this new post-
lapsarian working of God as representing an advance over the work of God in creation alone.
God is [now] more living, because more definite, than the God of Gen 1-2. And He 
has turned more intimately to the creature than before. Something other and greater 
than creation has taken place. It is so much greater that the dangerous saying is 
forced to our lips: felix culpa, quae talem et tantum meruit redemptorem. And in this 
different and greater thing we see nothing but the glory of the Creator and creation, 
forfeited by us and now for the first time revealed. (507; 570; emphasis added).^*
Barth will return to this idea of the ‘happy sin’ as he continues his exposition.In the kind of
dialectical language evident in the above quote (e.g. the dialectic of newness/continuity),
Barth speaks of the relationship between God’s work of creation and his work of
reconciliation in Heilsgeschichte.
(2) Second, Barth states that ‘the special act of God in this new work consists in the 
fact that in these dealings God does not disdain to enter into a kind of partnership [ein Art 
Partnerschaft] with man’ (507; 570). In other words, God’s relationship with humanity is, 
more concretely, a personal I-Thou relationship and thus a covenant relationship (although 
Barth does not employ these terms here). Barth continues, ‘In Genesis 1-2 it is only God who 
speaks,’ but ‘ftom Genesis 3 there is a human reply’ (507; 570f). Barth appeals to 
Abraham’s intercession for Sodom (Gen 18:20fl), Jacob’s wrestling with the angel of the 
Lord (Gen 32:33ff), and the ‘picture of God in the parable of the unjust judge’ (Luke 18: Iff) 
as illustrations of this theme of human partnership with God and response to God (507; 571). 
Barth speaks of God as being willing to enter into a ‘confr ontation [GegenüberY with 
humans. In that confrontation, human freedom, even when it is misused, ‘is taken seriously.’
^ Barth cites the Latin phrase (‘happy sin . . . ’) from the Roman Missal, Litui'gy for the Saturday before Easter 
Day (507; 570).
See Ford 1981: 161.
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In the one course [einen Zug\ of the divine action there is not only the divine 
predestination [Vorherbestimmung], but also a human self-determination [Selbst- 
bestimmung]; not only the divine faithfulness [Treue] but also human faith [Glauben]; 
not only God’s command and promise, but also the question of obedience and trust 
(508; 571).
In this one ‘course’ or ‘train’ of action, then, ‘God’s freedom, . .  includes the freedom of the 
creature.’ God’s special act (or couise of action) in Heilsgeschichte thus as emerges as a 
gracious work of God, which again leads Barth to make reference to the felix culpa (‘happy 
sin’).'""
(3) According to Barth, the peculiar characteristics of God’s work of salvation appear 
thirdly in ‘the fact that from the very outset and in all its stages, the history of salvation is 
based on a choice \Auswahl\." That choice is the choice of God to communicate and have 
partnership with ‘specific men who are marked ou t . . .  by God himself (508; 571). Barth 
mentions Abel, Noah, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob as examples of such ‘special children of 
God’ whom God chose as partners (508; 572). There is a biblical pattern of ‘continual 
selection and separation in Israel. . .  and even within the Church itself’ Such election does 
not contradict the universal scope of God’s grace and reconciliation.***' Rather, ‘it is just in 
this way’ of election of particular people that God ‘wills that all men will be saved’ (I Tim 
2:4). The triumph and sheer gratuity of the grace by which God wills to save humanity 
would not be evident ‘if the relation between God and all men were uniform’ (508; 571).
And again, in God’s free election of particular people, God has not become other than the one 
He is. He remains the God who constantly loves in freedom. God’s free election is another 
manifestation of the special work of God in history that surpasses the work of creation but 
also reveals the true nature of creation (see 508; 572).
(4) Fourth, Barth highlights the miraculous character of God’s second or saving work. 
He says the following of this second work: its ‘occurrence, acceptance by men and its effect 
on them are always accompanied by the sign of the miraculous’ (509; 572). Barth adds that 
although God’s reconciling work occurs in ‘the sphere and context’ of creation, ‘it is on each
Barth’s affirmation of this combination of supreme divine freedom and deiivative, but corresponding to, 
human freedom is related to his rejection of both monism and dualism’s misunderstandings God’s free and 
loving relationship with creation other than himself (see 2.2 above).
Barth’s quotes Mt 5:45 and I Tim 2:4 to highlight this point.
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occasion something completely new." It follows other events, but it does not follow from \
them. By means o f ‘interruption and annulment’ God’s saving Heilsgeschichte establishes a
"new continuity" with the created order that precedes it.***^
For Barth, the miraculous work of God does not speak so much of an ‘ontic’ or
‘ontological’ disruption of the created order (and hence standing in tension with God’s
‘other’ work of creation), but is construed primarily in ‘noetic’ or ‘revelational’ terms. So he
says: ‘Again, miracle is simply the revelation of the divine glory otherwise liidden from us,
on the strength of which we can believe and honour Him elsewhere as Creator and Lord’
(509; 573). Whether or not this is a proper reading of Scriptuie, this interpretation of miracle
allows Barth to maintain more easily the conviction that God remains constant in all his
actions. Barth again allows his particular reading of the scriptural witness to indirectly
authorise his doctrinal conclusions regarding divine constancy.
(5) Fifth, and finally, Barth makes the point, to which he has alluded before, that
‘creation itself gains new depth and perspective’ in the revelation of God that is constituted
by the new act of God in reconciliation (509; 573). All creation is seen in the light of the
‘distinction and connection between the reconciliation which is to be received here and now
in faith and the redemption which is to be revealed one day beyond’ (509; 573; emphasis
added). Here, Barth first brings into focus the eschatological dimension of salvation history.
Again, Barth regards what is new about this ‘eschatological work’ of God in a primarily
noetic or epistemological way, which allows it to be part of God’s one unified act of
salvation, which, in turn clearly preserves God’s constancy. Thus, Barth says that the
distinction between reconciliation (‘the now’) and redemption (‘the not yet’) is most correctly
stated as the distinction between:
this life and this world [i] in the form and manner in which they are known to us here, 
and [ii] in the form and manner of their perfection in which they are known to God 
alone, but will one day be known to us also hereafter; that is, in the form and manner 
of the kingdom of God which will then be manifested and seen absolutely, exclusively 
and without any contradiction (509; 573; bracketed numerals and emphasis added).
In this context, Barth employs the nature/giace distinction in his own distinctive way. ‘Grace is the secret 
behind nature, the hidden meaning of nature’ (509; 572). Again, he says, ‘there is in natur e more than nature’ 
and ‘Nature becomes the theatre of grace, and grace is manifested as Lordship over nature, and therefore in 
freedom over against it.’
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As such, creation is not abolished by this new work of reconciliation, and reconciliation is not 
abolished by redemption.***  ^ Rather, the principle is that ‘earlier’ works of God gain ‘new 
depth and perspective’ through the ‘subsequent’ works. As such, creation, reconciliation and 
redemption are actions within the one central act of God ad extra, that is, the act in which 
God elects to be and is pro nobis (for us) as the One who loves in freedom. As such, we 
encounter the implicit dialectic between the single-act perspective and the multiple-act 
perspective in Barth’s view of God’s relationship to creation and its history (see 2.2 above).
This concludes our exposition of Barth’s survey of ‘history of salvation’ in its five 
‘modes’ or ‘moments.’ This exposition attests to the indirect authorising function of 
Scripture over Barth’s doctrine of God’s constancy. Barth offers a particular narrative 
construal of the Bible that grounds and confirms his view that God is marked by a flexible 
constancy in his works ad extra. This view, in turn, is indirectly a reason for saying that God 
is constant ad intra (for Barth believes that God’s being in act ad extra are a true revelation 
of God’s being in act ad intra). We now turn to some further comments about the 
Christocentric character of Barth’s construal of salvation history and how this relates to his 
use of Scripture.
We observed at the end of 3.3 that Barth’s indirect way of authorising his doctrine of 
God is typically Cliristocentric in one way or another.***"* Sometimes, as with Barth’s 
treatment of the biblical texts and patterns regarding God’s repentance (3.2 above), the 
Christocentrism is indirect or implicit. This is again the case here; Barth nowhere names the 
name of Jesus Christ in his treatment of salvation history in this excursus. However, the 
implicit or tacit presence of a Christocentric perspective is again evident, and this time more 
strongly than it was above. As Barth clarifies in this main text after his excursus on salvation 
history, God’s constancy in the ‘history of salvation’ is manifested most clearly in the single 
act of God in Christ (512ff; 576ff).***^  This single act is mysteriously present in five specific
The revelation of God in reconciliation in turn gives birth to a ‘living hope’ (1 Pet 1:3) that expectantly 
awaits the final revelation of God (510; 573). In this sense, Barth can speak o f the fact that ‘God is our coming 
Redeemer’ as ‘a special element in God’s constant life’ and must be recognised as such by the believer.
Barth gives eloquent testimony to his own understanding of Christocentrism in a brief excursus earlier in IF 1 
(320).
‘The meaning and secret of the creation and preservation of the world is revealed in the history o f salvation. 
But the meaning and secret of the history o f salvation itself is Jesus Christ’ (512; 576).
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‘acts’ we explained above. These various works of God—whether in past, present, or 
future—can only be ‘anticipations’ or ‘repetitions’ of what God does in the single work or act 
of Christ in history.
Thus, Barth’s Christocentrism itself is related to the single-act and multiple-act 
dialectic that we noted above. The paradoxical ‘logic’ of this dialectic can be illuminated by 
what Hunsinger calls the pattern o f ‘dialectical inclusion.’ In this ‘trinitarian’ conceptual 
pattern, frequent in Barth’s doctrine of God, the ‘whole is understood to be included in the 
part without rendering the other parts superfluous.’ ®^^ In this case, the whole or single act of 
God’s grace in Christ is included in each one of the diverse acts (e.g. creation, reconciliation, 
and redemption) in a way that does not render the other acts superfluous. On one level, the 
distinct acts of creation, reconcilation, and redemption each play a distinct special role even 
though on another level each is simply a ‘repetition’ of the same single act of God’s grace 
towards humanity in Christ. Since God’s being is in act, God’s trinitarian being is in a 
parallel way marked by both simplicity and diversity, by constancy and change.
Underlying the ‘whole act’ or ‘single act’ perspective is God’s single eternal decision 
to elect humanity in Christ. In this way Christological election can be understood as the 
essential presupposition of or beghining of all God’s gracious, covenantal acts ad extra, not 
to mention shaping the contours of God’s being in act.^ ®^  Accordingly, Barth concludes his 
discussion of constaiîcy with an excursus that opposes the abstract, non-Christological 
understanding of God’s immutable will as a decretum absolutum (519-522; 583-587). In this 
excursus, Barth shows how the Reformed scholastics tended to ignore the concrete context of 
the passages ahout God’s will that they cited to support their view. Above all they failed to 
see how God’s will toward creation is united in and determined by Jesus Christ.
We conclude this section with an observation about Barth’s Christocentrism that 
applies to his whole account of divine constancy, not only the account of salvation history he 
gives within it. Since Scripture is the primary source for Barth’s understanding of who Christ 
is, Barth critiques the theological tradition of classical immutability primarily on the basis of
Hunsinger 1991: 86; cf. 56; lOTffand Hunsinger 2000: 174f.
McCormack (1995:460ff) argues that Barth’s Christological view o f election has a determining effect on 
Barth’s account o f the Being o f God in 11/1, even though he had not yet written II/2, where this Christological 
view is developed.
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the testimony of Scripture as he understands it. Likewise, it is Scripture, even more than the 
Christological dogmas of the Cliristian tradition, that is ultimately the primary determining 
norm behind his development of a Christocentric doctrine of God’s constancy as an 
alternative to the classical doctrine.
5.5. EXCURSUS: Barth and Dorner
We conclude this chapter with an excursus on the theological relationship that exists 
between Barth and the German theologian and doctrinal historian Isaak August Domer 
(1809-1884)^®  ^especially as it beais upon Barth’s doctrine of constancy. Near the beginning 
of his treatment of divine constancy, Barth comments, ‘Those who know his essay will 
recognise as they read this subsection how much I owe to Domer’s inspiration’ (493; 554).^ ®^  
Barth refers here to ‘Dorner’s great essay’ on divine ‘immutability’ in which, Barth says, 
Domer understood the immutable God as the tiiune God who is living m himself and ‘has 
made this clear in a way that is illuminating for the whole doctrine of God.’ In this case, 
Barth clearly recognises Dorner’s influence upon him, although this recognition is not always 
present in respect to other areas in which Dorner may have influenced him.
Two recent articles by Robert Sherman (1997) and Matthias Gockel (2000) 
respectively have explored this question of how much Barth does in fact owe to Domer in 
respect to divine immutability or constancy.*^® Earlier, both Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart 
Pannenberg had said that Domer influenced Barth to speak of three ‘modes of being’ rather 
than three ‘persons. ’ * * ^
Note that Dorner’s name can be abbreviated either J.A. Dorner (German) or LA. Domer (English).
The essay to which Barth refers is ‘Über die richtige Fassung des dogmatishen Begriffe der 
Unveranderlichkeit Gottes,’ which first appeared in three subsequent issues of the Jahrbuch fur deutsche 
Theologie in the years 1856-1858 and was later included in Dorner’s Gesammelte Schriften aus dent Gebeit der 
systematischen Theologie, 1883. An English translation of this essay, with an introduction, has recently been 
provided by Robert R. Williams and Claude Welch under the title Divine Immutability—a Critical 
Consideration (cited as Domer 1994).
Both Sherman and Gockel came independently to the conclusion that Domer provides a historical and 
theological link between the doctrines o f God provided by Schleiermacher and Barth, although they understand 
the nature of this link somewhat differently. Although Gockel’s article was published several years after 
Sherman’s, Gockel notes in a footnote tliat Sherman’s article was published cfter the completion of his 
(Gockel’s) study (Gockel 2000:491, n. 4). For the most part, Sherman follows Williams’s view o f the 
relationship between Schleiermacher, Domer and Barth, while Gockel does not (see Williams 1986 and his 
introduction to Dorner 1994). See also the additional secondary literature, both English and German, cited by 
Sherman and Gockel.
See Moltmann (1981: 139,241f) and Pannenberg (1980:99f and 1991:295ff). These authors refer to 
Dorner’s ti eatment of the Trinity in his System der christlichen Glaubenslehre (the ET is found in Dorner 1897: 
433ff)‘ Barth makes no explicit reference to Domer in his treatment of the Trinity in I /l .
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In the remainder of this excursus, we will not attempt to resolve the daunting 
historical task of trying to distinguish between that which is a genuine ‘influence’ of Dorner 
upon Barth and that which is merely an accidental correspondence or similarity between 
them. However we resolve this question, there are clearly many strong similarities between 
Barth and Dorner, including several to which other scholars have not yet attended.
In what follows, we wish to provide an introductory survey of various ‘points of 
contact’ between Barth and Domer, some showing striking similarity and others showing 
contrast. We will focus on those points of contact relevant to our thesis topic, namely, those 
which bear upon either the ‘doctrine of God’ or upon ‘theological method.’ Part of the 
evidence will be drawn from secondary sources and part will be drawn from our own 
research. In this survey we will distinguish thi'ee kinds of evidence: (1) evidence from 
Barth’s explicit references to Dorner, (2) evidence from ‘literæ*y correspondences’ between 
Barth and Dorner, and (3) evidence from more general similarities of thought or method.
First, Barth makes explicit references to Dorner on several occasions. In his 
Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, Barth gives a largely positive interpretation 
of Dorner,^ but makes no reference to his treatment of immutability. In his prolegomena 
volumes to CD Baifh cites Domer several times. In these references (which bear more 
directly upon Dorner’s theological method), Barth groups Dorner together with other 
nineteenth century theologians, and evaluates him in a largely negative l i g h t . F o r  one thing, 
Barth believes that Dorner and his contemporaries are ‘too much impelled by a mere 
acceptance of the achievements of contemporary philosophy,’ which in Dorner’s case is 
primarily German idealism. But in his doctrine of God, Barth’s comments are positive, 
both within his general treatment of the perfections in §29^ ^  ^and in relation to divine
Barth 2002: 563-573.
This may be because Barth had not yet read Dorner’s essay. The lectures on the nineteenth century (on 
which Barth’s 1972 book was based) were given in 1932-33 and 11/1 was published in 1939 (see Barth 2002: xii 
and Sherman 1997: 393f).
See I/l, 276; 1/2, 615f and 830.
‘‘^1/1,276.
On Dorner’s relationship to Schelling and Idealist philosophy in general (Hegel, Fichte, etc.), see Robert F. 
Brown, ‘Schelling and Domer on Divine Immutability’ Journal o f  the American Academy o f  Religion, 53/2, 
June 1986,237-249.
Barth cites Dorner earlier in his doctrine of God (11/1, 330; 371f) for resisting nominalism along with a 
couple o f his contemporaries.
220
constancy in §31 (as cited above). We will explore the nature and causes of these divergent 
evaluations below.
Second, there are what we can call ‘literary correspondences’ between Dorner and 
Barth. In respect to divine constancy, many of these correspondences (e.g. similar phrasing, 
similar scriptural references, etc.) are surveyed well by Sherman. We have also noted 
some of additional correspondences in Barth’s doctrine of divine unity (see chapter 4). In 
general, it appears that these correspondences provide evidence that Barth was influenced by 
Dorner in ways beyond what his explicit comments or citations verify.
Third, there are general similarities or correspondences between the ideas or 
approaches of Domer and Barth. For example, both of them attempt to develop a ‘flexible,’ 
‘personal’ and largely ‘ non-substantialist’ conception of immutability which allows God to 
relate to the changing world but to do so in a way that is constant, faithful and reliable. 
However, they develop these ideas in different ways. Dorner has a concept o f ‘ethical 
immutability’ in which ‘the ethical’ (as a roughly Kantian category) creates a kind of 
continuity between God and humanity, and thus between God and the world. * Rather than 
being marked by such a specific conception of God’s ethical immutability, Barth rather 
places a greater emphasis on God’s personal freedom and transcendence in relation to the 
world. In fact, Dorner appears to arrive at the three modes of being from a conception of 
God’s ethical essence by means of a Hegelian logical derivation, which, at least on the face 
of it, is quite opposed to Barth’s particularism and actualism.*^^ Despite these differences, 
Domer frequently displays a concem to ground his theological judgements in Scripture, much 
as Barth does.^^^
How can we summarise this diverse evidence in order to offer a concise comparison 
of Barth and Dorner? In respect to the doctrine of God, it is clear that important elements of 
Barth’s critique of and alternative to classical immutability were already taken up by Dorner, 
even though Barth also makes a distinctive contribution that goes beyond Dorner. Dorner
1997: 393-396.
See Williams 1986; cf. Gockel 2000: 505.
See Sherman 1997: 398 and Gockel 2000: 505f. 
See Dorner 1994: 171 f; cf. Gockel 2000: 503f. 
‘22 See Sherman 1997: 397f, 400f.
‘22 See Sherman 1997: 389,396.
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made a clear break from the classical view and recovered something of a more biblical view 
of God’s immutability or constancy. Barth develops these Biblical features fiirther, with an 
emphasis on God’s freedom. Dorner displays a more a specifically ethical conception of God 
influenced by modern anthropocentrism and idealism (e.g. Kant, Schleiermacher, Hegel and 
Schelling). That Barth is not entirely free from such influences, however, is evident in his 
conceiving of God along the idealistic lines of an absolute self-identical S u b j e c t .T h e  
lingering question is whether or not Barth’s use of modern conceptuality, albeit a use less 
heavy-handed than Dorner’s, is genuinely subordinate to the revelation attested in 
Scripture.
This last question leads to the further question of how we should compare the 
theological methods of Dorner and Barth. Specifically, how do they compare in their use of 
Scripture, tradition and reason? Dorner’s own statement of his theological method is 
perhaps clearest in his System o f Christian Doctrine, first published in German in 1879-80. 
There it is clear that Christian faith is the basic postulate and source of dogmatics or Christian 
doctrine. Dorner believed that dogmatics proceeded from this basis in faith by means of 
both ‘science’ {Wissenschaft^ (which relates to the use of reason) and ‘religion’ (which 
includes the use of church tradition and Scripture).Although Dorner believed that faith 
involved objective knowledge of God’s reality, this starting point is still too 
anthropocentric for Barth, who wished to begin with the Word of God itself. Further,
Barth would regard Dorner’s uncritical theological use of general concepts like ‘science’ and 
‘religion as highly problematic, even though he might recognize that Dorner aimed to be 
sensitive to the particularities of revelation.
‘2^  ^See Moltmann 1981: 139ff and Pannenberg 1991: 295ff. See also our related comments and citations in 
Chapter 3, section 1.
‘22 We could develop this question as follows. To what extent does Barth’s doctrine of constancy, despite its 
self-proclaimed biblical roots, still derive from this modern philosophical heritage? If we accept that no 
theologian can entirely escape having a philosophy or philosophical influences (see Barth’s own affiimation of 
this in CD VI, 727-736), could we say that Barth’s particular employment of Idealist and modem philosophy 
happens to be more consistent with the Bible on divine constancy than the ‘classical’ philosophical heritage 
was? That is, does it represent as positive theological use of ‘reason’ that actually improves one’s ability to read 
and interpret the biblical texts, and gives one more insight into them?
Dorner 1897: 31-187.
‘22 Dorner 1994: 13Of; see Sherman 1997: 389f.
‘2^  See Barth 2002:264f, where he stresses Dorner’s improvement over Schleiermacher on this point.
‘2^  See Pannenberg’s helpfiil reflections on these matters (1991:43ff and 126ff)>
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The two theologians somewhat differing uses of Scripture, tradition and reason of the 
are marked by both similarities and differences. Though he understands Scripture mainly as 
an expression of the faith of the primitive church, Dorner shows a high degree of reverence 
for Scripture. In fact, in his comments on ‘dogmatic method,’ Dorner says that faith ‘has by 
Scripture to continually approve itself as C h r i s t i a n .A g a in  in a way similar to Barth, 
Dorner also displays respect for the theological traditions (creeds and confessions) of the 
church, although they are always subordinate to S cr ip tu re .The  methodological differences 
between Barth and Dorner are most clear in respect to their uses of reason. Although Domer 
presents critiques of figures like Schleiermacher, Hegel and Schelling, he also appropriates 
much from them, showing himself to be very much a man of his time. Accordingly, he is apt 
to refers to the ideas coloured by the culture of his day as expressions o f ‘the universal 
consciousness of God’ or ‘the common reason of man.’^^  ^ Although Barth is by no means 
exempt from such intellectual influences (not least in relationship to Dorner himself!), he is 
more careful to subordinate philosophical ideas and concepts to revelation. This is evident in 
Barth’s typical avoidance of general concepts of human experience, religion or reason such as 
those that marked Dorner’s work.
In conclusion, despite his explicit and implicit reservations about Dorner, Barth 
regards Domer as having risen above most of his contemporaries in his capacity to articulate 
the unique reality of God. Barth’s doctrine of God bears the undeniable mai*k of Dorner’s 
legacy. The precise character of his influence on Barth will no doubt be the subject of fixture 
studies.
‘20 Dorner 1897: 170; cf. 175f. 
‘2‘ Dorner 1897: 175ff.
‘22 Dorner 1897: 170.
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Chapter 6: Barth’s Doctrine of Divine Eternity
In this chapter we will examine Barth’s account of Eternity in CD 11/1. This chapter is 
structured according to the same three-fold pattern we employed in chapters 4 and 5: (1) 
Barth’s presentation and critique of classical views, (2) Barth’s alternative view, (3) the role of 
Scripture in Barth’s argument.
Despite its similar structure, three factors will distinguish our expository analysis in this 
chapter from our considerations of divine unity and constancy in the last two chapters. First, 
Barth’s view of eternity and the related issue of God’s relation to time has been the subject of 
a great deal of secondary literature, which contrasts sharply with the relative dearth of material 
on his view of God’s simplicity or constancy. We will therefore give relatively more attention 
to the description and evaluation of such literature in this chapter. Second, even more than his 
accounts of God’s simplicity or constancy, Barth’s view of eternity is marked by a great deal 
of complexity. This complexity has led to a great deal of interpretative confiision, aspects of 
which we will expose and resolve below. Third, the question of God’s eternity and its relation 
to time is discussed much more frequently than either simplicity or constancy in other volumes 
of the CD. Thus, this chapter relates more easily to the larger themes and issues of the CD.' 
That said, this chapter treats in detail only the relevant section on eternity in volume 11/1 (608- 
640; 685-722).
1. Barth’s Presentation and Critique of Classical Views of Timeless Eternity
1.1. Accounts o f God*s Eternity in Distinction from Earthly Time
After some introductory remarks on what eternity is (to which we will turn in section 2 
below), Barth turns to an exposition of one aspect of eternity, that aspect which distinguishes 
it from time. In an excursus, Barth cites three classical theologians who represent the
‘ George Hunsinger says the following about Barth’s unique views of time and eternity: ‘No topic in Barth |
interpretation is more in need o f clarification, and none more requires working with the Church Dogtnatics as I
a whole, than this one’ (1991: 14). The following parts of CD offer the most extensive discussions o f time and }
eternity: I/l, §1 l ( ‘The Eternal Son’); 1/2 §14 ( ‘The Time o f Revelation’); II/l, §31.3 (‘Eternity and Glory,’ our |
focus in this chapter) and II1/2, §47 (‘Man in his Time’). Roberts 1979 and Colwell 1989 consider all o f these |
passages and others relatively comprehensively. :
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patristic, medieval and Protestant orthodox periods respectively (608; 686). Barth quotes
two passages from Augustine, which can be translated as follows:
Eternity is the very substance of God, who contains nothing changeable; there, nothing 
is past, as though it no longer existed; nothing is future, as though it did not yet exist. 
There, there is nothing except “is.”^
He was, because he never was not; he will be, because he will never not be; he is, 
because he always is.^
Then, Barth quotes the following passage from Anselm.
So it is not the case that yesterday you were and tomorrow you will be; rather, 
yesterday, today and tomorrow you are. In fact, it is not even the case that yesterday, 
today and tomorrow you are. Rather, you are simply out of time altogether. But you, 
although nothing exists without you, do not exist in a place or a time; rather, all things 
exist in you. For nothing contains you, but you contain all things.''
Finally, Barth cites the definition of eternity given by his favourite Reformed scholastic,
Amandus Polanus.
The eternity of God is the essential property of God, through which it is indicated that 
God is not bounded by any time and has neither any beginning in time nor any end of 
existence, but is earlier than every time and later than every end, and, absolutely 
without succession, always exists in his entirety at the same moment.^
At this stage in his argument, Barth cites these passages without significant criticism, letting
them stand as a traditional testimony that confirms the primary biblical testimony to the ‘clear
antithesis’ that exists between the eternity of the Creator and the time of the creature (608;
686).
Later in his argument, however, Barth gives a mixed review to the affirmations on 
eternity offered by these classical writers. On the one hand, the perspective on eternity 
represented by Augustine, Anselm and Polanus is found wanting because it expresses only 
part of the truth of God’s eternity—namely, eternity in its ‘negative’ aspect, its distinction 
from time. But on the other hand, this ‘part-truth of the concept of eternity in Augustine and 
Anselm’ is an important part-truth, for it shows the irreversible priority, freedom and 
transcendence of the eternity of God in relation to time (614f; 693).
2 Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. (on Psalm 101:2, 10), as cited by Barth in Latin on II/l, 608; 686. Unless otherwise 
noted, English translations from the Latin in this chapter are provided by Harry M. Hine of School of Latin 
and Greek, University of St Andrews.
2 Augustine, Joann. Tract. 99, as cited by Barth on 608; 686.
 ^Proslogion 19, as cited by Barth 608; 686. Translation from Ansehn 1995: 112.
2 Polanus, Synt. Theol. Chr., 1609. col. 928, as cited by Barth on 608; 686.
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L2. The Classic Boethian Definition of Eternity and Its Interpretative Legacy
Another classical writer, the sixth century philosopher-theologian Boethius, offers a
definition of eternity that ‘goes farther and deeper than the statements of Augustine and
Anselm, which are far too occupied with the confrontation between eternity and time’ (610;
688). For Boethius, ‘Eternity is the total, simultaneous and perfect possession of interminable
life.’^  This definition, as Barth interprets it, captures well the ‘positive quality of eternity’
which allows the biblical writers to speak of God as possessing ‘years and days’ (see section 3
below). As such, the definition is capable of speaking of a view of eternity that includes time.^
Barth notes, however, that ‘although later this statement of Boethius was constantly
quoted as authoritative it was never properly exploited’ (61 Of; 688). He continues, ‘We can
see this clearly in its defence by Thomas Aquinas, which is obviously only partially convinced
and certainly only partially convincing.’  ^ Indeed, Barth refers to a statement that Boethius
makes elsewhere (cited by Aquinas) that resists the positive potential of his own definition:
‘The flowing instant {nunc fluens) produces time and the abiding instant {nunc stans)
eternity.’^  For Barth, ‘it is not sufficient to contrast [eternity] as the nunc stans with the nunc
fluens of time’ (611 ; 689).'® Rather, ‘The interpretation of aeternitas by the posessio vitae
and thepossesio vitae by the nunc [‘the instant,’ ‘the now’] is correct.’ For Barth,
[T]he concept of the divine nunc must not exclude the time prior to and after the 
“now,” the past and the future, nor may it exclude the fluere [the flowing]. On the 
contrary, it must include it no less than the stare [the static]. Eternity is the nunc that 
is not subject to the distinctions between the past, present, and fiiture. But again, it is 
not subject to the abolition of these distinctions. The usual way of treating the concept 
of eternity in theological tradition leads to the dangerous position that there appears to 
be no eternity if there is no time . . . and that there appears to be no knowledge of 
eternity except through time, in the form of a negation of the concept of time: in 
cognitionem aeternitatis oportet nos venire per tempus (611; 689).
The Latin phrase in the last line of this quotation presents a kind of methodological rule
provided by Aquinas. It can be translated: ‘we can only come to know eternity by way of
*2 Boethius, De Comolatio Philosophiae 5.6; translation from Hunsinger 2000: 199.
2 Placher notes, ‘“life” seems to be an obviously temporal category,’ even though it speaks of a different kind of
life (God’s life) and thus a ‘different kind of time’ (1994: 31).
2 Barth refers to Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae la, 10 (esp. article 1).
 ^Boethius De Trin 4, as cited in Summa Theologiae la, 10, 2 (obj. 1); translation from Aquinas 1964 [vol. 2]:
139.
See Hunsinger 2000: 186ff on this traditional distinction between the two senses of ‘now’ {nunc).
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time.’" This rule arguably stands in opposition to Barth’s rule that the divine Subject must
give content to the predicates of God, for they are the perfections of this Subject alone. As
we have seen in earlier chapters, Barth’s methodological particularism runs up against the
abstract, a priori conceptions of God that result from conceiving of God as the opposite or
contrast to the created order.Accordingly, Barth states:
[W]e know eternity primarily and properly {eigentlich\, not by the negation of the 
concept of time, but by the knowledge of God as the possessor interminabilis vitae 
[possessor of interminable or unlimited life]. It is He who is the nunc, the pure 
present. He would be this even if there were no such thing as time. He is this before 
and beyond all time and equally before and beyond all non-temporality [Nicht- 
Zeitlichkeit] , . .  The theological concept o f eternity must be set from the Babylonian 
captivity o f an abstract opposite to the concept o f time}^
1.3. Classical Contributions Towards a View o f Eternity that Includes Time
According to Barth, however, classical writers like Aquinas were sometimes able to 
break out of their captivity to an abstract, negative view of eternity. Thus, Barth cites with 
approbation Aquinas’ statement: ‘Verbs of different tenses are used of God, not as though he 
varied from present to past to future, but because his eternity comprehends {includit) all 
phases of time {omnia tempord)3^^ For Aquinas to speak of such ‘inclusion’ of temporality 
within eternity, Barth thinks, ‘clearly denotes a positive relation to time that is the special 
possession of eternity’ (613; 691). But Aquinas only hints at this positive relation between 
time and eternity—a relation which Barth says ‘must be brought into greater prominence than 
in the older theology’ (see section 2). The older theologians were aware of ‘this positive 
meaning of the concept of eternity,’ denoting it by the term sempiternitas, but they did not 
give it the stress it deserves. ‘For, rightly understood, the statement that God is eternal teUs 
us what God is, not what He is not.’ Barth’s positive comments on Aquinas are thus qualified
“ Summa Theologiae, la, 10, 1; translation from Aquinas 1964 [vol. 2]: 135.
'2 See Camfield 1947: 70 and Gunton 1978: 2ff.
‘2 II/l, 611; 689; italics in last sentence added. The distinction between the two senses o f eternity here is 
parallel to the primary (positive) and secondary (negative) senses of divine freedom in general (see chapter 3, 
subsection 2.3.1).
Summa Theologiae la, 10,2; translation from Aquinas 1964 [vol. 2]: 141. Barth also cites several other 
passages from Aquinas in this context (612; 691). E.g., Barth quotes without criticism Aquinas’ distinction 
between eternity (as defined by Boethius) and time (as defined by Aristotle) as follows: ‘eternity is an 
instantaneous whole {totum simul\, whilst in time there is before and after’ {Summa Theologiae la, 10,4; 
translation from Aquinas 1964 [vol. 2]: 145).
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by Barth’s disapproval of the weight Aquinas gave to the via negativa and to the related 
methodological rule that we must learn of eternity only on the basis of time.'^
Barth can also cite Polanus with qualified approbation. Baith quotes the following 
statement of Polanus on the ordering of the Father, Son and Spirit within God’s eternity: ‘This 
principle of order is not excluded by eternity, nor is it opposed to eternity’ (see 615; 694).'® 
According to Barth, Polanus is surely correct to say that this Trinitarian ‘principle of order’ is 
not excluded from eternity. But then Barth critiques Polanus’ tendency to fall prey to the 
contrastive, negative logic of much of the classical tradition: ‘But it is not enough to 
distinguish this principium ordinis [the principle of order] . . . from the principium temporis 
[the temporal principle],’ for ‘this principium ordinis is clearly identical with a principium 
temporis in God himself (615; 694). What this means for Barth will be clarified in section 2, 
but at this point it suffices for us simply to show that Barth was intentionally qualifying the 
classical tradition here. Again, Barth desires to develop a view of God’s eternity that is still 
more inclusive of time than the classical theologians allowed. Boethius, Aquinas and Polanus 
occasionally make affirmations that moved in this direction, but they do not go far enough.
In addition, Barth cites a passage from Augustine as a precedent for the view that 
eternity includes a genuine, but unique, kind of temporality within it. Augustine writes: ‘For 
the years of God are not one thing and God himself another thing, but the eternity of God is 
the years of God.’'^  This is significant for Barth because Augustine here allows God as the 
self-revealing Subject to determine what eternity means, rather than taking an a priori view of 
eternity and making God fit into it. Accordingly, Augustine’s statement suggests that the 
theologian should accept the biblical affirmations of God’s temporality as saying something 
about the nature of God’s eternity rather than being merely instances of figurative 
anthropomorphism. This is an important dimension of the view that Barth wishes to develop 
(see especially section 3 below).
‘2 See our comments on Barth’s rejection of the via negativa in chapter 3, subsection 3.3.
Polanus 1609, col. 929, as quoted by Barth (615; 694). Translation provided by Hany M. Hine and modified 
by the author.
‘2 Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 101:2,10, as quoted by Barth (638; 720).
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2. Barth’s Alternative View of Eternity
We now take up the difficult task of summarising Barth’s complex alternative to the
classical views of eternity. Barth’s view incorporates something of these classical views, yet
also moves beyond them.'® While this section focuses primarily on giving our own exposition
of the main features of Barth’s view, we will also engage and evaluate relevant secondary
literature that is helpful in the exposition.'^
2.1. Barth *s ^Trinitarian* View of Eternity: Introduction and Formal Summary
In keeping with what we observed in the context of Barth’s views of divine simplicity
and constancy, we begin with George Hunsinger’s observation that, in Barth’s work, the
traditional conception of eternity is ‘subjected to radical reinterpretation according to
christological and trinitarian modes of thought,’ even if this is not always made explicit.^ ®
Specifically, Hunsinger speaks of the ‘perichoretic multidimensionality’ and a ‘patterned
complexity’ of Barth’s view of eternity, which resists reductionistic explanations and
criticisms.^' In a recent essay entitled ‘Mysterium Trinitatis: Karl Barth’s Conception of
Eternity,Hunsinger offers a Trinitarian (and also Christological) exposition of Barth’s
account of the divine perfection of eternity in 11/1. According to Hunsinger,
Barth makes perhaps the first sustained attempt in history to reformulate eternity’s 
mystery in fully trinitarian terms. The mystery of eternity becomes in effect a subtopic 
in the mystery of the Trinity. Eternity holds no perplexities that cannot be stated in 
trinitarian terms, and the Trinity has no formal aspects irrelevant to the question of 
eternity, so that the form of the Trinity and the form of eternity coincide.^^
George Hunsinger comments, ‘although Barth stands mainly in the tradition of Augustine, Boethius and 
Anselm, he modifies that tradition in order to appropriate what is valid in Hegel’ (2000; 188). While we agree 
that Barth’s view involves a conjunction of such pre-modern and modern elements, it is not always clear that 
Barth stands ‘mainly’ in the pre-modern classical tradition, nor that the modern aspects o f his view ought to be 
associated specifically or directly with Hegel.
The relevant works of Hunsinger (1991 and especially 2000) are perhaps the most helpful for the task of 
understanding Barth’s distinctive view o f eternity correctly. We will largely avoid discussion o f how we 
should evaluate Barth’s view of eternity, although much of the secondary literature on Barth’s account of 
eternity has been concerned with this.
2° Hunsinger 1991: 14. Hunsinger shows how a recognition of this point helps to overcome the charge that 
Barth’s theology is ‘monistic’ especially when such charges are prompted by Barth’s ‘objectivism’ (14fi).
2‘ Hunsinger 1991: 291. Hunsinger continues, ‘Barth holds, christocentrically, (1) a thoroughly perichoretic 
view of eternity, (2) a thoroughly eschatological view of history, and (3) a thoroughly Chalcedonian view o f the 
relation between them, such that within the Chalcedonian fi'amework all aspects of historicity are ultimately 
aufgehoben by eternity’ (my numerals in parentheses). See Hunsinger’s explanation of the Hegelian pattern 
of Aufhebung in Barth (85fi. Hunsinger’s later work (2000) shows that the perichoretic nature of Barth’s view 
of eternity (mentioned here) is only one o f its several Trinitarian features.
22 Hunsinger 2000: 186-209.
22 Hunsinger 2000: 189f; emphasis added.
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Robert Jenson and Richard Roberts had already refen'ed to the Trinitarian character of Barth’s
view of eternity before Hunsinger/'' But neither Jenson nor Roberts appears to have taken
this point sufficiently into account in their actual exposition of Barth’s view/^
We WÜ1 devote the remainder of this subsection to a survey of Barth’s view of
eternity—a survey that focuses on its Trinitarian ‘formal aspects,’ as Hunsinger calls them.
(The detailed Trinitarian and Christological content of Barth’s view of eternity in later
subsections of section 2.) Hunsinger observes that there are three irreducible formal aspects
or ‘forms’ of Barth’s account of eternity. They are: (1) eternity as ‘puie duration’ \reine
Dauer] (2) eternity as ‘beginning, middle, and end,^ ® and (3) eternity as the ‘simultaneity
[Gleichzietigkeit] of beginning, middle and end’ or simply ‘simultaneity’ (608; 685). We may
identify the presence of three forms of eternity in the following excerpt from Barth’s opening
discussion of eternity in II/l.
God’s eternity . . .  is the sovereignty and majesty of His love in so far as this has and is 
itself pure duration [form 1]. The being is eternal in whose duration [form 1] 
beginning, succession and end [form 2] are not three but one, not separate as a first, as 
second, and a third occasion, but one simultaneous occasion [form 3] as beginning, 
middle and end. Eternity is the simultaneity of beginning, middle and end [form 3], and 
to that extent is pure duration [form 1]. Eternity is God in the sense in which in 
Himself and in all things God is simultaneous [form 3], i.e., beginning and middle as 
well as end [form 2], without separation, distance, or contradiction (608; 6851).
Hunsinger then points out that these three aspects (or temporal forms) of eternity roughly
correspond to three aspects of Trinitarian doctrine—not to the three persons, but to three
Trinitarian concepts or terms and to the theological judgements that lay behind them.^  ^ The
following chart offers an overview of these conceptual correspondences.
^  E.g. Jenson 1969: 128; Roberts 1979: 106f, and 134f.
22 Regarding Roberts, Hunsinger comments: ‘In his severe criticism of Barth’s conception,. . .  Roberts fails 
almost entirely to take its trinitarian structure into account.. . .  Much of Roberts’ exasperation can perhaps be 
traced to this oversight’ (2000: 197). In our view, the primary source for Roberts’ exasperation with Barth lies 
in his theological method, which is very different from Barth’s.
2“ Some variations of this ‘form 2’ of eternity are ‘beginning, succession [Folge\ and end’ (608, 611; 685, 689) 
or ‘origin, movement and goal’ {Ursprung, Bewegung und Zeil\ (612; 690).
22 Hunsinger 2000: 197f,
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The Trinity and Eternity28
Category A [form 1] B [form 2] C [form 3]
1. Traditional 
Trinitarian 
Terms
One ‘being’ or 
‘essence’ {ousia)
Three ‘persons’ or 
‘modes of being’ 
{hypostases)
‘inter-penetration’ or 
‘mutual indwelling’ 
{perichoresis)
2. Relations of 
God*s ^Self
God as self-identical God as self- 
differentiated
God as self-unified
3. Correlative 
forms* of 
eternity
Eternity as ‘pure 
duration’
[form 1]
Eternity as 
‘beginning, middle, 
and end’ [form 2]
Eternity as 
‘simultaneity’ 
[form 3]
The essential soundness of these Trinitarian correlations will be tested in the course of our 
exposition. We will also observe other possible Trinitarian (and Christological) formal 
features in Barth’s account of eternity.
At this point, we may raise several important questions. Does Barth really speak of all 
three of these forms of eternity, and, if so, does he do so with equal emphasis on each? In 
other words, does Barth reduce any one of the three forms of eternity to any one of the 
others? Or is the Trinitarian structure that Hunsinger speaks of an imposition on Barth’s 
view? Also, does Barth’s own Trinitarian doctrine itself involve a kind of reductionism, which 
in some way is reproduced here in his account of eternity?
Although we will not develop answers to these questions at length, these critical 
questions will remain in the background of our exposition in the remainder of the chapter. For 
now, we can simply note that previous commentators have indirectly charged Barth with what 
we are here calling ‘reductionism’, of emphasising only one or two rather than three forms of 
eternity to the detriment of others. For example, Richard Roberts appears to regard form 1 
(pure duration) and form 3 (simultaneity) as more or less equivalent in Barth, and does not 
perceive the presence of form 2 (beginning, middle/succession, and end) in B a r t h .A s  such, 
Roberts believes Barth’s view of eternity is reducible to at most two formal aspects, and in 
effect he reduces these to one—to a Boethian concept of ‘pure duration.’^ ® This is
2® This chart is an attempt to summarise and organise relevant comments of Hunsinger’s (2000: especially 190, 
196). Hunsinger also notes other correspondences, but these are not pertinent to our purposes.
2^  Roberts 1979.
2^  ^And here one might wish to go farther, by linking this analysis with the critique that others have made of 
Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity (see chapter 3, section 1). Most importantly, one could speak of a ‘reduction’ to 
pure duration that corresponds to a ‘semi-modalist’ reduction of the three hypostases to the one ousia of God. 
Without due attention to the hypostases, perichoresis is likewise trivialized and reduced to God’s simple ousia.
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representative of a general tendency of many interpreters and critics of Barth to see a tendency
in his view of eternity to swallow up the real temporal distinctions of beginning, middle and
end—and hence the significance of ‘history’ for God/' The question that then arises is
whether Barth’s view is, after all, actually decisively different fi'om the classical view of
eternity as timelessness, a-temporality or non-temporality.
2,2, Eternity as Non-temporality: ^Classical* Features of Barth *s View o f Eternity
As we now turn to the actual content of Barth’s view of eternity, we begin where
Barth begins: namely, with the more or less ‘classical’ features of his view. Since we have
alluded to several of these features in section 1 of this chapter, we may be relatively brief.
In essence, the classical features of Barth’s view of eternity are those that emphasise
the distinction between eternity and time, and thus ar gue that in some sense God is a-temporal
or timeless. This emphasis appears in the opening part of Barth’s discussion of eternity. In
this context, Barth makes the following claims.
Eternity is not, therefore, time, although time is certainly God’s creation or, more 
correctly, a form of His creation. Time is distinguished fi*om eternity by the fact that in 
it beginning, middle and end are distinct and even opposed as past, present and future. 
Eternity is just the duration which is lacking to time, as can be seen clearly at the 
middle point of time, in the temporal present and in its relationship to the past and the 
future. Eternity has and is the duration which is lacking to time. It has and is 
simultaneity (608; 686).
In some respects, this passage creates the impression that Barth is defining eternity by
contrasting it to time, the very tendency that he critiqued in Aquinas and that he persistently
rejects as a manifestation o f ‘natural theology’ in the classical t rad i t ion .Is  it possible to
define eternity as ‘just the duration which is lacking to time,’ and at the same time to escape
this charge? Barth’s apparent ‘Babylonian captivity’ to a view of eternity as ‘an abstract
opposite of time’ appears to be confirmed in his strong words against the possibility of
construing eternity as ‘ everlastingness. ’
Eternity is not, then, an infinite extension of time both backwards and forwards. Time 
can have nothing to do with God. The infinity of its extension cannot help it. For
Although Hunsinger would resist these charges, including the charge o f ‘modalism,’ he does say that Barth 
gives a ‘logical and perhaps ontological precedence’ to the divine ousia (Hunsinger 2000: 191).
2‘ For example, see Gunton 1978, Moltmann 1967 (and 1981 and 1996), and others.
22 Because of this passage and other similar ones, Douglas FaiTow charges Barth with natural theology in 
which eternity is defined in opposition to time (1999: 29Iff).
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even and especially in this extension there is the separation and distance and 
contradiction that mark it as time and distinguish it from eternity as the creature from 
the Creator. It is quite correct, as in the older theology, to understand the idea of 
eternity and therefore God himself first of all in this clear antithesis. In the sense 
mentioned, it is in fact non-temporality (608; 686; emphasis added).
Whether Barth is actually falling prey to a classical kind of natural theology here depends on
two important questions. (I) What does Barth mean by ‘time’ in the context of affirmations
such as, ‘time can have nothing to do with God’? (2) Does Barth come to his views on
eternity’s distinction from time on the basis of a priori conceptions of time and eternity or on
the basis of a posteriori reflection (Nachdenkend) on God’s self-revelation as it is attested in
Scripture? While we will not be able to resolve these questions decisively, we can offer some
initial obseiwations.
On the first question of what Barth means by ‘time’ in the context his affirmations of 
eternity as non-temporahty, the above-cited passages give us some clarification. Here, Barth 
refers to time as:
(i) a form of God’s creation, and as such a ‘creature’
(ii) a reality in which ‘beginning, middle and end are distinct and even opposed’
(iii) a reality which lacks duration and simultaneity
(iv) a reality which is marked by (potentially infinite) extension [verlangerte].
Clearly, then, Barth is speaking of time in a specific sense, of time as it is found within 
creation.^^ Although Barth does not make it explicit, he is not referring to time or temporality 
in all of its possible senses here, some of which prove more amenable to being positively 
included within eternity (see below). Barth is referring to eternity in a particular (rather than 
general or aU-iticlusive) sense in this context: the sense mentioned, it [i.e. eternity] is in fact
non-temporality’ (608; 686; emphasis added).^''
The second question of the methodological basis for Barth’s view of eternity as non­
temporality or a-temporahty cannot be answered on the basis of the passages cited so far. At
22 One of the difficulties in understanding Barth’s view of time and eternity is that he uses these terms in many 
different senses (see subsection 2.3 on different senses of time). Also, it is an open question whether Barth is 
referring to fallen creation (see his references to ‘ftillen time’ in 1/2, §14), or to creation and created time in the 
present context (see Hunsinger 2000: 204f).
2^* In a later passage, Barth says, ‘If in this Triune being and essence of God there is nothing that we call time, 
that does not justify us in saying that time is simply excluded in God, or that his essence is simply the negation 
of time. On the contrary,. .  . God has and is himself time’ (615; 693f).
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this point we need only observe that even when Barth defines eternity as ‘just the duration 
which is lacking to [in] time’ he may not be starting with an a priori conception of time and 
then negating it to arrive at a general conception of eternity as timelessness. Rather, it is 
certainly possible that Barth begins with ‘empirical’ reflection on revelation and only then 
arrives at a view of eternity that just so happened to involve a contrast with time as a form of 
creation. Whether this is actually what Barth was doing will need to be considered in the 
course of our discussion. This, in turn, will determine whether Barth abides by his own 
methodological standards, particularly by his rejection of natural theology.
We wfll see that Barth’s dialectical view of eternity includes a strong affirmation of 
both: (a) the transcendence of God’s eternity in relation to time as a “form” or feature of 
creation and (b) the existence of a kind of temporality within God. The classical theologians 
occasionally moved towards aflSrming both sides of this dialectic (see 1.2 and 1.3 above), but 
they did not go far enough in respect to God’s real temporality.
2,3. Eternity as God*s Unique Temporality: ad intra and ad extra
Eternity is not simply non-temporality; it is also what we could call God’s unique 
temporality. As such, eternity has not only a negative relationship to time (608-610; 685- 
688), but also a positive relationship to time. The vast majority of Barth’s exposition of 
eternity discusses the positive relationsliip of God to time (610-640; 688-722). We would 
misunderstand Barth if we thought that he was contradicting himself when he speaks of God 
as both a-temporal and temporal. Rather, we will see that Barth uses eternity and time in a 
variety of ways, and that various senses of these terms operate at different levels of meaning. 
For example, Barth could say that God is non-temporally temporal, when ‘non-temporally’ 
means ‘not marked by time as a limited form of creation’ and when ‘temporal’ means ‘marked 
by temporality as it is found in God’s unique hfe.’
The positive sense in which God is temporal begins to emerge in Barth’s interpretation 
and use of the Boethian definition of eternity. Hunsinger observes that ‘what Barth does with 
this definition, in effect, is to relocate it within an explicit doctrine of the Trinity.’^ ® If we read
22 Hunsinger 2000: 199f. In a later passage where he is not explicitly discussing Boethius, Barth says: ‘A 
correct understanding of the positive side of the concept of eternity. . .  is gained only when we are clear that 
we are speaking about the eternity of the Triune God’ (615; 693), a point which he goes on to expound in ways 
that confirm Hunsinger’s Trinitarian interpretative thesis.
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between the lines of Hunsinger’s exposition, we can make several points about Barth’s use of 
this definition—points that move from the exphcit, to the clearly implicit, to the possibly 
implicit. (1) The definition explicitly refers to eternity as simultaneity (form 3; "simultaneous .
. . possession’). This relates, Hunsinger thinks, to the Triune perichoresis (see chart on “The 
Trinity and Eternity” in 2.1 above). (2) The definition clearly implies ‘pure duration’ (form 
1)^ ® in its concept o f "interminable life’ and possibly in its concepts of totality and perfection. 
Both of these ideas are, in turn, connected with God’s self-identical o u s ia . (3) Finally, the 
Boethian definition, at least in Barth’s view can be seen to imply eternity as beginning, middle 
and end (form 2). The reason is that simultaneity, totality and even duration appear to 
presuppose or imply some kind of succession of distinct temporal moments—some kind of 
beginning, middle, and end—even as simultaneity, totality (and duration) also qualify these 
distinct temporal moments as, in another sense, united with each other without separation or 
opposition.^® This third point, like the second, is not explicit in the Boethian definition, but 
expresses how Barth may have appropriated the definition. Barth’s appropriation would not 
contradict Boethius, but rather fill out his meaning in the light of Barth’s own understanding of 
God as the living, Trinitarian God.
What, then, does Barth mean when he speaks of God’s eternity as a kind of 
‘temporality’? Colin Gunton refers to ‘God’s eminent temporality,’ and John Colwell to the 
‘authentic temporality of God’s eternity .Alan Padgett is close to the mark when he says
2^  Roberts rightly speaks of how Barth’s concept o f pure duration ‘stems from the informing of the Boethian 
totum simul by the Trinitarian impulse’ (1979; 116).
22 Hunsinger says that ‘Totality, perfection and possession . . .  correlate with the simplicity, singularity and 
sovereignty of the trintarian ousia' (2000: 199). Regarding ‘interminability,’ he says, ‘The definition states 
not merely that the divine life is endless or unlimited, but that it cannot possibly terminate. . .  Therefore, the 
definition of eternity does not depend on the negation o f time’ (199f).
2® Hunsinger states the point with caution: ‘The ideas of simultaneity and totality. . .  seem to imply certain 
distinctions not found in the Boethian definition. From a trinitarian standpoint, at least as Barth carries it 
through, they can be taken to imply temporal distinctions that correlate with the trinitarian hypostases' (2000: 
200). As God’s seXf-uniting vciowem&ax, perichoresis presupposes three distinct hypostases that can nonetheless 
indwell each other (2000: 190). So also simultaneity would require beginning, middle and end as distinct 
realities that can nonetheless indwell each other.
2^  Gunton 1978: 177ff; Colwell 1989: 3 Iff; c f 13 Iff. Colwell’s terminology seems slightly preferable to 
Gunton’s for two reasons (1) Barth himself uses the term ‘authentic temporality’ (III/2, 437), and (2) Gunton’s 
‘eminent temporality’ has the connotation o f the classical method of the via eminentiae, which Barth rejected 
(see II/l, 347 and our comments in chapter 3 above). That said, Barth himself uses terms that suggest 
something like eminent temporality, as when he asserts that ‘God . . .  is supremely temporal’ (CD, III/2,437).
235
that, for Barth, ‘eternity is the fullness of time without the defects of succession/''® But what 
is time without the defects of succession? Rather than attempting to capture this divine time 
through a general definition, Barth’s approach is to say that it is the unique time of God that is 
revealed in Jesus Christ."' Accordingly, Barth undertakes lengthy meditations on the scriptural 
narratives about Jesus in other parts of CD, especially on the forty days between his 
resurrection and ascension, in order to ‘define’ this uniquely ‘real’ time of God."^ In his 
exposition of eternity in II/l, the Christological dimensions of Barth’s view of eternity are 
smaller in scope and detail, but still important (see subsection 2.4). We can summarise such 
Christological dimensions by stating that the time of God revealed in Jesus, unlike ‘our time’ 
(the time humans ordinarily experience), is not marked by any tension between the past, 
present and future, or between beginning, middle and end. Rather, Christ’s time embodies 
these distinctions in a way that is marked by continuous ‘duration’ and harmonious 
‘simultaneity.’
At this stage in our argument, we need to pause to clarify the main senses that Barth 
gives to the word ‘time’ and to explain how these are related to the distinction between God 
ad intra and God ad extra. Even an appreciative interpreter of Barth like Hunsinger concedes 
that Barth lacks clarity on such matters."^ With some reading between the lines of Barth’s 
treatment of eternity in II/l, §31.3, we can understand Barth to be employing at least four 
distinct but inter-related concepts or senses o f ‘time.’ The first two have to do with God’s 
time (and therefore our particular concern) and the latter two with human time.
• Time 1: God’s own ‘time’ ad intra, the ‘order and succession’ and ‘inner
movement’ of God’s eternal Triune being independent of a relationship to creation 
(615; 693Q."" This concept can also be spoken of as God’s ‘eternity,’ as ‘absolute 
time’ and sometimes as ‘readiness for time’ (618ff; 696ffy.
Padgett 1992: 143. However, we disagree with Padgett’s claim that this implies that Barth’s view of God’s 
time lacks ‘process’ or the ‘past-present-future distinction.’ If Barth were strictly consistent, this might be the 
case, but he is ‘dialectical’ instead. Thus, Padgett neglects the presence o f ‘form 2’ o f eternity in Barth (see 
subsection 2.1).
See Placher 1994: 35-40 for a fine exposition of how Jesus Christ reveals ‘God’s time’ in Barth’s view.
2^ See especially III/2, §47,440ff. .Cf. Ford 1985: 142-146.
'*2 Hunsinger 2000: 189 and 200.
We recall Barth’s comment in reference a passage in Polanus that ‘this principium ordinis' of the eternal 
immanent Trinity ‘is clearly identical with a principium temporis in God him self (615; 694; see subsection
1.3). This ‘temporal principle’ appears to refer in the first instance to time 1, a time God has independently of 
his relationship to the created order. ‘Time T is what Hunsinger speaks of as ‘God eternal becoming’ and
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• Time 2: God’s time for us ad extra, ‘the time for us, the time of revelation, the 
time of Jesus Christ’ (61 If; 689Q."® This concept of time can also be referred to as 
‘real time’ (613; 691),"® as redeemed time (cf. 617f; 696) or as another form of 
God’s ‘readiness for time.’
• Time 3: Created time, or time as a non-eternal ‘form of creation’ (608; 686)."^
• Time 4\ Fallen time, ‘our time,’ or the ‘lost time’ of human experience."®
We may make five observations about these four conceptions of time and their inter­
relationships. First, Barth is not contradicting himself when he says that God is both timeless 
and temporal. God is timeless in the sense of being Jfree from and sovereign ‘over’ time 3 and 
time 4, and temporal insofar as God includes time—in its various meanings—within himself. 
(God does include even time 3 and 4 in himself in a sense—not inherently, but by a voluntary 
act in which he overcomes their deficiencies Christologically. See section 2.4).
Second, Barth can refer to both time 1 and time 2 as ‘God’s time’ or even ‘eternity,’ 
and thus he does not always clearly distinguish when he is referring to God’s being in itself {ad 
intra) and in relation to the world {ad extra) Indeed, it appears that both time 1 and time 2 
can be regarded as a ‘prototype’ of time 3, or created time. But several passages (including 
those cited in our list above) show that Barth does wish to make a distinction between time 1 
and time 2, and that he regards the former as the ultimate ‘basis’ (and hence prototype) of the 
latter.
Third, the distinction between time 1 and 2 does not imply that time 2 is simply not 
eternal, for God has eternally determined himself (in election) to create and redeem the world
which he associates with the dynamic ofperichorisis (2000: 200); it is also what A. Torrance calls God’s ‘non- 
temporal “becoming”’ (2000: 85).
See Hunsinger 2000: 20If.
Cf. 1/2, §47,47 and passim.
See the treatment of created time in 1/2,45ff, where Barth stresses that we do not have any access to such 
created time, since we live only in the realm of ‘fallen time’ (time 4) which has become ‘revelation time’ (time 
2). If Hunsinger is correct that such created time, being marked by imperfection of transitoriness and division, 
stands in need o f the eternal God’s ‘healing’ even without sin’s corruption (2000: 204f), then this is a 
speculative issue on which Barth does not appear to comment directly. See Barth’s related language about 
‘raising’ cieated time to a form of his eternal being (616; 694 and 2.4 below; see also Oscar Cullmann 1962: 
63Q.
Barth does not appear to refer directly to the concept of fellen time or sinful time in the section we are 
expounding in II/l, but he does imply it (e.g. he refers to the ‘rectification’ of time on 618; 696). He refers to 
‘time 4 ’ explicitly under the rubric o f ‘our time’ in 1/2, §47,45 and passim.
For example, both time 1 and time 2 seem to be present in Barth’s exposition of God’s temporality in terms 
of pre-temporality, supra-temporality and post-temporality (see 2.5 below). The ambiguity between time 1 and 
time 2 may have to do with the ambiguity in Barth surrounding whether God’s being is constituted by or 
expressed by his decisions and acts (again, see McCormack 2000).
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in Christ. Moreover, this eternal determination of God can be regarded not only as ad extra, 
but in some sense ad intra. This does not deny the distinction between time 1 and time 2, but 
it shows that they are inseparably united with each other.^ ®
Fourth, time 3 and time 4 both refer to human time (and more broadly to the time of 
the created order), and thus, like time 1 and time 2, are not always carefully distinguished from 
each other. But fortunately, this distinction is not crucial to understanding Barth’s view of 
eternity.
Fifth and finally, we observe that, against some commentators, an accurate description 
of Barth’s view of eternity does not require that we ascribe to Barth a specific philosophical 
view of the nature of time.^' In fact, Barth’s approach, with its typically ad hoc use of 
philosophy, does not lend itself to such an interpretation. While Barth may have certain 
ontological tendencies regarding the nature of time, he does not wish to bring premature 
‘closure’ to philosophical issues on which revelation does not speak decisively.
2.4, The Christological Features of Barth *s View of Eternity 
We have seen that God’s eternity involves both a unique kind of divine non­
temporality (in relation to time 3 and time 4) and a unique divine temporality (in relation to 
time 1 and time 2). In many ways, the heart of Barth’s view of eternity is time 2, the 
‘revelation time’ that manifests what time 1 (God’s ‘inner’ eternal Triune being) is like.
Indeed, time 2 also reveals that the positive relationship between the eternal God and time 
extends not only to God’s own time (time 1 and time 2), but also to creaturely time (time 3 
and even time 4). For in God’s time pro nobis in Jesus Christ, God includes creaturely time 
within eternity, i.e. within his own time (time 2 and even time 1). As God does so, he heals 
and transforms created-fallen time, all without making it any less creaturely. (This is similar to
2° See Colwell for a generally accurate and insightful explanation of Barth’s view of the distinction and close 
relation between God ad intra (the immanent Trinity) and God ad extra (the economic Trinity) (1989; 195- 
230), Jenson also recognises that Barth draws both a distinction and an ‘analogy’ between the time 1 and time 
2. He regards this aspect o f Barth’s thought as ambiguous and problematic (1969: 152-155).
2‘ There are two main views of time in contemporary philosophical debate, the ‘stasis view’ (or ‘four 
dimensionalism’) and the process view (or ‘temporalism’) (see Padgett 1992). Padgett ascribes to Barth a 
qualified version of the ‘stasis’ view, shared by certain classical writers such as Aquinas (1992: 143ff). See 
also Roberts 1979: 134 and 115, where he speaks of the affinity between Barth and a recent proponent of the 
stasis view, J. M. E. McTaggart. Barth’s view of eternity and time seems to share elements of both of these 
views of time, perhaps incoherently; his view cannot be easily reduced to one or the other. This is consistent 
with his ‘philosophical eclecticism’ and his view that systematic consistency is not possible in theology.
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what we have observed in regard to God’s simplicity and constancy in their respective
relations to the created realities of multiplicity and movement/change. Even at this point,
there is no need to regard Barth as contradictory, since God is still a-temporal in the sense that
God’s redeems fallen created time as the Lord over our time and who overcomes the defects
of time rather than being captive to them.
Given Barth’s Christocentric inclinations, it will come as no surprise that Barth
construes this ‘time 2’ in thoroughly Christological terms. As Barth puts it,
[God] does have time for us, the time of revelation, the time of Jesus Christ, and 
therefore the time of His patience, our life-time, time for repentance and faith. But it 
really is He Himself who has time for us. He himself is time for us. For His revelation 
as Jesus Christ is really God Himself (6Ilf; 689fy.
To be Christocentric is, for Barth, to be Trinitarian, for the person and work of Jesus Christ
reveals the eternal Triune God, for the revelation in Jesus Christ is a work o f  the eternal
Triune God (see chapter 4, subsection 3.2.1). Further, the christological inclusion of
creaturely time within eternity is ‘modelled’ after a particular understanding of the ‘hypostatic
union’ of the divine and human ‘natures’ within Christ’s hypostasis—a union wliich involves
the inclusion of the human within the divine hypostasis. T h i s  Christological inclusion is
marked by two distinct formal or ‘grammatical’ patterns in addition to the ‘Trinitarian pattern’
and other Trinitarian features which we have been exploring above, namely: (1) The
Chalcedonian pattern, and (2) the YiogoXidiOrAufhehung pattern. In the remainder of our
discussion in this subsection, we will apply these two patterns (identified by George Hunsinger
as formal features of Barth’s theology) to the concrete Christological content of Barth’s view
of eternity.®"
In subsection 1.3 above we noted that classical theologians like Aquinas and Polanus 
had affirmed, to a limited extent, that eternity includes time within it, even though their
22 Barth makes this connection explicit in his account of eternity: ‘We have seen again and again that God is 
alive. His unity does not exclude but includes multiplicity and His constancy movement’ (612; 690).
22 Barth states, ‘The Word spoken from eternity raises the time into which it is uttered (without dissolving it as 
time), up into His own eternity, as now His own time’ (CD, 1/2, 52). See Dalferth 1989: 28ff.
2^* Hunsinger speaks of only the Trinitarian and Chalcedonian patterns in his treatment o f divine eternity 
(2000: 202). However, he earlier identifies the Hegelian-v4z^e/»wwg  ^pattern as a third, distinct formal pattern 
in Barth’s theology as a whole (1991: 85f). In our view, aspects of this third pattern are implicit in Barth’s 
treatment of eternity. In fact, this Hegelian pattern informs the structures of Barth’s doctrines of unity and 
constancy as well (see the Appendix to this thesis).
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primary emphasis was on God’s timelessness. Barth, by contrast, gives primary attention to
God’s voluntary ‘inclusion’ of creaturely time within eternity and secondary attention to God’s
timelessness (see 613ff; 69 Iff). The positive affirmation of God’s voluntary inclusion of
creaturely time within eternity finds its basis®® in God’s own eternal temporality. Barth
develops a theme that classical writers like Aquinas and Polanus did not develop satisfactorily,
namely, that Jesus Christ is the mediator between eternity and time, so that the latter is
included in and transformed by the former. In the incarnation, eternity and time enjoy a
positive relation of ‘real fellowship’ with each other (616; 694).®® It is with this basic fact that
we must start in our a posteriori reflection (Nachdenken) on eternity.
The fact that the Word became flesh undoubtedly means that, without ceasing to be 
eternity, in its very power as eternity, eternity became time. What happened in Jesus 
Christ is not simply that God gives us time, our created time . . .  In Jesus Christ, it 
comes about that God takes time to Himself, that He Himself, the eternal one, becomes 
temporal, that He is present to us in the form of our existence and our own world, not 
simply embracing our time and ruling it, but submitting himself to it, and permitting 
created time to become and be the form of His eternity (616; 694; emphasis added).
But what does Barth mean when he says that, in the incarnation, God permits created
time (time 3) to ‘become and be the foim of His eternity’? Although Barth does make it
explicit here, the answer to this question is best found in Barth’s Christocentric view of God’s
election—which for Barth, we recall, is a part of the doctrine of God.®^  Accordingly, we can
answer that created time is the form of God’s eternity in the sense that God eternally elects
Jesus Christ as the one in whom and through whom God will relate to the world. Insofar as
Jesus Christ is human, he lives in created time. Further, Jesus Clirist is eternally elected as the
God-man, not as the divine Logos without flesh (the logos asarkos). Therefore, the created
time that is a form of the human nature of Jesus Christ is eternally the form of God’s eternity.
This does not mean that created time (time 3) is the only temporal form of God’s eternity.
Rather, Barth’s discussion, as we have seen, implies that God has prior forms of eternity that
are properly his own (time 1 and time 2), and that these are what account for God’s readiness
for created time. That is, God’s own ‘time’ independent of creation (especially time 1)
22 God’s time for us, his readiness for time, is the basis and prototype for our time as both created and 
redeemed (612; 690). See Hunsinger 2000: 200ff.
2^  See Hunsinger 2000: 202.
22 See Gunton 1974, Colwell 1989: 183-230 and McCormack 2000 and 2002.
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accounts for God’s capacity to take this time 3 that is not his own and to make it his own. 
According to a transcendental argument, we could say that time 1 and time 2 are the 
conditions of the possibility of God’s taking time 3 into himself. But we would not know 
about God’s own inherent forms of temporality in any way except by God’s decision to reveal 
himself to us in the form of our time. This is an eternal decision that implies the inclusion of 
the form of our time in God’s eternal being, in Jesus Christ.
The nature of the real fellowship and unity between creaturely time and eternity in 
Jesus Christ is clarified by describing it in terms of the Chalcedonian pattern it manifests. Like 
Christ’s divine and human natures, eternity and time are united to each other (‘without 
separation or division’), yet they remain differentiated (‘without confusion or change’). Thus, 
the Christological act that includes creaturely time within God’s eternity does not make this 
time any less creaturely,®® nor does it make God’s eternity any less divine (see the above 
quotation fi-om Barth). The last feature of the Chalcedonian pattern of relationship between 
eternity and time is its ‘asymmetry,’ i.e. the clear and irreversible precedence of divine eternity 
(and thus divine time) over human time.®^  In Jesus Clirist, then, eternity and time are related 
to each other in unity, differentiation and asymmetry, and thus according to a Chalcedonian 
pattern.®® This pattern is evident in two main features of the work of God m Christ, the entry 
of eternity into time (the downward vector, or anhypostatic movement) and the elevation of 
time into eternity (the upward vector, or enhypostatic movement).®'
In Jesus we come to see that God’s eternity is not such that God ‘must set it over 
against our time’ nor ‘that God is prevented from causing [our time] to be His own garment 
and even His own body’ (616; 695). Hence, the name of Jesus ‘is the refutation of the idea of 
a God who is only timeless.’ Smce the eternal God actually became time, making our time his 
own, then God’s eternity must include this possibility, ‘the potentiality of time’ (617; 696Q.
2® ‘Yet even in God’s fellowship with His creature, this eternity belongs exclusively to God. In its fellowship 
with God the creature is permitted to taste it in one way or another, but it does not on that account itself 
become God and therefore eternal’ (609; 687).
2^  In a couple of polemical excurses within his treatment of the perfection of eternity, Barth makes this 
irreversible asymmetry abundantly clear. Barth points out that ‘the statement that God co-exists with our time 
cannot be reversed,’ first with respect to certain trends in modern Catholic theology (614f; 692f) and then with 
respect to Ritschl’s neo-Protestantism (618f; 697f). Time does not have any inherent potentiality for eternity, 
nor is it co-eternal (cf. Hunsinger 2000: 204).
"2° See Hunsinger 1991: 85f and 2000: 202f. See also the Appendix to this thesis for further comment.
See Hunsinger 2000: 203ff and A. Torrance 1996: 103.
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God becomes our time by a free decision, and likewise always maintains his sovereign freedom
over our time. God’s work does not leave our time ‘as it is.’
He masters time. He re-creates it and heals its wounds, the fleetingness of the present, 
and the separation of the past and the future from one another and from the present. . .  
Real created time acquires in Jesus Christ and in every act of faith m Him the character 
and stamp of eternity, and life in it acquires the special characteristic of eternal life.
The God who does this and therefore can do it is obviously m himself both timeless 
and temporal. He is timeless in that the defects of time . . .  are alien to him and 
disappear.. . .  He is temporal in that our time with its defects is not so alien to Him 
that He cannot take it to Himself by his grace, mercy and patience. Himself rectifying 
and healing it and lifting it up to the time of eternal life. This power exercised in Jesus 
Christ consists in His [i.e. God’s] Triune being (617f; 696).
Barth’s description of the healing and redemption of our created and fallen time is
characterised by a Hegelian pattern o f Aufhebung, which complements the Chalcedonian
pattern by drawing attention to other features of the saving work of God in Christ. This
Aufhebung pattern involves three ordered aspects: affirmation, cancellation, and reconstitution
on a higher plane. Thus, there is affirmation in God’s gracious entry into our time for our
sakes in the incarnation and in his consequent inclusion of our time in eternity, where he
preserves created time without abolishing it. Yet insofar as our time is fallen and corrupted by
sin it is cancelled and done away with, as is especially evident in the atoning work of Christ on
the cross. Finally, our time is reconstituted within the higher plane of eternal life, in which it
acquires, as Barth says, ‘the character and stamp of eternity.’ This re-constitution of our time
corresponds to and is accomplished above all in the resurrection of Christ and in the believer’s
union with Christ in his resurrection, for in this event the unity of the divine and human is at its
apex, but without dissolving the distinction between the two (consistent with the Chalcedonian
pattern).
Although this concludes our focused discussion of the Christological features of 
Barth’s view of eternity, these features will continue be relevant to the remainder of our 
chapter. Barth’s view of eternity as a whole is both Christocentric and Trinitarian and is thus 
grounded in Christocentric and Trinitarian forms of theological biblical interpretation.
2.5. Eternity as the Three Forms o f  Temporality: their Distinction and Unity 
In this last subsection of our overview of Barth’s account of the divine perfection of 
eternity, we turn to Barth’s discussion of eternity under the rubric of three forms of divine
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temporality: pre-temporality, supra-temporaHty and post-temporality. In terms of volume, this 
discussion takes up most of the second half of Barth’s account of eternity in II/l (619-638; 
698-720), In content, it emphasises God’s real but distinctive temporality, and God’s positive 
but free relation to our time. In form, it is Trinitarian (three modes of one temporal being 
which are perichoreticaUy inter-related), and it is so in a Christological way. Christ is the 
central figure in all three forms of divine temporality (pre-, supra- and post-temporality) and 
human temporality (past, present and future). All the various forms of eternity (the three 
forms of eternity; see 2.1), time (the four concepts of time; see 2.3) and temporality (the thi ee 
forms discussed here in 2.5) converge in Jesus Christ, the ‘centre of time’ (629; 709) and the 
mediator of time and eternity.^^
Before we summarise Barth’s tliree forms of temporality, we may consider how these 
three forms relate to the analytical distinctions we have used above. (1) These three forms are 
not to be confused with the three forms of eternity that Hunsinger believes are implicit in 
Barth (see 2.1).^  ^ Rather, Barth’s three forms of temporality correspond as a whole to what 
Hunsinger calls Barth’s second form of eternity, namely, the form in which eternity is seen as 
‘beginning, middle and end,’ or a similar threefold order of succession (see 2.1). The other 
two forms of eternity which Hunsinger identifies (i.e. ‘pure duration’ and ‘simultaneity’) are 
present in Barth’s discussion of the three forms of temporality, but do not have the primary 
focus. (2) Barth’s discussion of the three forms of divine temporality expounds the nature of 
God’s eternity/time (time 1 and time 2), rather than human time (time 3 and time 4). As such, 
the overall focus is on the concrete expression of God’s readiness for our time in his works ad 
extra (time 2). Yet Barth never forgets the ultimate basis of this readiness (as a free and 
voluntary readiness) in God’s internal temporality/eternity (time 1; see especially his exposition 
of God’s pre-temporality and post-temporaHty).^"^
Barth begins his discussion of the three forms of temporality with an introduction that 
offers at least two reasons why it is important to speak of God’s eternity in terms of pre-
Cf. Col 1:17: ‘In him all things hold together’ (c f  II/2, 98f).
To avoid confusion, we typically refer to Barth’s explicit categories as three forms of temporality and 
Hunsinger’s categories as three forms o f eternity, even though both sets of categories actually describe different 
forms of both God’s temporality and eternity (since God’s eternity is temporal and his temporality is eternal).
The following passage confirms the latter point: eternity ‘is itself temporal, and would be so even i f  no time 
existed apart from it’ (620; 698; emphasis added).
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temporality, supra-temporality, and post-temporality (619ff; 6988). First, Barth says that to 
speak of eternity in these terms is to speak biblically, and Barth’s assumption (as we have 
seen consistently in this thesis) is that he ought to follow the Bible’s example in his dogmatics 
(see section 3 below). The scriptural witness to God’s Word speaks of eternity in temporal 
terms, yet does so in a way that also speaks of the eternal God’s unqualified superiority to and 
freedom over our time. ‘He precedes its [i.e. time’s] beginning. He accompanies its duration 
[Dauer\, and He exists after its end.’ ‘This,’ Barth says, ‘is the concrete form of eternity as 
readiness for time’ (619; 698). Second, Barth believes that ‘a great deal depends’ on God 
being, quite literally, ‘before, above and after all things’ (620; 699). ‘Without God’s complete 
temporality the content of the Christian message has no shape.’ Without a definite temporal 
shape, the gospel message becomes either a ‘human monologue’ indistinguishable from a 
timeless myth or dream, or a proclamation that consists in ‘inarticulate mumbling.’ Against 
such errors, Barth wishes to express that God’s eternity surrounds and encompasses our time 
on all sides.
Barth considers the three forms of divine temporality in order. We need only 
summarise these briefly, especially since we will discuss aspects of them in relation to Barth’s 
use of Scripture in section 3 below.
First, ‘God is pre-temporal ]yorzeitlich\,'‘ which ‘means that His existence precedes 
ours and that of all things’ (621; 700). Taken in its ‘literal sense,’ this speaks the profound 
truth that God is not dependent on creation or created time for self-fulfilment. This is crucial 
for the affirmation that eternity is a perfection of the divine freedom. God is free in relation to 
the world and its time, because there is a ‘pre-time’ (an aspect of time 1 and time 2), a ‘time 
before time’ (before time 3 and time 4, that is) (622; 701). In this pre-time of God, 
‘everything . . .  was decided and determined, everything that is in time.’ This prior 
determination of the whole of God’s work ad extra (creation, reconciliation and redemption) 
has ‘its centre in Jesus Chr is t .Again ,  ‘To say that everythiug is predestined . . .  is just the 
same as to say simply that eveiything is determined in Jesus Clirist.’ God’s Christocentric
Clearly Barth has here incorporated into II/1 the decisive motif o f Christological election, before his 
extensive exposition of it in II/2 (see McCormack 1995: 461).
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time for us (time 2), reveals the essentially Trinitarian shape of God’s eternal temporality 
(especially time 1).^ ^
Second, ‘God is supra-temporal [überzietlichY (623; 702). Barth believes that this 
word itself is ‘not adequate to express what has to be expressed here,’ which includes 
something like ‘co-temporal’ or ‘in-temporal.’ Here especially ‘we have to do with the 
positive relationship of eternity to time.’ This relationship consists ‘in the fact that eternity 
faithfully accompanies time on high’ or, more precisely, ‘it causes itself to be accompanied by 
time.’^  ^ This supra-temporal accompaniment implies that in God’s eternity, our time, our 
present, is no longer ‘separated from its beginning and end’ (623; 702). Thus, supra- 
temporality cannot be construed simply as God’s ‘perpendicular connection with each moment 
of time,’ but also in horizontal connection with the ‘divine before and after’ (624; 703). But 
God surely is connected with the present, with the now, and this is the emphasis of supra- 
temporality. ‘Eternity did not cease when time began [only] to begin again when time ceases’ 
(624; 704). This supra-temporality of God makes it possible for him to love us in freedom in 
the midst of our time, in the midst of its process of unfolding. Again, Barth unfolds this supra- 
temporality in a Christocentric manner. Christ is ‘the centre [Mitte] of time’ (629; 709) in 
whom there is a decisive and momentous turning from past to the future, or, in biblical terms, 
from the old age to the new (6268; 7058; see section 3 below).
Third, ‘God is post-temporal [nachzeitlichy (629; 709). Completing the idea that 
eternity embraces time, God’s post-temporality consists in the view that our time moves 
towards the goal of the eternal God, to a future in which God will be revealed as ‘all in all.’ 
Humanity, which was elected and is reconciled, will one day be ‘redeemed.’ In the ‘time’ of 
post-temporality, God exists in ‘His Sabbath rest after the completion of all His works, the 
execution of all His will ad extra' (630; 710). ‘God is the Last as he was the First.’ This 
means that God is the ‘God of aU hope’ (631 ; 711). Indeed, although it is hidden to us now.
^  ‘[T]his pre-time is the pure time [die reine Zeii\ o f the Father and the Son in the fellowship of the Holy 
Spirit’ (622; 701).
Barth adds that all our markers of temporal succession (hours, years, epochs) ‘are all [embraced] in eternity 
like the arms of its mother’ (623; 703).
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God already is the Last ad intra (i.e. ‘in himself). In the post-temporality yet to come, aU that 
God is will be fully revealed to us (630f; 71 Of).^ *
Following his exposition of each of the three distinct forms of temporality, Barth offers 
a lengthy excursus about how there ‘can be no basic rivalry {KonkurrenzY between them 
(631-638; 711-719).^^ ‘They are not played off one another. ’ Barth then proceeds to give an 
account of how, in the history of theology, each form of divine temporality has at some time 
been over-emphasised to the exclusion of the others. The Reformers of the sixteenth century 
showed a ‘dangerous one-sidedness’ in favour of pre-temporality, which lead to a kind of 
hopelessness or gloom in their theologies (63 If; 712). The neo-Protestants of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries showed an even more serious over-emphasis, this time on God’s 
supra-temporality to the neglect of the ‘before’ and ‘after’ (632f; 713). This reaction against 
the Reformers led to a secularisation of God’s eternity that turned it into a kind o f ‘religious’ 
anthropocentrism. Finally, at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth century, there was a reaction against the previous over-emphasis on supra- 
temporality in the form of a new and excessive preoccupation with post-temporality (633-637; 
713-718). Within his account of this recent overemphasis on post-temporality, Barth criticises 
his own earlier work in the Epistle to the Romans (second edit ion).Barth now realises 
clearly that the errors of previous centuries ‘are not overcome by suppressing the element of 
truth which lay at the basis of the errors’ (637; 719). Instead, ‘they can be overcome only by 
seeing and establishing the truth in the context from which it should not be separated.’ This 
means that our view of eternity must involve equal emphasis on each of the three forms of 
God’s temporality or eternity—i.e. on God’s time for us as beginning, middle and end. For all 
three forms are ‘equally God’s eternity and therefore the living God himself (638; 720).
We recall our discussion of salvation history in chapter 5, section 3, where it emerged that Barth regarded 
eschatological redemption as primarily bringing about a noetic change in us (via full revelation) rather than an 
ontic change in God or in our relationship to him.
**To use Hunsinger’s terminology, Barth moves from the second form of eternity (as ‘beginning, middle and 
end’) to the third form (‘simultaneity,’ understood along the lines ofperichoresis). See above.
See Barth 1933. Barth’s self-criticism is moderate, since he believes that much of what he said then was 
necessary at the time, though incomplete with hindsight. For example, he says that his earlier interpretation of 
Rom 13:1 I f  had paid attention only to matters ‘at the periphery’ of the passage, and had missed its central and 
distinctive feature: that is ‘the teleology which it ascribes to time as it moves towards its real end’ (635; 716). 
See Moltmarm’s critique o f Barth’s early eschatology (e.g. 1967: 57f).
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This last point is unfolded in the concludmg section of Barth’s account of the
perfection of eternity (638-640; 720-722). Here Barth emphasises several points similar to
those we have identified in his accounts of God’s simplicity and constancy. God, the unique
subject, must define eternity, the predicate. The nature of God’s eternity as it is revealed ad
extra is the nature of God’s eternity ad intra. Since the Christian knowledge of eternity has to
do with the living, self-revealing God, it is not a matter of speculation, but of obedience to the
revelation of God attested in Scripture.
Barth also used the concluding pages of his account of eternity to highlight some
Trinitarian patterns in this account. First, Barth draws attention to the real distinctness and
real order of the three forms of temporality or eternity.
Once we are clear that eternity is the living God Himself, it is impossible to look on 
eternity as a uniform grey sea before, above and afl:er time . . . Eternity is really 
beginning, really middle, and really end, because it is really the living God. There 
really is in it, then, direction \Richtung\ and a direction which is irreversible. There 
really is in it an origin and goal and a way fi-om the one to the other. Therefore there is 
no uniformity in it. Its forms are not to be exchanged or confused (639; 721).^’
Barth summarises his understanding of the basis of the eternal God’s real temporal distinctions
by saying that ‘God lives eternally,’ and as the living God he is neither uniform nor without
temporal form.
Second, Barth draws attention to the real unity, perichoresis, or ‘mutual indwelling 
and interworking of the tliree forms of eternity’ (640; 72 If).^^  Whether or not we follow 
Hunsinger in consistently associating this perichoretic feature of Barth’s view of God’s 
temporality or eternity with ‘simultaneity,’ it is clearly an important feature of Barth’s account 
of God’s eternity. Barth sums up his understanding of the basis of unity of the temporal forms 
of eternity by repeating the statement he had made above but with a different emphasis: ''God 
lives eternally.’ The eternal God lives as the single undivided subject even in all of his self­
distinctions. As the next section will confirm, to speak of God as ‘living’ is one expression of 
the biblical roots of Barth’s account of eternity.
Barth goes on to say that, while there is a kind o f ‘symmetry’ between the three forms of divine temporality, 
this symmetry is not to be reduced to geometrical formulae or illustrations (like the sphere or the point). The 
reason is that the asymmetrical and ‘irreversible direction’ o f eternity is not found in them (639f; 721).
Barth here uses the phrase ‘three forms of eternity’ here to refer to what he more usually calls ‘three forms 
of divine temporality.’
247
3. The Role of Scripture in Barth’s Account of Eternity
1.1. Introduction
As with his treatment of divine simplicity, Barth’s treatment of divine eternity does not 
include an extended exegesis of any one scriptural passage/^ Instead, Barth’s engagement 
with Scripture here again falls into two main categories: the ‘catena’ form (citation or 
quotation of a group of passages with little comment on them) and the ‘thematic’ form (with 
or without the citation of text or group of texts associated with it). These two forms of 
scriptural usage are inter-related. BibHcal-theological themes typically provide the basis for 
grouping certain scriptural texts together, and biblical texts often provide either the grounds 
for or illustrations of the themes.
We will now examine several biblical themes (or motifs or patterns) and will consider 
Barth’s citation and discussions of various biblical texts (usually in catenae or groups) in the 
context of these themes. In looking at the function of Scripture in Barth’s account of eternity, 
we win strive to determine to what extent and in what way Scripture is the basis of Barth’s 
theological proposals regarding eternity.
3.2, The Minor Theme: Eternity as God's Freedom Over Our Time
As we have seen above, Barth begins his treatment of divine eternity by stating how 
eternity is distinct fi*om and contrasted with earthly time, and, as such is ‘non-temporality. ’ 
Immediately following his quotations of Augustine, Anselm and Polanus (see 1.1 above), 
Barth says: ‘From the witness of the biblical passages (especially in Deutero-Isaiah and 
Revelation), the older theology recalled the definitions in which God is spoken of as “the first 
and the last,” as Alpha and Omega’ (608; 686). This recalls how Barth regards the biblical 
witness to God as commensurable with both the ‘older theology’ of the classical theologians 
and his own theology (see chapter 4, subsection 3.3). Barth does not cite any of the biblical 
passages which include the ‘definitions’ of God as the first and the last or the Alpha and 
Omega, '^  ^but he does quote a group of three passages related to these: Isa 43:10, Ps 90:2-4
His treatment of constancy, by contrast, includes an extended ti eatment of Phil 2:5-11 (chapter 5, section
3.3).
Barth has in mind passages like Isa 41:4, 44:6,48:12, Rev 1:8 and 1:17.
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and Ps 102:25ff. Psalm 90:2-4 is the only passage on which Barth offers any interpretative
comments. This passage reads:
Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever you had formed the earth and the 
world, from everlasting to everlasting you are God. You turn us back to dust, and say, 
“Turn back, you mortals.” For a thousand years in your sight are like yesterday when 
it is past, or like a watch in the night (Ps 90: 2-4; NRSV).
Following his quotation of verse 2, Barth comments.
The final duplication, “from everlasting to everlasting,” which is so common in both 
Old and New Testaments,^^ may be regarded as particularly significant. It can be taken 
to mean from duration to duration, that is, in pure duration \in reiner Dauer]. This is 
how God exists in distinction from us who exist from one time to another, but never in 
pure duration. In light of this we can understand the continuation of the passage (609; 
686).^ ^
Barth here takes a biblical stock phrase to be semantically equivalent to, and hence fully 
commensurable with, one of his own theological definitions of eternity, i.e. ‘pure duration.’
To use David Yeago’s distinction again, we could say that the scriptural writers use one spt of 
conceptual terms to make basically the same judgement about the eternal God that he (Barth) 
wishes to make using a different set of conceptual terms. As such, the biblical phrase and 
Barth’s theological phrase have the capacity to illuminate the meaning of each other. 
‘Everlasting to everlasting’ ensures that ‘pure duration’ does not take on an a priori 
philosophical meaning foreign to that of the biblical text. In turn, the more abstract term ‘pure 
duration’ has the capacity (at its best) to relate ‘everlasting to everlasting’ to a wider range of 
related conceptual terms (especially in theology) which share essentially the same theological 
judgement about God.^^
In another excursus, Barth develops a similar point in the context of developing the 
biblical-theological motif of God’s freedom over time, and thus we shift from the catena form
In the Old Testament, Barth has in mind passages like 1 Chr 16:36, Neh 9:5, Ps 41:12, Ps 103:17 and Ps 
106: 48. It is not clear what New Testament passages he has in mind, although it would likely include 1 Tim 
1:17, which speaks of God as the ‘king o f ages’ and uses the phrase ‘glory forever and ever’ (literally ‘to the 
ages of the ages’).
Barth then quotes Psalm 90:3-4 and cites 2 Pet 3:8 for comparison.
Yeago 1994: 159ff (see chapter 2, subsection 2.3.3).
A similar conceptual relationship of mutual-illumination and equivalency of theological judgement between 
Barth’s ‘pure duration’ and biblical phraseology is implicit in respect to the other passages that Barth quotes. 
For example, the Psalmist says to God, ‘you endure’ and ‘you are the same and your years have no end,’ which 
he contrasts with the transience of even the least transient created things, ‘the foundation of the earth, and the 
heavens’ (Ps 102: 25fr). For God to endure and to be the same over time surely relates closely to what Barth 
means by ‘pure duration.’
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to the thematic form of Barth’s Scripture usage. ‘Whenever Holy Scripture speaks of God as
eternal it stresses his freedom’ (609; 687). By ‘freedom’ Barth here means basically what he
does by the term elsewhere. God’s freedom is that aspect of God which separates him from
all created things precisely so that God might suiTound and be ‘utterly present’ to humanity in
‘complete power over him’ (609f; 687).
Barth sometimes seems to accord eternity a special place among the perfections of
God’s freedom. For example, he says, ‘Eternity is the source of the deity of God in so far as it
consists in His fr eedom, independence and lordship’ (610; 687). This is congruent with
Barth’s attempt to regard eternity as what we might call the Bible’s ‘leading ontological
concept,’ as the biblical alternative to ‘Being,’ the leading ontological concept in Greek
philosophy and in most classical theology. Barth states the point as follows:
At the very place at which the later theology fell under the influence of Greek 
philosophy and made the concept of being predominant, the Bible speaks of the eternal 
God. According to the Bible, it is not being as such, but that which endures, duration 
itself, which is divine. . .  Being does not include eternity, but eternity includes being. 
The genuineness of being is examined . . .  and tested by eternity. It is being or non- 
being according to its relation to eternity (610; 6871).
At first glance, Barth in this passage appears to ahgn the Bible, and hence his theology, with a
particular revisionist ontological perspective that stands against other ontological
perspectives.^^ If this is so, the question arises whether this is a case o f ‘eisegesis’—i.e. a case
in which Barth reads an a priori viewpoint (a natural theology or a philosophy) into rather
than out of the Bible.
What is the nature of the ‘implied ontological com ponent in  Barth’s doctrine of
eternity? In Barth’s view, God’s self-revelation has priority over all such a priori ontological
views, and his doctrine of eternity is an attempt to follow that revelation, especially in its
witness to God’s freedom. Barth does not disavow the use of ontological schemes altogether,
but only rules out the inappropriate imposition of such schemes upon revelation. In our
judgement, the dialectical nature of Barth’s doctrine of eternity (God being both above time
See Jenson 1997.
Richard Muller speaks o f ‘an implied ontological component’ in Barth’s doctrine of constancy (1983: 27). 
Barth’s own comments sometimes suggest that he sees eternity as ontologically prior to God’s constancy. For 
example, he calls eternity ‘the principle [Prinzip\ o f divine constancy,’ stating that ‘the reason why he is free 
to be constant is that time has no power over him’ (609; 687).
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and engaged in time) prevents Barth from systematically imposing a specific ontology on the 
testimony of revelation to God’s eternity. This does not mean that he does not occasionally 
fall prey to ‘ontological imposition’ in a non-systematic, ad hoc sense. Insofar as this is true, 
Barth is open to the dangers of ‘eisegesis’ or ‘natural theology.’^ ’ In any case, the 
fundamental character of Barth’s dialectical, revelation-based theological method is structured 
so as to minimise these dangers.
At the least, Barth appears to improve on the method of the classical theologians in 
this regard. The classical accounts of eternity highlighted the biblical theme of God’s 
sovereignty, supremacy and incomparabhity by drav^ing attention to how God’s eternity is 
different from our time. But insofar as their concepts of eternity showed the influence of the 
Hellenistic concept of being, it was seen simply as ‘the negation of time’ or ‘abstract opposite 
of the concept of the time.’ Thus, the classical accounts were not faithful to the other features 
of the scriptural witness to God’s eternity that involved a more positive relation to 
temporality. Barth’s dialectical, non-reductionistic approach also aims to stress these aspects 
of the biblical witness, without neglecting the negative aspect of God’s eternity.
3.3, The Major Theme: Divine Eternity as God's Positive Relation to Time
Barth argues that the true ‘negative’ sense of eternity as ‘duration without separation 
between beginning, succession and end is true only against the background of the decisive and 
positive characteristic that as true \echte\ duration, the duration of God Himself as fhe  
beginning, succession and end’ (610; 688).*  ^ How is this claim grounded in Scripture?
According to Barth, ‘in distinction fr om the concept of eternity that later dominated 
the church, the Bible is interested primarily, i f  not exclusively, in this primary and positive 
quality o f eternity' (610; 688).^  ^ Barth supports generalisation about the Bible’s thematic 
content by means of an argument about the meaning of biblical terms for eternity. ‘By the 
terms ‘ôlâm and aion the Bible understands a space of time fixed by God, and eternity is
As noted above, this may be the case when Barth says that ‘eternity is just the duration that is lacking to 
time’ (608; see 2.2 above). See Farrow 1999: 29Iff.
^  This claim is consistent with Barth’s statement of the positive and negative sides o f divine freedom in 
general in II/l, §28.3; see chapter 3, section 2.
For Barth to say ‘if  not exclusively’ seems to be a rhetorical over-statement in the light of what we have
observed in 3.1.
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generally ascribed to God under the categories of beginning, succession and end.’^ "^ Barth, 
continues, ‘The biblical writers do not hesitate to speak of God’s years and days, or to 
describe these as e t e r n a l .T h e  biblical writers use of such ‘temporal’ teims to speak of 
God’s eternity is not ‘to be explained as naïve, Semitic realism,’ but is ‘incomparably more 
profound’ than an abstract conception of eternity as merely ‘non-temporality. ’ In some real 
and proper sense, God has freedom and power over our years and days both because he is 
their origin and because he possesses them a se or ‘in Himself (i.e. ‘time 1 ’). According to 
Barth, this ‘positive quality of eternity’ is ‘finely expressed’ in the classic definition of 
Boethius, as long as it is not interpreted (as it was by the scholastics) so as to make eternity 
secondary to being.
In a later excursus, Barth refers to a specific biblical phrase that speaks of the positive
concept of eternity. Having already spoken of eternity as God’s own unique temporality (time
1; see 2.3 above), Barth now begins to speak of God’s time for us (time 2), which is God’s
positive relationship to our time (time 3). In this context he says.
It is because God is the eternal One that Psalm 31:15 is to be taken literally {wôrtlîcH\: 
“My times are in thy hands.” God’s hands, the workings of His omnipotence, are not 
themselves timeless but supremely temporal, so that our time can be really in them, and 
can be not merely apparent but real [wirkliche^ time . . .  [T]he eternal God co-exists 
with the time created by Him (613f; 692).
Although Barth does not make the link explicit, this text’s reference to oui* times being in
God’s hands is an example of the biblical basis for Barth’s conception of the inclusion of our
time within God’s eternity—i.e. within God’s eternity as the ‘workings of His omnipotence’
that are ‘supremely temporal’ (time 2).
This positive relationship between divine eternity and human time, prefigured in the
Old Testament, is established and revealed definitively in Jesus Christ. The biblical testimony
to Jesus Christ and his incarnation constitutes another biblical motif or theme that Barth
Here and elsewhere, we are using the standard contemporary forms of transliteration for Hebrew and Greek 
terms, which sometimes differ from Barth’s own usage.
The passages that Barth’s quoted earlier (see 3.1 above) express well what Barth has in mind here. Ps 90:2 
employs the Hebrew term for ‘eternity’ ( ‘ôlâm). Barth translated the term as Ewigkeit (KD, 686) but we used 
the term ‘everlasting’ (as did the translator of the CD and the NRSV), a term which does not have the ‘a- 
temporal’ connotation that ‘eternity’ can have in English. That said, we recall, that Barth does not regard 
God’s Ewigkeit as the ‘infinite extension of time’ (608; 686; see 1.1 above) which is the main sense of 
‘everlasting’ in English.
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unfolds as the basis for his view of eternity. Barth does not explicitly refer to any biblical texts 
in expounding this motif, although he does quote pai t of John 1:14 (‘the Word became flesh’) 
without reference to its chapter and verse (616; 694). Barth uses this biblical statement as a 
kind of basic theological fact or axiom, a statement so basic that it needs no explanation, let 
alone defence. Thus, Barth can say (as we noted in 2.4): ‘The fact that the Word became flesh 
undoubtedly means that, without ceasing to be eternity.. .  eternity became time.’
Barth’s lack of exegetical comment on John 1:14 here does not mean that Barth 
regards such exegesis as unimportant, for he engages in this exegetical task elsewhere in CD.*  ^
Rather, this is an example of a two-fold phenomenon that is important for understanding the 
biblical basis of Barth’s view of eternity and indeed of his doctrine of God as a whole. That is,
1. Barth often does not spell out the exegetical basis for a given biblical-theological 
claim in the context in which he is ‘using’ that claim. He often uses such claims as 
‘premises’ in macro-arguments for other biblical-theological claims, rather than as 
‘conclusions’ to exegetical micro-arguments (see chapter 2, subsection 4.3.1).
2. When Barth does not spell out the exegetical basis in the immediate context, he 
often has done so somewhere else in CD.
Another example of this phenomenon is implicit in ftirther claims Barth makes about the
significance of the incarnation for our understanding of eternity. When God becomes man.
This does not mean that He . . .  ceases to be who He is in His superiority. But while 
He is still this. He humbles himself and lifts us up by becoming one of us like us in all 
things. . . .  He raises time to a form of His own eternal being. For our being, as 
created human being, has this form [i.e. temporal form], and He could not assume our 
being . .  . without taking time also and concealing and revealing his eternal being in it. 
His own time, eternity, is not so precious to him..  . that he must set it over against 
our time.. . . No contraction or diminution of deitv takes place’ (616; 695; italics and 
underlining added).
We may make two observations about this passage. (1) The two italicised phrases are biblical 
allusions or ‘echoes,’ whether or not they are intentional ones. The first alludes to Phil 2:8 
and draws attention to the whole of Phil 2:6-11, which appears to be in the background of 
Barth’s comments here. The second alludes to Heb 2:17a,*  ^which can be seen as a parallel 
passage to the passage in Phil 2. (2) The underlined phrases highlight terminology that is 
similar or identical to the terminology that Barth used in his exegesis of Phil 2:6-11 in the
^ E.g. FI: 401. Barth cites Jn 1:14 seven times in FI alone.
‘Therefore he had to become like his brothers and sisters in eveiy respect.. . . ’ (NRSV).
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context of his treatment of divine constancy/^ Taken together, these two observations show 
that Barth’s theological conclusions regarding incarnation and eternity are more firmly 
rooted in the theological use o f Scripture than might first appear. Several theological points 
that Barth takes for granted here (e.g. that it is God that is humbling himself in Christ; or that 
this humiliation ought to be understood under the rubric of concealment and revelation) are 
given an exphcit and extended exegetical basis elsewhere in CD. This confirms the main 
argument of our thesis as a whole, namely, that Barth’s unceasing attention to and engagement 
with Scripture is decisive in determining and supporting his theological conclusions regarding 
God’s perfections, often in places where this might not be apparent on the ‘surface’ of a given 
section of the CD.
3.4, The Biblical Basis of the Three Forms o f God's Temporality
3.4.1. Introduction
Barth’s account of the three forms of temporality is central to the biblical foundations 
of his account of eternity in its positive relationship to time. So long as we guard against 
misuses in which eternity is read in the light of our time, ‘the temporality of eternity may be 
described in detail as the pre-temporality, supra-temporaHty and post-temporaHty of eternity’ 
(619; 698). He continues, ‘With these terms we return to the direct proximity of the bibhcal 
outlook.’ Why do these terms or concepts stand in unmediated nearness to the bibHcal 
outlook? The answer is that these terms speak of God’s eternity in temporal terms—in 
positive relationship to time—and this is exactly how the Bible typicaUy speaks of God’s 
eternity (see 3.3 above). Again, this is not a sign of the Bible’s ‘naivety.’ Rather, it points to 
the profound awareness of the bibhcal outlook that eternity is both distinct from (our) time, 
and yet related to it. Specifically, we would argue that, for Barth, the Bible uses its own 
conceptual terms to affirm that the eternal God is before, above and after our time.^  ^ This is 
no mere ‘figure of speech,’ but is a ‘serious and divine truth’ (620; 699). God really is ‘He 
who was, and is and is to come.’^ ® This statement tells us the truth about ‘God himself.’ 
Neither it nor its temporal language is to be taken ‘figuratively’ [bildlich] or ‘metaphorically’
CD, II/l, 515-518. See chapter 5, subsection 3.3. See also CD, IV/1, 186-192.
This is what Barth calls the ‘concrete form of eternity as readiness for time’ (619; 698; see 2.4 above). 
Barth quotes this phrase from Rev 1:4 (and elsewhere in Revelation) twice here (620; 699), yet without 
giving the scriptural reference.
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[uneigentlich] (620; 699). Barth explains what this implies in a passage that is instructive for
understanding his view of the relationship between Scripture and theology in this context.
It is quite impossible to deny to God’s eternity the possession of preparedness 
[Bereitshaft, or ‘readiness’] for time. It is for this reason that this is true and the 
concepts of pre-temporality, supra-temporality and post-temporality are legitimate: 
because they simply spell out and analyse what the Christian message guarantees [or 
‘assures us,’ versichert]  ^to be the Word of God and therefore the truth. This message 
cannot be proclaimed nor believed as the truth without the proclaiming and believing 
of these statements about God. They are not simply inferences from the Gospel.. . . 
they are elements of the Gospel itself. The Gospel itself and as such cannot be spoken 
without these statements being made and this understanding of God’s eternity forcing 
itself upon us—not indirectly [mittelbarY as a scholastic parergon, but directly 
[unmittelbar], because the Gospel must either remain unproclaimed or be spoken in the 
form of these statements (621; 700).
To paraphrase, Barth believes that the three forms of temporality are strongly 
authorised by Scripture, because they offer what Frei called a conceptual analysis or 
redescription of aspects of the gospel message; they ‘spell out and analyse’ essential elements 
of God’s Word. These basic statements about God’s ‘temporal’ eternity (i.e. that God is 
before, is above and is after our time) are not only inferences from the gospel but integral 
elements of its form. As such, the scripturally-attested gospel ‘forces us’ to speak of God’s 
eternity in a particular (three-fold) way.^'
We can explain the scriptural authorisation of Barth’s three forms of divine temporality 
by employing, once again, the distinction between judgements and conceptual terms. Barth is 
best interpreted as saying that certain theological judgements, stated by both Scripture and 
himself in different ways, are ‘statements’ necessary and essential to the gospel’s form. As 
such, Barth regards his own conceptual terms (i.e. pre-temporality, supra-temporaUty and 
post-temporality) as legitimate means of expressing these essential judgements. Although 
Barth’s rhetorical overstatement may lead us to think otherwise, it is the judgements that 
‘force themselves upon us,’ not the particular conceptual forms that Barth or even Scripture 
uses to express them. Thus, Barth’s three forms of temporality are merely ‘legitimate,’ not 
‘necessary’ or ‘essential.’ They are Barth’s best (yet provisional) attempt to afiSrm, spell out
As we noted in chapter 2 (subsection 2.3.2), what Barth here calls ‘direct’ could still be seen as a case of 
‘indirect authorisation’ in our usage. The ‘Word’ encounters us in the ‘words’ and this can be seen as both 
direct and indirect on different levels. In this case, Barth associates an ‘indirect’ relationship between the 
Bible and theology specifically with an inappropriate scholastic mode of inference (quite different than our 
typical use o f ‘indirect’).
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and analyse more basic theological judgements—judgements that are in some sense an aspect 
of the divine Word of truth. Moreover, Barth first encounters and comes to believe in these 
judgements or statements about God’s time and eternity ‘directly’ through God’s ‘speaking to 
him’ in the course of his reading of Scripture, and thus in the form of Scripture’s presentation 
of the gospel in its own conceptual terms. We cannot discern by rational analysis precisely 
where the divinely authorised theological judgements end and where the relative and 
provisional linguistic forms begin. But Barth would say that this ambiguity is an inescapable 
feature of the mystery of theological God-talk in the face of revelation.
The preceding observations help us to understand what Barth means when he says: 
‘Without God’s complete temporality the content of the Christian message has no shape'
(620; 699). The gospel has a three-fold temporal shape or form. We wiU now examine how 
Barth expounds this with a view to uncovering how Barth concretely authorises it through his 
use of Scripture. Barth intends his survey of the three forms of temporality to remind us of 
‘two aspects,’ namely, (i) ‘that the truth of God’s Word depends on’ the truth of the 
statements (i.e. theological judgements) about God’s temporality, and (ii) ‘that they 
themselves are based on and preserved by the truth of God’s Word’ (621 ; 700). As we look 
briefly at the fimction of Scripture in each of the three forms of temporality, we must keep in 
mind this mutual dependence between (a) the basic theological statements implied in speaking 
of the three forms of temporality and (b) the truth or message of God’s Word.
3.4.2. Scripture and God’s pre-temporality
In regards to the pre-temporality of God, we already noted above (2.4) that God 
regards this ‘pre-time’ (Vorzeit) in a Christocentric manner. Accordingly, Barth states: ‘If we 
understand eternity as pre-time . . .  we have to recognise that eternity itself bears the name of 
Jesus Christ’ (622; 701). Immediately following this statement, Barth quotes three New 
Testament passages as ‘relevant in this connection’: John 8:58, Eph 1:4f, and I Pet 1:18f. The 
first text in this catena is Jesus’ statement: ‘Before Abraham was, I am.’ The latter two texts 
speak of the election and reconciliation of humanity that is accomplished in Christ and fi*om 
eternity. Eph 1:4 figures prominently in Barth’s account of Christological election in CD
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volume II/2, which provides ftiller exegetical substantiation for what Barth argues here.^^
Barth follows his quotation of these three passages with this comment: ‘Note how in all these 
and similar passages the eternal presence of God over and in time [i.e. supra-temporality] is 
established by reference to a pre-time in which time and with it the existence of man and its 
renewal, is foreseen and determined’ (622; 702). For Barth, the scriptural witness to God’s 
eternity as ‘before time’ (in Christ) is unmistakable and is inextricable from its witness to the 
other aspects of God’s temporality. Specifically, God’s pre-time reality establishes God’s 
supra-time reality.
3.4.3. Scripture and God’s supra-temporality
Scripture figures even more prominently in Barth’s account of God’s supra (iiber)-
temporality. In the course of a lengthy excursus, Barth quotes and comments on tlnee
Scripture passages that deal vrith God’s supra-temporality from the perspective of the
incarnation and especially the birth of Christ. We will examine Barth’s treatment of each of
these three passages in turn.
(1) First, Barth quotes the message of the angels in Luke 2:14: ‘Glory to God in the
highest and on earth peace, good will toward men’ (as translated on 623f). Barth states:
This is the most accurate description of God’s supra-temporality. For these words 
declare that, since God is in the highest over [iiber] the earth, and all glory belongs and 
is due to the One who is there, there is peace on [auj] earth, there is not to be any lack 
of security on earth, that is, among the men to whom this God who dwells in the 
highest has turned His good will. . .  It is He is supra-temporal. . . that He exercises 
and interprets His freedom in our favour . . .  that He wills to be not only God, but God 
among and for the men of His good will, and that He creates for the glory proper to 
Him in the highest a complement on earth in the peace which is guaranteed to us to 
magnify His glory and to be thankful to Him. It is in this way that God knows and 
wills aU things (624; 703; emphasis added).
Here Barth is in interested in drawing out one text’s witness to the positive relationship 
or correspondence between the eternal God and the peace among humans that is made 
possible by God’s grace in the birth of Christ. Later in the excursus, Barth notes that ‘The
^  Barth cites Eph 1:4f ten times in IF2 and discusses it extensively (see Cunningham 1995). Barth’s exegesis 
in II/2 provides the fuller biblical basis for what he says here and in similar passages in II/l (see our comments 
at the end of 3.3 above). If McCormack (especially 1995) is correct about the decisive significance of 
Christological election for Barth’s theology from the writing of II/l onvrards (and we have no reason to doubt 
this judgement), then the exegetical underpinnings of Barth’s doctrine of Christological election confirm our 
view that Scripture is decisive for his doctrine o f God as a whole in II/l and indeed for his theology in the 
remainder of CD.
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angel’s message in Lk 2:14 . . . does not proclaim a general truth’ (625; 705). Rather, he says,
‘it proclaims the fulfilment of the promise to Israel and the basis and meaning of the Church—
the birth of Christ.’ This helps Barth to establish his point that the God-given significance of
history in general derives from the special significance of the particular history of Israel, of the
Church, and above all, of Jesus Christ. This confirms that God’s pre-temporal election
determines God’s supra-temporal way of relating to the world and its unfolding history. The
birth of Christ marks the beginning of the special time the incarnation, the central time that
gives meaning to all earthly time.
(2) A second passage Barth quotes and discusses in his account of supra-temporality is
Psalm 2:6-7, wliich reads: “‘I have set my king on Zion, my holy hiU.” I wiU tell of the decree
of the Lord: He said to me, “You are my son; today I have begotten you . . .’” (NRSV;
emphasis added). For Barth, the ‘today’ in this text refers to ‘the temporal present’ in which
the messianic king is set up or installed on Zion, ‘which is contemporary with the nunc
aeternitasj and is thus ‘eternal time’ (625; 705). Barth believes this text speaks of a human
‘now’ (‘today,’ the present) which is ‘contemporary’ with the eternal divine ‘now,’ and
therefore speaks of ‘eternal time,’ time that is a part of eternity. Such theological exegesis is
Christocentric, since Barth believes that the ultimate referent to the ‘my king’ in this passage is
Christ. On this point, Barth follows both the New Testament (see Heb 1:5) and the ‘older
theology.’ But it is subtle Christocentrism. As such, Barth follows Calvin in departing from
the tendency of the older, pre-critical theology to regard the text as referring directly to the
eternal Son in contrast to the earthly Jesus.
Calvin rightly perceived that this hodie [‘today’] cannot mean eternity so that the 
begetting cannot be the eternal begetting of the Son by the Father. But this makes it 
all the more certain that what is meant is the appearing of the Messiah King in time. 
And in this appearance, as Calvin says, eternity is revealed, or, we should now say 
more specifically, the supra-temporaHty of God as His presence in time (625f; 705).^^
Barth refers to Calvin’s comments in C. R. [Corpus Reformatuni\, 31 ,46f. Harry M. Hine translates 
Calvin’s comments as follows: ‘As for the fact that God pronounces that he has begotten him, this ought to be 
referred to the sense or knowledge of humans . . . .  And so the adverb 'today' marks the time of that 
declaration, because after it became known that the king had been divinely cieated, he went forth as though 
recently begotten by God.’
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Indeed, Barth states: Tn this appearing [of Christ] time and all times have their direct meaning 
in relation to God . . . From it there is in all times and for all times that peace on earth for men 
of good will’ (626; 705).
(3) In his account of supra-temporality, Barth also quotes a classic New Testament 
passage about Christ’s (first) advent, namely John l:9f. This text speaks of Jesus Christ as the 
‘true light, which lights every man’ and is ‘coming into the world.’ It goes on to speak of this 
one, the light, as (a) the creator of the world and yet not known by the world; (b) as one not 
received by ‘his own’ and yet received by those (through faith) to whom he gave the power to 
become sons of God. Barth comments on this text with this illuminating reflection on the 
incarnation:
This occurrence [Gescheheri\ is the concrete form [Gestalt] to which we must hold 
fast in relation to God’s supra-temporality . . .  Because, in this occurrence, eternity 
assumes the form of a temporal present, all time, without ceasing to be time, is no 
more empty [leere] time, or without eternity. It has become new. This means that in 
and with this present, eternity creates in time real past and real future, distinguishes 
between them, and is itself the bridge and way from the one to the other. Jesus Christ 
is this way (626; 705; emphasis added).
Barth develops this motif of Jesus Christ as the way fiom the past to the future in 
terms of a wide ranging biblical-theological reflection. As the ‘hidden centre of time’ (626; 
705), Christ is the one in whom God accomplishes a decisive ‘turning’ [Wende] fi"om the ‘old 
age’ (or sphere) of sin and death to the ‘new age’ (or sphere) of righteousness and life (see 
626-629; 706-709). This exposition of a complex biblical-thematic pattern involves reference 
to many features of the biblical witness, sometimes with and sometimes without the citation of 
specific passages. Barth offers a rule for interpreting the relevant biblical material and life seen 
in light of it: in Christ, human existence is moving out of the old age or sphere (it is made 
genuinely ‘past’ and thus is passing away) and into the new age or sphere, the genuine future 
(see 626f; 706Q. This view stands in contrast to ‘a heathen view of the two spheres’ in which 
there are the ‘timeless, objective spheres’ that are caught in an ‘endless repetition’ or ‘endless 
dialectic’ (626; 706 & 628; 707). Thus, ‘the past is that fi-om which we are set fi*ee’ by Christ, 
and ‘the fiiture is that for which we are set fi-ee by Him’ (628; 798). Barth includes a 
discussion of the practical consequences of this delivering work of Christ in relation to our 
view of the past and the future. He quotes and comments on Ps 103:2 and Phil 3:13 in
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discussing how we should look at the past (628; 708), and alludes to Jesus’ admonition not to 
worry (Mt 6:25-34; Lk 12:22-30) in relation to how we should look at the fiiture (628f; 708Q.
3.4.4. Scripture and God’s post-temporality
Third and finally, we look at Barth’s use of Scripture in his treatment of post­
temporality. In this relatively short treatment (63 Off; 709ff), Barth does not include an 
exegetical or historical excursus, and does not treat Scripture in any detail here. However, he 
does refer in the main text to how God will one day be ‘all in all,’ a phrase taken fi*om 1 Cor 
15:28 (630; 710). In this day of the eschatological future, all things will find their ultimate 
destiny in God and under his final judgement. Barth’s distinctive ‘revelatory’ view of 
eschatology is evident when he says that in the future lies the Revelation of the kingdom of 
God,’ the revelation of the kingdom of God about which we can already say that ‘He is all 
and all’ (630; 710). '^^  Barth also refers to scriptural passages and themes indirectly in his 
treatment of God’s post-temporality, as when he alludes to Gen 2:2f in his reference to God’s 
final ‘Sabbath rest after the completion of all His works (630; 710).
In the last part of his treatment of eternity, Barth spells out how there is ‘no basic 
rivalry’ between the three forms of temporality (631 ; 711 ; see 2.4 above). There Barth 
employs Rom 11:36 as a leading passage and uses it as a rubric for referring to the distinction 
and unity of the three forms of God’s temporality: ‘For from him and through him and to him 
are all things’ (NRSV). Barth comments: ‘coming as it does at the end of Rom. 9-11,’ Paul’s 
adoption of this phrase^  ^ ‘surely points to the fact that. . .  in the same love and freedom, God 
is the One and all, the beginning, middle, and the end, the One who was and is and is to come, 
at perfect peace within himself (631 ; 71 Ify. This concludes oui’ survey of some of the ways in 
which Barth employs Scripture as a basis for his view of the three forms of divine temporality 
and the relationship that exists between them.
Barth continues, Tt is only in its revelation that the kingdom of God is post-temporal and therefore lies in 
the future. Already pre-temporally God was, and supra-temporally God is, all and all without reservation or 
reduction’ (630; 71 Of). It is not clear that this is what I Cor 15:28 or similar passages actually teach when read 
in context (see a similar issue raised in chapter 5, subsection 3.4).
After quoting the ‘adopted’ phrase in Greek, Barth adds in parentheses: ‘and there may be a verbal 
connection with certain ideas found in the mystery religions’ (631; 711). This points out how Barth is not 
adverse to making ‘higher-critical’ observations about the historical origins of the text or its content, though 
here (as typically elsewhere) the observation does not affect his theological interpretation of the text in its final 
form.
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3.5. Concluding Reflections on Scripture in Barth's Doctrine of Eternity
In Barth’s doctrine of eternity, as in other aspects of his doctrine of God, it is
sometimes difficult to know how to characterise Barth’s use of Scripture. Insofai* as it verges
on exegesis, it is surely not the kind of exegesis typical of academic biblical studies in the
twentieth century. In addition, Barth develops the relationship between the text and
theological conclusion in various ways that resist facile generalisations. Also, the various
practices that we refer to as Barth’s engagement with Scripture, interpretation of Scripture, or
use of Scripture are practices that could often simultaneously be placed under the rubrics of
Barth’s use of tradition or use of reason. As we have also seen in respect to his treatment of
divine unity and constancy, Barth weaves the three strands of the threefold cord so tightly
together that they are often difficult to distinguish from each other.
But it is possible to make some observations that illuminate the nature of Barth’s
complex use of Scripture within his account of divine eternity and his doctrine of God as a
whole. These observations concern the question of whether Barth avoids the related dangers
of ‘eisegesis’ and ‘natural theology.’ This question has been raised a number of times in this
thesis, and once again we cannot escape the great difficulties involved in answering this
question. Rival understandings of the nature of scriptural normativity and the criteria of
exegesis yield rival answers.
One way of probing the question of whether Barth falls into eisegesis is to consider
one of Barth’s sympathetic critics, in this case the New Testament scholar Oscar CuUmann.
Cullmann offers an ‘internal’ critique of Barth’s doctrine of eternity—i.e. criticism that agrees
with Barth’s methodological principle that theology should strive to be biblical and to avoid
the imposition of foreign ideas and convictions upon the Bible.^  ^ In the forward to his
influential book Christ and Time^^ Cullmann compares his own view to Barth’s.
I am united with [Barth] in recognising the strictly Christocentric character of the New 
Testament theology to which he in his Dogmatik gives so powerful an expression. 
When I here demonstrate that his conception of time, in which I see the last but quite 
momentous remnant of the influence of philosophy upon his exposition of the Bible, is 
incompatible with Primitive Christianity, I believe that thereby I am carrying out his
See Hunsinger’s description of the difference between internal and external critique (2000: 10).
Cullmann 1962. (This is the revised edition of the English translation of the 1946 German edition, which 
was published only a few years after the publication o f Barth’s treatment of eternity in KD, II/l).
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Christocentric program on the field of New Testament exposition and by means of 
exegetical methods/^
Cullmann is clearly happy with Barth’s ‘Christocentric program,’ but he believes that Barth
allows a philosophy incompatible with the primitive Christianity of the New Testament to
influence his biblical exposition. In a related passage, Cullmann finds in Barth ‘the last traces
of a philosophical and non-Biblical statement of the relation of time and e te rn i ty .Y e t ,  he
commends Barth for ‘treating the problem of time as a whole,' thus avoiding a one-sided
treatment of it that focuses on only one of the three forms of temporality.
What kind of ‘philosophy’ does Cullmann believe has influenced Barth’s view of
eternity and how eternity relates to time? The philosophy Cullmann has in mind is
‘Platonism.’ ®^” Cullmann describes the relevant aspect of Platonic thought as follows:
For Greek thinking in its Platonic formulation there exists between time and eternity a 
qualitative difference, which is not completely expressed by speaking of a distinction 
between limited and unlimited duration of time. For Plato, eternity is not endlessly 
extended time, but something quite different; it is timelessness.'®*
Barth’s claim that ‘eternity is n o t . . .  an infinite extension of time both backwards and
forwards’ (608; 686)'®  ^is designed to reinforce precisely the kind of quahtative distinction
between time and eternity that CuUmann ascribes to Platonic thinking. Barth stresses that
eternity is not simply ‘timelessness’ (as Cullmann recognises), but he also consistently says
eternity is more than everlasting time.'®  ^ CuUmann, by contrast, says that what the Bible caUs
eternity is simply the ‘unending duration’ of linear time under God’s direction, ‘the endless
succession of the ages.’*®**
Does Barth really come to his view primarily on the basis of Scripture? Or, as
Cullmann thinks, does he read a Platonic view of eternity into Scripture? At times it does
seem that Barth’s theological claims about God’s eternity, especially when he speaks of
eternity as ‘non-temporality,’ involve quasi-classical (perhaps Platonic) philosophical
Cullmann 1962: xiii. The kind o f ‘influence of philosophy’ that Cullmann wishes to speak of would probably 
fall under Barth’s category of natural theology, rather than being merely ‘terminological.’
^  Cullmann 1962: 60. He is commenting on Barth’s treatment of the three forms o f divine temporality {CD, 
II/l, 62 Iff and ÆD, II/l, 698fi).
See the similar conclusion reached by Moltmann (e.g., 1990: 18; cf. our comments in chapter 2, subsection 
4.3) and the pertinent reflections of Gunton (1978: 182ff)- 
Cullmann 1962: 61.
See also subsection 2.2 above.
Cullmann 1962: 62ff.
Cullmann 1962: 62.
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assumptions that are not sufficiently governed by the concrete particularities of Scripture.'®^
In such cases, Barth’s views on eternity’s distinction from time are not entirely based on a 
posteriori reflection (nachdenkend) on God’s self-revelation as it is attested in Scripture. 
However, we could say much the same thing about Cullmann’s views of time and eternity.
His view that eternity is everlasting time does not simply arise from ‘objective’ exegesis, but 
involves certain assumptions about reality (ontology) and the proper methodological 
relationship of Scripture to theology and philosophy.'®® Thus, the views of both Barth and 
Cullmann are best seen as different possible ways of interpreting the totahty of what Scripture 
has to say about the matters of time and eternity, ways that both involve a limited form of 
‘eisegesis’'®^ or perhaps even ‘natural theology.’'®* Each view has its own strengths and 
weaknesses. Cullmann’s view arguably has the advantage of simplicity, coherence and 
proximity to the ‘letter’ of the New Testament. Barth’s dialectical perspective, while it may 
be less coherent and more difficult to grasp, is perhaps more sensitive to the ‘spirit’ of 
Scripture, which testifies to God in his unique mysteriousness—a mysteriousness which we 
would expect to strain or even burst ordinary human concepts of time and eternity. Cullmann 
and Barth aie both striving to be biblical, but are speaking about matters that the Bible’s 
explicit statements do not clearly resolve. On the basis of a combination of direct and indirect 
authorisation (Cullmann stressing the former and Barth the latter), they reach differing 
doctrines of eternity. As such, they are able to critique each other’s errors and excesses, and 
to help their readers to identify where ‘eisegesis’ may hide under the guise of a noble attempt 
to be biblical.
See our references to Douglas Farrow’s criticism of Barth in 2.2 above.
Indeed, there is some reason to think that Cullmann’s view o f time is closer to a ‘modern progressivist’ 
view of time than a ‘Christian’ or biblical view of time (see Bauckham and Hart 2000: 46ff). We can also 
observe that part of the contrast between Cullmann and Barth on time and eternity owes to the fact that they 
are writing in different genres. Cullmann is doing ‘New Testament exposition’ (similar to what Barth calls 
‘biblical theology’), whereas Barth is doing dogmatic theology. The former genre tends to eschew all use of 
philosophy (although Cullmann’s attempt indicates that this may not be entirely possible), while the latter, as 
Barth saw it, is free to make use of philosophical discourse and concepts on an ad hoc basis (see chapter 2, 
subsection 2.3.4).
See Barth’s comments on the inevitability of some degree o f ‘eisegesis’ in theology (FI, 106).
Here we are not referring to a comprehensive or intentional natural theology, but simply to the inadvertent 
intervention of non-revealed (non-biblical or non-Christological) ideas or convictions into theology on specific 
points or occasions.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
In this final chapter, we will draw together the various strands of our argument and 
reflect on its significance. We will do so in two sections, the first offering a summary of our 
argument and the second some concluding observations.
1. A Summary of the Argument
By reflecting on our thesis-statement (initially offered in chapter 1, subsection 6.1), we 
will now summarise the heart of our argument, which is principally concerned with the nature 
of Barth’s theological method.' We recall that this thesis-statement is composed of the 
following two sentences.
(1) In Barth’s doctrines of God’s unity, constancy and eternity. Scripture functions as 
the authoritative source and basis for theological critique and construction, and 
tradition and reason are functionally subordinate to Scripture.
(2) Yet, in this process of redescribing the biblical testimony to God, Barth employs a 
predominantly indirect way of relating Scripture and theological proposals, a way that 
allows tradition and reason to play important ‘mediatory’ roles.
In light of the expository analysis of chapters 3-6, we can now offer the following
reflections on what this thesis-statement means and implies.
The first sentence in the thesis statement affirms the functional priority of Scripture
over tradition and reason in Barth’s method. This functional priority is evident in both the
‘critical’ and the ‘constructive’ aspects of Barth’s dogmatic theology. In respect to the
former, Barth’s multifaceted use of Scripture^ typically forms the primary and decisive basis
for his critique of certain classical conceptions of divine simplicity, immutability and a-
temporal eternity. In respect to the later, Barth ‘redescribes God’ primarily by means of
redescribmg the scriptural witness to God and thus provides an alternative to the faulty
classical and modem doctrines of God which he critiques. Thus, with only occasional
 ^Again, by Barth’s ‘theological method,’ we refer broadly to his way of doing theology, as it is evident 
primarily from his practice and secondarily from his programmatic or theoretical comments.
 ^The multifeceted character of Barth’s use of Scripture can be profitably described in terms of the five features 
that mark Barth’s method as a whole (see chapter 2, section 5 and chapter 3, subsection 2.3). To review, 
Barth’s theology is: (1) reverent, (2) Christocentric, (3) textually-based, (4) ecclesial, and (5) creative. See 
Pokrifka-Joe 2001 (unpublished paper) for a much fiiller exposition of the five features in relation to Barth’s 
use of Scripture.
264
exceptions, Scripture functions in Barth’s doctrine of God with the priority we would expect 
given his theoretical comments (see chapter 2). Rather than functioning with independent 
authority, tradition and reason function positively only in the hermeneutical task of interpreting 
and responding obediently to revelation and its scriptural witness.
The second sentence in the thesis statement clarifies the character of Scripture’s 
functioning in Barth’s work by saying that it is ‘predominantly indirect.’ That is, most of the 
claims Barth makes in his doctrines of divine perfections are not supported directly or 
independently through exegesis of scriptural proof texts (as might be the case for ‘biblical 
theology’ as opposed to ‘dogmatics.’) The second sentence of the thesis statement also 
affirms, that although Scripture has priority both in functional authority and in its capacity to 
explain Barth’s method as a whole, tradition and reason retain a ubiquitous and significant 
presence alongside Scripture within Barth’s unified theological practice. The indirect 
relationship between Scripture and a given doctrinal proposal is mediated in various ways by 
tradition and reason. Tradition does so either positively as a guide for the proper 
interpretation and use of Scripture, or negatively as a foil which displays Scripture’s capacity 
to critique tradition. Reason mediates Scripture and theological conclusions by enabling the 
theologian to form concepts, judgements and inferences that express obedience to the truths of 
revelation. Thus, the ‘three-fold cord’ of Scripture, tradition and reason enables Barth to ‘re­
describe’ God on the basis of a redescription of the biblical testimony to his self-revelation.
2. Concluding Observations
2.L The Unify ing Centre o f Barth's method
The unity of Barth’s theology has been construed in different ways by different 
scholars. Barth’s own comments suggest that it is unwise to look for a stable unifying 
conceptual centre to his dogmatic theology. Such a centre would imply that Barth’s theology 
is in Church Dogmatics is a closed ‘system,’ something that Barth consistently strove to 
avoid.^ A more promising suggestion, and one that Barth himself offered, is that his
 ^ See our comments on Barth’s rejection of the model o f a ‘system’ for dogmatics in chapter 2, subsection 1.2. 
See also the critical comments of Steven Sykes suggesting that Barth actually falls into a kind of Christological 
system in which incarnational doctrine prematurely predetermines Barth’s interpretation of Scripture (1979: 
41f, 47ff; cf. Pugh 1990: 139ff, 15If, 160f).
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dogmatics is ‘Christocentric’ in concentration and determination/ As such, his dogmatics is 
united around the person of Christ as the living Lord. This Christocentrism has been 
emphasised and is generally accepted in Barth scholarship.®
But Christocentrism is only one way of understanding the character and unity of 
Barth’s theology, and it bears consideration of whether other ways might complement the 
picture that it provides. In this thesis we have argued that Barth’s interpretation and use of 
Scripture provides just such an illuminating way of explaining the character and unity of 
Barth’s theology, especially in relation to the method Barth actually employs to reach his 
dogmatic conclusions. In the words of Francis Watson, ‘Barth’s biblical interpretation i s . . .  
the foundation and principle of coherence of his entire project’ in Church Dogmatics.^ It 
would not be appropriate to regard biblical interpretation or usage as the only foundation or 
principle of coherence of Barth’s CD, as Watson’s comment might suggest. However, it is 
both appropriate and necessary to complement reference to Barth’s ‘Christocentric 
concentration’ with significant attention to the ‘scriptural concentration’ of Barth’s theological 
method. This point is not only supported by a number of Barth’s theoretical comments, but is 
more importantly supported by close attention to how Scripture functions in Barth’s actual 
dogmatic practice. When we were faced with the task of explaining what method actually lead 
Barth to reach the conclusions he did about the doctrine of God, we found repeatedly that that 
Barth reached those conclusions by reflecting on Scripture and using it in a wide variety of 
direct and indirect ways.
Although our findings in this thesis have found little emphasis in previous Barth 
scholarship, these findings are not particularly surprising. All Barth scholars agree that Barth 
is consistently preoccupied with revelation in his theology. Christocentrism is one expression 
of this point. But since Scripture is the primary and only direct witness of God’s 
Christological self-revelation, it is only natural that Barth’s theology wUl also be consistently 
preoccupied with the interpretation and use of Scripture. Revelation is mediated. It is 
mediated to humanity primary through the testimony of Scripture and secondarily through
See II/l, 320 and Barth 1969: 43.
 ^E.g. Hunsinger 1991: 225-233 and McCormack 1995: 453ff. 
Watson 2000: 57 (see chapter 1, subsection 2.1).
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tradition and reason that help to explicate that scriptural witness. It is strange, then, that while 
interpreters of Barth universally recognise the importance of revelation for Barth, few have 
emphasised adequately how this concern for revelation is concretely manifested in a 
thoroughgoing and unrelenting engagement with Scripture.
But we have also seen that Barth’s concrete methodological practice is concerned with 
more than engagement with Scripture, at least if this engagement is understood narrowly as 
exegesis of specific bibhcal passages. Hence, we have spoken of the roles of tradition and 
reason in his method in ‘mediating’ Scripture and doctrine, such that doctrine is indirectly 
authorised by Scripture. But even here, we found that tradition and reason typically 
functioned in ways that either aided or were accountable to the interpretation and use of 
Scripture. Therefore, the fimctions of tradition and reason in Barth’s work, as important as 
they are, are best and most accurately understood when we examine them m the context of the 
more basic function of Scripture in his work.
Indeed, every significant feature of Barth’s theological method (e.g. its a posteriori 
character, its particularism, its opposition to natural theology, etc.) can be illuminated by 
understanding it as an aspect of Barth’s interpretation and use of Scripture, including his 
Christocentrism. ^  Moreover, these diverse methodological features are linked together as 
necessary aspects of the practice of (Christocentric) theological biblical interpretation. The 
concrete features of Barth’s way of doing theology can be firuitfuhy illuminated by putting 
them into the fi’amework of the reverent use of Scripture, which includes roles for tradition 
and reason within it.
2.2. Theological Method and Divine Action
To make such a strong claim for the significance of Barth’s engagement with Scripture 
in his theology can only make sense when one speaks of the fi*ee and gracious power of the 
Word of God and the Holy Spirit as they are active in Scripture and in the theologian. Barth 
consistently stressed that scriptural interpretation and use cannot be seen as a purely immanent
 ^ Strictly speaking, this observation is limited to the scope of our examination, namely Barth’s doctrine of God 
in II/l, and especially his doctrines of unity, constancy and eternity—although it may vyell apply more 
generally,
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human endeavour.® In this respect, a faithful interpretation of Barth must regard basic 
Christian doctrines about God and his relationship to sinful humanity as prior to claims about 
‘theological method.’^  This is one important contribution of the dominant scholarly emphasis 
on Barth’s substantive, soteriological Christocentrism. But again, we wish to provide a 
corresponding and complementary concentration on the concrete scholarly and spiritual 
practices and disciplines involved in Barth’s scriptuially-fbcused method. As such, we 
concentrate on an aspect of the ‘human side’ of the divine-human relationship, namely the 
faithful human response to God’s gracious initiative that is, or at least should be, expressed in 
dogmatic theology. But the ‘divine side’ should not be forgotten. Barth regarded God’s 
decisive and ongoing self-revelatory action as the primary presupposition and basis of all 
legitimate human theologising and all human hermeneutical activity in relation to Scripture.’® 
God’s reconciliation and revelation is what makes possible a theology that is anything more 
than sinful human self-projection—the religious self-projection that Barth thought Ludwig 
Feuerbach so accurately depicted. Barth believed that unaided human reasoning was unable to 
speak of God aright, but, because of revelation, theology can speak of God and can do so 
without speculation.” Thus, the theologian tries to redescribe or reinterpret what God says 
and reveals about himself, rather than constructing a portrait of God out of his own mind or 
even out of the mind of the church—both of which Barth regarded as plainly fallible. In all the 
human activities of the ‘hermeneutic of obedience,’ the theologian must constantly hope and 
pray for the ongoing self-revelatory action of God without which these activities are empty 
and unable to make real reference to the mysterious reality of God.’^  Barth aims, together 
with his church community, to be guided, confronted and animated by the presence and 
ongoing word and work of the true and living God. In this ‘hermeneutical situation,’ Barth’s
 ^ In this respect, the use of Scripture itself finds its ‘divine’ centre and foundation not in itself, but in an |
‘extrinsic’ or ‘referential’ foundation and centre; the God revealed over and over in the revelatoiy action of j
Jesus Christ (see Watson 2000: 57f). |
 ^McCormack frequently speaks of the priority of material decisions over shifts in method in Barth’s method 1
(1995: 19f 438, etc.). i
See Webster 1996: 3 If. |
’ * In developing the idea of theology that assiduously avoids ‘speculation,’ Barth joins the ranks of both Calvin I
and Schleiermacher in different respects. |
See Sykes 1979: 45; Barth makes some helpful comments along these lines in conversation with John j
Godsey. Reflecting on his view that no human activity (even theology) can ‘make room for revelation,’ Barth i
nonetheless says that we can and must pray for God’s revelatory activity (Godsey 1963: 95). j
I
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hermeneutical theology weaves together the strands of the ‘tliree-fold cord’ in an effort to 
respond in faith and obedience to the Triune God of grace.
2.5. The Significance o f this Study and Some Unanswered Questions
This study is significant for a number of reasons, many of which we have already 
indicated.’'^  Here we need only to recall some of the most important reasons, which relate to 
Barth’s use of Scripture. Barth scholars have recently noticed the importance of several of 
Barth’s overlooked exegetical writings, especially several of commentaries.’^  A number of 
worthy scholars have already examined Barth’s exegesis in his CD, concentrating on his 
exegetical excurses .Yet  no scholar has examined comprehensively the role of Scripture 
within Barth’s CD, or even in a section of the CD. In particular, scholars have neglected the 
indirect role that Scripture has in supporting and authorising many of the main claims that 
Barth makes in the main dogmatic claims of his work—often without explicit citations of 
specific texts. In respect to one section of the CD, Barth’s doctrine of God in II/l, this study 
bridges the gap between the concern for Barth’s interpretation of Scripture and concern for 
the main contours of his dogmatic claims.
There are a number of unanswered questions that future research on Barth could 
pursue. First, there is the question of consistency, of whether what we have found about 
Barth’s method in selected portions of II/l would hold true in respect to other parts of CD. 
We have indicated some reasons why it would be likely for the scriptural priority evident in 
Barth’s method II/l to be all the more evident in other parts of CD,”  but such a claim would 
need to be tested. Future studies could also consider the degree to which Barth’s theological 
method remained consistent, not only in the various volumes of CD, but in all of his writings 
throughout the various stages of his intellectual development. Comparisons of his method of
For further comments on the ‘hermeneutical situation’ as it is framed by distinctively Christian doctrine, see 
Webster 1998.
See especially chapter 1, section 1.
See the comments of John Webster (2000: 13f) and the introductions in the new English edition of Barth’s 
commentary on Philippians (Barth 2002).
See the works surveyed in chapter 1, section 2.
The nature of Barth’s doctrine of God in II/l, involves less exegesis and requires a greater emphasis on 
indirect scriptural authorisation (and thus greater stress on the mediating roles of tradition and reason) than 
most other doctrines in his CD (see our comments in chapter 1, subsection 1.3).
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scripture usage between his early exegetical works (i.e. commentaries) and his later dogmatic 
works would be particularly illuminating.
Second, there is the question of evaluation, of whether the various aspects of Barth’s 
method are right or wrong, helpful or unhelpful. We have raised such critical questions 
occasionally throughout the thesis, and have made observations relevant to them. But it has 
been outside our purview to develop definitive or thorough answers to such evaluative 
questions. For example, we have been somewhat ambiguous about the extent to which 
Barth’s use of Scripture sometimes involves improper ‘eisegesis.’ Future studies could also 
consider whether Bailh’s emphasis on Scripture causes him to underestimate the 
methodological contributions of tradition, reason, or other factors such as ‘experience’ or 
‘culture.’
Third, there is the question of constructive appropriation. We have not considered 
how Barth’s method could be appropriated in a critical and constructive way within 
contemporary theology. Future studies could take up the question of what contemporary 
theology can learn fi*om Barth in the areas of his doctrine of God or his theological method.
Our hope is that this study has laid a stable foundation for potential future studies by 
providing a sound and illuminating interpretation of Barth’s biblically-focused theological 
method in a select portion of his work.
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Appendix: 
The Shared Formal Structure of Barth’s 
Doctrines of Divine Unity, Constancy and Eternity
In this appendix, we wish to draw out certain shared aspects of the formal structure of 
Barth’s accounts of unity, constancy and eternity, the ‘leading’ perfections of divine freedom, 
as these were imderstood in chapters 4-6.
Barth’s accounts of divine unity, constancy and eternity share a common formal 
structure. Although Barth does not make this structure explicit, the following pattern seems 
implicit in his account. Each of these three perfections stand in a particular dialectical 
relationship with what we might call its ‘correlate’ or ‘opposite.’* Thus, Barth understands 
God’s unity (simplicity) to be in a dialectical relationship with multiplicity, constancy with 
movement or change, and eternity with time. In each case, the relationship is ‘dialectical’ in a 
specific sense: it involves both an element of identity (or inclusion or unity) between the 
perfection and its correlate and an element a distinction (or exclusion, contrast or opposition) 
between the perfection and its correlate.^ Also, imphcit in these three pairs of dialectical 
relationships is an element of asymmetry, in which the divine perfection proper (unity, 
constancy or eternity) has a kind of ontological priority over its correlate (multiplicity, 
movement/change or time/temporahty).
This dialectical structure of identity-distinction-asymmetry in Barth’s doctrine of God 
is an example of what George Hunsinger calls the ‘Chalcedonian’ formal pattern in Barth’s CD 
(see chapter 6, subsection 2.4).^ While the dialectical relationships involved are too complex 
and ambiguous to be pure examples of this pattern, the basic elements of the pattern are clear. 
In correspondence to the pattern we described above, the Chalcedonian formulation teaches 
that the divine and human natures of Christ are united (‘without separation or division’).
' Although we did not have occasion to stress it in this thesis, a similar point could be made o f some other 
divine perfections. For example, we could suggest that Barth’s conception of omnipresence exists in a dialectic 
with (determinate) space.
 ^In this respect, Barth’s work manifests something like the Hegelian principle of the identity o f opposites, 
particularly in the relationship between the thesis and the antithesis in his dialectic (see Stace 1955: 96f; cf. 
1061).
 ^Hunsinger 1991: 85.
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distinct (‘without confusion or change’) and asymmetrical (the implicit ‘precedence of the
divine over the human nature of Jesus Christ’) /  For example, divine constancy and divine
change (what Barth called ‘holy mutabilty’) are united with each other, yet are distinct realities
in which constancy takes a certain precedence over change. In more dynamic terms, just as
God, in and through the person of Christ, includes humanity within the divine identity, without
denying that humanity, so also God in his constancy includes change within liis constant
identity, rather than strictly excluding or opposing it.^  A similar point could be made in
respect to unity and eternity and their respective ‘opposites.’^
The following passage from Barth’s account of eternity brings out this formal
dialectical, Chalcedonian pattern that runs through Barth’s doctrine of God.
We have seen again and again that God is alive. His unity does not exclude but 
includes multiplicity and His constancy movement. And God does not first create 
multiplicity and movement, but He is one and simple. He is constant, in such a way that 
all multiplicity and movement have their prototype and pre-existence in Himself. Time, 
too, pre-exists in this way in Him, in His eternity. . .  The form of creation’ is the being 
of God for a reality distinct fiom Himself (612; 690).
Since the tension in the relationship between the divine perfections and their correlates are not
resolved in a higher synthesis,® there is an element of ambiguity in this relationship.
Hunsinger 1991; 85. Here, Hunsinger describes the asymmetry as ‘unqualified conceptual precedence’ of the 
divine over the human nature of Christ. This conceptual precedence seems rooted in a more basic ontological 
precedence. Perhaps Hunsinger would agree.
 ^The language and conceptuality of Christological inclusion is evident at many places in Barth’s work (see 
Dalferth 1989).
 ^The points made in this paragraph about the Chalcedonian pattern are clarified by Hans Frei’s comments on 
the logic of the Chalcedonian affirmation within Christian self description. Within the Chalcedonian 
‘conceptual redescription’ of features of the gospel stories, the categories of person and nature ‘both function 
logically as descriptions of the unitary subject to whom they are ascribed’ (1992: 125). He continues, ‘The 
logic, I suggest, of the formula is that of a subject-predicate description, rather than that of a substance- 
accident description.’ He notes that this does not imply a subject-predicate ontology, which did not appear in 
earnest until Hegel. We would suggest that, in Barth, both the subject-predicate logic and a parallel (quasi- 
Hegelian) ontology are at work. This is in keeping with Barth’s ‘realism’ (in a sense stronger than Frei’s) in 
which the biblical witness and its logic genuinely refers to external reality, which in this case is the reality of 
God and Christ. The subject-predicate ascriptive logic thus points to the God who can be described in a 
rudimentary personalist-actualist theological ontology. Strictly speaking, then, Barth does not uphold the 
classical Chalcedonian two natures doctrine, in the sense o f a substantialist ontology (see Farrow 2000 and 
MacCormack 2000: 108f and 2002: passim).
’ By ‘the form of creation’ Barth here refers to time. In the same context, Barth also refers to space as another 
aspect of the form of creation. Space finds its prototype in God’s omnipresence (II/l, 464f), even as time finds 
its prototype in eternity.
* In this respect Barth’s dialectic here is different from Hegel’s. There is no ‘third term,’ no synthesis o f the 
thesis and antithesis. As such, the opposites that form the two sides of his dialectic remain in an unresolved 
tension with each other. This is typical of Barth’s use of dialectic (as in the dialectic between love and 
freedom) and is indicative of his Trinitarian and Chalcedonian thought-patterns.
272
Multiplicity, movement and time are ambiguously properties both of God (and so are unified 
with the perfections of unity, constancy and eternity) and of the created order (and so are 
distinguished fi*om the three perfections). Put differently, multiplicity, movement and time are 
both (1) realities that are included in prototypical form within God’s unity, constancy and 
eternity, and (2) realities that are part of creation or forms of creation. Ambiguity arises in 
Barth’s account of divine perfections in part because Barth believes that a reverent response to 
the biblical testimony to God’s revelation requires a dialectical combination of both of these 
emphases. That is, Barth resists a priori tendencies to define God either in basic continuity 
with the created order or in total contrast to it.
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